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SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE
Picture Macbeth alone on stage, staring intently into empty space. 
‘Is this a dagger which I see before me?’ he asks, grasping deci-
sively at the air. On one hand, this is a quintessentially theatrical 
question. At once an object and a vector, the dagger describes the 
possibility of knowledge (‘Is this a dagger’) in specifi cally visual 
and spatial terms (‘which I see before me’). At the same time, 
Macbeth is posing a quintessentially philosophical question, one 
that assumes knowledge to be both conditional and experiential, 
and that probes the relationship between certainty and perception 
as well as intention and action. It is from this shared ground of 
art and inquiry, of theater and theory, that this series advances its 
basic premise: Shakespeare is philosophical. 
It seems like a simple enough claim. But what does it mean 
exactly, beyond the parameters of this specifi c moment in Macbeth? 
Does it mean that Shakespeare had something we could think of 
as his own philosophy? Does it mean that he was infl uenced by 
particular philosophical schools, texts and thinkers? Does it mean, 
conversely, that modern philosophers have been infl uenced by him, 
that Shakespeare’s plays and poems have been, and continue to be, 
resources for philosophical thought and speculation? 
The answer is yes all around. These are all useful ways of 
conceiving a philosophical Shakespeare and all point to lines 
of inquiry that this series welcomes. But Shakespeare is philo-
sophical in a much more fundamental way as well. Shakespeare 
is philosophical because the plays and poems actively create new 
worlds of knowledge and new scenes of ethical encounter. They 
ask big questions, make bold arguments and develop new vocab-
ularies in order to think what might otherwise be unthinkable. 
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Through both their scenarios and their imagery, the plays and 
poems engage the qualities of consciousness, the consequences of 
human action, the phenomenology of motive and attention, the 
conditions of personhood and the relationship among different 
orders of reality and experience. This is writing and dramaturgy, 
moreover, that consistently experiments with a broad range of 
conceptual crossings, between love and subjectivity, nature and 
politics, and temporality and form. 
Edinburgh Critical Studies in Shakespeare and Philosophy 
takes seriously these speculative and world-making dimensions 
of Shakespeare’s work. The series proceeds from a core convic-
tion that art’s capacity to think – to formulate, not just refl ect, 
ideas – is what makes it urgent and valuable. Art matters because 
unlike other human activities it establishes its own frame of refer-
ence, reminding us that all acts of creation – biological, political, 
intellectual and amorous – are grounded in imagination. This is 
a far cry from business-as-usual in Shakespeare studies. Because 
historicism remains the methodological gold standard of the fi eld, 
far more energy has been invested in exploring what Shakespeare 
once meant than in thinking rigorously about what Shakespeare 
continues to make possible. In response, Edinburgh Critical Stud-
ies in Shakespeare and Philosophy pushes back against the critical 
orthodoxies of historicism and cultural studies to clear a space for 
scholarship that confronts aspects of literature that can neither 
be reduced to nor adequately explained by particular historical 
contexts. 
Shakespeare’s creations are not just inheritances of a past cul-
ture, frozen artifacts whose original settings must be expertly 
reconstructed in order to be understood. The plays and poems are 
also living art, vital thought-worlds that struggle, across time, with 
foundational questions of metaphysics, ethics, politics and aesthet-
ics. With this orientation in mind, Edinburgh Critical Studies in 
Shakespeare and Philosophy offers a series of scholarly monographs 
that will reinvigorate Shakespeare studies by opening new interdis-
ciplinary conversations among scholars, artists and students.
Kevin Curran
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INTRODUCTION: SHAKESPEARE AND THE 
VULNERABLE SELF
It would generally be a decisive refutation of a moral philosophy 
to show that moral agency on its own account of the matter could 
never be socially embodied; and it also follows that we have not 
yet fully understood the claims of any moral philosophy until we 
have spelled out what its social embodiment would be.
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue1
The central claim of this study is that Shakespeare is deeply scepti-
cal of neoclassical as well as classical glorifi cation of the kind of 
personal autonomy Seneca describes as ‘constancy’. Shakespeare 
sees this pursuit of individual invulnerability, not only as a defi n-
ing feature of Roman culture, but also as the most fundamental 
cause of the fall of the Roman Republic. The tragic protagonists of 
his Roman plays strive to transcend the limits of their own physi-
cal bodies, as well as their susceptibility to passions such as pity, 
grief and fear, and instead come crashing back down to earth. The 
‘frailty’ that they hope to escape proves instead an intransigent 
given of the human condition. Unsuccessful efforts to achieve what 
Hannah Arendt calls ‘sovereignty’ backfi re politically, as well.2 
The untrammelled freedom from dependence on all others that 
Shakespeare’s Romans idealise leaves no room for power-sharing 
between political rivals or for compromise across social classes, 
but instead leads them inexorably towards violence and, fi nally, 
civil war. As a thought-experiment, Shakespeare’s Roman plays 
provide a prescient critique of the vision of the good that animates 
present-day political liberalism, the ethical ideal Quentin Skinner 
calls ‘neo-Roman liberty’.3 
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For Peter Holbrook, ‘Shakespeare’s poetic personality is deeply 
wedded to one particular value: individual freedom.’ ‘More than 
any other pre-Romantic writer,’ Holbrook argues, ‘Shakespeare is 
committed to fundamentally modern values: freedom, individuality, 
self-realization, authenticity.’4 For Ewan Fernie, as well, ‘freedom’ 
is ‘a supreme Shakespearean value’. ‘But what is freedom,’ he asks, 
‘and what does it mean to invoke it as a surpassing value in Shake-
speare?’ ‘Shakespearean drama doesn’t give us a smug and senti-
mental liberalism.’ Fernie sees an analogy between ‘the politics of 
Shakespearean form’ and ‘the classic statement of liberalism’, John 
Stuart Mill’s treatise On Liberty, in which Mill speaks of ‘a nec-
essary tension between individual freedom and social fl ourishing’. 
‘The Shakespearean struggle for freedom foretells the great political 
passion of modernity, amounting to a serial and probing experiment 
in liberal democracy avant la lettre.’5 
In his ‘Idea for a Universal History’, Kant introduces the coun-
terintuitive claim that ‘the cause of lawful order among men’ is not 
any kind of fellow-feeling, but instead our ‘antagonism’, arising 
out of what he calls our ‘unsocial sociability’. ‘Man has an incli-
nation to associate with others,’ Kant observes. ‘But he also has a 
strong propensity to isolate himself from others, because he fi nds 
in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to 
have everything go according to his own wish.’ Each of us is ‘pro-
pelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice’ to achieve ‘a rank 
among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he 
cannot withdraw’. Such dissatisfaction might seem like a species of 
damnation. Yet, as Kant sees it, this incessant ‘opposition’ is salu-
tary. ‘Thanks be to Nature’, he proclaims, ‘for heartless competi-
tive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess and to rule!’ ‘Thus 
are taken the fi rst true steps from barbarism to culture.’ If human 
beings were not so competitive, Kant maintains, ‘all talents would 
remain hidden, unborn in an Arcadian shepherd’s life, with all its 
concord, contentment, and mutual affection’.6 
Shakespeare’s Roman plays very precisely contradict Kant’s just-
so story here of the development of civilization. As Fernie observes, 
‘Shakespeare is aware of how readily freedom degenerates into a 
violent free-for-all: a “universal wolf” that will devour everything, 
including itself.’7 In his Roman plays, Shakespeare asks what kind 
of moral character is necessary in order for a republic or, as Fernie 
says, ‘liberal democracy’ to function. And Shakespeare’s answer 
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is that the Christian virtue of what he calls ‘pity’ is what binds 
civil society together, rather than the pagan virtue of what he calls 
‘ambition’. To explain Shakespeare’s sense of what goes wrong in 
Rome, I draw here on St Augustine’s concept of libido dominandi, 
a precursor of the ‘insatiable desire to possess and to rule’ that Kant 
defends as ‘unsocial sociability’ and that Nietzsche later heralds as 
‘the will to power’. In Shakespeare’s Roman plays, as in St Augus-
tine’s City of God, this ‘drive for dominance’ proves what A. C. 
Bradley might identify as the ‘tragic trait’ of pagan Rome. Figures 
such as Caesar and Octavian refuse to rest content with anything 
less than total dominion, even at the cost of provoking civil war.
Fernie sees Shakespeare’s plays as staging a struggle to align 
‘personal freedom’ with ‘social fl ourishing’. ‘No-one is simply 
free, no-one simply his or her own.’ Instead, ‘there are tensions 
between subjective, familial, national, and larger political identi-
fi cations as alternative spheres of freedom, and these are tensions 
which sometimes tear apart the lives of individuals, families, and 
nations.’ How can such disparate interests be reconciled? For a 
philosophical analogue of this arbitration, Fernie turns to Hegel. 
Like Shakespeare, Hegel’s ‘aim’, Fernie argues, is ‘to marry per-
sonal freedom at its most realized and powerful with a more com-
prehensive and shareable politics of freedom’. The competition for 
dominance that Kant sees as the engine of civilisation is for Hegel 
a form of false consciousness, the so-called ‘master–slave dialec-
tic’, leading to inequality through competitive coercion. ‘Hegel’s 
highest evocation of the life of freedom’ is instead, as Fernie says, 
‘mutual recognition’, enabling ‘reciprocal fl ourishing’.8 ‘It is only 
with the release and liberation of the slave’, Hegel writes, ‘that 
the master also becomes fully free.’ ‘In this condition of universal 
freedom, in being refl ected into myself, I am immediately refl ected 
in the other person, and conversely, in relating myself to the other 
I am immediately related to myself.’9
As Francis Fukuyama helped to clarify in his account of ‘the 
end of history’, in the wake of the revolutions of 1989, as well as 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, communism in effect passed 
away as what William James would call a ‘live option’.10 What 
we see now in its place, Patchen Markell suggests, is increasing 
interest among social and political theorists in Hegel’s concept of 
‘recognition’ (Anerkennung): ‘a general shift away from a “politics 
of redistribution,” focused on the satisfaction of interests and the 
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distribution of material goods, and toward a “politics of recogni-
tion,” focused on securing equal respect and esteem for the diverse 
identities borne by members of pluralistic societies.’11 One of the 
fi rst to articulate this change in perspective was Charles Taylor. In 
an essay, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, which Markell singles out as 
‘catalytic’, Taylor describes reciprocal recognition as a ‘vital human 
need’. ‘A person or group of people can suffer real damage, real dis-
tortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them 
a confi ning or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.’12 
As Fukuyama observes, ‘modern identity politics’ now ‘revolves 
around demands for recognition of group identities’.13 
Is this change necessarily for the better? Peter Holbrook fi nds 
it unsettling to see ‘group rights trumping the individual ones clas-
sical liberals defended’. ‘We are enjoined to become ever more 
guarded and careful about language, images, practices that might 
offend groups, a recent landmark example being the controversy 
over the Danish Mohammed cartoons, in which the reluctance of 
many to defend free speech showed how far the West had retreated 
from liberal values.’14 In his critique of ‘the politics of recognition’, 
Markell argues that the ‘pursuit of recognition’ characteristic of 
identity politics ‘comes to be bound up with a certain sort of mis-
recognition’, ‘not the misrecognition of identity’, but ‘an even more 
fundamental ontological misrecognition, a failure to acknowledge 
the nature and circumstances of our own activity’. As an illustra-
tion of this problem, Markell turns to Sophocles’ Antigone, and 
what he describes as ‘tragedy’s critique of the pursuit of sover-
eignty through recognition’. For Markell, Greek tragedy does not 
represent ‘the tension between oneself as an individual and oneself 
as belonging to a larger community’, but instead a more complex, 
‘cross-cutting’ tension between ‘the acknowledgment of the open-
ness and contingency of human interaction on the one hand, and 
the denial of that openness and contingency on the other hand 
through the pursuit of recognition – either of oneself qua indi-
vidual or of oneself qua community member, or both’.15
To help explain the danger he sees latent in ‘the pursuit of recog-
nition’, Markell distinguishes between ‘recognition’, as Taylor and 
others use the term, and what Stanley Cavell describes in contrast as 
‘acknowledgment’. ‘The source of relations of subordination lies not 
in the failure to recognize the identity of the other, but in the failure 
to acknowledge one’s own basic situation and circumstances.’ That 
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is to say, the primary problem with identity politics as it is usually 
pursued is not so much political resistance as it is the kind of iden-
tity that it presumes to exist and that it asks its adherents to demand 
each other recognise. It continues to invoke the ‘sovereign self’ that 
it ostensibly aims to displace. ‘What’s acknowledged in an act of 
acknowledgment is not one’s own identity – at least, not as the poli-
tics of recognition conceives of identity: a coherent self-description 
that can serve as the ground of agency, guiding or determining what 
we are to do.’ Instead, ‘acknowledgment is directed at the basic con-
ditions of one’s own existence and activity, including, crucially, the 
limits of “identity” as a ground of action, limits which arise out 
of our constitutive vulnerability to the unpredictable reactions and 
responses of others.’ Acknowledgment is, in brief, ‘an avowal of 
one’s own fi nitude’.16 
For Markell, ‘the fact of human freedom, which is the condition 
of possibility of effective agency, also limits our practical capabili-
ties because it is not exclusively ours but is mirrored in others’.17 
Shakespeare’s Romans are unwilling to acknowledge their partici-
pation in what Hannah Arendt calls ‘plurality’, however, because 
they are too desperate to be recognised as conforming to an ideal 
of absolute, unattainable individual ‘freedom’: what Arendt calls 
‘sovereignty’. As Arendt observes, ‘sovereignty, the ideal of uncom-
promising self-suffi ciency and mastership, is contradictory to the 
very condition of plurality. No man can be sovereign because not 
one man, but men, inhabit the earth.’ ‘Untouchable integrity’ could 
only be achieved, if it were possible, through ‘arbitrary domination 
of all others’ or ‘as in Stoicism, the exchange of the real world for 
an imaginary one where these others would simply not exist’.18 
In Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare shows 
how Romans’ characteristic drive for dominance can turn inwards, 
especially in defeat. Examples include Brutus’ retreat into philoso-
phy, modelled on contemporary Neostoicism, as well as Antony’s 
escape to the more sensuous pleasures of Egypt. Antony’s with-
drawal into a world of wine, women and ‘fancy’ evokes a fading, 
medieval ethos of aristocratic licence, as well as the contemporary 
world of the theatre. The most iconic instance of such involution, 
however, is the practice Cleopatra calls ‘the high Roman fashion’: 
suicide. Shakespeare’s Romans’ futile efforts to be recognised as 
absolute masters of themselves prove equally self-destructive 
throughout, whether in the public or in the private sphere. In their 
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unwillingness to acknowledge the profound vulnerability of the 
human condition, including especially what Arendt terms ‘plural-
ity’, Shakespeare’s Romans prefi gure what Hegel calls the ‘Unhappy 
Consciousness’ of the modern individual, and which he associates 
with ‘the Roman Empire, the seat of Stoic strength of mind’, in 
which ‘a man lives unto himself alone’.19 The would-be solipsist is 
‘unhappy’, Hegel explains, because he fi nds himself torn between 
a ‘Stoic’ sense of himself and himself alone as the source of mean-
ing and experience and a refractory ‘Sceptical’ countercurrent of 
awareness that he remains subject, somehow, nonetheless, to forces 
and powers beyond his control.
The new individualism that emerged over the course of the 
Reformation, as well as the Renaissance, as Jacob Burckhardt sug-
gests, and that came to the fore in the Enlightenment, epitomised by 
Kant, is deeply indebted to early modern Neostoicism such as that 
of Justus Lipsius, which itself is modelled on the thought of Seneca.20 
What Lipsius calls ‘constancy’, echoing Seneca, Kant appropriates, 
refi nes and exalts as ‘autonomy’. Selfhood is identifi ed with an 
immaterial faculty of the mind, independent of the body, the emo-
tions or society at large. Its glory is precisely its ‘freedom’, under-
stood as what Fernie calls ‘self-sovereignty, self-possession’.21 With 
Romanticism, this dissociation of the self from the world became 
even more pronounced. As Holbrook notes, ‘The drive toward 
authenticity is not only a nineteenth-century or post-Romantic phe-
nomenon. It has a classical and Renaissance dimension.’22 Senecan 
Stoicism in particular, as Geoffrey Miles explains, carries with it an 
‘ ‘‘antinomian” implication that self-consistency is all that matters, 
and that each individual can defi ne virtue itself’.23 What was once 
understood as an objective moral order began to be seen instead as 
a subjective work of art, an opportunity for the expression of each 
individual will. 
Classicist Christopher Gill describes the difference between 
classical and modern subjectivity in terms of a contrast between 
‘objective-participant’ and ‘subjective-individualist’ concepts of 
personhood.24 Charles Taylor calls the transition from one to the 
other the ‘expressivist turn’ and traces it back to the infl uence of 
Romanticism, a paradigm shift in the history of ethics which he 
sees as ‘tremendously infl uential’. Shakespeare foreshadows this 
pervasive change in his Roman plays and calls it into question, 
anticipating later criticism of political liberalism. Shakespeare 
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enjoys a critical distance from this now-typical perspective which 
we today can fi nd it diffi cult to recapture. ‘Expressive individu-
ation has become one of the cornerstones of modern culture,’ 
Taylor notes, ‘so much so that we barely notice it, and we fi nd 
it hard to accept that it is such a recent idea in human history 
and would have been incomprehensible in earlier times.’25 As 
David Bentley Hart observes, ‘We live in an age whose chief 
moral value has been determined, by overwhelming consensus, 
to be the absolute liberty of personal volition, the power of each 
of us to choose what he or she believes, wants, needs, or must 
possess.’ The result is an unparalleled sense of licence, at once 
enticing and vertiginous. ‘Each of us who is true to the times 
stands facing not God, or the gods, or the Good beyond beings, 
but an abyss, over which presides the empty, inviolable author-
ity of the individual will, whose impulses and decisions are their 
own moral index.’26
In his Roman plays, Shakespeare represents this deracinated 
concept of selfhood as a dangerous mistake. As Stephen Greenblatt 
suggests, Shakespeare was ‘fascinated by the idea of autonomy’. 
Nonetheless, he concludes, ‘Shakespeare doubted that it was pos-
sible for even the most fi ercely determined human being to live as 
if he were the author of himself.’ ‘Autonomy in the strict sense 
is not a state available for any sentient creature.’ Even the sup-
posed ‘aesthetic autonomy’ of a work of art, such as Cleopatra 
aims for in her suicide, turns out to be compromised.27 In this 
sense, Shakespeare more closely resembles critics of Romanti-
cism and modernity such as T. S. Eliot, Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Charles Taylor than he does the German and British Romantics 
who cemented his fame and who strive to claim him as one of 
their own.28 Shakespeare does indeed capture the beginning of 
the cultural turn Isaiah Berlin describes as ‘the apotheosis of the 
Romantic will’.29 But he portrays this embrace of solipsism as 
tragically misguided, rather than as moral progress.30 The self-
absorbed, quintessentially modern form of self-consciousness 
Charles Taylor calls ‘radical refl exivity’ and that Eric Langley 
fi nds adumbrated in Shakespeare’s representation of narcissism 
and suicide may be dazzling on stage, in the person of characters 
such as Richard II and Falstaff, as well as Cleopatra, but it is not 
in the end, all things considered, a perspective on life Shakespeare 
himself idealises or sees as advisable.31 
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Drawing on Shakespeare’s Coriolanus as a recurring point 
of comparison, I argue that Shakespeare presents the fall of the 
Roman Republic, not as a by-product of economic, social or polit-
ical dysfunction, but instead as a consequence fi rst and foremost 
of patrician misconceptions about human nature. Violent oscilla-
tion between autocracy and civil war is not the disease itself but a 
symptom, as Shakespeare sees it, of a deeper malady, an a priori 
misunderstanding of human selfhood. Since Roman noblemen see 
absolute, unquestioned command as the summum bonum, they 
approach politics as a zero-sum game. Any concession is a loss; 
any form of dependency is a dangerous, intolerable weakness. In 
this Hobbesian war of all against all, they see only two ways to 
attain the imperium they seek: either objective rule over others or 
a retreat from public affairs altogether, in order to focus instead 
on subjective self-control over their own experience. Shakespeare 
sees both of these expressions of libido dominandi as doomed to 
tragic failure. Neither the Stoic sapiens nor the emperor can escape 
the essential vulnerability of the human condition. Instead, human 
beings should be understood as intrinsically interdependent and 
intersubjective. 
In his sense of the constraints on selfhood, Shakespeare does 
not go as far as twentieth-century antihumanists such as Foucault, 
Althusser and Lacan. Instead, his emphasis on human interaction 
more closely resembles the via media of authors such as MacIntyre, 
Taylor and Habermas. The individual is neither a disembodied, 
disinterested wisp of pure agency, nor altogether fl attened out and 
overwhelmed by impersonal forces such as ‘discourse’, ‘ideology’ 
or ‘language’. Instead, each person should be understood as both 
grounded in a community and at the same time capable of trans-
formative action within that network. Bakhtin’s literary criticism 
of Dostoyevsky and Rabelais provides a point of comparison. The 
individual is neither entirely determined, like a cog in a machine, 
nor wholly autonomous, like a god, but instead both passive and 
active, like a partner in a conversation. 
In order to explain Shakespeare’s theory of selfhood, as well as 
how it differs from that of his Roman characters, I introduce the 
theological concept of ‘passibility’, meaning, susceptibility to being 
acted-upon, as the defi ning difference between the human and the 
divine. For Shakespeare, the Roman ideal of impassibility is unat-
tainable, the prerogative of God alone. His perspective in this sense 
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is closer to Christianity or to traditional Roman pietas than it is to 
contemporary Neostoicism. The individual is embedded from birth 
in a web of obligations and liabilities which can never be escaped 
altogether, even in death. Cicero’s treatise De offi ciis (‘On Duties’) 
is the most infl uential classical articulation of this perspective, 
emphasizing our individual responsibility for each other. ‘We are 
not born for ourselves alone,’ Cicero insists. ‘Our country claims 
for itself one part of our birth, and our friends another.’32
What exactly does our country claim from us, however, if any-
thing? Would Shakespeare agree with Cicero that representative 
democracy, in the absence of a monarch, is the best form of gov-
ernment? In his infl uential study Shakespeare and Republicanism, 
Andrew Hadfi eld concedes it is ‘unlikely’ that Shakespeare was a 
‘convinced republican’. Nevertheless, republicanism ‘set the politi-
cal agenda in Shakespeare’s England’; Shakespeare ‘dealt with 
complex and troubling political – specifi cally, republican – issues, 
from the start of his career’. As examples of ‘the sorts of issues 
which characterized political discussion in late sixteenth-century 
and early seventeen-century England’, Hadfi eld provides a useful 
list: ‘when one could resist a tyrant; whether hereditary monarchy 
was the best form of government; what were the effects of the 
rule of queens; who could and who should occupy political offi ces; 
how exactly the people at large should be represented by their rul-
ers; and so on.’33
In their collection of essays, Shakespeare and Early Modern 
Political Thought, editors David Armitage, Conal Condren and 
Andrew Fitzmaurice, as well as contributors David Colclough and 
Eric Nelson, argue in sharp contrast to Hadfi eld that Shakespeare 
was surprisingly indifferent to such questions.34 As the editors 
observe in their collective introduction, citing Hadfi eld, among 
others, ‘Much of what has been written on Shakespeare and polit-
ical thought has been devoted to the vexed issue of what kind 
of constitution he endorsed. While such questions are legitimate, 
there is an anachronistic element to the collective emphasis upon 
Shakespeare’s constitutional loyalty.’ Shakespeare, they argue, 
should be situated instead ‘amid the fundamental political con-
cerns of his contemporaries: that is, in the milieu of values rather 
than debates about constitutions’. ‘What mattered was not any 
particular constitution but the patterns of conduct and value that 
should prevail.’35
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As Eric Nelson explains, ‘political thought in Shakespeare’s 
Europe organized itself to a signifi cant degree around the question 
of what constituted, in Cicero’s words, “the best state of a com-
monwealth”.’ Nelson fi nds it understandable, therefore, that schol-
ars have expected to fi nd in Shakespeare’s Roman plays, moving 
as they do from one form of government to another, an ‘interven-
tion’ in this ‘canonical early modern debate’. ‘Surely Shakespeare 
must have had a view about the best constitution (either the best 
absolutely, or at least the best for Rome); surely his Roman works 
must show us a Rome that is virtuous when governed correctly, 
and corrupt when governed incorrectly? Yet the striking fact about 
the Roman plays is that this is not so.’ Shakespeare is neither ‘a 
nostalgic partisan of the Republic’ nor ‘a defender of the impe-
rial pax romana’. Instead, Shakespeare offers ‘a view of Roman 
history that dissolves the question of “the best state of a com-
monwealth”’, since, Nelson maintains, ‘he believes that the choice 
does not matter’.36 The editors, as well, argue in their introduc-
tion that Shakespeare was ‘cynical about politics’, to the point 
that he refused ‘to commit clearly to republican or monarchical 
government’. ‘Pessimistic to an almost Augustinian extent about 
humanity generally’, Shakespeare ‘saw no difference in choosing 
one constitution over another’.37
I would not go so far as Nelson et al. in this regard. As Mau-
rice Samely and I have argued elsewhere, Shakespeare, like most 
of his contemporaries, was in favour of a mixed government, 
one which included a monarch. His sense of an ideal govern-
ment is very close to the one Hegel describes in his Elements 
of the Philosophy of Right, in which popular participation in 
government is carefully limited. In fact, Samely and I go so far as 
to surmise that the parallel may not be coincidental; Hegel was 
an avid reader of Shakespeare’s plays. His theorising about poli-
tics seems to be informed by Shakespeare’s sense of a need for 
checks and balances on power, as well as Shakespeare’s distrust 
of what Annabel Patterson calls ‘the popular voice’.38 What-
ever Hegel’s debt to Shakespeare may or may not be, however, 
Shakespeare himself, we propose, does have a considered and 
consistent view on what Nelson calls ‘the best state of a com-
monwealth’, one that is in keeping with a relatively ‘pessimistic’ 
view of human nature. As might be expected of an Englishman 
of his time, Shakespeare takes a compromise position, limited 
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monarchy, in-between classical republicanism and the imperial 
rule of, as Cassius says, ‘one only man’ (1.2.156).
In this book, I turn to a different problem. Both Hadfi eld and 
Nelson, for all their differences, read Shakespeare’s Roman plays 
as if he were a political theorist. The question they ask is, in effect, 
whether Shakespeare sees the Roman Republic or the Roman 
Empire as having been a better form of government. I want to look 
at Shakespeare’s Roman plays, instead, as if Shakespeare were a 
historian. Why does Rome change from Republic to Empire? What 
in fact does Shakespeare think happened? How does he explain 
what I call here ‘the fall of the Roman Republic’? Hadfi eld brings 
up this question more than once, although he leaves it unresolved; 
a question Shakespeare shares with his classical sources. As Had-
fi eld points out, Polybius’ History, for example, ‘is really a lament 
for the loss of the Roman Republic’. ‘The question that Polybius 
fails to ask, however, is why the Roman Republic decayed if it 
was such an ideal constitution.’ Sallust, too, he notes, is ‘studi-
ously ambiguous’ and ‘deliberately avoids the question of causa-
tion so vital in charting the reasons for the decline of the republic’. 
‘He simply informs the reader that the overarching pride of the 
Romans and the war against Jugurtha happened at the same time 
as part of the same process, but does not say which came fi rst.’ 
Reading Titus Andronicus, Hadfi eld fi nds an analogous lack of 
resolution. Why does the ‘body politic’ become a ‘bloody mess’? 
‘Exactly how this structural failure occurs – whether the institu-
tions fail the people or the people the institutions – Shakespeare, 
like Sallust, does not say.’39
At the beginning of his account of the Catilinarian conspir-
acy, Sallust claims that ambition fi rst entered the world with the 
Persians, Athenians and Spartans. These empires, he says, were 
the fi rst ‘to subdue cities and nations, and to make the lust for 
dominion [libido dominandi] a pretext for war, [and] to consider 
the greatest empire the greatest glory’.40 Citing this passage, St 
Augustine in his City of God seizes on Sallust’s concept of libido 
dominandi and recasts it as the defi ning feature of the Roman 
character; the quintessence of Romanitas.41 This ‘earthly city’, 
he explains, ‘was itself ruled by its violent, immoderate desire 
to rule’ (ipsa ei dominandi libido dominatur).42 More broadly 
speaking, libido dominandi distinguishes what St Augustine 
calls ‘the City of Man’, meaning not just Rome, but all secular 
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civilisation, from what he calls ‘the City of God’, meaning the 
Christian community, which, although scattered now, in the end 
will be gathered together in the ‘New Jerusalem’ described in the 
Book of Revelation. 
Elaborating on Sallust’s history, St Augustine argues that Rome 
‘grew with amazing rapidity’ on account of its ‘desire for glory’ 
and love of ‘domination’. Eventually, this ‘vice’, however, led 
Rome into interminable civil wars.43 As the Romans fought and 
conquered other nations, competition within Rome itself was at 
fi rst kept in check by a desire to be praised for temperance, as well 
as service to the state, as in the case of Republican heroes such 
as Cincinnatus. Over time, however, the nobility began to turn 
on each other. As historian Ronald Syme points out, among the 
Roman aristocracy, even well before the fall of the Roman Republic, 
‘competition was fi erce and incessant’. ‘The political life of the 
Roman Republic was stamped and swayed, not by parties and 
programmes of a modern and parliamentary character, not by the 
ostensible opposition between Senate and People, Optimates and 
Populares, nobiles and novi homines, but by the strife for power, 
wealth, and glory. The contestants were the nobiles among them-
selves, as individuals or in groups, open in the elections and in the 
courts of law, or masked by secret intrigue.’44 Eventually, inevita-
bly, St Augustine explains, ‘desire for dominance’ was no longer 
kept in check by ‘desire to preserve a reputation’. Internal rivalry 
spilled over into open violence and shameless self-seeking, with 
little effort made even to appear as if concerned for the greater 
good of the commonwealth. This change culminated in the reign 
of the Emperor Nero, whom St Augustine describes as ‘the summit 
and, as it were, citadel of this vice’. But it began long before. ‘His-
tory shows that there were many such.’45
For Cicero, the epicentre of the fall of the Republic is Julius Cae-
sar, his contemporary. ‘If there is any area in which it is impossible 
for many to be outstanding,’ Cicero observes, ‘there will generally 
be such competition there that it is extremely diffi cult to maintain 
“sacred fellowship”. The rash behaviour of Gaius [Julius] Caesar 
has recently made that clear: he overturned all the laws of gods and 
men for the sake of the pre-eminence that he had imagined for him-
self in his mistaken fancy.’ ‘When you desire to surpass all others,’ 
Cicero concludes, ‘it is diffi cult to respect the fairness that is a spe-
cial mark of justice.’ ‘Here you have a man who longed to be king of 
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the Roman people and master of every nation; and he achieved it! If 
anyone says that such a greed is honourable, he is out of his mind; 
for he is approving the death of laws and liberty.’46
Writing The City of God not long after Alaric’s Sack of Rome, 
St Augustine’s most immediate and express aim is not history per 
se, but instead, by his analysis of the causes of Rome’s rise and 
fall, to defend Christianity against the charge that it was some-
how responsible for the ongoing collapse of the Roman Empire. 
‘Many escaped who now complain of this Christian era’, he 
explains, ‘and hold Christ responsible for the disasters which their 
city endured.’47 In his Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli revives this 
ancient complaint:
The ancient religion did not beatify men if they were not full of 
worldly glory, as were captains of armies and princes of repub-
lics. Our religion has glorifi ed humble and contemplative more 
than active men. It has then placed the highest good in humility, 
abjectness, and contempt of things human; the other placed it in 
greatness of spirit, strength of body, and all other things capable 
of making men very strong. 
‘This mode of life’, Machiavelli writes, ‘seems to have rendered the 
world weak and given it in prey to criminal men, who can man-
age it securely, seeing that the collectivity of men, so as to go to 
paradise, think more of enduring their beatings than of avenging 
them.’48
In the Enlightenment, Edward Gibbon took up the same 
old pagan charge anew. By discouraging Romans’ traditional 
valour and ruthlessness, Gibbon suggests, Christianity left them 
unable to resist the onslaught of Germanic tribes such as Alaric’s 
Visigoths. In his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, as if 
recalling St Augustine’s opponents, Gibbon cites ‘the contempt 
and reproaches of the pagans’, who, he imagines, ‘very frequently 
asked, what must be the fate of the empire, attacked on every 
side by barbarians, if all mankind should adopt the pusillanimous 
sentiments of this new sect?’ He concludes:
As the happiness of a future life is the great object of religion, we 
may hear without surprise or scandal that the introduction, or at 
least the abuse, of Christianity had some infl uence on the decline 
and fall of the Roman empire. The clergy successfully preached 
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the doctrines of patience and pusillanimity; the active virtues of 
society were discouraged, and the last remains of military spirit 
were buried in the cloister.49  
St Augustine anticipates such charges. The decline and fall of Rome 
should be traced back, he maintains, not to the emergence of Chris-
tianity, but instead to the ruthless libido dominandi that spurred on 
its internecine civil wars. 
How can our opponents have the effrontery, the audacity, the 
impudence, the imbecility (or rather the insanity) to refuse to 
blame their gods for these catastrophes, while they hold Christ 
responsible for these disasters of modern times? The brutal Civil 
Wars, more bitter, on the admission of their own authors, than 
any wars against foreign enemies – those Civil Wars which, in the 
general judgment, brought on the republic not merely calamity but 
utter destruction – broke out long before the coming of Christ.50
As St Augustine points out, when the Gauls and Goths did invade, 
they proved more merciful to the Romans, relatively speaking, 
than the Romans themselves had been to each other, during their 
infi ghting. ‘What was the foulest and most horrible spectacle ever 
seen in Rome?’ St Augustine asks. ‘The invasion of the Gauls, long 
ago? The recent invasion of the Goths? Or the ferocity vented on 
those who were parts of their own body, by Marius, by Sulla, and 
by other men of renown, the leading lights of their factions?’51 
During the sack of Rome, Alaric, himself an Arian Christian, 
showed mercy to those who took sanctuary in Christian shrines; 
St Augustine argues that the Romans should be grateful. ‘The 
barbarians spared them for Christ’s sake, and now these Romans 
assail Christ’s name.’ ‘They should give credit to this Christian 
era’, instead, ‘for the fact that these savage barbarians showed 
mercy beyond the custom of war’.52 
For St Augustine, Christianity is the solution, not the problem. 
In his English history plays, Shakespeare shows himself keenly 
aware of the possibility of Christian hypocrisy. He understands, 
as well, the need for occasional moral compromise, especially dur-
ing times of war.53 Nor would St Augustine object; even at his 
most optimistic, he retains a lively sense of the fallenness of human 
nature. Taking into account, then, these important qualifi cations, 
Shakespeare, I believe, would agree with St Augustine’s assessment 
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of ‘the City of Man’. At the heart of Rome’s catastrophic but inevi-
table decline is the absence of Christianity. In this study, I look 
closely at two of Shakespeare’s plays, Julius Caesar and Antony 
and Cleopatra. Taken together, they present his account of the fall 
of the Roman Republic. As a touchstone for Shakespeare’s sense 
of Roman culture, I also turn repeatedly to Shakespeare’s late play 
about early Rome, Coriolanus. As Russell Hillier suggests, ‘the 
belligerent Martius is a synecdoche for Rome’, ‘the species for the 
genus’, ‘the Roman substance unmasked and in the raw’.54 Like 
Cicero, as well as St Augustine, Shakespeare presents the pride 
that Coriolanus represents as the root cause of Rome’s transition 
from Republic to Empire. In this vision of history, the difference 
between democracy and autocracy is not as important as the dif-
ference between paganism and Christianity. That said, however, 
forms of government are not irrelevant. In the Republic, the drive 
that Nietzsche calls ‘the will to power’ strives for outward, objec-
tive conquest. In the Empire, by contrast, it turns inwards, seeking 
consolation in subjective fantasy.
As Hillier notes, ‘Both Menenius and Volumnia identify, rather 
than liken, Martius with the cornerstone of the Capitol. He is, in 
their view, hypostatized Romanitas.’55 If Coriolanus is, in some 
sense, Rome incarnate, what is Shakespeare’s sense of Rome’s dis-
tinctive character? Stephen Greenblatt sees in Shakespeare’s depic-
tion of Coriolanus ‘three dreams’ of an elusive, fi nally unobtainable 
‘liberty to live after one’s own law’:
There is a dream of physical autonomy, exemption from the mortal 
vulnerability of the fl esh or at least from the fear this vulnerability 
instinctively arouses. There is a recurrent dream of social auton-
omy, independence from the dense network of friends, family, and 
alliances that tie the individual to a carefully ordered world. And 
there is a dream of mental autonomy, the ability to dwell in a sepa-
rate psychic world, a heterocosm of one’s own making.56 
For Zvi Jagendorf, ‘The emblem of this self-suffi ciency is Corio-
lanus fi ghting alone in the enemy city with its gates shut behind 
him and his own army outside.’57 In the end, however, Coriolanus, 
the would-be ‘lonely dragon’ (4.1.30), renounces his doomed bel-
lum unius contra omnes. Confronted by his formidable mother, 
Volumnia, as well as his wife and child, he calls off the siege 
of Rome. ‘Ladies,’ he proclaims, ‘all the swords / In Italy and her 
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confederate arms / Could not have made this peace’ (5.3.206–9).58 
It is as if Shakespeare, in this late Roman play, went back to Rome’s 
early history for a change of tack: the restoration of the Republic, 
rather than its destruction. By going back in time, he gives his own 
version of Roman history a happy ending – although, to be fair, 
one not especially happy for Coriolanus himself.59 
Although he seems for a time an implacable enemy of the com-
mon good, Coriolanus becomes in the end an unlikely, grudging 
martyr to its survival, like the early heroes of the Republic whom St 
Augustine, like Livy, praises for their self-sacrifi ce: Mucius Scaevola, 
Marcus Curtius and Marcus Atilius Regulus. ‘Furius Camillus, who 
was condemned by those who envied him, notwithstanding that he 
had thrown off from the necks of his countrymen the yoke of their 
most bitter enemies, the Veientes, again delivered his ungrateful 
country from the Gauls.’60 Seen in this light, as Leah Whittington 
suggests, Coriolanus is of a piece with other late plays such as Cym-
beline and The Tempest which ‘show Shakespeare seeking out new 
ways to explore the dramatic possibilities of estrangement and for-
giveness’.61 Coriolanus’ incomplete rebellion against Rome stands 
in relation to the collapse of the Republic much as the tragicom-
edy of The Winter’s Tale stands in relation to the utter, unrelieved 
tragedy of Othello. As Hillier observes, ‘Coriolanus stands apart 
from Shakespeare’s other Roman plays in that pity and compassion 
overwhelm wrath and fury.’62 
In Coriolanus, Shakespeare revisits and rewrites, in a fi gurative 
sense, the history of Rome’s tragic decline into civil war. And, in 
so doing, he presents a compelling alternative to the characteristic 
Roman exaltation of ‘constancy’ over mutability, masculinity over 
femininity, and violence over ‘pity’ which he presents with such pain-
ful clarity in Julius Caesar. The senators praise his mother afterward 
as ‘our patroness, the life of Rome’ (5.5.1) and call for fl owers to be 
strewn before her, as well as Coriolanus’ wife, Virgilia. Coriolanus 
tells them, ‘You deserve / To have a temple built to you’ (5.3.206–7). 
Femininity, inconstancy, pity, tears, prayer, supplication: aspects of 
the human condition which Romans in other plays tend to despise 
and disavow, Shakespeare here rehabilitates and recasts as praise-
worthy. The Republic cannot function without some measure of 
vulnerability to the claims of pity.
In Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra, the characteris-
tic Roman desire for imperium tends to retreat under pressure 
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and become subjective. Shakespeare’s Romans shift with surpris-
ing facility back and forth from conquering others into solipsistic 
shadow-boxing: an inward-looking struggle over self-perception. 
Brutus’ Stoicism is an introverted, intellectual variation on Caesar’s 
more obvious pursuit of autonomy and invulnerability.63 Brutus 
speaks of his own emotional condition, ‘the state of man’, as ‘like 
to a little kingdom’ (2.2.67–8); in his efforts to control its ‘insur-
rection’ (2.2.68), ‘poor Brutus, with himself at war’ (1.2.46) even 
in silence or in the privacy of his own study can think of himself 
as if he, too, like Caesar, were a celebrated military commander, a 
world-bestriding ‘Colossus’ (1.2.135). Antony’s tendency to escape 
into wine, women and a world of his own ‘fancy’ is not altogether 
different from Octavian’s relentless focus on military campaigns. 
Each of these characters desperately wants to be master of his own 
domain; only for some of them, the world-historical winners, that 
domain is external, out in the world at large, whereas for others, 
the ostensible losers, that domain is internal, confi ned to a smaller, 
more manageable arena. ‘Here is my space!’ (1.1.35) Antony 
cries, embracing Cleopatra. ‘Let Rome in Tiber melt, and the wide 
arch / Of the ranged empire fall!’ (1.1.34–5) 
The starting point for my sense of this difference between Repub-
lic and Empire in Shakespeare’s Roman plays is Paul Cantor’s semi-
nal study, Shakespeare’s Rome. Citing Aristotle, Cantor proposes 
that ‘different regimes work to bring out different sides of human 
nature in their citizens’.64 ‘With our notion of representative govern-
ment,’ he explains, ‘we think that rulers should refl ect the values 
or opinions of those they rule; more generally, that a government 
should take its character from the society out of which it arises.’ 
‘In the classical understanding of the polis,’ however, ‘the regime 
(politeia) has a formative role, and is itself the primary factor in 
shaping or giving character to the community it rules.’ Applying 
this approach to the contrast between Coriolanus and Antony and 
Cleopatra, Cantor observes that ‘the comparative rigidity of politi-
cal hierarchy in the Empire works to redirect the energies of men 
from public to private life’.65 Under the Empire, as historian Ronald 
Syme explains, once-proud nobiles ‘lost power and wealth, display, 
dignity, and honour’. ‘No more triumphs after war, no more roads, 
temples, and towns named after their honour and commemorating 
the glory of the great houses that were the Republic and Rome.’66 
‘The rewards of public life begin to look hollow,’ Cantor suggests, 
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‘whereas private life seems to offer new sources of satisfaction.’ 
Antony therefore drifts away from the objective fi eld of battle into 
a ‘private and subjective world’. ‘The Roman world portrayed in 
Coriolanus is one of hard, solid objects, palpable to the touch and 
thus unquestionably real. In Antony and Cleopatra this tangible 
world begins to dissolve into a realm of shadows that seem to hide 
the true reality.’67
In his more recent book Shakespeare’s Roman Trilogy, Cantor 
argues that ‘the buried theme of Shakespeare’s Roman plays is 
the way that the dissolution of the Roman republican regime pre-
pared the way for the rise of Christianity in the Roman Empire’.68 
Regarding Roman history, Cantor may well be right. Regarding 
Shakespeare’s plays, however, I am not so sure. As a response to 
imperial subjugation, Hellenistic schools of thought such as Sto-
icism and Epicureanism were an important precursor of the more 
radical ethical revolution Christianity represents. Nevertheless, I 
would be hard-pressed to see this transition as Shakespeare’s focus. 
Cantor misjudges here at times, as it seems to me, Shakespeare’s 
aims in turning to Roman history, as well as Shakespeare’s own 
distinctive sense of historical causation. As a result, our accounts 
of Shakespeare’s Roman plays end up simultaneously entangled 
and opposed. For example, Cantor is at pains to emphasise the 
similarities between Stoicism, Epicureanism and Christianity.69 
I, by contrast, draw attention to their differences.
Like Marx, Cantor tends to represent ideology as a product of 
physical conditions. More specifi cally, Cantor argues that ‘the cor-
ruption of the Roman Empire softened it up and made it possible 
for Christianity to sweep the ancient world’. And, again, he may 
be right. With time, Cantor maintains, ‘Rome’s great captains and 
even its ordinary people are corrupted by the wealth that fl ows into 
the city from conquered lands, and devotion to the common good 
gradually weakens until the city is ripped apart by private fac-
tions.’70 It is a venerable vision of history, one that Cantor shares 
with Ibn Khaldun, as well as Livy and Montesquieu. Neverthe-
less, Shakespeare himself does not see cultural history as a prod-
uct of impersonal economic change. Instead, like St Augustine, 
Shakespeare tends to represent what Marx would call the ‘base’ 
as a product of what he would call the ‘superstructure’. Beliefs are 
the engine of history, not material resources. As George Bernard 
Shaw was wont to complain, Shakespeare is also more inclined, 
5877_Gray.indd   18 12/09/18   3:31 PM
 Introduction: Shakespeare and the Vulnerable Self [ 19
like Thomas Carlyle, to the ‘great man theory of history’.71 World-
historical events in Shakespeare’s plays are represented as the 
result of individual choices between moral paradigms, rather than 
those choices as themselves a response to such events. Antony, for 
instance, is not so much victim as author of his own ignominious 
demise. Cantor focuses on the differences between the Republic 
and the Empire.72 I think Shakespeare, however, saw them as two 
sides of the same coin; two societies equally obsessed with com-
mand and control. The effort to secure individual ‘liberty’ takes on 
different guises, depending on what Stanislavski would describe 
as the ‘given circumstances’ of each character. But the underlying, 
tragically misguided goal remains the same.
Both Cantor and I agree with A. D. Nuttall that Shakespeare is 
attracted to Roman history as an occasion to work through ethi-
cal and political thought-experiments, evaluating various compet-
ing claims in light of a kind of evidence. As Nuttall writes, ‘The 
cultural separateness of the Roman world, its independence of 
Christianity, makes it a perfect laboratory for free-ranging politi-
cal hypothesis.’73 Cantor for his part sees Shakespeare weighing 
up the relative merits of life in the Republic as opposed to the 
Empire. ‘The Roman plays taken as a whole pose a Hegelian 
tragic choice between antithetical ways of life, each of which 
embodies a distinct and defensible vision of human excellence.’74 
Warren Cherniak comes to a similar conclusion about republican-
ism in the Roman plays, in keeping with a long tradition within 
Shakespeare studies:
Shakespeare’s habitual practice is to juxtapose differing perspec-
tives on a character or event without privileging a single voice as 
clearly preferable. This habit of mind has been associated with the 
rhetorical tradition of arguing in utramque partem, speaking with 
equal eloquence on either side of a given question, or attributed to 
a Keatsian ‘negative capability’.75 
As Peter Holbrook observes, ‘we are often told Shakespeare did 
not advance a particular view of life.’ ‘Emphasizing Shakespeare’s 
intellectual openness can be overdone,’ however, he believes, ‘with 
the plays and poems ending up a bland, self-cancelling rendezvous 
of perspectives’.76 Holbrook cites Richard Strier: Shakespeare is 
not ‘the less Shakespeare’ for ‘having had beliefs that he expressed 
in his plays’. ‘When Sidney said that the poet “nothing affi rms,”’ 
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Strier notes, ‘he had in mind factual claims, not ethical and politi-
cal ones. Only a peculiar version of post-Romantic poetics could 
lead to the view that the poet “nothing affi rms” in general.’77 As it 
happens, I tend to disagree with Strier as well as Holbrook regard-
ing what it is, more precisely, that Shakespeare ‘affi rms’. To wit, 
I am much more sympathetic than they are to what Strier calls 
the ‘Burkean’ thesis that ‘Shakespeare’s social and political views 
were deeply conservative’.78 Setting that contention to one side, 
however, I wholeheartedly agree with both Holbrook and Strier 
that Keats’ claim about Shakespeare’s ‘Negative Capability’ is a 
misleading and counterproductive myth, needlessly disabling even 
the possibility of fruitful debate.79 
In contrast to Cantor, as well as Chernaik, I propose here that 
Shakespeare uses Rome’s transition from Republic to Empire as a 
case study to evaluate the personal and political implications of a 
proto-liberal ethos which prizes autonomy above relatedness and 
which was emerging in his own time as an alternative to Christian-
ity, as well as the ethics of Aristotle and Cicero. Over the course 
of this thought-experiment, weighing the claims of this resurgent 
neo-Roman paradigm against his sense of human nature, as well 
as the evidence of history, Shakespeare comes to a conclusion: a 
society which adopts this individualistic ethos, whether it be as 
large as a nation or as small as a marriage, will inevitably oscil-
late between autocracy and civil war. The self-suffi ciency that such 
a radical pursuit of liberty idealises and seeks in vain to secure 
precludes the power-sharing necessary for stable, peaceful coexis-
tence. Hegel captures this dilemma in his account of the master–
slave dialectic, which I am inclined to believe was in part inspired 
by his study of Shakespeare’s Roman plays. ‘The earliest writing 
of Hegel’s we have’, Ewan Fernie points out, ‘is a free adapta-
tion of Act Four, scene one from Julius Caesar, which the philoso-
pher wrote as a fi fteen-year-old schoolboy.’80 As Cantor says of 
Nietzsche, ‘sometimes it seems as if everyone studied Julius Caesar 
in high school’.81
Rome as Cantor sees it was undone, not only by its windfall 
of prosperity, once it defeated Carthage, but also by ‘its encoun-
ter with alien ways of life in the lands the Republic conquered’. 
‘Adapting to the ways of life of the very peoples they defeated, 
the Romans came to embrace an ethos of defeat. That is the 
ultimate tragedy of the Roman Republic.’82 All of Shakespeare’s 
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pagans, however, including his Greeks and Egyptians, as well as 
his Romans, chase different forms of radical autonomy that from 
a Christian perspective are impossible to attain, as well as unde-
sirable even if they were. Roman and Egyptian alike are chasing 
variations on the same impossible dream. Shakespeare’s Romans’ 
problem, moreover, as Cantor himself stresses, elsewhere in the 
book, is by no means ‘an ethos of defeat’, but the exact opposite. 
Roman protagonists such as Coriolanus, Julius Caesar and Mark 
Antony are profoundly unwilling to make any kind of concession 
to each other, even at the price of deluding themselves, blundering 
into disaster and committing suicide. ‘Shakespeare’s Romans are 
extraordinarily competitive,’ Cantor writes, ‘just like Nietzsche’s 
Greeks, to the point of striving to become gods, and they are 
destroyed in the process.’83
Alongside Cantor’s account of Shakespeare’s Rome, I am 
deeply indebted to Gordon Braden’s study of Seneca’s infl uence 
on drama in the sixteenth century, Renaissance Tragedy and the 
Senecan Tradition. Like St Augustine, Braden presents Seneca’s 
one-time pupil, the Emperor Nero, as the acme of unchecked 
Roman libido dominandi.84 Having achieved unparalleled author-
ity, Nero became, as it were, baffl ed. Frustrated, tetchy and 
increasingly paranoid, he set up rigged artistic competitions, fake 
chariot races and show trials of imagined opponents, all to have 
someone, somehow to defeat. Until the rise of Nero’s predecessor, 
Julius Caesar, opportunities for limited political power had been 
available to most male patricians through a traditional structure 
Braden calls ‘Republican timocracy’: ‘a fi nely graded system of 
clearly specifi ed dignitates, competitively achieved, of which the 
cursus honorum is the central, enduring form’. Under Augustus 
Caesar, however, the corruption of honours and enfeeblement of 
public offi ces which began under the infl uence of Julius Caesar 
became fi xed and defi nitive. Augustus ‘preserved much of the hon-
orifi c paraphernalia and rhetoric of the Republic’, but ‘it could no 
longer mean what it used to mean’.85 
Braden suggests that ‘the politics of imperial terror’ can be best 
understood as an ad hoc response to the dissolution of this tradi-
tional Republican structure for acquiring and validating a sense of 
personal power. Thus its ‘bizarre air of improvisation and make-
believe’: having conquered Rome itself, as well as the better part 
of the rest of the world, Roman emperors such as Nero no longer 
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knew how to express their will to power. With the collapse of the 
‘stylized rivalry’ at the core of ‘Republican timocracy’, other aris-
tocrats also found their will to power stymied; indeed, much more 
obviously so. Their response, Braden suggests, was to turn inwards. 
Stoicism projects disengagement, detachment, indifference. In fact, 
however, Braden argues, Stoicism can be better understood as ‘the 
inner form of imperialism’. ‘Imperial aggression and Stoic retreat 
are both informed by a drive to keep the self’s boundaries under its 
own control.’86 Cicero makes much the same point in De offi ciis. 
‘There have been many,’ he observes, ‘and there still are’, who seek 
‘tranquility’ by ‘abandoning public business and fl eeing to a life of 
leisure’, including ‘the noblest and foremost philosophers’ as well 
as ‘certain strict and serious men who could not endure the behav-
ior of the populace or its leaders’. ‘Their aim’, ‘common both to 
those who desire power and to such men of leisure’, is ‘the aim of 
kings: that needing nothing, and obeying no one, they might enjoy 
liberty, the mark of which is to live just as one pleases’.87
For Braden, Stoicism is what Freud might term a ‘sublimation’ 
of the drive that St Augustine calls libido dominandi, and that 
Braden himself more typically refers to by the Greek terms thymos 
or thymoeides: ‘the ambitious, competitive part of the soul . . . 
living for victory and honour’. The idealised wise man may be dis-
passionate, but the actual, practising Stoic is in fact just as driven 
by ambition, just as much a slave to passion, as a power-mad 
emperor. ‘Imperium remains the common value, the desideratum 
for both sage and emperor.’ Suicide in this context, the character-
istic death of the ‘noble Roman’, is not a renunciation of worldly 
power, but instead a demonstration of its all-encompassing scope. 
‘Suicide is the natural fulfi llment of the wise man’s life, the point 
where his drive for control becomes totally and unsurpassably self-
referential in a fi nal triumph over the world outside.’88 
Braden sees the resurgence of Stoicism in the Renaissance as in 
part an effect of a social ‘dislocation’ of the aristocracy in the early 
modern period, a loss of their former political independence which 
mirrors that of the Roman patriciate in the fi rst century bc, during 
the transition from Republic to Empire. Stoicism ‘serves the need 
of an honorifi c selfhood deprived of its referents’. In particular, 
‘the military function of the nobility as a class was on the way out’. 
‘Medieval aristocratic values’ proved tenacious, however, ‘even 
under changing social and political conditions’.89 Braden draws 
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particular attention to what Charles Trinkaus calls autarkeia, 
the ideal of ‘psychic and moral self-suffi ciency’ which Petrarch 
fi rst identifi ed as a distinctive feature of classical thought.90 For 
ancient Greek noblemen such as those described in Homeric epic, 
autarkeia (‘self-suffi ciency, independence’) was political, defended 
by force of arms. Neostoicism allowed the early modern nobility 
to continue to lay claim to this ideal, if only in a more subjective 
sense, even as they lost their traditional martial capacity. It also 
opened up aristocratic modes of self-regard to poets, playwrights 
and scholars.91 
In his emphasis on a broader ‘Senecan tradition’, Braden says 
relatively little about Shakespeare’s Roman plays. In a later arti-
cle, however, Wayne Rebhorn singles out Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar.92 In this tragedy, he argues, Shakespeare depicts ‘the 
transformation of the English aristocracy between the reign of 
Henry VIII and the Civil War’, a historical process Lawrence 
Stone describes in his classic study The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 
1558–1641. Rebhorn argues that Shakespeare fi nds a historical 
analogue for this contemporary crisis in the fall of the Roman 
Republic, a collapse which, like Cicero, he sees as beginning with 
Julius Caesar. Admittedly, he says, ‘Julius Caesar is set well before 
the start of the Silver Age and the orgies of destruction associated 
with Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero.’ ‘Nevertheless’, the tragedy 
presents ‘a Renaissance vision of the imperial self whose drive for 
mastery during the chaos unleashed by the Civil War in Rome has 
been turned away from the vast expanse of the empire and inward 
towards the ruling class itself.’93
If Julius Caesar evokes the beginning of the decline of the Eliza-
bethan aristocracy, Antony and Cleopatra shows its terminus ad 
quem, out on the horizon. David Quint proposes that ‘Shakespeare’s 
Roman plays’ present ‘a schematic treatment of a nobility losing its 
status before the pressure of new historical forces’. In Coriolanus, 
for example, ‘the urban populace . . . dictates new conditions to 
the patricians’. In Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare shows ‘the 
demise of a feudal aristocratic order and its style of greatness’. The 
two lovers, Antony and Cleopatra, embody ‘outmoded noble val-
ues and behaviors’, receding before the advance of Octavian, the 
‘universal landlord’ (3.13.72).94 In his Longman edition of the play, 
Quint presents Antony and Cleopatra in more detail as representa-
tive of a ‘magnifi cent individualism’, doomed in their own time, as 
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well as Shakespeare’s, by the ‘double advent’ of ‘political absolut-
ism’ and ‘Christianity’. With the rise of English Calvinism, as well 
as a new urban bourgeoisie, ‘the Renaissance culture of individual 
aggrandisement’ was giving way to ‘a narrower, less aristocratic, 
more mercenary, and more puritanical culture’. Octavian’s Rome 
represents the future, ‘a new era of calculation and effi ciency’. 
Egypt, ‘a realm of excess’, ‘older and culturally richer’, represents 
the past, ‘the outmoded ethos of an old aristocracy’, ‘a world of 
greatness that now seems to be a dream of the larger possibilities of 
human experience’. This ‘dream-world’ will now become ‘a prov-
ince of homogenizing Rome’.95 
What Rebhorn sees in Julius Caesar, Quint sees in seventeenth-
century tragedy more broadly considered, including French and 
Spanish drama, as well as English plays such as those of Shake-
speare. 
A defi ning strain of seventeenth-century tragedy – something larger 
than a subgenre – dramatizes the loss of a particular, high aristo-
cratic identity and focuses the genre on the travails of a nobility 
newly imperiled and disempowered by the centralizing projects of 
a newly powerful monarchy. 
Quint points out that the English ‘crisis’ Stone identifi es is not with-
out contemporary parallels on the Continent. ‘Confl ict between 
king and noble vassal, between royal court and local grandee, pro-
vided a political issue and literary theme throughout the Middle 
Ages.’ By the seventeenth century, however, ‘this confl ict was, in 
fact, nearing its end, decided in favor of the monarch’. The ‘style of 
noble independence and self-assertion’ which Antony and Cleopa-
tra represent had become ‘the object of nostalgia’.96 Stone’s descrip-
tion of bellicose, independent English noblemen abandoning their 
warlike ways for a new civility can be understood as an instance of 
the larger phenomenon Norbert Elias calls ‘the civilizing process’. 
The warrior culture of aristocrats in feudal society was giving way 
to courtoisie. 
Stone and Elias provide pervasive and appealing paradigms 
for present-day critics’ understanding of the economic and politi-
cal bases of early modern intellectual history, including literary 
history. There is some question, however, whether they accurately 
describe Shakespeare’s understanding, as a kind of historian him-
self, of the Roman history that he presents in Julius Caesar and 
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Antony and Cleopatra. Consider, for instance, St Augustine’s 
concept of a characteristic Roman libido dominandi. Every desire 
or libido, one might say, can be reimagined as a species of fear. 
The desire to dominate, in this case, is the obverse of a fear of 
being dominated, of being subject to a dominus or ‘master’, in 
the manner of a slave. This fear could be interpreted, then, as an 
effect of the rise of a centralised and increasingly overbearing 
political authority. Roman aristocrats start to crave power so 
desperately because they feel it slipping away. Once it has indeed 
dissipated, dissolved by political and economic forces beyond 
their command, they then try to retrieve it by withdrawing into 
the one arena still within their control, their own private, domes-
tic and subjective experience, as apparent both in Brutus’ Stoic 
silence and Antony’s tendency to distract himself with romantic 
idylls in Egypt. Shakespeare’s plays, however, do not present so 
neat an order of cause and effect. Antony’s debauchery, wasting 
time and opportunity in Alexandria, does not occur solely after 
his defeat, as a kind of consolation, but also precedes and in 
fact causes his political decline. Brutus’ withdrawal from public 
affairs does not begin with Caesar’s rise, but instead could be 
said to help enable that ascent, by removing one of the tradi-
tional, competitive restraints on Caesar’s populist demagoguery, 
a patrician counterweight rivalling in stature Caesar’s previous 
opponent, Cato of Utica. 
Writing on Shakespeare’s early English histories, John Cox 
begins by acknowledging that these plays ‘reproduce what we now 
recognize as the central processes of change in sixteenth-century 
English political life’. To speak of Shakespeare, however, he goes 
on, ‘as if he had read Lawrence Stone’ would be ‘wilful anach-
ronism’. Shakespeare, like most of his cohort, did not conceive 
of these processes in ‘the conceptual terms of the modern social 
historian’.97 Wayne Rebhorn makes much the same point in regard 
to Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. ‘Like Stone,’ he concedes, ‘the play 
suggests that the aristocracy is undergoing a profound change that 
will eventuate in its ultimate loss as a class of any real power and 
infl uence, in its marginalization by increasingly absolutist mon-
archs.’ Nonetheless, ‘the analytical perspective offered by the 
play is not Stone’s’. Stone ‘emphasizes economics and social his-
tory’, whereas Shakespeare ‘presents the situation in moral terms’. 
‘Shakespeare’s play is analytical, revealing the self-destruction, the 
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suicide, to which an entire class is being impelled by its essential 
values and mode of self-defi nition.’98 
For Shakespeare, subjective libido dominandi such as that appar-
ent in Brutus’ Stoicism is a displacement or refi nement of the kind 
of objective libido dominandi more obviously manifest in Caesar’s 
political ambition. Both Senecan withdrawal and Neronian aggres-
sion are expressions of the same core paradigm, a tragically fl awed 
value-system which idealises absolute power. This exaltation of 
power creates what Rebhorn calls a ‘zero-sum game’. Any increase 
in anyone else’s capacity to dominate is seen as an increase in one’s 
own vulnerability to being dominated. The rise of the other thus 
comes to seem intolerable; a threat to be countered with desperate, 
pre-emptive aggression, or else avoided by withdrawing from pub-
lic life altogether. Rebhorn sees Julius Caesar, especially, as depict-
ing ‘a struggle among aristocrats – senators – aimed at preventing 
one of their number from transcending his place and destroying the 
system in which they all ruled as a class’.99
In his literary history of what he calls ‘the dramaturgy of power’, 
John Cox argues that English court politics in the 1590s gave rise 
to a ‘contemporary shift in the sense of human self’, characterised 
above all by an effort to secure ‘social or political invulnerability’:
The scramble to win individual purposes and good advantages 
became increasingly frantic and cynical, eventually issuing in 
Essex’s violent bid for power just after the turn of the century. 
Court striving was therefore increasingly risky, like contemporary 
voyages to the new world: one could win enormous benefi ts, but 
in the process one risked losses that were even more spectacular.100
Contemporary interest in Tacitus bespeaks a more pervasive sense 
of Elizabeth herself, at the end of her reign, as ever more capri-
cious, ruthless and autocratic. ‘Because the environment of the 
court was so insecure, it became increasingly receptive to strategies 
for achieving apparent invulnerability.’ Cox draws attention to 
two such ‘strategies’ in particular as characteristic developments. 
Humanists as well as courtiers could pursue ‘the new ideal of the 
invulnerable self’ either through Machiavellian maneuvering, like 
that of the devil or personifi ed ‘Vice’ of medieval drama, or else 
through a Senecan withdrawal into cultivated indifference. ‘For 
humanist and courtier alike, social advancement was highly com-
petitive, heavily dependent on favor at the top, and therefore risky 
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in the extreme.’ Stoicism thus became newly ‘attractive’, as it once 
had been for Seneca. ‘The ancient Stoic ideal of apatheia had been 
cultivated in a very similar atmosphere in imperial Rome – the 
Rome of Livy, Suetonius, Seneca, and Tacitus.’101 
Cox suggests that characters such as Caesar and Brutus may be 
understood, not only as counterparts to English aristocrats, but 
also as representing members of Shakespeare’s own more immedi-
ate circle, London’s humanist intelligentsia: disgruntled Neostoics 
such as George Chapman, as well as rebels against Calvinism such 
as Christopher Marlowe. ‘Interest in the ideal of the invulner-
able self became widespread among a new class . . . the privileged 
minority whose literacy alone gave them considerable power and 
widened their scope for literary self-perpetuation and display.’102 
Geoffrey Miles observes that ‘“Stoicism” and “constancy” became 
code words for a certain fashionable pose of cynical and affect-
less “cool.”’103 The characteristic striving for autonomy, even to 
the point of antinomianism, which Harry Levin gives the name 
‘overreaching’, and which Anthony Esler links to ‘the aspiring 
mind’ of the Elizabethan ‘younger generation’, a variation on the 
self-suffi cient ‘pose’ of Neostoicism, can be seen as readily in the 
literary careers of some of Shakespeare’s fellow playwrights as 
in the more martial exploits of swashbuckling noblemen such as 
Raleigh, Sidney and Devereux.104 
In his study of early modern English republicanism, Open Sub-
jects, James Kuzner argues that early modern idealisation of invul-
nerability, a reaction to increasingly absolutist, centralised power, 
is itself inevitably damaging to efforts to replace that autocracy 
with healthy, functioning representative government. As Braden 
explains, ‘Stoicism is not fi nally a philosophy of political resis-
tance. The essential Stoic strategy for dealing with a tyrant is not 
interference but indifference.’105 For Kuzner, atomistic autarkeia 
is not a viable model for republican selfhood: neither Senecan 
retreat into the self (‘refusing to be moved by others’ words’) 
nor Machiavellian striving to dominate the other, even if only, 
as a courtier, through fl attery and deceit (‘occluding interiority 
so as to manipulate others’). Instead, Kuzner turns to the kind 
of ‘open’ political engagement Cicero proposes as an alternative. 
‘For Cicero,’ Kuzner observes, ‘as for many Renaissance fi gures, 
shared vulnerability is central to community’s existence.’ ‘As 
Cicero understands them, republics both must make peace with, 
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and even recognize their dependence on, vulnerability of various 
kinds.’106 Kuzner cites Cicero’s De amicitia (‘On Friendship’), 
written the same year as Caesar’s assassination: ‘Take away the 
bond of kindly feeling from the world, and no house or city can 
stand.’107 Kuzner fi nd Cicero’s thought in this respect adumbrat-
ing that of Jürgen Habermas.108
Kuzner sees Shakespeare as profoundly sympathetic to Cicero’s 
sense that ‘the courage required of us to embrace vulnerable being’ 
is ‘the most crucial republican virtue’. ‘Shakespeare’, Kuzner argues, 
‘advocates an intersubjective openness which resembles that advo-
cated in Cicero and Livy in the classical period and, more recently, in 
Habermas’s later work.’ In his Roman plays, especially, Shakespeare 
illustrates the inevitably tragic end of all attempts ‘to withdraw into 
a well-bounded selfhood’. ‘For Shakespeare, bounded selfhood is a 
pernicious fi ction.’ Cicero recognises that ‘susceptibility – to change, 
decay, and transformation that one does not will – cannot be elim-
inated, whatever we might wish.’ So, too, Shakespeare illustrates 
that ‘selves are vulnerable in constitution, incapable, on their own, 
of fully mastering either the passions threatening to undo them from 
within or the violence threatening from without’.109 Cox sees Shake-
speare in much the same light. ‘No other Elizabethan playwright is 
as sensitive and sympathetic to the vulnerability of even the most 
admirable of human beings, and none so insistently uses this vulner-
ability as a way of qualifying the claims of privilege.’110
In my analysis of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar and Antony and 
Cleopatra, I take up the concept that Cox and Kuzner introduce 
as ‘vulnerability’ and subsume it under its more formal, technical 
name of ‘passibility’. When these authors refer variously to ‘vulner-
ability’, ‘susceptibility’ or ‘weakness’, what they are describing is, 
in more precise language, the theological concept of ‘passibility’, 
meaning ‘susceptibility to being acted-upon’. To be passible is to be 
subject to external causation. To be impassible, by contrast, is to 
be invulnerable to any kind of action from without. The term itself, 
‘impassibility’, as a description of a characteristic of the divine, 
is derived from Stoicism, which emphasises an analogous state, 
apatheia, as the sine qua non of the ideal human being, the sapiens 
or ‘wise man’. Like most forms of classical philosophy, Stoicism 
tends to assume that anything divine or ideal is by defi nition impas-
sible. In Kuzner’s language, its selfhood is ‘bounded’, rather than 
‘open.’ Within Stoicism, for example, the degree of apatheia that a 
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philosopher attributes to the sapiens or ideal ‘sage’ is the best index 
of his place in a spectrum of Stoic thought, ranging from radical 
to moderate. So also, in speaking of deities, the degree of impas-
sibility that a theologian attributes to God or the gods places him 
in a spectrum of possibilities ranging from the Unmoved Mover of 
Aristotle to the fi gure Jesus, whom Nietzsche often describes simply 
as ‘the Crucifi ed’. The degree to which impassibility is idealised is 
not only the chief criterion for distinguishing between rival schools 
of Stoicism, but also for distinguishing between rival concepts of 
the divine, especially the theology found in classical philosophy as 
opposed to that of Christianity.
What I aim to show in this study as a whole is that throughout 
Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra Shakespeare’s Romans 
strive to achieve what Kuzner calls ‘bounded selfhood’ and Cox 
describes as ‘the new ideal of the invulnerable self’. That is to say, 
Shakespeare’s Romans are distinguished above all by their persis-
tent efforts to escape their own human passibility. This fl ight from 
vulnerability is what drives what St Augustine calls libido domi-
nandi, both in its objective expression as absolutist political ambi-
tion and in its subjective expression as a retreat from reality itself. 
Since passibility cannot be escaped, the attempt to do so brings 
tragedy, however, both to individuals and to ancient Rome more 
generally, as a society. At the root of this problem, as Shakespeare 
sees it, is a maladaptive value-system. Like aristocratic contem-
poraries such as the Earl of Essex, as well as ambitious Neostoic 
humanists, Shakespeare’s Romans idealise impassibility. Their 
ideal self is transcendent, invulnerable. As human beings, however, 
they would be better served by an ideal that instead embraces the 
most basic, inescapable facts of our human condition: embodi-
ment, vulnerability, sympathy, dependence. In the symbolic lan-
guage of the play, ‘the northern star’, ‘the beast without a heart’, 
needs to yield to ‘fl esh and blood’. In more abstract terms, the 
Neostoic ideal of ‘constancy’ needs to give way to the Christian 
paradox of ‘strength made perfect in weakness’ (2 Cor. 12:9). As 
Kuzner explains, ‘The strongest social structures are held together 
by weakness.’ ‘To form the bonds of friendship – bonds that sus-
tain community – means to give oneself over to susceptibility and 
to loss.’111
An underlying assumption of my argument is that the ideal self 
or ‘ego ideal’ of psychoanalytic theory is susceptible to cultural 
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infl uence. Even Freud, who for the most part sees human behav-
iour as biologically determined, grants in his later work that the 
ego ideal refl ects the idiosyncrasies of an individual’s social con-
text. The ego ideal represents an intersection of the distinctive, 
historically contingent value-systems of a society as a whole with 
the individual experience of a given member of that social group. 
In the fi rst section of the fi rst chapter, ‘Brutus vs. Brutus’, I briefl y 
introduce the concept of the ego ideal as it appears in the work of 
Freud and Adler.112 I then turn to the particular example of Shake-
speare’s Rome. The behaviour of Shakespeare’s Roman characters, 
I propose, can be described in terms of the peculiar character of 
their ego ideals, fantasies of selfhood which, as Freud and Adler 
suggest, we can see represented most clearly in their concepts of 
the divine. 
Such exemplary ideals can also appear in other forms, however. 
They can be human heroes, for instance, drawn from legends of 
antiquity.113 The hypothetical sapiens of the Stoics is a good exam-
ple, as well as his perceived incarnation in fi gures such as Socrates, 
Cato and Brutus’ own ancestor, Lucius Junius Brutus. Less obvi-
ously, the ideal self can be expressed metaphorically as an animal, 
a star, a monster or even an inanimate object such as a statue or 
a sword. When Coriolanus asks for followers to accompany him 
in his drive against Aufi dius and his Antiates, for example, the 
Roman soldiers cry in unison, ‘O me alone! Make you a sword of 
me!’ (1.6.76). Coriolanus himself ‘outdares his senseless sword / 
And when it bows, stand’st up’ (1.4.53–4). As Dostoyevsky writes 
in The Adolescent, 
A man cannot live without worshipping something; without wor-
shipping he cannot bear the burden of himself. And that goes for 
every man. So that if a man rejects God, he will have to worship 
an idol that may be made of wood, gold, or ideas. Those that think 
they don’t need God are really just idol worshippers.114 
The aspirations that such symbols both express and shape are not 
always practicable, however, or even internally coherent. Brutus in 
particular is torn between two rival schools of thought. In keep-
ing with the precepts of Epicureanism, Seneca advocates a com-
plete withdrawal from politics, since such activity will inevitably 
impinge upon the apathia (‘freedom from passion’) of the true 
sapiens. Cicero, however, much to the contrary, insists on service 
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to the state as a necessary component of virtue. ‘Those who are 
equipped by nature to administer affairs’, he maintains, ‘must aban-
don any hesitation over winning offi ce and engage in public life.’115 
In order to convince Brutus to abandon his initial retirement from 
public life in favour of this kind of more proactive political engage-
ment, Shakespeare’s Cassius makes a symbol of Brutus’ ideal self, 
the statue of his ancestor, Lucius Junius Brutus, seem to come alive 
and exhort him personally to rejoin the political arena. As a statue, 
mute, immobile and imperturbable, this statue, as well as others 
in the play, aptly represents Seneca’s ego ideal: the indifferent gods 
of Epicureanism. As it seems to come alive, however, communicat-
ing with Brutus in the form of a letter, urging him to take action, 
the statue comes to represent more closely instead the ego ideal of 
Ciceronian Stoicism: the illustrious forebear whom it depicts and 
whom Brutus decides in the end to imitate.
In the second section, ‘“A marble statue of a man”’, I turn from 
internecine debates within classical philosophy to the later confl ict 
in the Renaissance between Neostoicism and Christianity. In Julius 
Caesar, Shakespeare uses the history of ancient Rome as a testing-
ground to evaluate the claims of contemporary Neostoicism, measur-
ing them against the competing standard of Christianity. I stress that 
Shakespeare is responding primarily to early modern Neostoicism, 
rather than to classical Stoicism itself, partly to draw attention to the 
concept of ‘constancy’, a buzzword promulgated by Shakespeare’s 
Neostoic contemporary, Justus Lipsius, and partly to forestall over-
scrupulous questions of exact chronology. Strictly speaking, Sen-
eca post-dates the fall of the Roman Republic by almost a century. 
Cicero’s De offi ciis was written several months after Caesar’s assas-
sination, when Rome had already degenerated into open civil war. 
Shakespeare uses the tipping point of the transition from Republic 
to Empire as an opportunity to telescope both of these perspectives 
backwards in time. In Brutus’ divided impulses, Shakespeare is able 
to illustrate both the patriotism of the Republican citizen and the 
despair of the Imperial subject. 
In the fi rst section of the second chapter, ‘Power and Passi-
bility’, I introduce the theological concept of passibility in more 
detail as a useful tool for distinguishing between different ethical 
ideals, both in general and in Shakespeare’s Roman plays in par-
ticular. Differences between these ideals, I propose, can be seen 
most clearly in competing concepts of the divine. In keeping with 
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its admiration for absolute power, classical philosophy describes 
its deities as impassible, even impersonal: abstract forces such as 
‘Fate’, ‘the One’ or ‘the Form of the Good’. Christianity, by con-
trast, glorifi es empathy and therefore describes its version of the 
divine, ‘Christ crucifi ed’, as necessarily passible, as well as per-
sonal. God must be vulnerable, sentient, in order to feel compas-
sion for the suffering of man. As objects of what Wayne Rebhorn 
calls ‘emulation’, a mixture of admiration, imitation and competi-
tion, these divine exempla affect day-to-day decision-making. Cit-
ing Rebhorn’s concept of ‘emulation’, Coppélia Kahn represents 
this ‘cultural practice’ as a root cause of Shakespeare’s Romans’ 
characteristic cruelty. The tragedy of Shakespeare’s Romans is not 
emulation itself, however, but the inhuman character of the ideal 
self which they choose to emulate: the unfeeling, invulnerable 
form of the divine Caesar describes metaphorically as ‘Olympus’ 
and ‘the northern star’. This ideal leaves no room for the suscepti-
bility to empathy, reciprocal respect and openness to compromise 
which Shakespeare, like Cicero, sees as integral to healthy human 
interdependence.116
In his history of personhood, The Mirages of the Selfe (sic), 
Timothy Reiss argues that the modern concept of the self, the Car-
tesian ego cogito, emerges in the early modern period, beginning 
with Petrarch, as a result of an effort to separate personhood from 
the most basic given of the human condition: the state of being 
‘embedded in and acted on by’ what he calls ‘circles’ or ‘spheres’ 
of infl uence. Modern concepts of personhood tend to present rela-
tional factors such as social status, kinship, moral duties and reli-
gious beliefs as mere contingencies, accidents surrounding but not 
defi ning the self. In the pre-modern period, however, these various 
forms of what Reiss calls ‘passibility’ were understood as intrin-
sic to selfhood. The self is not autonomous, but embedded, exist-
ing in a state of reactivity. Reiss might easily sound therefore as 
if he were a fellow traveller with those, like Lacan or Althusser, 
who argue for what Ricœur calls ‘the shattered subject’. For these 
antihumanists, individual agency is an illusion; the self is in fact 
altogether at the mercy of impersonal forces such as language or 
economics. Reiss insists, however, that the susceptibility to external 
infl uence he ascribes to the passible self is not the same as mere 
‘passivity’. ‘None of this is to say that persons are wholly deter-
mined by context, that personal identities are socially, culturally, 
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and ideologically fashioned as mere semes of an overarching dis-
course, meanings made by a symbolics of power. Webbed, made 
and making in multiple contexts, personhood still has real agency 
(of endlessly varied sorts).’117 Reiss’s metaphor, ‘webbed’, suggests 
the kinship between his ‘circles’ of infl uences and Taylor’s conceit 
of a ‘web of interlocution’. Reiss argues that the attempt to proj-
ect modern concepts of the self as independent of such ‘webs’ or 
‘circles’ back into the pre-modern past is anachronistic. 
Charles Taylor, however, has a different agenda, as does Reiss’s 
other key source, Alasdair MacIntyre. From their perspective, the 
pre-modern concept of what Reiss calls the ‘passible’ self is in fact 
more accurate, even today, than the isolated, incorporeal phantom 
Ricœur calls ‘the Cartesian subject’. Modern ethics as they see it 
is led astray by efforts to imagine individuals as capable of radi-
cal autonomy, much less to represent that ‘liberty’ as the highest 
good. Reiss introduces similar misgivings about the application of 
‘universal’ ethics such as those formulated by the United Nations 
to nations that may not share Western assumptions as to what it 
means to be a person. Kant’s belief, for instance, in the possibility 
of disinterested action seems to him especially dubious. 
Shakespeare, I propose, sees his Romans much as MacIntyre, 
Taylor, Ricœur and Reiss see us moderns. He sees his Romans’ 
characteristic Neostoicism, moreover, much as these philosophers 
see Kantian ethics. The problem is not that individual agency, 
the defi ning characteristic of the so-called ‘bourgeois subject’, is 
entirely illusory. The problem is rather that its scope is more lim-
ited than characters such as Caesar, Antony and Coriolanus would 
like to believe. Like Icarus, they try to fl y too close to the sun, and 
as a result they plummet back down to their death. Kantian dis-
interestedness, for example, such as Brutus seems to strive for is 
not so much good or bad as fl at-out impossible. The ideal of the 
unattached, unencumbered self is not only unattainable, but dan-
gerous to pursue; ‘liberty’ in the ‘neo-Roman’ sense proves to be a 
tragically misleading aim. 
In the second section of the second chapter, ‘“Constancy” and 
“Frailty”’, I look more specifi cally at feminist interpretations of 
Julius Caesar put forward in the 1980s and 1990s by Janet Adel-
man, Madelon Sprengnether, Cynthia Marshall, Gail Kern Paster 
and Coppélia Kahn. The characteristic Roman disdain for femi-
ninity that these authors attribute in their earlier work to men’s 
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‘pre-Oedipal’ desires to detach themselves from their ‘suffocat-
ing mothers’ and establish themselves as masculine, and then in 
their later work to the political pressures of patriarchy and male 
rivalry, I see instead as an effect of a more fundamental Roman 
discomfort with passibility. The two female characters in the play, 
Portia and Calpurnia, can themselves be read, not only as indi-
viduals, but also as symbols of repressed aspects of Brutus and 
Caesar. The women represent their husbands’ underdeveloped 
capacity for pity.
In the conclusion to my analysis of Julius Caesar, ‘Shakespeare’s 
passion play’, I explore the possibility that Shakespeare’s depiction 
of Julius Caesar is indebted to the representation of Augustus Caesar 
in medieval English biblical drama. Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar’s 
unabashed description of himself as ‘Olympus’ and ‘the northern 
star’ strongly resembles Augustus Caesar’s opening speech in the 
Towneley cycle, as well the same character’s opening speech in the 
Chester cycle. Both of these speeches, moreover, are themselves 
parodies of God’s opening speech in each case, the great ‘Ego sum’ 
with which each cycle opens. In further support of this suggestion, 
I compare Shakespeare’s version of the Caesar legend to that of 
other, roughly contemporary authors such as Marc-Antoine Muret 
and Sir William Alexander. These authors model their Caesar on 
the example of Seneca’s Hercules, borrowing repeatedly from his 
Hercules furens and Hercules Oetaeus. That Shakespeare deviates 
from this tradition, and that he also departs in various intriguing 
details from his most immediate source, Plutarch’s ‘Life of Julius 
Caesar’, suggests that he had in mind a different precedent. Like 
the traditional cycle-play ‘Caesar’, Shakespeare’s, too, is a bloviat-
ing, ineffectual parody of Christ.
In my discussion of Julius Caesar, I focus on susceptibility to 
emotions, especially ‘pity’, and a very literal, physical kind of pas-
sibility. In my analysis of Antony and Cleopatra, I turn, by contrast, 
to a subtler form of vulnerability. Shakespeare, I argue, sees the 
self as profoundly sensitive to moral judgement. Every individual 
is perpetually, ineluctably embedded in overlapping matrices of 
moral evaluation, judging and being judged in turn. I describe this 
process of judgement as ‘interpellation’, modifying the sense that 
it has for Althusser, in order to stress the fact that Shakespeare sees 
the perceptions of others as a powerful force, not easily dismissed. 
Despite the many different, formidable defence mechanisms that 
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each individual psyche can potentially bring to bear, other people 
are at times capable of altering our own self-perception. Denial, 
disavowal and retreat from ‘nature’ into an alternative world of 
‘fancy’ allow some measure of escape. If other people are more 
powerful, however, or more numerous, exposure to their opinion 
can over time prove impossible to ignore. The most drastic exam-
ple of this kind of exposure, in Shakespeare’s Roman plays, is to 
be led in triumph as a captive through the streets of Rome, and 
this prospect represents therefore for characters such as Antony 
and Cleopatra, as well as Brutus, a kind of summum malum. 
Brutus insists that he will not, under any circumstances, ‘go bound 
to Rome’. And, indeed, he does in the end kill himself, once his 
defeat is apparent. In the fi rst section of the third chapter, ‘Stoic 
Suicide as “Hobgoblin”’, I compare Cleopatra to Brutus and pro-
pose that Cleopatra’s death is in fact surprisingly consistent with 
Stoicism, despite her vividly passionate life.118
Shakespeare’s interest in the Roman triumph is one expression, 
among others, of a more general fascination on his part with a 
paradox built into the very nature of honour itself. Characters 
who are concerned about honour pride themselves, above all, 
on their self-suffi ciency. Their claim to honour, as they see it, is 
grounded in an autarchy akin to that of a medieval lord. They 
want to see themselves as masters of their own sphere of infl u-
ence, including their bodies, their emotions and even their rela-
tions. They bristle at the thought of any kind of dependence on 
anything other than themselves, because that measure of fragility, 
however slight, would imply that they are somehow vulnerable, 
somehow less than ideal. Much literary criticism of Antony and 
Cleopatra focuses on the differences between the Egyptians and 
the Romans; in this respect, however, they are essentially akin. 
The same mindset can be seen in Shakespeare’s ancient Greeks, as 
well, in Troilus and Cressida and Timon of Athens. Shakespeare’s 
pagans, or at least, those of his pagans who belong to the upper 
class, such as Cleopatra, refl ect the value-system of the contempo-
rary English nobility, but exaggerated, or perhaps rendered clearer, 
by the absence of Christianity. The self is all; the other is unneces-
sary, irrelevant; or so they would like to believe. 
What such characters discover, much to their chagrin, is that 
the other, even if despised, is indispensable. The paradox of hon-
our, as Shakespeare sees it, is that the self needs the other in order 
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to confi rm its own self-suffi ciency. That very need for the other, 
moreover, shows that their supposed self-suffi ciency is delusional. 
As Paul Cantor observes, a psychological double bind lies at the 
heart of Coriolanus’ character. ‘He seeks honor but dislikes the 
requirement of having other men to honor him. Thinking he can 
stand alone on the basis of his honor, he fi nds instead that his 
pursuit of honor binds him more closely to the city.’119 Hegel 
describes the same problem in more abstract terms in his descrip-
tion of the master–slave dialectic. ‘Just where the master has effec-
tively achieved lordship, he really fi nds that something has come 
about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not 
an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has 
achieved.’120 
Coriolanus is able to scoff at the opinion of his fellow Romans, 
not because he is truly impervious to all opprobrium, but because 
he is so deeply bound to one person, his mother, that no one else’s 
approval seems important in comparison. In Antony and Cleopa-
tra, the two lovers cultivate in like manner what amounts to a folie 
à deux. Cleopatra fi nds one powerful man whom she can seduce, 
one pre-eminent enough, like Antony or Caesar, that she can take 
him as representative of the entire world. Antony in turn is able 
to tap into the legendary, limitless wealth of Egypt, as well as the 
glamour of having won, in Cleopatra, a singular prize, a latter-
day Helen of Troy. While he is in her company, moreover, Antony 
is able to enjoy what for Roman would have been an unaccus-
tomed degree of absolute rule. As long as he is with Cleopatra in 
Egypt, Antony no longer has to go through the motions of being 
merely one more Roman citizen; he does not have to push away 
the crown, like Caesar in Julius Caesar, or negotiate terms with 
two other triumvirs. Instead, he can unabashedly behave, even in 
public, as if he were a god: Osiris to Cleopatra’s Isis. 
In the second section of the third chapter, ‘“Fancy” vs. “Nature”’, 
I show that such a compact of mutual admiration is not without 
its own attendant dangers. For it to work without fail, their folie à 
deux would require a sangfroid that Antony and Cleopatra do not 
possess, perhaps to their credit: a clearheaded self-awareness that its 
very terms tend to preclude. Antony would have to remember that 
he is not, in fact, the god that he can pretend to be, while he is at 
play in Alexandria; his power in the larger Roman world, unlike the 
obedience of Cleopatra’s slaves, does not answer solely to his passing 
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caprice. Caught up in an enchanting delusion, he comes to see him-
self as more autonomous than in the end he really is. Cleopatra for 
her part would have to be careful not to fall too deeply in love; she 
would have to be willing to move on from Antony, when he falls, just 
as she did from Caesar, to the next world-bestriding colossus, who 
in this case turns out to be the rather frosty, off-putting ‘boy Caesar’, 
Octavian. And, despite all Antony’s fears to the contrary, she cannot. 
She is in the end too old and too enamoured of Antony in particular 
to be able to play politics with her affections as she perhaps might 
once have done, in her ‘salad days’. 
In order to explain Shakespeare’s sense of human selfhood as 
susceptible to moral judgement, in the fi rst part of the next chapter, 
‘“Eye to eye opposed”’, I introduce an explanation of what I take to 
be Shakespeare’s understanding of the intersubjective relationship 
between self and other. Since at least the 1980s, Shakespeare studies 
has been decidedly historicist, at times even radically so, emphasis-
ing the contingency of aspects of the human subject such as sexuality 
or madness once thought susceptible to description in terms of uni-
versal, abiding and objective norms. Elements of personhood which 
psychologists might describe as a natural consequence of perennial 
features of human biology have instead been represented as primar-
ily or even entirely dependent on the shifting contexts of contem-
porary culture. For a time, the infl uence of Althusser and Foucault 
became pervasive, even hegemonic. Relationships of power and sub-
jection were held to produce ‘ideology’, which through literature, 
as well as other forms of ‘discourse’, ‘interpellates’ the individual 
and shapes him or her into a compliant ‘subject’. Peter Holbrook, 
among others, laments this effect of what he calls ‘the “Theory” 
explosion’. ‘Theory’s chastening lesson is that the autonomous self 
is a will-o’-the-wisp and that character is determined by imperious 
historical forces.’121
As Holbrook says, ‘I do not recognize myself in the estranged 
world of the anti-humanists.’122 Happily, however, as critics such as 
Nancy Selleck, Christopher Tilmouth and others have begun to sug-
gest, Shakespeare’s own understanding of intersubjectivity provides 
an appealing alternative.123 In his representation of interpersonal 
interaction, Shakespeare complicates false dichotomies between 
supposedly overwhelming cultural forces such as ‘discourse’, imper-
sonal, diffuse and vast in scope, and the beleaguered, supposedly 
powerless ‘subject’. Other individuals intervene between culture 
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and the subject, shaping and being shaped in turn, mediating the 
infl uence of any kind of Zeitgeist. The particularity of these oth-
ers should not be elided, but instead recognised as introducing the 
granular specifi city of smaller-scale, intersubjective networks within 
any larger and more sweeping construct such as Foucault’s epis-
temes. As Tilmouth explains, ‘Since 1990 several critics have devel-
oped the paradoxical claim that Renaissance selfhood was in some 
degree vested outside the individual, imagined as located in other 
minds.’ What Katharine Maus describes as ‘inwardness’ has been 
‘reconceived as an experience situated on the boundary between the 
person and those to whom he relates, within the dialogic domain of 
intersubjectivity’.124
 Shakespeare’s interpretation of the relation between self and 
other is in part derived from Aristotle’s theory of friendship. As he 
articulates that theory, however, he also introduces complications, 
anticipating in several respects one of the most prominent trends 
in twentieth-century philosophical anthropology. Like Shakespeare, 
authors such as Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin, Paul Ricœur and 
Jürgen Habermas have come to emphasise relations between indi-
viduals as the ground of human personhood. The other is what 
Martin Buber calls a ‘thou’, a partner in a dialogue. This ceaseless, 
constitutive interaction, the ‘I –thou’ relationship, is the most fun-
damental given of the human condition. Nancy Selleck argues that 
this sense of selfhood as ‘interpersonal’, ‘part of a reciprocally-con-
stituted social fi eld’, ‘underpins much of the language of selfhood in 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries’. Other early modern 
authors such as John Donne, as well as Shakespeare, ‘magnify or 
harp on’ this ‘sense of engagement with a live other’: ‘a live, con-
crete, agentive other that is also not alien but in dialogue with the 
self.’ ‘The Renaissance self entails other selves.’125 
Departing from Aristotle, Shakespeare’s fi rst innovation is to 
expand ancient thought about the role of the other in self-knowledge 
beyond the confi nes of friendship between two individuals, so that it 
approximates instead the relationship between actor or playwright 
and audience. Shakespeare’s second point of revision is to present 
the other much more explicitly as a necessary part of self-percep-
tion: integral, not optional. Shakespeare’s third alteration, however, 
is by far the most interesting, and appears most clearly in Antony 
and Cleopatra. As Selleck says of the narrator in Shakespeare’s 
sonnets, in Antony and Cleopatra the self fi nds itself imbricated in 
‘other frames of reference that it cannot control’.126 The effect of 
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the other upon the self is not something that the self can easily or 
entirely dismiss. We cannot help but be affected, in some measure, 
by what other people think of us. Given suffi cient exposure to their 
perspective, their version of our selves, however troubling, begins to 
impinge upon our own. The risk of such forced alteration in his own 
self-image is the reason why Coriolanus refuses to go through the 
proper motions to become consul and why Brutus and Cleopatra 
are so horrifi ed at the thought of being led in triumph. To be seen a 
certain way long enough and by enough people is to have one’s self-
image, howsoever unwillingly, brought into closer conformity with 
that collective assessment.
To explain Shakespeare’s thought about this phenomenon, in the 
second section of the fourth chapter, ‘“I would not see’t”’, I invoke 
Althusser’s well-known metaphor of interpellation or ‘hailing’, but 
apply it in a very different sense than Althusser himself. Althusser 
sees interpellation as a unilateral process with one kind of agent, 
an impersonal force that he calls ‘ideology’, and a different kind of 
subject, the individual, whom he presents as markedly passive, as if 
ideology were form, and the individual, matter. As Selleck observes, 
this putative ‘passivity’ of the subject is ‘both crucial to Althusser’s 
theory and one of its more problematic aspects’. ‘In contrast to 
Bakhtinian theory, there is no sense here of the subject’s participa-
tion in a process: “ideology” is not affected by its subjects.’127 Like 
Bakhtin, Shakespeare sees interpellation instead as multilateral and 
reciprocal. People continually act upon each other’s subjectivities, 
even without meaning to, so as to bring them into closer confor-
mity with their own. Our diverse individual experiences of reality 
are not and indeed cannot be made entirely solipsistic; cannot be 
rendered self-contained, even by dint of great effort. Instead, our 
individual perspectives are inevitably porous, diffuse, bleeding into 
each other like contiguous inkblots. 
Resistance to being subsumed into a shared subjective space is 
not altogether impossible, however. One can escape from ‘common 
sense’ into wine or ‘mandragora’; imaginative fantasies (‘dreams’) 
or a romantic relationship. Just how far in practice we can escape 
subjective entanglement with the rival images of ourselves other 
people have in mind, especially those that are less than fl attering, 
is in general a question Shakespeare seems to have found fascinat-
ing, and which he explores in particular detail in his version of 
the Cleopatra legend, as well as his earlier history play Richard 
II.128 In both cases, Shakespeare’s sense of the limits of perceptual 
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autonomy seems to be that the process I call here ‘interpellation’ 
is to some extent voluntary, but not completely so. The ability of 
an individual to resist interpellation is susceptible to disparities 
of power and, especially, number. Characters such as Cleopatra 
see being shown at length before a hostile, jeering crowd as too 
much to be able to resist, even given great powers of dissociation; 
such prolonged and multifaceted exposure would inevitably prove 
overwhelming. So, as the alternative of last resort, they commit sui-
cide. Even suicide, however, Shakespeare suggests, may not prove 
in the end the defi nitive exit that these pagan characters imagine 
it will be. In keeping with Christian doctrine, for Shakespeare, the 
afterlife promises, not escape, but if anything, even more extensive 
exposure to the other. As Sartre says, huis clos (‘no exit’). 
In Shakespeare’s Roman plays, characters such as Antony and 
Cleopatra, as well as Brutus, strive to escape the possibility of 
being judged adversely, and their success is never complete or last-
ing. Coriolanus is the most obvious example; he cannot even bear 
to be praised, lest it suggest that his sense of himself depends in 
any way on the good opinion or ‘voices’ of other people. Corio-
lanus’ ostensible contempt for others’ opinion of him, however, 
is belied by his exaggerated and fi nally fatal dependence on his 
mother’s approval. He and Volumnia represent the folie à deux 
broken, much as Antony and Cleopatra represent it sustained, 
even to the point of death. Out of all of Shakespeare’s characters, 
these two lovers in particular come as close as possible to escaping 
all external interpellation, fi nding a kind of refuge from oppro-
brium in each other’s fl attering gaze. Subtly, however, throughout 
the play, Shakespeare reminds us that even personalities as grandi-
ose as Cleopatra’s may not be able to escape the Last Judgement: 
‘doomsday’. Human beings by their very nature as human, rather 
than divine, are vulnerable to processes of moral judgement that 
they do not and cannot ever entirely control. 
In the conclusion to my analysis of Antony and Cleopatra, ‘The 
Last Interpellation’, I look closely at the play’s recurrent, ironic 
allusions to Scripture and argue that Shakespeare subtly reminds 
the audience throughout of a Christian revelation of which the 
characters on stage are themselves unaware. For Shakespeare’s 
Romans, suicide appears to be an unimpeachable defence against 
the possibility of any further humiliation. Suicide is a means to 
remain unseen and therefore unaffected by a hostile audience. This 
view of suicide depends, however, as Shakespeare recognises, on 
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a rejection or else ignorance of the Christian understanding of the 
afterlife. Death is only an escape, if there is nothing after death, or 
if death leads, not to heaven and hell, but to some sort of pagan 
Elysium; one that corresponds with suspicious congruity to the 
suicide’s own fantasies. Whether or not we see Antony and Cleopa-
tra as ultimately successful in their attempt, through suicide, to 
preserve their own self-contained subjective space depends, in the 
end, on whether or not we believe Shakespeare shares their vision 
of what Hamlet calls ‘the undiscover’d country’.
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Discontent. My own impression is that in the civil rights era, rac-
ism was the centre of political contention, at least within the United 
States. Once civil rights more or less won the day, Christianity became 
the new faultline, giving rise to the so-called ‘Culture Wars’ of the 
1980s and 1990s. I am relieved that racism is no longer as pervasive 
as it once was in American society. I am less sanguine, however, about 
the dissolution of Christianity, for fear of the ‘rough beast’ that has 
shown up to fi ll the void: identity politics, including the so-called ‘alt-
right’, which I see as in essence a peripheral variation on the same. 
As Christianity loses its former cultural hegemony, what seems to 
be emerging in its place, not only in the United States, but also in 
the United Kingdom and Europe, is an antagonism that is not so 
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Sandel, I wonder what happens next. Can liberalism on its own avoid 
degenerating into what Hobbes calls bellum omnium contra omnes? 
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CHAPTER 1
‘A BEAST WITHOUT A HEART’: PIETAS AND 
PITY IN JULIUS CAESAR
In Julius Caesar, Brutus is a deeply attractive character, not only 
to his wife, Portia, and his friend, Cassius, but even to his mur-
der victim, Caesar, as well as his chief rival, Antony. What makes 
Brutus so appealing, however, is a quality which he himself sees 
as a moral vice, empathy, including in this case a sense of civic 
duty. Despite his initial misgivings, Brutus backslides into political 
engagement: Cassius lures him away from Senecan philosophical 
isolation into an obsolescent Ciceronian enthusiasm for service to 
the state. Brutus’ kind-heartedness is political, as well as ethical, 
fi nding expression in a sense of noblesse oblige. He tries to with-
draw from public affairs and ‘live unknown’ like an Epicurean 
philosopher, but he has too keen a sense of his responsibilities or 
what Cicero might call his offi cia (‘roles, obligations’) as a hus-
band, friend and patriot; he cannot shake his old-fashioned pietas 
(‘duty, reverence’). 
Even more striking, given his ostensible Stoicism, is Brutus’ 
tendency, like Coriolanus, to give way to compassion. Pity is an 
emotion which they both see, like Seneca, as an embarrassing and 
distracting weakness. As Russell Hillier observes, ‘The natural 
pity Martius fi nds within himself for his family and his people 
when he capitulates to the claims of “Great Nature” (5.3.33) 
shames him in the eyes of the Romans and the Volscians.’1 Like 
Coriolanus, Brutus fi nds to his chagrin that his strenuous efforts 
to maintain a sense of command over his inner life repeatedly 
break down. When he sees that he has hurt his friend, Cassius, 
or his wife, Portia, he yields, like a Christian, to a humane and 
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generous desire to comfort them in their distress. This unbidden 
empathy, like his decision to engage in politics, is incompatible 
with his chosen ‘philosophy’ (4.3.143).2 His own ideal self is not 
the one which Antony describes, the Republican hero, animated 
by concern for the ‘common good’ (5.5.72), but instead the quasi-
mythical fi gure of the Stoic sapiens, distinguished by his superhu-
man detachment from the world at large.
In sum, Shakespeare depicts Brutus as torn between two 
opposed visions of heroism: Stoic and proto-Christian. He aims 
to become an exemplary Stoic sage. But he fails to remain indif-
ferent to the imminent collapse of the Roman Republic. He can-
not bring himself to alienate his own wife, Portia, or his friend, 
Cassius. Instead, in his concern for other people, Brutus reveals 
an aspect of his character which cannot be reconciled to his ambi-
tion to be seen as a philosopher: a refractory streak of kindness. 
For Shakespeare, as well as his audience, shaped by the values of 
a Christian milieu, Brutus’ deep-set sense of empathy is attrac-
tive. It fi ts the Christian model of heroism: Christ’s self-sacrifi ce 
for love. For Brutus himself, however, acts of pity, including his 
own, are contemptible. His heroism, in so far as it is analogous 
to Christian heroism, is inadvertent, ‘accidental’ (4.3.144), rather 
than deliberate, emerging despite his own best efforts to restrain 
himself. Brutus’ reaction to his wife’s death, especially, stands out 
as a kind of felix culpa, redeeming him as a character from other-
wise-insufferable Stoic posturing.
For a Stoic, love such as Christ’s is not a form of heroism, but 
a dangerous weakness. As Francis Bacon explains, ‘He that hath 
wife and children, hath given hostages to fortune.’3 When Brutus 
grieves for his wife, it humanises him in the eyes of the audience. 
To a Christian, tears can be noble; Christ himself weeps at the 
tomb of Lazarus. What Brutus wants, however, is instead to be 
what a Christian would call hard-hearted. As he sees himself, his 
concern for others’ well-being is not virtuous, but on the contrary 
an embarrassing, damning lapse in his effort to maintain, at all 
times, an appearance of Stoic constancy, if not that constancy in 
fact. Christian caritas has no place in that vision of an ideal self, the 
remote, self-suffi cient philosopher exalted in Senecan Neostoicism. 
There is no room there for political activism; no room even for 
more discrete, personal acts of human fellow-feeling. Compassion 
by its very nature entails a loss of self-control: to empathise with 
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others is to lose the emotional self-sovereignty which Seneca, espe-
cially, praises as the highest conceivable moral good.
Shakespeare invokes older, more civic-minded Roman thought 
through the fi gure of Lucius Junius Brutus, Brutus’ ancestor, famous 
as the man who drove out the tyrannical Tarquins. This hero is 
a fl esh-and-blood character drawn from history, or at least from 
quasi-historical legend. Within Stoic philosophy, however, the ideal 
self is often described in the abstract instead, simply as the sapiens 
(‘wise man’, ‘sage’). In Shakespeare’s tragedy, this fi gure appears as 
well, in a sense, in the form of a statue of the ancestor in question, 
Lucius Junius Brutus. Refl ecting on Seneca in his Praise of Folly, 
Erasmus condemns his ideal sapiens as ‘a marble statue of a man, 
utterly unfeeling and quite impervious to all human emotion’.4 
A statue is a vivid symbol of disinterestedness: a visual incarnation 
of Stoic apathia. 
Brutus vs. Brutus: Seneca, Cicero and the Stoic Ideal
In this section, I begin by introducing the psychoanalytic concept 
of the ego ideal, and I argue in the spirit of Freud and Adler that 
this ideal tends to be articulated in images of the divine. The ideal 
self can also be hypostasised, however, as a fellow human being: 
a hero such a Christian saint. The ego ideal is contingent upon 
cultural context, as well as personal preference, and as such can 
be a Christian martyr, for example, or a Buddhist monk, just as 
easily as a warrior such as Achilles or Beowulf. Within Stoicism, 
the ego ideal is typically described in the abstract as the sapiens, a 
quasi-mythical ‘wise man’ or ‘sage’ who always does as he ought. 
Seneca sometimes identifi es the fi gure of the sapiens with spe-
cifi c historical individuals such as Socrates and Cato the Younger. 
But that identifi cation is pressurised, temporary and subject to 
doubt. In his essay ‘On Cruelty’, Montaigne turns against Sen-
eca; after much thought, he concludes that Socrates and Cato 
did not in fact conform, as Seneca suggests, to the template of 
the Stoic sapiens. Even at their most heroic moments, the very 
instant of their suicides, they each felt some touch of exultation. 
‘Witness the younger Cato,’ Montaigne writes. ‘I cannot believe 
that he merely maintained himself in the attitude that the rules 
of the Stoic sect ordained for him, sedate, without emotion, and 
impassible.’5
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Despite himself, Shakespeare’s Brutus shows like signs of inner 
confl ict: he describes himself as ‘with himself at war’ (1.2.46), 
‘vexed’ with ‘passions of some difference’ (1.2.39–40). Brutus 
is not only torn, like Montaigne’s Cato, between his Stoic ‘atti-
tude’ and his own emotions, but also between two rival moral 
imperatives. The tension between competing visions of ethics 
that Shakespeare’s Brutus experiences and that largely defi nes 
his character refl ects the contrast between Seneca’s Epicureanism 
and Cicero’s Stoicism. For Seneca, apathia is an end unto itself, 
requiring disengagement from political obligations. Cicero, 
much to the contrary, denounces ‘philosophers’ who retire from 
the public sphere for ‘neglecting to defend others’ and ‘deserting’ 
their ‘duty’. ‘Hindered by their devotion to learning, they aban-
don those whom they ought to protect.’6 
The Greek philosopher Xenophanes once quipped that, if 
animals were to describe the gods, they would draw pictures 
of themselves. ‘Horses would paint the forms of the gods like 
horses, and oxen like oxen.’7 Centuries later, Feuerbach came to 
much the same conclusion. ‘If God were an object to the bird, 
he would be a winged being.’8 In the nineteenth century a wide 
range of intellectuals, including Marx and Durkheim, as well as 
Fueurbach, came to see man’s gods as merely projections of him-
self. Man draws his own character upon an inanimate, indifferent 
cosmos. In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud is sympathetic 
to this tradition, but also introduces an important revision. Man 
is not so thoroughly self-satisfi ed as to imagine that God is sim-
ply identical to himself. Instead, concepts of the divine refl ect a 
man’s concept of an ideal or perfect self, one to which he himself 
does not necessarily conform. God represents what Freud calls 
the ‘ego ideal’. 
Long ago he [sc. ‘man’] formed an ideal conception of omnipo-
tence and omniscience which he embodied in his gods. To these 
gods he attributed everything that seemed unattainable to his 
wishes, or that was forbidden to him. One may say, therefore, that 
these gods were cultural ideals. 
Freud then defi nes more clearly what he means by ‘cultural ideals’: 
‘what might be called man’s “ideals”’ are ‘his ideas of a possible 
perfection of individuals, or of peoples or of the whole of human-
ity, and the demands that he sets up on the basis of such ideas’.9 
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This understanding of the divine as an articulation of the char-
acter of the ideal self appears more clearly in the work of Freud’s 
contemporary rival Alfred Adler. Adler grants that ‘each person 
imagines his God differently’. Nevertheless, God is ‘the best con-
ception gained so far of this ideal elevation of mankind’, ‘the 
concrete formulation of the goal of perfection’.10 For Adler, all of 
man’s activity can be explained in terms of a single master motive, 
comparable in character and explanatory force to Freud’s ‘libido’: 
a ‘striving for perfection’, ‘superiority’ or ‘overcoming’ which 
Adler sees as innate and integral to life itself:
Mastery of the environment appears to be inseparably connected 
with the concept of evolution. If this striving were not innate to 
the organism, no form of life could preserve itself. The goal of 
mastering the environment in a superior way, which one can call 
the striving for perfection, consequently also characterizes the 
development of man. 
Adler takes some pains, however, to distinguish this urge from 
its most obvious apparent analogue, Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’. 
‘Striving for perfection’ is not necessarily the same as ‘striving for 
power’.11 
Unlike Nietzsche, Adler does not see an irreconcilable confl ict 
between man’s ‘striving for perfection’ and his human feelings of 
compassion or pity: that ‘feeling with the whole’ which he calls 
‘social interest’ (Gemeinschaftsgefühl, literally ‘community feel-
ing’). Instead, he defi nes Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ as a subspe-
cies of this ‘striving for perfection’, a misdirection of its energy 
away from man’s proper goal: the ‘common work’ of a ‘cooperat-
ing community’. ‘Deviations and failures of the human character 
– neurosis, psychosis, crime, drug addiction, etc. – are nothing 
but forms of expression and symptoms of the striving for supe-
riority directed against fellowmanship (Mitmenschlichkeit, liter-
ally ‘being a fellow-man’, ‘co-humanity’).’ For Nietzsche, pity 
leads to décadence, a self-destructive malaise akin to the world-
weariness Romantics called Weltschmerz (literally, ‘world-pain’). 
For Adler, however, precisely the reverse is true. To ‘concretise’ 
one’s ‘striving for perfection’ or ‘mastery of the environment’ as 
a ‘striving to master one’s fellow man’ is ‘erroneous, contradict-
ing the concept of evolution’. The ambition ‘to dominate over 
others’ is the ‘incorrect path’, leading to the ‘decline and fall of 
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the individual’, as well as the ‘extinction’ of entire ‘races, tribes, 
families’.12 
What Adler calls ‘striving for perfection’ is not therefore sim-
ply synonymous with what Nietzsche calls ‘the will to power’, 
and which Freud defi nes, in more sexual terms, as a longing for 
phallic potency. The ego ideal is open to a much wider variety of 
instantiations. If represented by a deity, that God need not be the 
wholly transcendent, impersonal God of classical philosophy. If 
represented by a human hero, the exemplum need not be a war-
rior such as Coriolanus. Depending upon a given individual’s or 
culture’s defi nition of ‘perfection’, the ideal self can at times be 
found instead in paragons of martyred passivity. It can be Jesus, 
for example, broken on the Cross. As Adler explains, ‘each per-
son imagines his God differently’.13 In some cultures, it is not the 
warrior who inspires the most fervent admiration, but instead 
the martyr or ascetic. The idealisation of masculinity, physical 
force and invulnerability that defi nes Shakespeare’s Romans can 
be understood therefore as peculiar to their culture, rather than 
any kind of biological necessity or given of human nature. Their 
ego ideals, although compelling, are not the only such ideals pos-
sible. Moreover, in their aspirations, Shakespeare’s Romans are 
themselves not wholly internally consistent, either with each other 
or even within themselves, as individuals. They all seek power, in 
one sense or another, but power is subject to varying defi nitions. 
Caesar, for example, seeks political sovereignty: the power of a 
king. Brutus, however, wants to be able to control himself: the 
power of a philosopher. 
Like all ethical systems, Stoicism presupposes a discrepancy 
between the real and the ideal. We are not what we could and 
should be, if we only recognised what it is we ought to do. Like all 
ethical systems, Stoicism then explains its exhortations by means of 
concrete examples, as well as abstract precepts. For Christians, for 
instance, the rule is the Golden Rule, and the exemplar is Christ. 
For Buddhists, the rule is the Eightfold Path, and the exemplar 
is the Buddha. For Stoics, the rule is Epictetus’ maxim ‘Bear and 
forebear’, or some variation thereon. The example, however, tends 
to be anonymous: the unnamed ‘wise man’ or ‘sage’ (Latin, sapi-
ens). Like Hamlet’s Stoic friend, Horatio, the sapiens can there-
fore come across as a curious cipher: a mere blank space, albeit 
with praise attached.14 Typically, for instance, the ‘wise man’ is 
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described apophatically, more notable for what he is not (‘pas-
sion’s slave’ [3.2.72]) than for what he is.15 Even so, the Stoics 
need him as a convenient shorthand. Even if he remains somewhat 
notional and indefi nite, the ‘wise man’ as a placeholder crystallises 
their theorising into a personifi cation. Seneca describes the sapiens 
as ‘calm’ and ‘unshaken’. He has ‘attained perfection’; his ‘mind’ 
is like ‘the superlunary world’, ‘always serene’.16 
The fi gure of the Stoic sage also defl ects possible charges of 
hypocrisy. By directing attention to people such as Cato and 
Socrates, Seneca need not present himself as a hero of his own 
moral system. ‘I hope someday to be a wise man,’ he explains, ‘but 
meanwhile I am not a wise man.’17 This modesty is a trope which 
he inherits from his Hellenistic Greek precursors, as he reveals in 
an anecdote about the Stoic philosopher Panaetius. 
I think Panaetius gave a charming answer to the youth who asked 
whether the wise man would fall in love: ‘As to the wise man, we 
shall see. What concerns you and me, who are still a great distance 
from the wise man, is to ensure that we do not fall into a state of 
affairs which is disturbed, powerless, subservient to another, and 
worthless to oneself.’18 
This habit of speech, however, gives rise to an obvious question. 
Is the ‘wise man’ wholly notional? In the course of human history, 
has any fl esh-and-blood person ever fi t this category? If not, could 
anyone ever even conceivably come to exist who might some-
day, somewhere live up to its criteria? A living, breathing hero 
of apatheia? Alexander of Aphrodisias, a Hellenistic opponent 
of Stoicism, insists that ‘the majority of men are bad’. Neverthe-
less, he is willing to grant that ‘there have been just one or two 
good men, as their fables maintain, like some absurd and unnatu-
ral creature rarer than the Ethiopian phoenix’.19 More typically, 
Greek Stoic philosophers concede that the sapiens might not exist. 
Chrysippus confesses that ‘on account of their extreme magnitude 
and beauty we [Stoics] seem to be stating things which are like 
fi ctions and not in accordance with man and human nature’. And 
he admits, ‘Vice cannot be removed completely.’20 Epictetus also 
tries to temper expectation. ‘Is it possible to remain quite fault-
less? That is beyond our power . . . We must be content if we 
avoid [. . .] a few faults.’21 Cleanthes is the most optimistic of the 
Hellenistic Stoics, and even he gives little room for hope. ‘Man 
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walks in wickedness all his life, or, at any rate, for the greater part 
of it. If he ever attains to virtue, it is late, and at the very sunset of 
his days.’22
With more confi dence than his Greek sources, Seneca insists 
that it is possible for us to perfect ourselves, that is, to free our-
selves from passion. Nevertheless, the feat is extremely unusual. 
‘A good man’, ‘one of the fi rst class’, ‘springs, perhaps, into exis-
tence, like the phoenix, only once in fi ve hundred years’.23 ‘Perhaps’: 
even here Seneca hedges his bets. In his essay De constantia (‘On 
Constancy’), Seneca rebukes his friend, Serenus, for his doubts, but 
then trails off into careful qualifi cations of his claims.
There is no reason for you to say, Serenus, as your habit is, that 
this wise man of ours is nowhere to be found. He is not a fi c-
tion of us Stoics, a sort of phantom glory of human nature, nor 
is he a mere conception, the mighty semblance of a thing unreal, 
but we have shown him in the fl esh just as we delineate him, and 
shall show him – though perchance not often; after a long lapse 
of years, only one. For greatness which transcends the limit of the 
ordinary and common type is produced but rarely.24 
Seneca seizes upon two men above all as paragons of Stoic virtue: 
Socrates and Cato the Younger. And it is in response to Seneca that 
Montaigne returns to these two fi gures repeatedly in his Essays, 
testing the philosopher’s claims about their supposed apathia 
against his own more grounded sense of human nature. 
Shakespeare casts a different character in the role of the possi-
ble sapiens: Brutus. Brutus combines, so to speak, the philosopher 
Socrates with the statesman Cato. Cicero, Seneca and Montaigne, 
for instance, all mention Brutus’ authorship of treatises on ethics, 
now lost.25 Cicero even dedicates two of his own philosophical 
treatises to Brutus, De fi nibus (‘On Moral Ends’) and Paradoxa 
stoicorum (‘On the Paradoxes of the Stoics’), citing him there 
as a friend, a Stoic, and an interlocutor in an ongoing, lifelong 
debate.26 Shakespeare shows his version of Brutus reading late 
into the night, just before the battle at Philippi, like Cato reading 
Plato’s Phaedo, just before his suicide, and gives him in his funeral 
oration the distinctive, staccato ‘Attic’ style associated with Stoic 
philosophy. 
Throughout Julius Caesar, Shakespeare suggests that, if any-
one in the play is Seneca’s ‘phoenix’, a hero of proto-Kantian 
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disinterestedness, it is Brutus. In his eulogy at the end of the play, 
Antony exalts him as ‘the noblest Roman of them all’ (5.5.68). 
The Roman people, too, see him, at least at fi rst, as a paragon of 
virtue. When Cassius tells Casca that he might join their party, 
Casca is delighted. ‘O he sits high in the people’s hearts,’ Casca 
crows. ‘That which would appear offence in us / His counte-
nance, like richest alchemy, / Will change to virtue and worthi-
ness’ (1.3.157–60). The conspirators trust that the Roman people 
will see Brutus’ intervention as an expression of his sense of civic 
duty, rather than, as in their own case, an outbreak of spite. As 
Antony observes, 
All the conspirators save only he
Did that they did in envy of great Caesar.
He only, in a general honest thought
And common good to all, made one of them.
(5.5.69–72)
Antony admires his fallen enemy’s pietas: ‘a general honest 
thought’. For Brutus himself, however, this same patriotism is 
a troubling source of cognitive dissonance. The concern for the 
‘common good’ which Antony praises as the best part of his char-
acter is incompatible with the Stoic ideal of indifference.
In his study of the concept of ‘constancy’ in Shakespeare’s 
Roman plays, Geoffrey Miles presents it as divided between a 
familiar defi nition as ‘steadfastness’, associated with Seneca, and 
a less familiar defi nition as ‘consistency’, connected with Cicero.27 
In De offi ciis, Cicero exhorts private citizens to engage in public 
life, taking on and fulfi lling their proper ‘offi ces’ or social roles 
for the good of the commonwealth, rather than remaining in 
more tranquil seclusion. Giles Monsarrat describes this sense of 
duty to the state as ‘a far cry from the self-suffi ciency of the Stoic 
sage’.28 Nonetheless, Miles feels comfortable describing Cicero as 
a Stoic.29 Cicero does not simply disagree with Stoicism, he argues, 
but instead co-opts it, redefi ning its core ethical ideal of ‘con-
stancy-to-oneself’ as ‘constancy-to-others’. Constancy becomes a 
‘means to an end’ rather than an ‘end unto itself’. ‘Cicero’s ideal 
is a politician who has the moral qualities of a Stoic sapiens, but 
who uses them for the good of the commonwealth, rather than 
for his own self-perfection.’30
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Miles is right to see a contrast between Cicero and Seneca, 
but their differences in this regard are not best explained, tech-
nically speaking, as manifestations of opposing interpretations 
of Stoicism. Marvin Vawter claims that ‘the Stoic Wise Man sees 
himself as an independent entity unwilling to bind himself to any 
specifi c community.’31 Miles agrees, as does Monsarrat. Cicero’s 
sense, however, that even philosophers should engage in politics 
is entirely in keeping with the Stoic doctrine known as oikeiōsis, 
a term which is not easy to translate; it means, literally, ‘the pro-
cess of making things home’. Sometimes it is rendered as ‘appro-
priation’. According to this aspect of Stoic thought, which Cicero 
takes up in De offi ciis, the philosopher should extend his sense 
of himself outward in concentric circles, fi rst to his family, then 
to his city, then to his nation; fi nally, to the entire human race, 
thinking of them as part of himself, so that his natural sense of 
individual self-preservation becomes instead a more expansive, 
impartial concern for every human being.32 
The problem in this case is Seneca’s outsized infl uence on Neos-
toicism. Seeing him loom so large in the Renaissance imaginary, crit-
ics such as Vawter, Monsarrat and Miles whose focus is primarily 
Shakespeare and his contemporaries tend to mistake Seneca for a 
more general philosophical standard. But Seneca is not a reliable 
touchstone for classical Stoicism. Compared to his sources, Seneca is 
eclectic and idiosyncratic. His occasional exhortations to his friend, 
Lucilius, to abandon public affairs are not representative of main-
stream Hellenistic or even Roman Stoicism, but instead of a rival 
school of thought: Epicureanism. Seneca’s recurrent praise for a pri-
vate life of leisure and seclusion refl ects the Epicurean precept, lathe 
biōsas (‘live unknown’).33 Seneca is not entirely consistent on this 
point; his essay De benefi ciis (‘On Benefi ts’), in particular, explain-
ing the importance of reciprocal gift-giving, can be understood, 
like Cicero’s De offi ciis, as an articulation and reimagination of the 
Hellenistic doctrine of oikeiōsis.34 More typically, however, Seneca 
advocates Epicurean self-suffi ciency.35 The attraction of abandoning 
court life, fraught with anxiety and danger, for a more carefree, tran-
quil life of primitive isolation appears with great force, not only in 
his philosophical prose, but also in his tragedies, in the fantasies of 
protagonists such as Thyestes and Hippolytus.36
In Julius Caesar, Shakespeare illustrates the tension between 
Senecan Epicureanism and Ciceronian Stoicism in the contrast 
5877_Gray.indd   58 12/09/18   3:31 PM
 Pietas and Pity in Julius Caesar [ 59
between the statue of Brutus’ ancestor, Lucius Junius Brutus, and 
the man himself whom that statue represents. Striving to persuade 
Brutus to join his conspiracy against Caesar, Cassius calls this 
illustrious forebear to mind. 
O, you and I have heard our fathers say
There was a Brutus once that would have brooked
Th’eternal devil to keep his state in Rome
As easily as a king.
(1.2.157–60)
‘You and I have heard our fathers say . . .’: Cassius’ opening 
captures the importance to a Roman patrician such as Brutus 
of his sense of his place in a succession of noble patriarchs. As 
Sallust writes:
Quintus Maximus, Publius Scipio, and other eminent men of our 
country were in the habit of declaring that their hearts were set 
mightily afl ame from the pursuit of virtue whenever they gazed 
upon the masks of their ancestors . . . It is the memory of great 
deeds that kindles this fl ame, which cannot be quelled until they 
by their own prowess have equalled the fame and glory of their 
forefathers.37 
Cassius’ fi nal word, ‘king’, is also well chosen. As ‘Brutus once’ 
drove out the last ‘king’ of Rome, so now, he hopes, Brutus will 
help him forestall Caesar’s imminent coronation.
Up until this point, Brutus has been noticeably silent, still and 
cold, like a statue. He neglects his usual ‘shows of love’; his ‘look’ 
is ‘veiled’; Cassius complains that his ‘hand’ has become ‘stub-
born and strange’ (1.2.34–7). Cassius must go to great lengths 
to spark even the slightest ‘show / Of fi re’ (1.2.175–6). To help 
draw Brutus out of this retreat into himself, Cassius hits upon an 
unusual expedient.
Good Cinna, take this paper
And look you lay it in the praetor’s chair
Where Brutus may but fi nd it. And throw this
In at this window. Set this up with wax
Upon old Brutus’ statue.
(1.3.142–6)
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Fewer than twenty lines later, Shakespeare introduces a new char-
acter, as well, Lucius, a young male attendant. Like Macbeth’s 
valet, Seyton, or Antony’s, Eros, this minor character’s name is 
designed to reveal the more central protagonist’s inner psychoma-
chia. Most immediately, ‘Lucius’ is derived from lux (Latin, 
‘light’), and, appropriately enough, when he enters, Brutus asks 
him to fetch a taper. Lucius is also the praenomen, however, of ‘old 
Brutus’: Lucius Junius Brutus. It is signifi cant, therefore, that it is 
this character, Lucius, who brings Brutus the fi rst of Cassius’ let-
ters. Unsigned, the letters are designed to appear like missives from 
the Roman people at large. In addition, however, they give voice 
to Brutus’ sense of his ancestor’s example: his likely exhortation, 
if he were present. Cassius brings ‘old Brutus’ statue’ back to life. 
‘Speak, strike, redress!’ (2.1.47, 55)
Invoking this older model of heroism proves effective in 
unmooring Brutus from his Senecan withdrawal. His response 
echoes Cassius’ speeches earlier: ‘My ancestors did from the 
streets of Rome / The Tarquin drive, when he was called king’ 
(2.1.53–4). By luring Brutus into this Ciceronian mode of hero-
ism, however, Cassius sets him at odds with himself. In his eulogy, 
Antony praises Brutus for his public-spirited engagement in poli-
tics, much in the spirit of Cicero’s De offi ciis. Brutus himself, 
however, might well balk at this description; he seems to want to 
come across, instead, as a model of Senecan disengagement. Even 
at the cost of alienating his own inner circle, as well as the Roman 
masses, Brutus aspires to be seen as a philosopher, rather than a 
statesman: a paragon of rational, unpreturbed detachment. 
In their opening conversation, Cassius complains to Brutus 
that he seems cold and standoffi sh. ‘I am not gamesome’ (1.2.28), 
Brutus replies. ‘I do lack some part / Of that quick spirit that is 
in Antony’ (1.2.28–9). He strives to seem unmoved; much in con-
trast to Antony, he seems to pride himself on his own stillness and 
dissociation. Portia, too, complains that Brutus seems distant and 
devoid of affection. ‘Dwell I but in the suburbs / Of your good 
pleasure?’ (2.1.284–5). What humanises Brutus and renders him a 
sympathetic fi gure, a hero despite himself, is not so much his suc-
cess at being a Stoic as his failure at his own set task. Unable to 
stick to his Stoic pride, Brutus gives way to compassion instead, 
prefi guring the very different moral world of Christianity.38 As A. 
D. Nuttall writes, ‘His love for his wife and his grief at her death, 
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“affections” Brutus is proud to be able to repress, actually redeem 
him as a human being.’39
Under pressure, Brutus occasionally sets aside his performance 
of Stoic indifference, revealing emotions such as pity, grief and 
anger. Unfortunately, however, he is only willing to let down his 
guard in private. This concern for his public reputation as a phi-
losopher is much of the reason why his funeral oration is not more 
successful. He is not willing to be passionate in public, as Antony is. 
Instead, he tries to sway his audience through arid, impersonal 
argument. ‘Censure me in your wisdom’ (3.2.16), he says, appeal-
ing to his fellow Romans’ faculty of reason. ‘Be patient till the last’ 
(3.2.12). Conceding nothing to what we now might call optics, 
pausing at no point for any tug at the proverbial heart-strings, Bru-
tus presses hoi polloi with challenging counterfactuals and condi-
tionals, in the manner of a present-day analytic philosopher. ‘Had 
you rather Caesar were living, and die all slaves, then that Caesar 
were dead, to live all free men?’ (3.2.22–4). ‘If . . . if then . . . this is 
my answer’: Brutus’ brusque, interlocking ‘if . . . then’ statements 
call to mind the characteristic sorites of Hellenistic Greek Stoics 
such as Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus. ‘As he was ambitious, 
I slew him’ (3.2.26–7). In his dialogue De fi nibus (‘On Moral 
Ends’), Cicero, master orator, complains about the logic-chopping 
of the Stoics, gives an example and rejects it out of hand as hope-
lessly unpersuasive: ‘“Everything good is praiseworthy; everything 
praiseworthy is moral; therefore everything good is moral.’ What 
a rusty sword! Who would admit your fi rst premise?’40 
Antony wins the people’s hearts because Brutus, hindered by 
a peculiarly Stoic squeamishness, resolutely fails to pre-empt his 
rival’s more persuasive appeal to pathos. His insistence on his own 
dry logic baffl es his audience, which fails to follow his intricate 
reasoning. Brutus’ carefully cultivated persona of disinterest and 
scrupulous objectivity comes across as unnatural, even repugnant, 
rather than reassuring. Antony’s tears, provocations and mingling 
with the crowd; his display of Caesar’s mangled, bloody cloak and 
corpse: these oratorical masterstrokes are left to fi ll an emotional 
vacuum. ‘I will myself into the pulpit fi rst,’ Brutus assures Cassius, 
‘and show the reason of our Caesar’s death’ (3.1.236–7). ‘The rea-
son’: how far Brutus overestimates the power of such an appeal 
to reason soon becomes painfully clear, as the plebeians begin to 
respond to Antony’s emotional fi reworks. ‘Methinks there is much 
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reason in his sayings’ (3.2.109), one remarks. Brutus gets no such 
commendation. Setting aside questions of rhetorical technique, to 
permit Antony to speak at all, even to allow him to remain alive, 
is a grave tactical error, as Cassius recognises. ‘The people may 
be moved’ (3.1.234), he warns Brutus. ‘You know not what you 
do’ (3.1.232). Brutus, however, underestimates the power of emo-
tions, including feelings such as loyalty or friendship, as well as 
romantic love.41
Not long after, as the Roman Republic collapses into open civil 
war, recrimination erupts between Brutus and Cassius. The two 
generals meet in Sardis after some time apart, and Cassius immedi-
ately accuses Brutus of betraying his trust. ‘Brutus, this sober form 
of yours hides wrongs’ (4.2.40). Brutus urges Cassius to speak 
‘softly’, however, and retire to his tent, out of sight of their respec-
tive armies. ‘Before the eyes of both our armies here,’ he says, ‘let 
us not wrangle’ (4.2.43–5). Once he and Cassius are on their own, 
Cassius complains that Brutus ignored his request that Lucius 
Pella be pardoned, and Brutus accuses him in exchange of ‘an itch-
ing palm’ (4.3.10), selling ‘offi ces’ to ‘undeservers’ (4.3.11–12). 
Cassius responds with indignant protests, and the dispute degen-
erates into acrimonious grandstanding. Cassius threatens Brutus, 
and Brutus mocks him in return. ‘There is no terror, Cassius, in 
your threats: / For I am armed so strong in honesty / That they pass 
me by as the idle wind’ (4.3.66–8). He, Brutus, will not ‘tremble’, 
‘budge’ or ‘crouch’ under Cassius’ ‘testy humour’ (4.3.44–6).
In De constantia, Seneca compares the Stoic sapiens to ‘cer-
tain cliffs’, which, ‘projecting into the deep, break the force of 
the sea, and, though lashed for countless ages, show no traces of 
its wrath’.42 Like these cliffs, or like Caesar, when he calls himself 
‘Olympus’ (3.1.74), Brutus will not be moved. In his account of 
the ideal Stoic sage, Seneca explains in some detail how he reacts 
to others’ anger. He is unruffl ed, disdainful, serene, just as Brutus 
pretends to be here: ‘he either fails to notice them, or counts them 
worthy of a smile’.43 Cassius, however, is cut to the quick by this 
show of casual contempt. ‘Have you not love enough to bear with 
me?’ (4.3.118), he asks. Seeing that his friend is hurt, Brutus drops 
his frosty pretence. ‘When I spoke that,’ he confesses, ‘I was ill-
tempered too’ (4.3.115). ‘Much enforced’, he admits he showed ‘a 
hasty spark’ (4.3.111). Put to the test, Brutus’ ‘love’ for his friend, 
Cassius, overrides his Stoicism.
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In his essay ‘Of Books’, Montaigne cites Brutus’ private quar-
relling with Cassius as a paradigmatic example of the discrepancy 
between a public persona and a private person. He begins by 
lamenting the loss of Brutus’ treatise on virtue, ‘for it is a fi ne thing 
to learn the theory from those who well know the practice’. Then 
he doubles back. ‘Theory’ does not always correspond to ‘practice’. 
‘But since the preachings are one thing and the preacher another, I 
am as glad to see Brutus in Plutarch as in a book of his own.’ As in 
Shakespeare’s play, one episode in Brutus’ life stands out: ‘I would 
rather choose to know truly the conversation he held in his tent 
with some one of his intimate friends on the eve of a battle than 
the speech he made the next day to his army.’44 Montaigne likely 
has in mind here what would later serve as the classical source text 
for Shakespeare’s scene, a short passage in Plutarch’s biography of 
Brutus. ‘[Brutus and Cassius] went into a litle chamber together, 
and bad every man avoyde, and did shut the dores to them. Then 
they beganne to powr out their complaints one to another, and 
grew hot and lowed, earnestly accusing one another, and at length 
both fell a weeping.’45
It may well be the case that Shakespeare was infl uenced by 
Montaigne’s musing about Brutus in his tent: his quarrel scene 
seems designed to fulfi l Montaigne’s wish. In this case, however, 
Montaigne’s spirit echoes Plutarch’s own. At the beginning of his 
biography of Alexander the Great, Plutarch distinguishes himself 
from more traditional historians. ‘My intent is not to write histories, 
but only lives. For, the noblest deedes doe not always shew mens 
vertues and vices, but oftentimes a light occasion, a word, or some 
sporte makes mens natural dispositions and maners appeare more 
plaine, than the famous battells wonne, wherein are slaine tenne 
thowsande men.’46 Seneca, too, stresses the need to examine phi-
losophers’ lives for signs of hypocrisy. ‘Deed and word should be 
in accord.’47 Shakespeare departs from Plutarch’s simpler narrative, 
however, by suggesting not only that Brutus fails to maintain his 
composure in private, but also that he tries to cover up that lapse, in 
order to preserve a public image of himself as a dispassionate Stoic. 
In Shakespeare’s version, Brutus is much more consciously perform-
ing the role of a Stoic sapiens. He insists that he and Cassius speak 
inside his tent, for instance, out of earshot of their men.
Brutus’ investment in his own reputation as an exemplary Stoic 
sage is most obvious, however, after this scene, in his reaction to the 
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message from one of his captains, Messala, that his wife, Portia, is 
dead. Reconciling with Cassius after their heated exchange, Brutus 
calls for a bowl of wine: a symbol of self-indulgence and momen-
tary emotional liberty. The wine calls to mind, as well, Cassius’ 
initial accusation, outside Brutus’ tent: ‘Brutus, this sober form of 
yours hides wrongs’ (4.2.40). Brutus is not as ‘sober’ as he seems, 
literally as well as fi guratively. ‘Wrongs’, moreover, takes on in ret-
rospect an intriguing ambivalence. Cassius’ own meaning is that 
Brutus has wronged him as a friend; he has been unkind, unsym-
pathetic. Brutus also ‘hides wrongs’, however, in a Stoic sense: he 
is more prone to emotional breakdown than he lets on. His studied 
persona of indifference is ‘form’, rather than ‘substance’. Cassius’ 
word ‘form’ aptly suggests at once both a detached and unrealised 
ideal, like a Platonic form, and a hollow shell: an exterior show 
or pretence, as opposed to an authentic interior lived experience.
Cassius for his part marvels that Brutus lost his temper; Brutus, 
a man who prides himself above all on his emotional self-control. 
‘I did not think you could have been so angry’ (4.3.141). Brutus 
replies, ‘O Cassius, I am sick of many griefs’ (4.3.142). Cassius is 
surprised at this answer and chides Brutus gently, mostly in jest, 
for failing to abide by his Stoic principles. ‘Of your philosophy you 
make no use / If you give place to accidental evils’ (4.3.143–4). 
Brutus’ pride is stung by this remark, however, and he responds 
with a clarifi cation, in the form of a slightly disturbing boast. 
‘No man bears sorrow better. Portia is dead’ (4.3.145). Cassius is 
shocked: again, Brutus’ ‘sober form hides wrongs’ (4.2.40). From 
one perspective, that of a Stoic, Brutus is in the wrong to be trou-
bled by Portia’s death. As he admits, he is ‘sick with many griefs’ 
(4.3.142). From another perspective, however, that of human 
compassion, Brutus is in the wrong not to let himself mourn for 
his wife’s death more fully and openly.
Brutus asks Cassius twice not to mention Portia’s death, as if 
afraid that if he does, he will not be able to contain his grief. ‘Speak 
no more of her’ (4.3.156), he says; and again, ‘No more, I pray you’ 
(4.3.164). Meanwhile, however, Messala and Titinius enter, bearing 
letters. Brutus presses Messala for news about Portia, and Messala 
tells him at last, reluctantly, that ‘she is dead, and by strange man-
ner’ (4.3.187). Without giving any indication that this report is not 
the fi rst time he has heard of her death, Brutus abruptly launches 
into a brief, startling and, again, self-aggrandising speech. ‘Why, 
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farewell, Portia: we must die, Messala: / With meditating that she 
must die once / I have the patience to endure it now’ (4.3.188–90). 
Messala is awed by this display of Stoic virtue, and he heralds 
Brutus straightaway as a paragon of heroic indifference. ‘Even so 
great men great losses should endure’ (4.3.191). Cassius, however, 
knows better. ‘I have as much of this in art as you,’ he tells Brutus, 
cryptically, ‘But yet my nature could not bear it so’ (4.3.192–3). 
Like the audience, Cassius knows that Brutus is adopting a persona 
here. As T. S. Eliot says of Othello, he is ‘cheering himself up.’48 He 
is, in fact, deeply affected by Portia’s death; he can barely keep him-
self from breaking down altogether. In order to impress his offi cers, 
however, he keeps up appearances. He wants to be seen as Stoic 
sapiens, not as a loving husband.
Some critics have found the so-called ‘double announcement’ 
of Portia’s death so puzzling as to suggest some sort of mistake, 
either in the manuscript itself or in the printer’s shop.49 According 
to this account, two drafts of the announcement, an early and a 
late, were somehow both included in the only authoritative source 
for the play, the 1623 Folio. A detail in the second announcement, 
however, suggests that it was included in full awareness of the 
fi rst. Messala tells Brutus that Portia died ‘by strange manner’, and 
Brutus does not ask him to explain what he means. It is diffi cult 
to believe that Shakespeare meant this passage to stand alone. To 
mention that Portia died ‘by strange manner’ but not explain what 
that manner was would be an uncharacteristic disservice to his 
audience. Brutus’ ostensible lack of curiosity here is not a printer’s 
accident, but forms part of Brutus’ own deliberate deception of his 
offi cers. It is a ruse, and a revealing one, designed to suggest an 
incredible, awe-inspiring apathia. 
In contrast to Messala, the audience is supposed to see through 
Brutus’ set-piece speech. Shakespeare uses the double announce-
ment of Portia’s death, apparent on stage only to Cassius, to show 
that the ‘form’ of the Stoic sage is at best a fi ction: a persona which 
can be performed, like an actor’s role, but which cannot in fact be 
maintained at all times, in private life as well as in public. Shake-
speare takes us backstage, so to speak, in order to allow us to see 
the incongruity between the performer and the performance. In 
Cassius’ terms, Shakespeare presents Stoicism as an ‘art’ beyond 
the scope of human ‘nature’. Behind the façade of the superhuman 
Stoic philosopher, Shakespeare allows us to glimpse a different, 
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more complex, and more plausible character. In his grief for his 
wife, as well as his kindness towards his friend, Brutus falls short 
of his own stringent philosophical standard. At the same time, 
however, he becomes a much more attractive human being: a hero 
in a different sense. In his failure at his own set task, Shakespeare’s 
would-be paragon of Stoic indifference turns out to be instead an 
admirable example of Christian compassion.
In his Praise of Folly, Erasmus censures Seneca for ‘removing 
all emotion whatsoever from the wise man’.50 Seneca for his part 
denies that he is making any such claim: ‘I do not withdraw the 
wise man from the category of man, nor do I deny him the sense of 
pain as though he were a rock that has no feelings at all.’51 Some 
things do ‘buffet’ the wise man, Seneca admits, even though they 
do not ‘overthrow’ him: ‘bodily pain and infi rmity’, ‘the loss of 
friends and children’ and ‘the ruin that befalls his country amid the 
fl ames of war’. ‘I do not deny that the wise man feels these things,’ 
he maintains. ‘The wise man does receive some wounds.’ Erasmus 
thus might seem to misinterpret Seneca. Seneca himself, however, 
is inconsistent. At the end of De constantia, Seneca insists that the 
wise man is not altogether impervious to injury. ‘We do not claim 
for him the hardness of stone or of steel.’52 Yet this claim is in 
fact precisely the boast that he does make at the beginning of the 
essay. ‘The wise man is not subject to any injury. It does not mat-
ter, therefore, how many darts are hurled against him, since none 
can pierce him. As the hardness of certain stones is impervious to 
steel, and adamant cannot be cut or hewn or ground [. . .] just so 
the spirit of the wise man is impregnable.’53 The inconsistency of 
Shakespeare’s Brutus corresponds to an inconsistency in Seneca’s 
representation of the ideal Stoic sage.
Seneca’s reversals regarding the sapiens show the need, if only in 
terms of conceptual clarity, of fi nding a more absolute representa-
tion of the Roman ethical ideal, one uncompromised by the vicis-
situdes of human nature. And it is just such an ideal that can be 
readily discerned in the concepts of the divine put forward by clas-
sical philosophers, including Seneca himself. For example, I began 
this section by citing the philosopher Xenophanes of Colophon. 
Much as Plato does later in his Republic, Xenophanes disparages 
the anthropomorphic deities popular among his contemporaries. 
Xenophanes is not an atheist, however, in the vein of Feuerbach. 
His aim, rather, is to replace the gods of the poets with a different 
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fi gure: ‘One God, the greatest among gods and men, neither in form 
like unto mortals, nor in thought.’ God, ‘the motionless One’, is not 
subject to change. He ‘abides ever in the selfsame place, moving not 
at all; nor does it befi t him to go about now hither, now thither’.54 
Already in the thought of this pre-Socratic fi gure, it is possible to 
see an adumbration of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover, as well as the 
impersonal ‘World-Soul’ of the Stoics. 
The idea that God or the gods are wholly impassible, even 
impersonal, is not limited to the Stoa, but can be found in all major 
schools of ancient philosophy, including Platonism, Aristotelian-
ism and Epicureanism. Stoicism is simply the most radical, confi -
dent attempt to attain this ideal in its purity, as a human being.55 
Impassibility becomes in Stoicism not merely a characteristic of 
the divine or of the soul after death but a primary aim in this life, 
as well as the next. It is a condition, moreover, which the Stoic 
sage is thought to attain, at least to some degree. Seneca adopts 
the Epicurean idea of the gods as plural and personal, but indiffer-
ent to human affairs, and describes the hypothetical Stoic sapiens 
in their likeness. ‘The wise man is next-door neighbor to the gods 
and like a god in all save his mortality.’56 Or again, ‘a good man 
differs from God in the element of time only; he is God’s pupil, his 
imitator, and true offspring.’ The true wise man can even surpass 
God. ‘In this you may outstrip God; he is exempt from enduring 
evil, while you are superior to it.’ 57
Shakespeare, however, does not share Seneca’s confi dence in 
man’s ability to escape his own emotions. In the next chapter, 
‘“The northern star”’, I present the ideal of impassibility that I 
have begun to outline here in more detail, both in its original 
incarnation in classical philosophy and again in its resurgence 
in sixteenth-century Neostoicism, where it tends to be presented 
as the virtue of ‘constancy’. Like many of his contemporaries, 
Shakespeare does not see this kind of ‘constancy’ as compatible 
with human nature. Caesar, for example, compares himself to ‘the 
northern star’: a symbol of aloof invulnerability, like the various 
statues scattered throughout the play. Roman attempts to emulate 
these kinds of ego ideals end in tragedy. Caesar is not in fact the 
godlike fi gure that he starts to think he is, just as Brutus proves 
not to be an unshakeable Stoic sage. 
Shakespeare’s implicit, concrete criticism of the ideal of impas-
sibility resembles the explicit, abstract concerns of contemporary 
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theologians about the possibility of reconciling Stoicism with Chris-
tianity, as well as related disputes about the relative merits of each 
ethical system. In his emphasis on man’s susceptibility to passions, 
accidents and material wounds, as well as his consistent counter-
idealisation of an ethos of compassion, Shakespeare sides with the 
claims of Christianity against those of Stoicism. In the next section 
of this chapter, ‘“A marble statue of a man”’, I look more closely at 
early modern debate about the role of ‘pity’, in particular, in Stoic 
ethics. In delineating Shakespeare’s place along a spectrum of con-
temporary opinion, the infl uential Neostoic humanist Justus Lipsius 
provides a useful point of contrast. The notoriously severe theologian 
Jean Calvin proves a surprisingly sympathetic point of comparison. 
Despite manifest sympathy for misguided characters such as Brutus, 
Caesar and others, Shakespeare is a partisan of a Christian ethos of 
compassion, over and against the Neostoicism that he brings to life 
in his representation of ancient Rome.
‘A marble statue of a man’: Neostoicism and the 
Problem of Pity
Over the course of the last several decades, following an early arti-
cle by John Anson on Julius Caesar and Neostoicism, critics have 
tended to agree that a central project of this Roman play is a critique 
of Neostoic exaltation of ‘constancy’.58 Marvin Spevack in his Cam-
bridge edition describes it as ‘the major dramatic, psychological, 
social, and political ideal’ of the play.59 Coppélia Kahn describes 
Romanitas in Shakespeare as ‘ethically oriented’, and directs the 
reader to G. K. Hunter’s longer description of ‘a set of virtues . . . 
thought of as characterizing Roman civilization – soldierly, severe, 
self-controlled, self-disciplined’.60 Paul Cantor observes, ‘It is dif-
fi cult to fi nd one English word to cover the complex of austerity, 
pride, heroic virtue, and public service that constitutes Romanness 
in Shakespeare.’61 Nevertheless, certain terms do appear repeatedly, 
and especially one: ‘constancy’. Vivian Thomas writes, ‘The funda-
mental values which permeate the Roman plays are: service to the 
state, constancy, valor, friendship, love of family, and respect for the 
gods.’62 Robert Miola narrows the list to three: ‘constancy, honour, 
and pietas (the loving respect owed to family, country, and gods)’.63 
I would collapse these even further: a Roman’s sense of ‘honour’, 
for Shakespeare, depends on his sense of his own ‘constancy’. 
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Geoffrey Miles, especially, argues convincingly that constancy ‘for 
Shakespeare and his contemporaries’ represents ‘the quintessential 
Roman virtue’.64
As I explained in the previous section of this chapter, ‘Brutus vs. 
Brutus’, the ethical ideal of ‘constancy’ can conceivably be pressed 
into the service of pietas, as in Cicero’s De offi ciis. It can also come 
into confl ict with that sense of duty, however, as in the case of 
Seneca’s revised version of Hellenistic Stoicism. Retirement from city 
to country, negotium (‘business’) to otium (‘leisure’), is more typi-
cally associated with Epicureanism. Nonetheless, Seneca sees with-
drawal from public affairs as the shortest route to Stoic ‘constancy’, 
understood in this case as imperviousness to external infl uence.65 
Cicero, by contrast, like Virgil, subordinates the Stoic ideal of con-
stancy to an older Roman ideal of pietas: reverence for gods, ances-
tors and the Roman state. ‘Constancy’ for Cicero does not mean 
complete indifference or apathia, but instead self-sacrifi cing service 
to others. Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.66 Such patriotism 
is familiar from legends such as that of Marcus Curtius in Livy’s 
History, as well as Aeneas in Virgil’s Aeneid. 
In this section of the chapter, I outline a second such debate 
about constancy, one more specifi c to the Renaissance. Much as 
Cicero and Seneca tried to promote Hellenistic philosophy, a new 
and controversial import from Greece, within the very different, 
largely incompatible context of traditional Roman mores, so also 
Shakespeare’s contemporaries, Neostoics such as Lipsius and Du 
Vair, tried to introduce Stoicism, a resurgent, contested legacy of 
ancient Rome, into a pervasively Christian milieu. Can the idea 
that constancy is a virtue be reconciled to Christianity? If Jesus 
as he appears in the Gospels is understood as the paradigmatic 
ethical exemplum, and constancy is defi ned, as it is for Seneca, as 
primarily apathia, freedom from emotion, then any such recon-
ciliation is impossible. Jesus weeps, grows angry, suffers, dies; the 
details of his life forestall any coherent redefi nition of this central 
Christian fi gure as a latter-day Stoic sage. 
In the next chapter, ‘“The northern star”’, I address a third 
and fi nal debate about constancy: the extent to which it is synony-
mous with masculinity. Can women be constant? For Shakespeare’s 
Romans, the answer is, for the most part, no. As Hamlet says, ‘Frailty, 
thy name is woman’ (1.2.146). The Latin language itself suggests 
this perspective: virtus literally means ‘manliness’. For Shakespeare 
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himself, however, like Montaigne, the question itself would be mis-
guided. Inconstancy is not limited to women but instead a defi ning 
characteristic of human nature, male as well as female. As Benedick 
says at the end of Much Ado about Nothing, ‘man is a giddy thing, 
and this is my conclusion’ (5.4.106–7). Every man has in this sense 
a kind of ‘woman’ within: a feminine aspect of himself which is sus-
ceptible to emotions such as pity and grief. ‘What patch or bit of 
one’s personality is essential?’ Peter Holbrook asks. ‘Which of our 
many contradictory drives is truest? How can we speak of authentic-
ity if, as Montaigne says, “there is as much difference between us and 
ourselves as there is between us and other people”?’67
At present, however, I will focus on the opposition between 
Christianity and Neostoicism. The fi gure most immediately respon-
sible for the revival of Stoicism in late sixteenth-century Europe 
is Justus Lipsius. His seminal work, De constantia, appeared in 
English translation in 1595, only a few years before the presumed 
composition of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar in 1599. A shorter 
treatise by Guillaume du Vair, La Philosophie morale des stoïques 
(‘The Moral Philosophy of the Stoics’)¸ based on Epictetus’ Man-
ual, appeared in English only a year before, in 1598. Subsequent 
scholars such as Bishop Joseph Hall would build upon their ideas, 
and Stoicism would in time become a characteristic subject of later 
Jacobean drama.68 Given the early date of Julius Caesar, however, 
within the development of early modern English Neostoicism, it 
is not necessary at present to look beyond these two authors, into 
the seventeenth century. J. H. M. Salmon traces Neostoicism in 
England in this early period back to the infl uence, especially, of 
the Sidney circle. The Countess of Pembroke herself, for instance, 
translated a Neostoic treatise by Philippe de Mornay, his Excellent 
discours de la vie et de la mort (‘Excellent Discourse of Life and 
Death’), and published it in 1592 as part of a single volume with 
her translation of Garnier’s Marc-Antoine.
In his work on the Protestant concept of ‘conscience’, Geoffrey 
Aggeler draws attention to the curious fact that most of the Eng-
lish translators of Continental Neostoic treatises were not only 
part of the Sidney circle, but also, like Sidney himself, committed 
Calvinists.69 The conjunction might easily seem counter-intuitive. 
Drawing upon the fi nal, most pessimistic writings of St Augustine, 
Calvin insists on man’s utter incapacity to control his own 
depraved nature. As a result of the Fall of Man, virtue is entirely 
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dependent on God’s grace. Stoicism, by contrast, emphasises man’s 
ability to master his own emotions. Man in his strength is able 
to emulate and even exceed the divine, becoming self-suffi cient 
through unaided, individual human effort. Reviewing the intel-
lectual history of the Renaissance and Reformation, William 
Bouwsma takes up these two schools of thought as emblems of 
what he calls ‘the two faces of humanism’. ‘The two ideological 
poles between which Renaissance humanism oscillated may be 
roughly labeled “Stoicism” and “Augustinianism.”’70
At the end of his Apology for Raymond Sebond, in response to 
a lament of Seneca’s which he calls ‘absurd’, Montaigne draws a 
similar contrast. He cites Seneca: ‘O what a vile and abject thing 
is man, if he does not raise himself above humanity!’ ‘Man cannot 
raise himself above himself,’ Montaigne replies, except ‘by purely 
celestial means’. ‘It is for our Christian faith, not his [sc. Seneca’s] 
Stoical virtue, to aspire to that divine and miraculous metamor-
phosis.’71 Pierre de La Primaudaye, too, at the beginning of his 
popular French Academie, criticises the Stoics for not recognising 
man’s need for the grace. On the one hand, he maintains, we are 
to avoid the pessimism of ancient fi gures such as ‘Timon the Athe-
nian’, who saw life as so miserable that he urged his countrymen 
to hang themselves. Man’s is not such ‘a vile and abiect estate’. On 
the other hand, however:
We must take heed, that we enter not into that presumptuous opin-
ion of many others, who endeuour to lead man to the consider-
ation of his dignitie and excellencie, as being endewed with infi nite 
graces. For they persuade him, that through the quicknes of his 
vnderstanding, he may mount vp to the perfect knowledge of the 
greatest secrets of God and nature, and that by the only studie of 
philosophie, he may of himselfe, following his own nature become 
maister of all euill passions and perturbations, and attaine to a rare 
and supreme kind of vertue, which is void of those affections . . . 
Thus whilest they grant to mans power such an excellent and diuine 
disposition, they lift him vp in a vain presumption, in pride and trust 
in himselfe, and in his owne vertue, which in the end cannot be but 
the cause of his vtter undoing.72 
At the beginning of Shakespeare’s Love’s Labour’s Lost, Berowne 
protests in like vein against the king’s proposal that he and his 
companions swear to forgo the company of women. ‘Necessity 
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will make us all forsworn’ (1.1.147), he vows. ‘For every man with 
his affects is born / Not by might mastered, but by special grace’ 
(1.1.149–50). 
The ‘special grace’ that Berowne invokes here, like the ‘spe-
cial providence’ that Hamlet sees ‘in the fall of a sparrow’, is a 
technical concept borrowed from Calvinist theology. ‘Special’ in 
this context means ‘specifi c to an individual’ and tends to refer in 
Calvin’s Institutes to that ‘grace’ or ‘providence’ which God offers 
to each of the elect. Taken together, the two instances, Berowne’s 
‘special grace’ and Hamlet’s ‘special providence’, suggest that in 
Shakespeare’s mind, as in the context Aggeler describes, Neosto-
icism and Calvinism stand connected. Hamlet’s comments about 
‘special providence’ arise from his embrace of a fatalism which 
resembles that of a Roman Stoic. Alan Sinfi eld, for example, com-
pares Hamlet’s speech to Horatio, ‘the readiness is all’, to Seneca’s 
essay, De providentia (‘On Providence’) as well as Calvin’s Insti-
tutes, as an example of the manifest diffi culty in sorting out the 
two possible lines of infl uence.73 
One explanation Aggeler offers for the connection between 
Calvinism and Neostoicism in Elizabethan England is that Calvin 
himself was much exercised to distinguish his interpretation of 
Christian theology from Senecan Stoicism, precisely because, as 
in the case of Hamlet’s determinism, the two could seem so eerily 
similar.74 English Calvinists then naturally took an interest in the 
pagan antagonist of the master. ‘Certainly his frequent references 
to Seneca and other pagan writers were noticed.’ Aggeler cites 
as an example the translator of Du Vair’s treatise on Stoic moral 
philosophy, Thomas James, who in his introduction defends his 
use of ‘words and sentences of the Heathen’ by appeal to Calvin’s 
authority.75 
In his effort to distinguish between Stoicism and Christianity, 
Calvin insists in particular on the difference in their attitudes 
towards compassion for the weak and suffering. For example, Cal-
vin’s fi rst published book is a commentary on Seneca’s De clementia 
(‘On Mercy’), a treatise in which Seneca tries to convince his for-
mer pupil, the Emperor Nero, to be more merciful to his subjects. 
On the face of it, the exhortation might seem readily compatible 
with Christianity. Calvin, however, objects to the spirit in which it 
is made. Seneca does not appeal to Nero’s sense of sympathy, but 
instead to his sense of his own superiority. He wants to convince 
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Nero, like Shakespeare’s Brutus, to take pride in seeing himself as an 
aloof and imperturbable sapiens, rather than in imposing sudden, 
cruel violence. ‘Cruel and inexorable anger is not seemly for a king, 
for thus he does not rise much above the other man, toward whose 
own level he descends by being angry at him.’ To bear a grudge is 
for ‘women’ or ‘wild beasts’, and ‘not even the noble sort of these’. 
‘Elephants and lions pass by what they have stricken down; it is the 
ignoble beast that is relentless.’ 
For Christians, pity is the chief virtue. For Stoics, however, it is 
an inexcusable weakness. As Calvin explains in his commentary 
on Seneca, ‘Although it [pity] conforms, in appearance, to clem-
ency, yet because it carries with it perturbation of mind, it fails 
to qualify as a virtue (according to the Stoics).’ As Calvin recog-
nises, Seneca distinguishes carefully between misericordia (‘pity’), 
a vice, and clementia (‘mercy’), a virtue. Pity involves empathy 
with another person’s suffering, and thus a loss of emotional sov-
ereignty: ‘the sorrow of the mind brought about by the distress 
of others’. Mercy, however, as Seneca describes it is a demonstra-
tion of power. The sapiens is charitable, pardons, gives alms; he 
does so, however, ‘with unruffl ed mind and a countenance under 
control’.76 
Calvin fi nds this distinction unconvincing. ‘Obviously we ought 
to be persuaded of the fact that pity is a virtue, and that he who 
feels no pity cannot be a good man – whatever these idle sages 
discuss in their shady nooks.’77 The putative opposite of ‘pity’, a 
passionless ‘clemency’, is in his opinion a fi ction, founded on a 
false notion of human nature. ‘To use Pliny’s words: “I know not 
whether they are sages, but they certainly are not men. For it is 
man’s nature to be affected by sorrow, to feel, yet to resist, and to 
accept comforting, not to go without it.”’78 In his later Commen-
tary on Romans, Calvin cites St Augustine to similar effect. ‘As he 
[sc. St Paul] mentions the want of mercy as an evidence of human 
nature being depraved, Augustine, in arguing against the Stoics, 
concludes, that mercy is a Christian virtue.’79
In his Institutes, even as early as the 1539 Latin edition, Calvin 
complains about ‘new Stoics’ who, he says, ‘make patience into 
insensibility, and a valiant and constant man into a stock’.80 
Calvin echoes here the work of an earlier humanist, Erasmus. In 
his 1529 edition of Seneca, Erasmus questions the authenticity of a 
supposed record of a correspondence between Seneca and St Paul, 
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now recognised as a fourth-century forgery.81 In his 1511 The 
Praise of Folly, Erasmus lambastes Seneca’s ideal of the ‘wise man’ 
or sapiens. Like Calvin after him, Erasmus is put off in particular 
by Stoic disdain for pity. Folly asks, ‘Who would not fl ee in horror 
from such a man, as he would from a monster or a ghost – a man 
who is completely deaf to all human sentiment, who is untouched 
by emotion, no more moved by love or pity than “a chunk of fl int 
or mountain crag” . . .?’82 
Whereas Erasmus’ Folly speaks directly of Seneca, Calvin speaks 
somewhat more mysteriously of ‘new’ Stoics ‘among the Christians’. 
Who are these ‘new Stoics’ (novi Stoici)? Calvin does not identify 
them. Moreover, they predate standard narratives of the history of 
Neostoicism. Lipsius’ De constantia did not appear in Latin until 
1584: almost fi fty years later. Gilles Monsarrat suggests that Calvin 
is referring here to unspecifi ed contemporary Christians, infl uenced 
by the resurgence of Stoic ideas in the sixteenth century. He has 
trouble identifying any positive instance of such Neostoicism earlier 
than 1542, however, some years after Calvin’s initial composition of 
the Institutes. Even then, the example that he does give, Gerolamo 
Cardano’s De consolatione, is not notably Christian; its author was 
later put in prison by the Inquisition for casting Jesus’ horoscope, as 
well as for writing a book in praise of the Emperor Nero, tormentor 
of Christian martyrs.83 
Departing from Monsarrat, I would suggest that ‘new’ here 
may perhaps mean ‘new’ in relation to Seneca, rather than in rela-
tion to Calvin’s own early modern Europe. Pagan authors in late 
antiquity tend to criticise Seneca for infelicities of Latin style, as 
well as his compromising political entanglement with the reviled 
Nero. Marcia Colish details a countervailing tradition, however, 
of ‘Christian apologists and Church Fathers’, dating as far back 
as the second century, which ‘gave Seneca a new and more posi-
tive appreciation’. ‘These authors were less concerned with his 
biography and his literary style than with his moral philosophy, 
which they found strikingly compatible with Christian ethics at 
some points. They concentrated their attention on his ethical 
works, borrowing heavily from them and occasionally mention-
ing him by name as a sage.’84 Tertullian, for example, refers to 
Seneca as Seneca saepe noster (‘Seneca, often ours’). St Jerome 
later drops the qualifi er: Seneca for him is simply Seneca noster 
(‘our Seneca’).85 
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Calvin is more sceptical. ‘Now, among the Christians there are 
also new Stoics, who count it depraved not only to groan and 
weep but also to be sad and care-ridden.’ In his Institutes, as also 
in his commentary on Seneca’s De clementia, Calvin is especially 
appalled by Stoic disapproval of compassion. Appealing to the 
example of Christ, Calvin presents Stoic opposition to pity as an 
insurmountable barrier to any proposed reconciliation of Stoic 
and Christian ethics. ‘We have nothing to do with this iron phi-
losophy which our Lord and Master has condemned not only by 
his word, but also by his example. For he groaned and wept both 
over his own and others’ misfortunes.’86 Calvin even provides an 
Old Testament type of this aspect of Christ in his Commentary 
on Genesis, in the person of Joseph. Having risen to preeminence 
in service to the Pharaoh, Joseph encounters after many years the 
brothers who betrayed him and sold him into slavery, and they fail 
to recognise him. He seizes the youngest, Benjamin, as his prisoner, 
having fi rst framed him for a crime. Knowing his father’s love for 
the boy, one of the older brothers, Judah, offers to serve as a slave 
in his place instead. And, at this act of pity, Joseph cannot ‘restrain 
himself’. He orders everyone out of his chambers and begins to 
weep, then invites his brothers back in, reveals who he is, and pro-
vides for them in their poverty. 
Calvin seizes upon one clause from this story, ‘Joseph could 
not restrain himself’, and expounds upon it with unusual vehe-
mence. ‘Joseph had done violence to his feelings,’ he imagines, 
‘as long as he presented to them an austere and harsh counte-
nance.’ The image calls to mind Shakespeare’s Brutus, unable to 
hide his anxiety from Portia while the conspiracy is afoot; unable 
later, as well, to contain his anger at Cassius, once he learns that 
she has passed away. Infl uence, direct or indirect, is possible. An 
English edition of the commentary appeared in 1578.87 My more 
general point, however, is that Calvin and Shakespeare, as well 
as English Calvinists interested in Neostoicism, share a common 
interest in the tension between passion, especially pity, and a mis-
leading appearance of stern, even cruel, impassivity. ‘At length,’ 
Calvin continues, ‘the strong fraternal affection, which he had 
suppressed during the time that he was breathing severe threaten-
ing, poured itself forth with more abundant force.’ This break-
down, however, is not a vice, as Brutus sees it. Instead, Calvin 
argues, Joseph’s pity is laudable. ‘This softness or tenderness is 
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more deserving of praise than if he had maintained an equable 
temper.’ On the whole, Calvin concludes, ‘the Stoics speak fool-
ishly when they say, that it is a heroic virtue not to be touched 
with compassion. Had Joseph stood infl exible, who would not 
have pronounced him to be a stupid or iron-hearted man?’88 
In Lipsius’ dialogue De constantia, ‘constancy’ is defi ned explic-
itly as the absence of any ‘passion’, including sympathy. ‘ “Con-
stancy” is a right and immovable strength of the mind, neither 
lifted up nor pressed down with external or casual accidents.’ 
Writing during the Wars of Religion, Lipsius wanted to escape the 
turmoil around him, even if only subjectively, and thus welcomes 
Seneca’s Epicurean quietism. Patriotism, for him, is especially sus-
pect. Lipsius’ interlocutor in the dialogue, ‘Langius’, complains 
that the word ‘piety’, a closer translation than usual, in this case, 
of the Latin term pietas, is sometimes used to mean ‘affection to 
our country’, rather than ‘honour and love toward God and our 
parents’. Even in this more limited sense, he maintains, pietas is a 
vice; a variation on ‘pity’, which he reproves, like Seneca, as by its 
very nature introducing a blameworthy, undesirable susceptibility 
to external turbulence. Langius attacks the central Christian virtue 
of compassion with startling directness. ‘Commiseration or pitying 
. . . must be despised by he who is wise and constant, whom noth-
ing so much suits as steadiness and steadfastness of courage, which 
he cannot retain if he is cast down not only with his own mishaps, 
but also at other men’s.’ Lipsius’ persona in the dialogue, ‘Lipsius’, 
is shocked at the suggestion. ‘What Stoical subtleties are these?’ he 
asks. ‘Will you not have me to pity another man’s case? Surely it is 
a virtue among good men, and such as have any religion in them? 
. . . Are we so unkind and void of humanity that we would have no 
man to be moved at another’s misery?’89 
The context of early modern Neostoicism is post-classical, 
Christian. Individual Neostoic authors, however, do not therefore 
inevitably aim at an explicit reconciliation of Stoic and Christian 
ethics. Lipsius’ degree of interest, in particular, in achieving such a 
synthesis, as well as Du Vair’s, can be easily overstated. As Mon-
sarrat observes, Lipsius mentions God frequently in his De con-
stantia, but the words ‘Christ’, ‘Christian’ or ‘Christianity’ do not 
appear at any point.90 His descriptions of God are drawn from 
classical sources such as Seneca, not the Bible.91 The same is true 
of Du Vair’s treatise, which, Du Vair himself attests, amounts to 
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little more than a paraphrase of Epictetus’ Manual. ‘It is nothing 
els but the selfe same Manuell of Epictetus owne making, which 
I haue taken in peeces, and transposed according to that method 
and order which I haue thought most conuenient.’92 The dispar-
ity between Christian and Stoic ethics that Calvin emphasises, a 
difference of opinion about ‘pity’, is not addressed directly, but 
instead left unresolved.
The troubling pitilessness which fi gures so prominently in 
Calvin’s criticism of Stoicism, as well as Erasmus’, appears repeat-
edly in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. The cold indifference to human 
fellow-feeling which Erasmus mocks and censures in his portrait of 
Seneca’s ideal sapiens Shakespeare sees as a characteristic problem 
of pagan Rome in general. Towards the end of Titus Andronicus, 
for instance, Lucius fi nds his father wandering the streets of Rome, 
pleading to the cobblestones for the life of his sons. ‘No man is by,’ 
Lucius protests. ‘You recount your sorrows to a stone’ (3.1.28–9). 
‘They are better than the Tribunes,’ Titus replies. ‘When I do weep, 
they humbly at my feet / Receive my tears and seem to weep with 
me’ (3.1.38, 40–1). Roman authority, by contrast, is ‘more hard 
than stones’ (3.1.44).93
The opening scene of Julius Caesar proves in this sense a micro-
cosm of what is to come. The problem of a characteristic Roman 
insensibility to the suffering of others is stated explicitly and 
almost immediately at the beginning of the play when the tribune 
Murellus rebukes the plebeians for celebrating Caesar’s victory 
over Pompey, a fellow Roman. ‘You blocks, you stones, you worse 
than senseless things! / You hard hearts, you cruel men of Rome, 
/ Knew you not Pompey?’ (1.1.35–6). John Anson sees the callous 
embrace of cruelty Shakespeare’s Murellus describes here as the 
central problem of the play. ‘The body politic suffers a gradual loss 
of sensibility represented by the separation of hand from heart.’ 
Romans themselves become the victims of ‘a loss of compassion, 
an induration of feeling that gradually hardens their hearts’.94 The 
language itself, too, suggests that Neostoicism is in play. Murellus’ 
opening term of reproach, ‘blocks’, echoes Shakespeare’s Grumio’s 
pun about Stoics in his earlier Taming of the Shrew: ‘Let’s be no 
Stoics nor no stocks, I pray’ (1.1.31).95 Calling the Roman people 
‘stones’ alludes, perhaps, to what Geoffrey Miles identifi es as a 
recurrent conceit in Senecan Stoicism, the image of the sapiens as 
an impervious rock.96 
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Most clearly, however, Shakespeare’s language echoes that of 
Heinrich Bullinger in his third Decade. Bullinger took a strong 
interest in England’s conversion to Protestantism, keeping up cor-
respondence with English Reformed clergy throughout his life; 
ministers fl eeing the Marian persecution studied with him person-
ally in Zurich and returned in 1558, after Queen Mary’s death, 
under the Elizabethan Settlement. Several became bishops. Parish 
preachers were required to read his sermons, and his Ten Decades 
were used at Oxford as a guide to ‘orthodox’ theology. Monsarrat 
gives details: 
In 1586 Archbishop Whitgift ordered that ‘every minister having 
cure, and being under the degrees of master of arts, and batch-
elors of law’ should purchase the Decades, in Latin or in English, 
read one sermon every week and make notes; the second edition 
of 1584 was insuffi cient to meet the demand and a third appeared 
in 1587.97 
Bullinger tends to follow Zwingli more closely than Calvin; in his 
criticism of what he calls ‘idle fellows’, however, ‘exercising them-
selves in contemplation rather than in working’, Bullinger hews 
closely to Calvin’s original. ‘Men must reject the unsavory opinion 
of the Stoics,’ he maintains, ‘touching which I will recite unto you, 
dearly beloved, a most excellent discourse of a doctor in the church 
of Christ’, that is, the passages on Stoic ethics from Calvin’s Insti-
tutes, which he repeats almost verbatim. ‘Upstart Stoics’, Bullinger 
laments, make ‘patience’ into ‘a kind of senselessness’, and ‘a val-
iant and constant man’ into ‘a senseless block, or a stone without 
passions’. The same language of ‘blocks’ and ‘stones’ reappears in 
another sermon from the same Decade, as well as Shakespeare’s 
Grumio’s ‘stocks’. ‘The Lord’, Bullinger says, would not ‘have us 
to be altogether benumbed, like blocks and stocks and senseless 
stones’.98
Throughout Julius Caesar, Shakespeare includes a wide vari-
ety of instances of coldness, insensitivity and other failures of 
human sympathy, ranging from the most extreme (murdering a 
friend) to the most quotidian (a passing social snub). In their open-
ing conversation, Cassius accuses Brutus of being ‘too stubborn 
and too strange’, forgoing his former ‘gentleness’ and ‘show of 
love’ (1.2.34–8). ‘Y’have ungently, Brutus, / Stole from my bed’ 
(2.1.236–7), Portia complains. ‘And when I asked you what the 
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matter was / You stared upon me with ungentle looks’ (2.1.240–1). 
Brutus kills a man whom he insists he also loves. ‘I . . . did love 
Caesar when I struck him’ (3.1.183), he tells Antony. To the crowd 
in the Forum he protests, as well, with an echo of Caesar’s charac-
teristic illeism, ‘If there be any in this assembly, any dear friend of 
Caesar’s, to him I say, that Brutus’s love to Caesar was no less than 
his’ (3.2.18–20). 
Brutus emphasises his love for Caesar in order to stress the sup-
posedly disinterested nature of his political engagement. Ultimately, 
however, the ‘assembly’ of baffl ed plebeians fi nd his emotional dis-
cipline alienating, instead. As Cassius and Portia speak of Brutus as 
‘ungentle’, so also Antony censures him as ‘unkind’. Pointing out 
the place in Caesar’s cloak where, he says, ‘the well-belovèd Bru-
tus stabbed’ (3.2.174), Antony describes him as having ‘unkindly 
knocked’ (3.2.177). ‘This was the most unkindest cut of all,’ he 
proclaims. ‘For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar’s angel. / Judge, 
O you gods, how dearly Caesar loved him’ (3.2.179–80). Antony 
then begins to speak of his ‘countrymen’, the gathered multitude, 
whom he describes as ‘kind souls’ (3.2.192). Weeping, like him, 
they feel ‘the dint of pity’ (3.2.193). ‘Dint’ recalls ‘knock’: Antony 
aligns the audience with the dead Caesar metaphorically, as if they, 
too, in their ‘pity’, had been physically affected by Brutus’ ‘most 
unkindest cut’.
In addition to the obvious, central event of the play, Caesar’s 
assassination, Shakespeare includes a number of instances in which 
Caesar and Brutus both alike refuse to be merciful. Just before 
he is killed, Caesar roundly refuses to pardon Metellus Cimber’s 
brother, Publius. In the quarrel scene, Brutus likewise dismisses 
Cassius’ pleas on behalf of Lucius Pella. In the Capitol, Brutus 
kneels before Caesar, interceding on Publius’ behalf, but fails even 
so to soften Caesar’s resolve. When the other conspirators press 
him, as well, for Publius’ pardon, Caesar points to this rejection: 
‘Doth not Brutus bootless kneel?’ (3.1.75) Caesar seizes upon his 
resistance to his own known affection for Brutus as a symbol to 
the other petitioners of his ‘constancy’ to his own intentions, as 
if there could be no more striking proof of his imperviousness to 
their ‘prayers’ than his indifference to his ‘angel’ (3.1.59), Brutus. 
So, too, Brutus refuses to grant Portia’s entreaty, when she kneels 
before him and begs him, by ‘all’ his ‘vows of love’ (2.1.269), to 
tell her why he is ‘heavy’ with anxiety (2.1.274). ‘Kneel not, gentle 
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Portia’ (2.1.277), Brutus replies. Portia, unsatisfi ed, strikes back 
with a play on the word ‘gentle’. ‘I should not need if you were 
gentle Brutus’ (2.1.278).
Brutus and Portia’s disputed term for each other here, ‘gen-
tle’, appears repeatedly in Julius Caesar: ‘gentle Romans’, ‘gentle 
friends’ and so on.99 When Antony learns that Brutus is dead, he 
proclaims in his eulogy, ‘His life was gentle’, where ‘gentle’ seems 
to mean ‘noble’, aristocratic: ‘he was the noblest Roman of them 
all.’ Alone with Caesar’s corpse, however, Antony uses ‘gentle’ in 
a different sense: ‘Pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth / That 
I am meek and gentle with these butchers!’ (3.1.254–5). Refer-
ring to a series of examples ranging from 1555 to 1769, the OED 
explains that ‘gentle’ in Shakespeare’s time could mean a passive 
as well as an active quality; not just ‘considerate’ or ‘kind’, but 
also ‘fl exible, yielding’: ‘Gentle a. 5: not harsh or irritating to the 
touch; soft, tender; yielding to pressure, pliant, supple. Obs.’ ‘Gen-
tleness’ in this sense is the opposite of another key concept in the 
play, ‘constancy’, understood in contrast as rock-like intractability. 
This concept of ‘gentle’ as ‘meek’, however, is under pressure 
from a competing defi nition of ‘gentle’ as ‘characteristic of the gen-
tility’. In a world of tame courtiers, these two defi nitions would not 
necessarily contradict each other; an aristocrat would of necessity 
be skilled in the art of yielding. In Shakespeare’s Rome, however, 
these two concepts of what it means to be ‘gentle’ are irrecon-
cilable, investing the term with pointed, dramatic irony. ‘Gentle 
friends, / Let’s kill him boldly, but not wrathfully; / Let’s carve 
him as a dish fi t for the gods, / Not hew him as a carcass fi t for 
hounds’ (2.1.171–4). The increasingly coarse, concrete language 
of the sentence, beginning with ‘gods’ and ending with ‘hounds’, 
moving from the elegance of ‘carve’ to the messiness of ‘hew’, pro-
gressively gives the lie to Brutus’ wishful, initial description of his 
co-conspirators as ‘gentle’.
In sum, Shakespeare’s Rome seems to be both distinguished and 
destroyed by a peculiar pitilessness. At one point, the haruspices 
tell Caesar that ‘plucking the entrails of an offering forth, / They 
could not fi nd a heart within the beast’ (2.2.39–40). The most 
obvious interpretation of this omen is that it represents, as Anson 
says, ‘a state without a leader’. On the other hand, Anson adds, the 
beast without a heart may also represent Caesar himself.100 When 
Calpurnia tries to keep him from the Senate house, he protests, 
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‘Caesar should be a beast without a heart / If he should stay at home 
today for fear’ (2.2.42–3). He misinterprets the omen, however, 
just as he does her dream. As Cicero warns, early on, ‘Men may 
construe things after their fashion / Clean from the purpose of the 
things themselves’ (1.3.34 –5). The missing heart does not indicate 
‘cowardice’ (2.2.41), as Caesar suggests, but instead Caesar’s own 
marked lack of compassion. He dismisses his wife’s pleas; once he 
arrives at the Senate, he also dismisses the conspirators’ petitions to 
pardon Publius Cimber. The play begins with his defeat of his own 
countryman, Pompey, a former ally, as well as the former husband 
of his daughter, Julia. Equally well, however, the absent heart could 
be said to represent the ruthless Republican conspirators, including 
especially Brutus, who kills Caesar despite his professed ‘love’ for 
the man. The same hard-heartedness that the tribune Murellus fi nds 
reprehensible in the Roman plebs, cheering the downfall of their 
countrymen, appears again among the aristocracy. High and low, 
plebeian and patrician, Rome itself seems to be ‘a beast without a 
heart’.101 Geoffrey Hughes describes the portent as ‘an apt symbol 
of the Roman body politic’.102
It would be too simple, however, to say that Shakespeare’s 
Romans are entirely closed-off and callous. The tradesmen who intro-
duce the play, for example, caught off-guard amid their celebration 
of Caesar’s victory over Pompey, prove not insensible to the tribunes’ 
censure of their ‘hard hearts’. ‘See where their basest mettle be not 
moved’ (1.1.62), Murellus’ fellow tribune Flavius observes. ‘They 
vanish tongue-tied in their guiltiness’ (1.1.63). A near-exact antith-
esis of Murellus’ condemnation of the Roman people as ‘blocks’ or 
‘stones’, lacking all ‘sense’ of other people’s suffering, appears about 
halfway through the play, as well, in a parallel address to the Roman 
plebs. In his funeral oration, Antony tells the crowd, ‘You are not 
wood, you are not stones, but men’ (3.2.143). ‘It is not meet you 
know how Caesar loved you’ (3.2.142), he goes on. ‘Being men, 
hearing the will of Caesar, / It will infl ame you, it will make you mad’ 
(3.2.144 –5). Cassius predicts this outcome, when he warns Brutus 
against allowing Antony to speak: ‘the people may be moved / By 
that which he will utter’ (3.1.234–5).
Throughout Julius Caesar, tears represent the exercise of the 
emotional faculty of compassion. In the opening scene, Flavius 
urges his ‘good countrymen’ to ‘weep’ for their ‘fault’ (1.1.52), 
in encouraging Caesar’s triumph ‘over Pompey’s blood’ (1.1.57):
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Assemble all the poor men of your sort; 
Draw them to Tiber banks, and weep your tears
Into the channel, till the lowest stream
Do kiss the most exalted shores of all.
(1.1.58–61)
The hyperbole is extreme; the core of the conceit, however, is the 
coming-together of high and low, patrician and plebeian, in an act 
of extreme sympathy, a movement Antony adeptly recreates in his 
funeral oration. Yet he reverses its hierarchy: before he asks the 
poor to take pity on Caesar, he describes Caesar, the great popu-
list, as having sympathy for them. ‘When that the poor have cried, 
Caesar hath wept’ (3.2.92). In Flavius’ terms, ‘the most exalted 
shores’ come down to ‘kiss’ the ‘lowest stream’. So also Antony 
himself, unlike Brutus, comes down from the pulpit to mingle 
more immediately with the crowd. ‘If you have tears, prepare to 
shed them now’ (3.2.167), he suggests. Before prompting his audi-
ence to weep, he fi rst does so himself. ‘Poor soul,’ one plebeian 
observes, ‘his eyes are red as fi re with weeping’ (3.2.116). 
The basis for such sympathy is the shared experience of being 
‘fl esh and blood’ (3.1.67). Howsoever disparate in social status, 
patricians and plebeians hold in common the basic human given 
of embodiment. All alike are physically vulnerable, and this vul-
nerability becomes by extension a symbol of a more intangible 
susceptibility to being ‘moved’ emotionally. For example, Fla-
vius’ mention of ‘Pompey’s blood’ affects or ‘moves’ the trades-
men, in the opening scene. So here, Caesar’s blood: ‘sweet Caesar’s 
wounds’ (3.2.218), his ‘sacred blood’ (3.2.134), symbolise the 
great man’s shared humanity, eliciting pity. Harping on Caesar’s 
‘blood’, Antony fi nally observes his rhetoric take physical effect. 
‘O, now you weep, and I perceive you feel / The dint of pity: these 
are gracious drops’ (3.2.191–2). ‘O piteous spectacle!’ (3.2.196) 
one plebeian cries, as Antony at last unveils Caesar’s corpse. 
‘O most bloody sight!’ (3.2.198).
In the next chapter, ‘“The northern star”’, I discuss critical 
responses to the leitmotif of blood in Julius Caesar in more detail, 
including especially those of feminist critics Gail Kern Paster and 
Coppélia Khan. More than just femininity, blood represents the 
passibility of the ‘grotesque’ body, the shared ‘vulnerability’ that, 
through sympathy, enables the formation of human community. 
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Here, for example, by appealing to pity, Antony the orator is 
able ‘to stir men’s blood’ (3.2.216). The heart, too, reappears as 
symbol: Antony is able to ‘steal away’ the ‘hearts’ of the people 
(3.2.209). His own ‘heart’, he says, ‘is in the coffi n there with 
Caesar’ (3.2.107). Murellus rebukes the Roman people by calling 
them ‘stones’, ‘hard hearts’. Antony, however, is able to ‘move’ 
these ‘stones of Rome’ to ‘rise and mutiny’ (3.2.222–3), by insist-
ing instead that they are ‘men’ (3.2.143) and that they share a 
common humanity with the murdered Caesar. 
Nor are the patricians immune to pity. Meeting the conspirators 
for the fi rst time shortly after Caesar’s death, Antony initially main-
tains what he calls ‘cold modesty’, shaking their bloody hands and 
greeting them each by name. ‘Looking down on Caesar’, however, 
he is momentarily ‘swayed from the point’ (3.1.219). He begins to 
lament Caesar’s passing – a dangerous digression:
Pardon me, Julius! Here wast thou bayed, brave hart.
Here didst thou fall. And here thy hunters stand
Signed in thy spoil and crimsoned in thy lethe.
O world, thou was the forest to this hart,
And this indeed, O world, the heart of thee.
How like a deer, strucken by many princes,
Dost thou here lie?
(3.1.204–10)
Antony’s foray here into extravagant rhetoric, a characteristic for 
which he was known, and which expresses his passionate nature, 
is presented as a lapse into a series of puns, akin to John of Gaunt’s 
deathbed variations on his own name, ‘Gaunt’, in Richard II. The 
‘hart’ at the centre of the wordplay calls to mind Jaques’ ‘sob-
bing deer’ in As You Like It: in each case, the deer functions, like 
children in Macbeth, as a symbol of the object of pity, much as 
tears represent its exercise.103 Once the conspirators leave, recoil-
ing at what he calls ‘the cruel issue of these bloody men’ (3.1.295), 
Antony imagines a world without pity, in terms that call to mind 
Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth: ‘Mothers shall but smile when they 
behold / Their infants quartered with the hands of war: / All pity 
choked with custom of fell deeds’ (3.1.267–9). In this nightmare 
vision, blood no longer evokes pity, but instead becomes ‘lethe’, 
wiping out the memory of past affection.
5877_Gray.indd   83 12/09/18   3:31 PM
84 ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic
Antony’s later weeping in the Forum is politically expedient, 
but that does not mean it is not also genuine. As if to corroborate 
Antony’s testimony, Shakespeare includes beforehand a more pri-
vate display of ‘passion’. Just before the funeral orations, when 
Antony’s servant sees Caesar’s corpse, he begins to weep, and Ant-
ony sends him away, lest his own tears, prompted by his servant’s, 
interfere with his ability to remain composed in front of Caesar’s 
assassins. ‘Thy heart is big: get thee apart and weep’ (3.1.282), 
he tells the man. ‘Passion, I see is catching, for mine eyes, / Seeing 
those beads of sorrow stand in thine, / Begin to water’ (3.1.283–5). 
In order to be an effective orator, Antony must fi rst be an actor, 
acting the part of an orator. In other words, he must seem to pos-
sess the ‘cold modesty’ of a traditionalist Roman patrician, Brutus’ 
‘reason’ and ‘patience’, even if in practice what he plans to unleash 
is populist pathos. 
Shakespeare touches upon a dubious dichotomy here that the 
Romans themselves recognised and fretted about: the thin line 
between respectable, manly Roman oratory and disreputable, 
effeminate Greek drama.104 To win permission to speak, Antony 
must seem restrained; to speak effectively, however, he must 
become passionate. In his De oratore (‘On the Orator’), Cicero 
compares public speaking to acting, as well as poetry, and insists 
that in all of these performances, the performer must be ‘on fi re 
with passion’ in order to be effective.105 Specifi cally, the orator 
must fi rst himself feel even more strongly than his audience the 
emotion that he wants them to feel. For, as Cicero explains: 
it is impossible for the listener to feel indignation, hatred, or ill-
will, to be terrifi ed of anything, or reduced to tears of compassion, 
unless all those emotions, which the advocate would inspire in an 
arbitrator, are visibly stamped or rather branded on the advocate 
himself.
To that end, Cicero adds, ‘I give you my word, I never tried, by 
means of a speech, to arouse either indignation or compassion, 
either ill-will or hatred, in the minds of the tribunal, without being 
really stirred myself.’106 
In the third chapter of this study, ‘“The high Roman fashion”’, 
I suggest that Brutus is just as theatrical, just as conscious of him-
self as performing an unnatural persona, as Cleopatra, despite 
obvious differences in their outward behaviour. He is playing 
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the role of the Stoic sapiens, as well as that of his ancestor, ‘old 
Brutus’, just as she is that of her former self, meeting Antony at 
Cydnus, as well as that of the goddess Isis. Brutus’ role model, 
Lucius Junius Brutus, was himself noted for a similar near-lifelong 
performance. In order to deceive the Tarquins, who had killed 
a number of the most notable men of Rome, including his own 
brother, ‘old Brutus’ feigned slow-wittedness, until the rape of 
Lucrece gave him at last suffi cient casus belli to foment a full-scale 
rebellion against the Tarquins’ rule. Hence his cognomen: ‘dullard’ 
(Latin, brutus). The idea that the Stoic resembles an actor is not 
new; Gordon Braden, citing J. M. Rist, observes in Senecan Sto-
icism ‘a persistent strain of what has been called theatricality’.107 
Braden draws attention to Seneca’s description of Cato’s suicide: 
‘Behold a spectacle worthy for a god, intent on his own work, to 
look at.’108 As Braden explains, ‘the point of Cato’s spectaculum 
is not just that it is well-done, but also that it is being watched.’109 
Brutus himself associates ‘constancy’ with role-playing when, like 
Lady Macbeth to Macbeth, he exhorts the conspirators not to 
let their ‘looks’ reveal their ‘purposes’. ‘Look fresh and merrily’ 
(2.1.224), he says. ‘Bear it as our Roman actors do, / With untired 
spirits and formal constancy’ (2.1.225–6). ‘Formal’ here suggests 
not only stiffness or self-control, but also superfi ciality: ‘form’ as 
opposed to ‘substance.’ 
Even Brutus, however, is susceptible to ‘pity’. Antony criticises 
Brutus in his funeral oration as a man driven by a pitiless concern 
for his own honour, but praises him, more honestly, perhaps, in 
a eulogy at the end of the tragedy as ‘gentle’. Out of all the con-
spirators, Antony says, Brutus and Brutus alone was motivated 
by a ‘general honest thought’ and hope of ‘common good to all’, 
rather than ‘envy of great Caesar’ (5.5.68–71). Antony’s qualifi -
ers ‘general’ and ‘common’ are especially signifi cant; they show 
that he sees Brutus as concerned for the well-being of the masses, 
sympathising with them, in a manner that earlier, in his funeral 
oration, he reserves for himself and Caesar, representing Brutus 
as well as the other conspirators as motivated instead by ‘private 
griefs’ (3.2.206). 
Immediately after Caesar’s death, speaking to Antony and cor-
roborating Antony’s later assessment of his motives, Brutus defends 
himself, as well as, less plausibly, his co-conspirators, as inspired 
above all by a spirit of ‘pity to the general wrong of Rome.’ You 
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see ‘but our hands,’ he protests, still stained with Caesar’s blood, 
and so ‘we must appear bloody and cruel.’ This appearance of cal-
lous cruelty, however, he insists, is misleading.
Our hearts you see not; they are pitiful;
And pity to the general wrong of Rome – 
As fi re drives out fi re, so pity pity – 
Hath done this deed on Caesar.
(3.1.166–73)
Brutus’ apology to Antony here, emphasising ‘the general wrong 
of Rome’, echoes his earlier soliloquy, ‘It must be by his death.’ 
‘For my part,’ Brutus there begins, ‘I know no personal cause to 
spurn at him / But for the general’ (2.1.10–12). Psychologically, 
the key point is that Brutus sees, or claims to see, the decision 
to assassinate Caesar as primarily a question of ‘pity’ rather than 
‘honour’, as Antony implies in his later funeral oration. His ‘pity’ 
for the people of Rome outweighs his ‘pity’ for Caesar. 
What exactly is the ‘wrong’, however, of which Brutus speaks? 
Here, honour reasserts itself. As Brutus’ soliloquy progresses, it 
becomes clear that what he fears is, above all, shame. ‘Th’abuse 
of greatness’ which he expects from Caesar is that, having climbed 
the ‘ladder’ of apparent ‘lowliness’, he will then turn upon those 
below him, such as Brutus himself, and treat them with contempt, 
‘scorning the base degrees by which he did ascend’. ‘So Caesar 
may’ (2.1.27), he concludes. ‘Then, lest he may, prevent’ (2.1.28). 
The same root concern with the threat of shame, specifi cally, of 
being seen as less than ‘noble’, less than ‘Roman’, reappears with 
great force in Brutus’ later funeral oration. ‘Who is here so base, 
that would be a bondman?’ he asks. ‘Who is here so rude, that 
would not be a Roman? If any, speak, for him have I offended’ 
(3.2.29–31).
Brutus’ desire to maintain his reputation as a ‘noble Roman’, 
and, by extension, to preserve the Roman ‘liberty’ that gives that 
self-image its value, does not wholly blot out, however, his ‘pity’ 
for Caesar. He is not indifferent to his affection for the would-be 
tyrant, just as he is not indifferent to the charms of conjugal love 
or the claims of longstanding friendship. He initially resists Portia’s 
pleas to be taken into his counsel, but eventually does open up to 
her, disclosing ‘the secrets of [his] heart’ (2.1.305). In the quarrel 
scene, Brutus mocks Cassius, at fi rst, for his blustering, agitated 
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indignation, but in the end embraces him, forgives him and admits 
that he, too, was in part at fault. ‘Do you confess so much?’ 
Cassius asks, astonished. ‘Give me your hand’ (4.3.116). ‘And my 
heart too’ (4.3.117), Brutus replies. 
Without question, the Romans in this tragedy are capable of 
astonishing cruelty. Antony, Octavius and Lepidus sentence their 
own relatives to death with hardly a moment’s hesitation:
ANTONY
  These many, then, shall die; their names are 
pricked.
OCTAVIUS
  Your brother, too, must die; consent you, 
Lepidus?
LEPIDUS I do consent.
OCTAVIUS Prick him down, Antony.
LEPIDUS Upon condition Publius shall not live,
  Who is your sister’s son, Mark Antony.
ANTONY
  He shall not live. Look, with a spot I damn 
him.
(4.1.1–6)
The ‘prick’ of Antony’s ink-pen here recalls the stab of a dagger, 
like Brutus’ ‘most unkindest cut’. The ‘spot’ of ink resembles a 
bleeding wound, like those left in Caesar’s body. The metaphorical 
diminution of murder to such a small-scale, seemingly trivial event, 
committed indirectly and from afar, without any apparent internal 
hesitation or deliberation, refl ects another order altogether of cal-
lous inhumanity. The victims of their proscription seem no more 
to the triumvirate than dots on a page, despite family ties that 
would normally evoke affection. 
Even so, the faculty of pity is there, somewhere, even if etiolated. 
Antony may not hesitate to ‘damn’ his poor nephew, Publius, but 
he does weep genuine tears for Caesar. Rome is not wholly driven 
by fear of shame, but instead can be understood as tempered, if 
only to a limited degree, by a countervailing strain of guilt. ‘Our 
hearts you see not’ (3.1.169), Brutus tells Antony, but nonetheless, 
he insists, they exist. He feels ‘pity’ for Caesar, just as he also does 
for the Roman people. The problem is not that Brutus does not feel 
sympathy for others, but rather that he does not know what to do 
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with this sense of compassion. He wants to operate instead on the 
basis of ‘reason’ alone. Antony, by contrast, like an actor, knows 
how to make use of pathos. A. D. Nuttall describes ‘the Roman 
world’ of Julius Caesar as ‘a place of malfunctioning emotion’. In 
this play, especially, ‘love is an ill-nourished, undeveloped thing. 
Either it is crushed by Stoic repression or it is rhetorically manipu-
lated and converted into aggression.’110 In the Neostoic paradigm 
Shakespeare’s Rome represents, there is no place for pity, and as a 
result it goes underground, becoming unstable and dangerous, like 
a cellar full of gunpowder.
In insisting on the persistence of pity, Shakespeare presents a vari-
ation on a widespread argument against Stoicism, one which can 
be found in sources ranging from Cicero and Plutarch to Erasmus 
and Calvin. The objection common to all is that emotions such as 
pity cannot be eliminated altogether, even if, contrary to fact, it were 
somehow in our interest to do so. To become a disinterested creature 
of pure reason is simply impossible, even if it were advisable; sympa-
thy for other people’s suffering, right or wrong, is to some extent an 
ineradicable component of our human nature. We can repress it, we 
can deny its force, but in the end the heart cannot be removed from 
the beast. What can happen, however, is that, in being stifl ed, the 
human sense of pity, like any other emotion, can become weak, slug-
gish, unpredictable, and, like the Roman people in this play, prone 
to sudden explosions. In his essay ‘Of Anger’, Montaigne warns that 
hiding anger may in fact make it worse, like water trapped behind a 
dam. ‘We incorporate anger by hiding it; as Diogenes said to Dem-
osthenes, who, for fear of being seen in a tavern, was drawing back 
further inside it: “The further back you go, the deeper in you are.”’111 
Refusing to acknowledge passionate feelings does not make them 
disappear. Instead, they may even be exacerbated. Or they may break 
out in places where they do not properly belong. 
‘The soul discharges its passions on false objects when the true 
are wanting,’ Montaigne writes.112 Such psychic displacement 
occurs repeatedly in Julius Caesar. Emotions that Romans deny 
in one arena reappear with disastrous force in another. A crowd 
of plebeians tear apart the poet Cinna, for example, ignoring his 
protests that he is not, in fact, the Cinna that they are looking 
for. Brutus confesses in retrospect that his anger at Cassius in the 
quarrel scene was at least in part a reaction to his grief at the loss 
of his wife. Portia’s suicide by swallowing hot coals is a vivid, if 
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horrifying, symbol of this hysterical acting-out of unassimilated, 
disavowed emotional distress. The ‘constant’ silence that Brutus 
asks of her earlier in the play is inhuman, deadly, like ‘swallow-
ing fi re’.113 Shakespeare frames Portia’s suicide so that it becomes 
an allegory of what Brutus does to himself by pretending, fi rst to 
Cassius, then to Messala, that he is less affected by the news of her 
death than he really is. He keeps his mouth shut about his grief, 
even though it is, so to speak, killing him; he, too, is in a sense 
‘swallowing fi re’, and the pain of it drives him to uncontrolled, 
uncharacteristic anger at his friend and ally, Cassius. As David 
Quint explains, ‘Montaigne’s essay on anger is of a piece with the 
larger moral teaching of the Essays.’ Unlike Shakespeare’s Brutus, 
the essayist ‘gives up on maintaining a constant inner equanim-
ity and outward composure to the observing world’. ‘The toll one 
exacts upon one’s nature to do so is simply not worth it,’ Mon-
taigne concludes; ‘it is better to let the passions run their course.’114
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CHAPTER 2
‘THE NORTHERN STAR’: CONSTANCY AND 
PASSIBILITY IN JULIUS CAESAR
In the general introduction, ‘Shakespeare and the Vulnerable Self’, 
I proposed that Shakespeare’s concept of personhood rests some-
where between twentieth-century antihumanism such as that of 
Althusser and the Kantian dream of autonomy that such ‘Theory 
with a capital T’ sets itself against. Both extremes are too reduc-
tive. The individual is neither entirely transcendent, like some 
sort of disembodied deity, nor entirely determined, like a cog in 
a machine, but instead interdependent, at once agent and object, 
like a partner in a dance or an interlocutor in a dialogue. For an 
antihumanist such as Lacan, the other is primarily ‘the Other with 
a capital O’, an impersonal force or structure such as ‘language’ 
or ‘discourse’. For Shakespeare, however, the other is in con-
trast another consciousness: what Martin Buber calls a ‘thou’, as 
opposed to an ‘it’. 
In this chapter, as well as the fi nal chapter on Antony and 
Cleopatra, I turn for purposes of comparison to the literary criti-
cism of Mikhail Bakhtin. Like Lévinas, Barth, Tillich and many 
other twentieth-century theologians, Bakhtin is deeply indebted 
to Martin Buber.1 These theologians, however, tend to emphasise 
only one instance of what Buber calls the ‘I–thou’ relationship, 
man’s relationship with God, and to pass over what for Buber 
was equally important, man’s relationship with his fellow man. By 
turning to a different disciple of Buber, Bakhtin, I hope to reintro-
duce the ‘horizontal’, so to speak, alongside the ‘vertical’. Citing 
Buber’s description of himself as ‘a man among men’, Ewan Fernie 
fi nds an analogue in ‘the truth, as Hegel as describes it, of “I” that 
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is “We” and “We” that is “I.”’2 Christopher Tilmouth turns to 
Hobbes, and Jane Kingsley-Smith to Aristotle, for a similar pivot 
or reorientation away from the connection between man and God 
towards, as Buber says, the relations ‘between man and man’.3 
Bakhtin for his part fi nds in Rabelais’s ‘grotesque’ vision of the 
human body, as well as Dostoyevsky’s gift for characterisation, a 
literary analogue of Buber’s emphasis on human interdependence. 
Whereas Dostoyevsky focuses on relatively intangible questions of 
ethics, the intersection of ‘multiple consciousnesses’, Rabelais is 
more earthy and physical, emphasising the interrelatedness inher-
ent in embodiment. Bakhtin sees in each author, however, Rabelais 
as well as Dostoyevsky, a preeminent artist of human passibility. 
Each communicates in his own distinct manner the same basic 
truth which I argue Shakespeare also presents here in these Roman 
plays: the unhealthy, dangerous absurdity of attempting to main-
tain what Bakhtin calls ‘proud solitude’. 
In the fi nal chapter on Antony and Cleopatra, ‘A spacious 
mirror,’ using Bakhtin’s analysis of Dostoyevsky as a parallel, I look 
closely at Shakespeare’s sense of human passibility as it extends to 
the relatively rarefi ed sphere of ethics: our susceptibility to moral 
judgement. To some extent, even if limited, we as human beings 
cannot help but be affected by what other people think of us. In this 
chapter on Julius Caesar, ‘The northern star’, drawing on Bakhtin’s 
analysis of Rabelais, I turn instead to a more obvious form of pos-
sibility: human materiality. In so far as we are ‘fl esh and blood’, we 
fi nd ourselves enmeshed in a world of physical objects, one which 
we do not and cannot entirely control. For Shakespeare’s Romans, 
this vulnerability is deeply distressing. 
To explain Shakespeare’s Romans’ perspective on human 
embodiment, I also turn to a different strain of thought about 
the other, Derrida’s concept of the other as the opposite of the 
selfsame. As mediated through postcolonial literary criticism, this 
concept of the other has come to mean an ostensible foil or point 
of contrast, usually, one drawn from a despised or ‘subaltern’ cul-
ture, which a hegemonic power uses to distinguish itself as ‘self’. 
Derrida’s observations on the traces of the selfsame within the 
other then serve as a model for a demonstration that the supposed 
opposition between this particular ‘self’ and its chosen ‘other’ 
is not absolute, but instead a self-serving, inaccurate social con-
struction.4 The distinction between self and other turns out to be 
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permeable, specious. Disavowal of the supposed other does pro-
vide an index, however, of what it is that the self sees as less than 
ideal. In the case of Shakespearean Romanitas, the other seems 
to be femininity. This opposition itself refl ects a deeper tension, 
however, between what Neostoicism calls ‘constancy’, a form of 
godlike transcendence, and the ‘frailty’ inherent to the human con-
dition. Femininity for Shakespeare’s Romans is only one symbol 
or instance of our ineluctable human ‘vulnerability’; other aspects 
include sickness, old age and ignorance.
Power and Passibility: Two Concepts of the Divine
In this section, I explain the concept of ‘passibility’ in more detail 
and compare it to other theoretical categories such as vulnerability 
and femininity. In his history of personhood, Timothy Reiss intro-
duces passibility as means to distinguish between pre-modern and 
modern perceptions of the self. Along the same lines as Charles 
Taylor and Alistair MacIntyre, Reiss describes modernity as distin-
guished by its emphasis on the autonomous agency of the individ-
ual, a tendency which he sees emerging in the early modern period 
in the introspection characteristic of authors such as Petrarch and 
Montaigne, as well as Descartes. In antiquity, as well as the Middle 
Ages, the self was understood in contrast as embedded in ‘circles’ 
or ‘spheres’ of relatedness. The susceptibility or ‘passibility’ of the 
self to the moral claims of its relationships with others was not con-
sidered accidental or extrinsic to its nature, but instead constitutive 
of its identity. Reiss derives the term ‘passibility’ from Aristotle. 
Oddly, however, he omits any mention of its usual fi eld of signi-
fi cation. The concept of passibility has a long history in Christian 
discourse as a criterion for distinguishing between the human and 
the divine. For example, the question whether God is passible only 
in his humanity as the Son or if he is also passible in his divinity 
as the Father is one of the most contentious subjects of debate in 
twentieth-century Christian theology, echoing centuries of earlier 
Patristic controversy. 
Passibility not only distinguishes the human from the divine, 
but also the God of Christianity, a human being, from the vari-
ous deities or analogues of the Godhead proposed in classical 
philosophy. Figures such as Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover are 
essentially impassible, whereas Christ, especially at the moment 
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of his Passion, is obviously in some sense passible. This differ-
ence between classical and Christian representations of the ideal 
self corresponds to a key difference between the ethical para-
digm of Shakespeare’s Romans and Shakespeare’s own. Shake-
speare’s Romans strive to become impassible, like the wholly 
transcendent deities of classical philosophy. Shakespeare himself 
believes they would be better served, however, if they made peace 
with their own human passibility. The healthy functioning of a 
republic, a marriage or even a friendship requires an openness 
or vulnerability to the other that these characters see instead as 
a threat to their sense of their own imperium: Patchen Markell 
might say, to their efforts to be recognised as ‘sovereign’.
Theoretically, at least, Christians aim at an ideal of compassion 
and concession. God as Trinity serves as a model of unbegrudging 
interpersonal interdependence. Shakespeare’s Romans, by contrast, 
prove fatally uncomfortable with any such arrangement. As Russell 
Hillier observes, ‘in Roman eyes, empathy for a stranger’s misfor-
tune is a weakness or an evil’.5 Shakespeare’s Romans are suspicious 
of political compromise, since it involves giving up some degree of 
personal autonomy. Cooperation as they see it is at best a necessary 
evil, a means to an end, rather than a condition they are willing 
to accept ad infi nitum. As a result, in Antony and Cleopatra, the 
triumvirate of Octavian, Antony and Lepidus proves a kind of secu-
lar anti-Trinity, doomed from the outset to degenerate into deadly 
rivalry. By grounding Shakespeare’s Romans’ transition from one 
political regime to another in their assumptions about ethics, rather 
than vice versa, I depart from Paul Cantor’s approach to Shake-
speare’s Roman plays, as well as Fredric Jameson’s more general 
claims about ethics in The Political Unconscious. The same kind 
of reversal of assumptions about cause and effect also informs my 
response here to most extant feminist criticism of Shakespeare’s 
Roman plays. Rather than explaining the psychology of Roman 
characters as an effect of Roman patriarchy, I argue that Shake-
speare’s Romans’ patent discomfort with femininity, as well their 
tendency to exclude women from the public sphere, emerges out of 
a more fundamental idealisation of impassibility.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a remarkable effl orescence of feminist 
interest in so-called ‘pre-Oedipal’ male anxiety about masculinity in 
Shakespeare’s plays, including especially Julius Caesar and Coriola-
nus. Drawing upon the object relations theories of psychoanalysts 
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such as Nancy Chodorow and Dorothy Dinnerstein, feminist critics 
Janet Adelman, Gail Kern Paster, Madelon Sprengnether, Cynthia 
Marshall and Coppélia Kahn present characters such as Coriola-
nus as striving to escape what Adelman calls ‘suffocating mothers’. 
According to Adelman, ‘contemporary object-relations psychoanaly-
sis locates differentiation from the mother as a special site of anxiety 
for the boy-child, who must form his specifi cally masculine selfhood 
against the matrix of her overwhelming femaleness.’6 In her early 
book on masculinity in Shakespeare’s plays, Man’s Estate, Coppélia 
Kahn adheres to much the same paradigm, citing in addition the 
work of sympathetic psychoanalysts such as Robert J. Stoller and 
Ralph Greenson. Kahn quotes Stoller: ‘still-to-be-created masculinity 
is endangered by the primary, profound, primeval oneness with the 
mother.’7 In sum, Kahn explains,
the polarization of social roles and behavior into masculine inde-
pendence, power, and repression of feeling as opposed to feminine 
dependence, weakness, and tenderness, and the consequent deval-
uation of femininity by men (and women as well) may arise as ‘a 
quite nonbiological defensive maneuver against an earlier stage: 
closeness and primitive identifi cation with mother.’8 
A decade later, in her book on Shakespeare’s Roman plays, Roman 
Shakespeare, Kahn revisits this argument, modifying it in ways that 
refl ect the contemporary rise of New Historicism. Given her abid-
ing interest in what she describes as Shakespeare’s ‘preoccupation 
with the masculine subject’, it is perhaps only natural that Kahn 
would in time turn to Shakespeare’s Rome. In this setting above 
all, masculinity seems to enjoy pride of place, albeit at tragic cost. 
Rome is a symbol and an instance of patriarchy and male domi-
nance: ‘Romanness’ itself, Kahn argues, ‘is virtually identical with 
an ideology of masculinity’. For example, she points out, ‘the very 
etymology of virtus [Latin, ‘virtue’] is gender-specifi c’; it is ‘derived 
from vir, Latin for man’. ‘Roman virtue’ is not a ‘moral abstrac-
tion’ but instead ‘a marker of sexual difference crucial to construc-
tion of the male subject’.9 In this analysis of Romanitas, Kahn no 
longer appeals to psychoanalytic theory as she did in Man’s Estate, 
as what she calls there ‘a hermeneutic cornerstone’. No longer an 
‘intra-psychic phenomenon’, grounded in a universal ‘pre-Oedipal’ 
complex, masculinity instead appears reconfi gured as ‘an ideology 
discursively maintained’. As an ‘ideology’ in the Althusserian sense, 
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masculinity ‘interpellates’ the individual through ‘discourse’ such 
as the chivalric revival in the last years of Elizabeth’s reign, chan-
nelling the energy of that subject into the tragic, aristocratic ‘cul-
tural practice’ of ‘emulation’. The concept of ‘emulation’ is crucial; 
Kahn cites the OED (‘to copy or imitate with the object of equal-
ling or excelling’), then gives her own, more complex account. ‘In 
emulation, the admiration that generates a desire to imitate some-
one easily turns into rivalry, the desire to excel him, and fi nally to 
the desire to defeat or destroy him and take his place.’10 
Kahn does not altogether abandon her argument in Man’s 
Estate, however. What she does, rather, is let go of the belief that 
character is determined primarily during early childhood, the 
premise Stephen A. Mitchell calls ‘infantilism’, in favour of a new 
emphasis on present, adult interaction. This reorientation towards 
what Mitchell calls the ‘current interpersonal world’ is not in itself 
incompatible with post-Freudian object relations theory.11 For 
example, in Man’s Estate, Kahn summarises and seconds the con-
clusions of Ralph Greenson. ‘For the boy, the critical threat to 
masculinity is not, as Freud maintains, castration, but engulfment 
by the mother, and his critical task in establishing his masculinity 
is not an oedipal one but a pre-oedipal one of “dis-identifying” 
from his mother and “counter-identifying” with his father.’ In 
Roman Shakespeare, Kahn presents what amounts to a revised 
version of the same narrative. Just as the ‘pre-oedipal’ male child 
strives to ‘dis-identify’ with the mother and ‘counter-identify’ with 
the father, so also the Roman man tries to dissociate himself from 
the feminine more generally considered and instead engage with a 
masculine ‘rival’: ‘the mirror image of an ideal self’.
Kahn’s account of the root cause, however, of male striving for 
separation from the female is very different from one book to the 
next. In Man’s Estate, male children ‘dis-identifying’ from their 
mothers is an expression of an innate human drive. In Roman 
Shakespeare, male rejection of the feminine is a consequence of 
the male individual being interpellated by an ideology, masculinity, 
which itself is not, so to speak, natural, but instead propaganda in 
the service, ultimately, of the ruling monarch. ‘Up to a point, fac-
tion fueled by emulation served the queen’s purposes.’ Kahn cites 
Eric Mallin: ‘To prevent challenges to the monarchy, the nobles 
were encouraged to conceive of one another as the sole obstacles 
to positions of greater and greater strength.’12 In both books, 
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however, men to be masculine must ‘struggle to differentiate them-
selves’ from women as well as, especially, the feminine within them-
selves, with which they share, nonetheless, a degree of primordial 
unity, and from which they can never entirely escape.13 
In the notes to Roman Shakespeare, Kahn notes that her empha-
sis on emulation takes its cue from Wayne Rebhorn’s article, ‘The 
Crisis of the Aristocracy in Julius Caesar’. Here, Rebhorn presents 
emulation as ‘the hallmark of the Elizabethan aristocracy’ and 
argues that it is represented on-stage in Julius Caesar by the sym-
bolic proxy of the Roman aristocracy. Kahn’s description of the key 
difference between her analysis of emulation and Rebhorn’s, how-
ever, is somewhat misleading. ‘While I share his view of the impor-
tance of emulation in Julius Caesar,’ she writes, ‘I see it as a cultural 
practice that contradicts republican ideology, rather than as a “fun-
damental drive” or “character type” (1990: 78).’14 The parentheti-
cal citation makes it seem as if Kahn is citing Rebhorn directly, but 
the phrases ‘fundamental drive’ and ‘character type’ are her own 
interpolation. The choice of words makes Rebhorn seem more psy-
choanalytic, more like Kahn herself in her earlier study Man’s Estate 
than he really is. To say that Rebhorn sees emulation as a ‘funda-
mental drive’ suggests, in the context Kahn sets up, that he sees it as 
an innate, biological impetus, akin to the ‘pre-oedipal’ motives that 
Kahn describes in Man’s Estate, when in fact he presents it as emerg-
ing out of a specifi c historical context, the ‘crisis of the aristocracy’ 
in early modern England. Rebhorn even uses Kahn’s own key term, 
‘ideology’, albeit not in her more technical, Althusserian sense, citing 
the work of Anthony Esler on what Esler calls ‘the aspiring mind’ of 
‘the Elizabethan younger generation’.15
A more accurate way to distinguish between Kahn’s account 
of the origin of the early modern English aristocratic emulation 
and Rebhorn’s would be to say that although both see this ‘cul-
tural practice’ as grounded in contemporary, historically contin-
gent social relations, Kahn sees it as emerging top-down, whereas 
Rebhorn sees it as emerging bottom-up. In the manner associated 
with New Historicism, and of a piece with her use of terms such 
as ‘ideology’ and ‘interpellation’ derived from Althusser, Kahn 
presents aristocratic emulation as a product of manipulation by 
the crown, imposing self-sabotage upon the English nobility as a 
means to keep them in check. By fostering factionalism, Elizabeth 
forestalled the possibility of a more republican alternative to her 
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relative absolutism. Kahn cites Eric Mallin: ‘The proliferation of 
emulous factions was a crucial component of Elizabeth’s method 
of rule.’ 
Rebhorn, by contrast, sees emulation as emerging in a more 
decentralised, diffuse manner, as a result of ‘Elizabethans’ concern 
to defi ne aristocratic identity’: what Gordon Braden calls ‘a crisis 
of the aristocratic imagination’.16 This ambient ‘concern with aris-
tocratic self-defi nition’ was ‘the result of the dislocations caused 
by social mobility and the ontological insecurity that mobility pro-
duced for Englishmen used to living in a seemingly immutable, 
intensely hierarchical society.’ Not only aristocrats themselves, but 
also their various hangers-on, including writers such as Spenser 
and Shakespeare, for whom they served as patrons, found them-
selves obliged to make sense of the nobility’s ongoing transition 
from warriors to courtiers.17 
On the basis of his reading of Julius Caesar, Rebhorn argues 
that whereas Stone attributes the crisis of the aristocracy that he 
identifi es chiefl y to economic causes, Shakespeare tends to see it ‘in 
moral terms’. His play is ‘analytical’, but his analysis is grounded 
in the history of ethics, rather than the history of class confl ict. The 
nobility as a class is being ‘impelled’ to its own ‘suicide’, literal 
as well as fi gurative, not by material changes in the distribution 
of wealth, but instead by its own ‘essential values and modes of 
self-defi nition’. The idea of the ‘imperial will’ or ‘imperial self’ 
which Rebhorn argues Shakespeare sees as the engine of aristo-
cratic self-destruction is a concept that he takes up from Gordon 
Braden. As Braden explains, the desire to preserve the ‘imperial 
self’ transforms human relationships into a ‘zero-sum’ competi-
tion for power, breaking down social relations into atomistic fac-
tionalism. It as if the nobility would return, if they could, to the 
medieval landscape of independent fi efdoms; instead, however, 
they are divided and conquered. Shakespeare’s Roman patricians 
exemplify this inability to coexist: ‘driven by the hunger of emula-
tion to extend endlessly the terrain of the self, they destroy and 
will keep destroying one another until the stage is bare and only 
a single imperial will is left.’18 The monarch does not engineer 
‘emulous factionalism’ in order to preserve his own power, as per 
Mallin’s account; rather, the monarch is the last man (or woman) 
standing once that factionalism has run its course, like the winner 
of a medieval melee. 
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In this chapter, I re-examine this concept of the ‘imperial self’, 
looking closely, along the lines of Kahn’s inquiry, at the ways in 
which it intersects with Roman concepts of masculinity. In contrast 
to Kahn, however, I propose that Roman aversion to femininity in 
Shakespeare’s plays is not primarily an ideological instrument of 
‘patriarchy’, designed to preserve male ‘dominance’ over women. 
Its point of origin is neither aristocratic ‘emulation’ nor the male 
child’s desire to secure a discrete identity, separate from what 
Adelman describes as the ‘suffocating mother’. Instead, Roman 
misogyny can be better understood as one manifestation among 
many of Romans’ profound distrust of passibility, a characteristic 
anxiety about the most basic given of the human condition which 
they share, not only with the aristocracy of early modern England, 
but also with the ancient Greeks, and indeed with much subse-
quent Western culture. 
Outside relatively rarefi ed debates about Christian theology, the 
term ‘passibility’ is likely to be unfamiliar. Kahn gets at something 
similar through the concept of ‘vulnerability’, which she associ-
ates with its etymological root vulnus, the Latin word for wound. 
‘Wounds mark a kind of vulnerability readily associated with 
women: they show the fl esh to be penetrable, they show that it can 
bleed, they make apertures in the body.’19 Kahn moves quickly to 
ground Roman fear of physical vulnerability in misogyny; I would 
prefer to step back one remove still further, however, and ground 
both in a larger anxiety about all forms of ‘vulnerability’, includ-
ing the emotional and moral, as well as the physical and political. 
James Kuzner introduces an analogous broad use of the same term, 
‘vulnerability’, to denote the emotional availability and openness 
which, like Cicero, he sees as fundamental to the fl ourishing of any 
possible commonwealth.20 
According to Kuzner, a republic to be viable requires of its 
citizens the virtue of being ‘open’ to compassion and concession, 
which itself requires that they choose to accept being embedded in 
their own society, like Cicero, rather than, like Seneca, attempting 
to withdraw into an isolated, wary privacy. This kind of voluntary 
engagement is risky, entailing ‘vulnerability’ to other people, but 
even so absolutely necessary for a functioning republic, or even for 
a healthy friendship. Kuzner thus redefi nes ‘vulnerability’ as a vir-
tue, rather than a weakness, somewhat against the grain of classical 
liberalism, with its characteristic, contrary emphasis on ‘negative 
5877_Gray.indd   103 12/09/18   3:31 PM
104 ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic
liberty’. For Quentin Skinner, in particular, the core of republican-
ism is ‘freedom as non-domination’, an ideal he describes as ‘neo-
Roman’. In the contrarian spirit of philosophers such as Charles 
Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, Kuzner presents a ‘communitarian’ 
critique of this ‘neo-Roman’ vision. ‘Freedom’ should be under-
stood as ‘freedom to’ participate in the exercise of government, 
rather than ‘freedom from’ interference with individual liberties. 
Kuzner shows that ‘vulnerability’ can be given a remarkably 
expansive sense. For present purposes, however, I would like to 
retain the more technical term, ‘passibility’. Its denotation admits 
of a larger scope, without resorting to extension via metaphor. 
More importantly, it serves to introduce some questions of theol-
ogy that I think are crucial to understanding the distinctive char-
acter of Shakespeare’s Romans. I am not the fi rst to apply the 
concept of passibility to literary criticism; my use of the term is in 
part an invocation of what is for me, as well as Kuzner, an impor-
tant source, Timothy Reiss’s recent history of changing concepts 
of personhood, Mirages of the Selfe. Here, Reiss draws a convin-
cing picture of changing attitudes towards ‘passibility’ as the pivot 
of an intellectual transition to modernity during the early mod-
ern period, beginning with Petrarch’s break from antiquity and 
culminating in Descartes’s new vision of the self, the notorious 
Cartesian ego cogito: ‘The idea that consciousness precedes or is 
otherwise apart from public interpersonal exchange, sociopolitical 
activity, and all forms of material activity and event.’21 
To some degree, Reiss’s argument can be understood as a 
refi nement of Burckhardt’s familiar description of the Renaissance 
as the emergence of modern personhood. In the ‘Middle Ages’, 
Burckhardt argues, ‘man was conscious of himself only as a mem-
ber of a race, people, party, family, or corporation – only through 
some general category.’ Over the course of the Renaissance, how-
ever, ‘man became a spiritual individual, and recognized himself 
as such’.22 Fleshing out what Burckhardt means by ‘general cat-
egory’, Reiss introduces the idea of what he calls ‘circles’, includ-
ing, for example, ‘material world, society, family, animal being, 
rational mind, divine’. ‘These circles or spheres – as Cicero, Sen-
eca, Hierocles and Plutarch called them . . . did not ‘surround’ a 
person who somehow fi t into them. They were what a person was: 
integral to my very substance. . . . They named existential spheres 
to which the person enlaced in them was in a reactive relation.’23 
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One of Reiss’s key sources for this insight is Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
history of changes in ethical presuppositions in his After Virtue. 
According to MacIntyre, in ‘many pre-modern, traditional soci-
eties, to be a man is to fi ll a set of roles each which has its own 
point and purpose: member of a family, citizen, soldier, philoso-
pher, servant of God’. Social roles such as the ‘offi ces’ Cicero out-
lines in his De offi ciis are not ‘characteristics that belong to human 
beings accidentally, to be stripped away in order to discover “the 
real me.” They are part of my substance.’24 Relationships with 
other people are integral to personhood itself. Reiss introduces an 
archaic spelling, ‘selfe’, in order to distinguish and defamiliarise 
this pre-modern concept of personhood. ‘An embedded, passible 
“selfe” . . . pervious and tied to divine, social, material spheres and 
historical community, underlay Western experience from Petrarch 
until Michel de Montaigne, even as dissonances appeared.’25 
Within Reiss’s narrative, ‘passibility’ refers to the experience of 
all that the modern, ‘Cartesian’ reimagining of personhood tries to 
strip away, leaving behind, as Reiss sees it, little more than a ghost 
in the machine: a wisp of reifi ed, implausibly pure agency. 
Passibility names experiences of beings whose common denomi-
nator was a sense of being embedded in and acted on by these 
circles [i.e. the ‘circles or spheres’ mentioned above] – including 
the material world and immediate biological, familial, and social 
ambiences, as well as . . . cosmic, spiritual, or divine life. 
In his Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor introduces a similar met-
aphor, the idea that the individual subject is inevitably entangled 
in ‘webs of interlocution’. We are ‘transcendentally embedded’, he 
maintains, in relationships with other people, despite all effort at 
‘independence’.26 Like MacIntyre, Taylor aims to rehabilitate this 
older sense of personhood, which he sees as more accurate than 
the ‘Cartesian’, and therefore a sounder basis for ethical action. 
Reiss, by contrast, is more value-neutral, seeking simply to present 
an accurate picture of changing conceptions of what he sometimes 
calls ‘who-ness’.
 Moving through an astonishing range of literary sources from 
antiquity and the Middle Ages, Reiss shows passibility ensconced 
in concepts of personhood throughout. With Petrarch, however, 
followed by Montaigne, Reiss begins to discern what he calls ‘dis-
sonances’: forerunners of the modern effort to conceive of a self 
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independent of all passibility. The term itself, ‘passibility’, is cen-
tral to his argument. Nevertheless, Reiss’s reviewers seem to have 
found it baffl ing. Hassan Melehy describes it as ‘to this reader’s 
knowledge . . . Reiss’s own innovation’.27 Stephen Nichols puts it 
in scare quotes and posits that Reiss uses ‘the Latinate term . . . 
for lack of a satisfactory English equivalent’.28 Neither of these 
assessments is correct. ‘Passibility’ is a well-established technical 
term in Christian theology; in fact, the key term in one of the most 
contentious academic theological debates of the twentieth cen-
tury, as well as earlier debates among the Greek Church Fathers.29 
John Donne, for instance, employs it repeatedly in his sermons. 
‘Passibility’, as he uses the term, is the quality that most clearly 
and profoundly distinguishes man from God. For example, in a 
sermon delivered before Charles I at court, April 1629, Donne 
defi nes God ‘in his essence’ as ‘not mortall, not passible’. Or again, 
in a sermon at St Dunstan’s, Trinity Sunday, 1627: ‘God is that 
which is not mortall, not passible, not moveable.’ Man, by con-
trast, is by defi nition ‘passible’. In a sermon at Lincoln’s Inn, 1618, 
Donne explains that man was immortal before the Fall, but not 
‘impassible’: impassibility is the prerogative of God alone.30
In fairness to Reiss’s reviewers, Reiss himself makes no mention 
of this history of his own key term, ‘passibility’, within Christian 
theological debate. The source that he cites is instead the brief pas-
sage in Aristotle’s De anima (‘On the Soul’) which distinguishes 
between the ‘active intellect’ (nous poiētikos) and the ‘passive intel-
lect’ (nous pathētikos; Scholastic Latin, intellectus passibilis).31 
Reiss’s defi nition of the term, as well, is idiosyncratic. ‘Passibility’ 
as it is normally used does not refer to ‘experiences of being’, even 
experiences of being ‘embedded in and acted on’, but instead more 
precisely to the state or condition of being ‘vulnerable’ to being 
‘embedded in and acted on’. In other words, passibility is the capac-
ity for experiencing passivity, not the experience itself. In particular, 
in the context of Patristic debate, to be passible (Greek, pathētos; 
Latin [Vulg.], passibilis) is to be capable of feeling emotion, ‘pas-
sion’ (Greek, pathos; translated into Latin as passio). Most espe-
cially, to be passible is to be capable of suffering.32 Reiss describes 
the term simply as ‘Latin’, and it is; at base, it is derived from pati, 
‘to bear, suffer, endure’ (cf. Greek, paschein). Its origin, however, is 
more specifi cally post-classical Christian Latin, as a translation of 
a Greek concept, to pathēton (literally, ‘the ability to feel pathos’, 
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i.e. ‘passibility’).33 In his ‘Life of Pelopidas’, Plutarch describes 
Dionysius and Hercules, for example, as gods who began as men, 
but on account of their aretē were able to cast aside to thnēton kai 
pathēton (‘mortality and passibility’).34 Or, for example, in his ‘Life 
of Numa’, he describes Numa as insisting, like Pythagoras, that the 
divine is not passible (pathēton).35
The same root (Latin [Vulg.], passio) is behind the Christian 
practice of referring to Christ’s crucifi xion as his ‘Passion’. ‘Hyster-
ica passio,’ King Lear cries. ‘O, how this mother swells up toward 
my heart!’ This moment of self-diagnosis inspired Adelman’s title, 
Suffocating Mothers. And in keeping with Adelman’s interest, the 
feminist implications of the fi rst part of Lear’s exclamation, ‘hys-
terica’, have attracted a great deal of commentary. The theological 
and philosophical implications of the second part, ‘passio’, how-
ever, have been in comparison neglected. Shakespeare’s recourse to 
Latin here, as well as his striking description of Lear’s ‘passio’ as ‘the 
mother’, allows him to connect several of the overarching themes of 
this chapter in a single cry: a failed attempt at quasi-Stoic self-con-
trol (passio as pathos), the humiliating frailty of embodiment (Latin 
as medical jargon), femininity (Greek, hystera, ‘uterus’), (self-)pity 
(‘the mother’) and theology (passio as the Passion).
The concept of passibility is especially useful as a means to dif-
ferentiate between the various assumptions about the nature of the 
divine characteristic of classical philosophy and the new theology 
put forward by Christianity. Pagan poets such as Hesiod, Homer 
and Ovid posit anthropomorphic gods who fall prey to passions 
such as love and anger, who eat, who sleep; Homer in the Iliad 
includes an episode in which the war-god Ares is literally wounded 
in battle.36 In Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the tendency of gods as well 
as human beings to change shape provides the poem’s most basic 
structural continuity. Pagan intellectuals reacting against this pop-
ular tradition tended to emphasise, by contrast, God’s otherness: 
God as immaterial, impersonal and immutable. In other words, 
the philosophers of antiquity, when they did turn to theology, 
tended to emphasise the impassibility of the divine, as opposed to 
the passibility of man. 
The pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes of Colophon seems 
to have been one of the fi rst to make fun of the idea that the God-
head in any sense resembles a human being. ‘Ethiopians say their 
gods are snub-nosed and black; / Thracians say they are pale and 
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red-haired.’ On the contrary, he maintains, God is something radi-
cally other than human: ‘in no way similar to mortals in either 
body or thought’. He is ‘one’, Xenophanes says, somewhat enig-
matically. He does not move, but instead always ‘remains in the 
same place’. In another fragment, Xenophanes complains about 
Homer and Hesiod attributing all manner of human excess to the 
gods, including crimes such as theft and adultery.37 Socrates in Pla-
to’s Republic seconds Xenophanes’ criticisms of popular theology. 
God does not engage in immoral activity; God does not in fact ever 
change in any way at all, even voluntarily. God is so impassible, so 
devoid of emotion, as well as physical embodiment, that he is not 
even a person; much less, a human being. Instead, in place of Zeus, 
Plato posits the Form of the Good. Aristotle in like manner, taking 
up Xenophanes’ insistence that God does not move, proposes an 
impersonal ‘Unmoved Mover’. Hellenistic Stoics closely identifi ed 
God, fate and reason (logos) as a single ‘World-Soul’: the origin of 
the Christian concept of God as ‘the Word’ (logos).38 
Roman philosophers carried on this emphasis on divine tran-
scendence.39 Like Epicurus before him, Lucretius speaks of mul-
tiple gods, and therefore might seem an exception. Lucretius’ gods, 
however, are utterly indifferent to anything that happens on earth, 
including prayers, as well as even the most outrageous crimes. 
Such apathia, like that of the Stoic sapiens, is as a variation on the 
philosophical ideal of impassibility that animates the theology of 
Plato and Aristotle; it simply limits its scope to the psychological. 
At times Seneca speaks of Epicurus’ gods as moral exempla. But 
Seneca’s reception of Hellenistic philosophy is eclectic. At other 
times, he speaks as if there were only one God: the ‘World-Soul’ of 
the Stoics. For example, Seneca insists that God never changes his 
mind. ‘His will must ever be the same who can never will aught 
but that which is best. Nor is he on that account less free or less 
powerful, for he is himself the source of his own destiny.’40 Or, 
again, ‘The great author and ruler of all things wrote the decrees 
of fate indeed, but he also follows them. He decreed them once for 
all; he continually obeys them.’41
In his First Letter to the Corinthians, St Paul describes ‘Christ 
crucifi ed’ as ‘a stumbling-block to the Jews and foolishness to 
the Gentiles’. And it is easy to see why. For an educated Greek 
or Roman, as well as for a knowledgeable Jew, the quintessen-
tial characteristic of the divine is power. God is that which acts, 
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not that which is acted-upon. Even the popular conceptions of the 
gods taken up by pagan poets present them as more powerful than 
human beings; they stand in relation to mankind, roughly speak-
ing, as aristocrats do to commoners. Crucifi xion, by contrast, is 
the quintessential symbol of powerlessness; a punishment reserved 
for slaves and barbarians, involving immobility, helplessness and 
profound physical pain, as well as public exposure and humili-
ation. To equate this experience of the most extreme passibility 
with the Godhead must have seemed in context an utter contradic-
tion in terms. Homer shows Ares wounded; Christianity, however, 
proclaims that God was not only wounded, but tortured, like a 
slave; even that God died, in some sense.42 
Delighting as ever in paradox, Donne presents God’s assump-
tion of passibility in his Incarnation as itself a kind of power: 
the power even to become powerless. As Christ tells St Paul: ‘my 
strength is made perfect in weakness’ (2 Cor. 12:9).
What could God suffer? God himselfe could not; and therefore 
God hath taken a body that could. And as he is the Head of that 
body, he is passible, so he may suffer; And, as he is the fi rst born 
of the dead, he did suffer; so that he was defective in nothing; not 
in Power, as God, not in passibility, as man; for Complacuit; It 
pleased the Father, that in him, All fulnesse (a full capacity to all 
purposes) should dwell.43 
As Donne’s emphasis suggests, Christianity introduces a concept 
of the divine which is very different from those found in classical 
philosophy; the very opposite, in fact, of the pagan philosophers’ 
ideal. ‘Christ crucifi ed’ is obviously in some sense passible, vul-
nerable, even if that sense might be debated. Aristotle’s Unmoved 
Mover, however, or Plotinus’ ‘One’, emphatically is not. Like Epi-
curus’ Olympians, the impersonal deities or equivalents of deities 
that Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus and the Stoics posit are essentially, 
unequivocally impassible.
The distinction between these two concepts of the divine, God 
as impassible agent and God as passible subject, becomes all the 
more important in so far as concepts of the divine present ethical 
ideals. Theology, like hagiography, articulates moral precepts by 
means of exempla. What individuals in a given society treat as a 
deity is in part a representation of the kind of behavior that they 
honour. Theology is not the only medium for such exemplarity; 
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people often take other people, as well, as their heroes or role 
models, as Brutus does, for example, with his ancestor ‘old Bru-
tus’. To the extent that people do believe in some sort of Godhead, 
however, their interpretation of the divine comes to serve as a 
description of what it is that they see as the ideal self. The percep-
tion of the Godhead extant in a given culture both shapes and is 
shaped by that culture’s understanding of ethics.
The two concepts of the divine that I have outlined here, the clas-
sical philosophical concept of God as impassible and the Christian 
concept of God as passible, can be seen in this light to correspond 
to the contrast between Roman libido dominandi and Christian 
pity. The ideal self for Shakespeare’s Romans is powerful, active, 
invulnerable. As Paul Cantor points out, ‘Coriolanus believes the 
gods look down from their heights and laugh at human fallibil-
ity and weakness. Evidently for him a god should be imperturb-
able, unmoved by any human spectacle and hence unmoved by any 
appeal from men.’44 The ideal self for an ethos of compassion such 
as Christianity is instead merciful; he shares in others’ suffering, 
and so must be capable of some degree of suffering himself. If the 
others with whom he sympathises are material, then he, too, must 
be material; if the others feel emotions such as love, anger and grief, 
then he, too, must in some sense take on those emotions. Aristotle’s 
‘Unmoved Mover’ is replaced by Isaiah’s ‘suffering servant.’ ‘He 
has born our griefs, and carried our sorrows’ (Is. 53:4).45 
For Shakespeare, the tragedy of Romans such as Caesar and 
Brutus is that they are emulating the wrong kind of ideal self, a 
fantasy of impossible autonomy akin to the various concepts of 
the divine found in classical philosophy, as opposed to the very dif-
ferent understanding of the divine that appears with Christianity. 
This ideal self is what Rebhorn, following Braden, calls the ‘impe-
rial self’. To call it the ‘imperial’ self, however, is to ground it in 
politics, and, like Rebhorn, I am not convinced that Shakespeare 
himself saw the tragedy of Rome in this light. Instead, Shakespeare 
seems to see the political problem in Julius Caesar, the beginning 
of Rome’s degeneration into civil war, as itself a result of a fl awed 
value-system. In their collection, Shakespeare and Early Modern 
Political Thought, editors David Armitage, Conal Condren and 
Andrew Fitzmaurice stress the role of individual ethics as the bed-
rock of mass politics in the early modern understanding of political 
life. ‘From the early modern perspective, it was the character and 
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spirit of those making up the polity that was crucial to its politi-
cal health. In relative contrast, modern political analysis has put 
more stress on the institutional and constitutional arrangements of 
politics.’46 For those of a Marxist bent, it might seem like a matter 
of course that facts on the ground, fi rst economic, then political, 
precede and determine the shape of ethical debate. But I doubt that 
Shakespeare would agree. To make him a kind of Fredric Jameson 
avant la lettre is an attractive but misleading distortion of his own 
distinctive understanding of historical causation. 
Paul Cantor is a rare and valuable example of a critic interested 
in the infl uence of economics on literature who does not accept 
Karl Marx’s critique of capitalism but instead draws upon the 
Austrian school of economics associated with Ludwig von Mises 
and Friedrich Hayek. As Cantor points out, ‘Economic discussions 
of literature are almost all anti-capitalist in spirit, and are often 
avowedly pro-socialist.’ Given such an overwhelming, largely 
unquestioned consensus, it is intriguing to encounter a different 
point of view. Cantor defends the usefulness of the free market as 
an arbiter of value over against what he sees as the impracticable 
pretentions of central planning. He also questions Marx’s account 
of the relation between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’. ‘What was new 
in Marx’, he observes, ‘was his claim that economic forces are the 
determining factor in all history, including cultural history.’ For 
Cantor, this determinism is ‘too reductive’. Human behaviour is 
not simply the result of macroeconomic forces, and these forces 
are themselves not susceptible to precise mathematical modelling 
and forecasting. Instead, Cantor stresses the free choice of indi-
viduals, leading to unpredictability within any social system. In 
keeping with the ‘Austrian principle of consumer sovereignty’ as 
opposed to the ‘Marxist idea of producer hegemony’, Cantor sees 
individual economic choices as giving rise to what he calls ‘spon-
taneous order’.47
Having drawn such a sharp contrast, Cantor acknowledges, 
nonetheless, that literary criticism informed by Austrian econom-
ics is not in all respects opposed to the Marxist criticism he dis-
parages. ‘As economic approaches, both call into question the 
Romantic ideal of the autonomy of art and isolated creative genius. 
Both Austrian economics and Marxism lead us to picture the 
novelist as involved in a social process, but they understand and 
evaluate this process very differently.’ ‘Austrian economics does 
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complicate our understanding of intentionality,’ Cantor explains, 
‘because it views the market as a means of mediating among the 
intentions of the vast number of individuals who participate in it, 
actors whose interaction often produces results larger and more 
complex than anything at which an isolated individual can aim.’ 
By way of illustration, Cantor distinguishes his own approach 
from both New Criticism and Deconstruction. Economic criti-
cism as he represents it, Marxist or Austrian, is the opposite of 
formal criticism.48
But there is another option, one that Cantor leaves out. What is 
missing from Cantor’s survey of possible foundations for literary 
criticism is a view of history, like St Augustine’s (or Nietzsche’s), 
that sees ideas, especially theology, as the most important driver 
of systematic change, rather than either material consumption 
(as in the Austrian School) or material production (as in Marx-
ist economics). This interpretation of history is often associated 
with Hegel. Hegel’s mature sense of history, however, is not sim-
ply, as Marx puts it, Marxism turned back on its head, but instead 
more complex and idiosyncratic: the World-Soul coming to con-
sciousness of its own nature. ‘History is the process’, he maintains, 
‘whereby the spirit discovers itself and its own concept.’49 Hegel’s 
narrative is modelled on the Christian concept of Providence, 
but Hegel sidelines Christianity itself. Cantor for his part draws 
attention to a very early essay of Hegel’s, ‘The Positivity of the 
Christian Religion’, published posthumously, in which, as Cantor 
explains, ‘Hegel looks for natural causes to explain why Christi-
anity displaced the pagan religions.’ Hegel describes Rome here 
as ‘corrupted’ by ‘fortunate campaigns, increase of wealth, and 
acquaintance with luxury’, and also argues that Rome’s expansion 
led to the demise of its former fervent patriotism: ‘the picture of 
the state as a product of his own energies disappeared from the 
citizen’s soul.’50 
In Shakespeare’s Roman Trilogy, Cantor aligns Shakespeare’s 
representation of Roman history with Hegel’s here, as well as Livy’s 
Ab urbe condita (‘From the Founding of the City’) and Montes-
quieu’s Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et 
de leur décadence (‘Considerations on the Causes of Roman Great-
ness and Their Decline’). Underlying all of these accounts, Hegel’s, 
Livy’s and Montesquieu’s, as well as the view Cantor attributes to 
Shakespeare, is the ‘quasi-Marxist’ premise that changes in Roman 
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ideology are an effect, rather than a cause, of changes in material con-
ditions. As Cantor says elsewhere, ‘In explaining history, for Marx-
ists and quasi-Marxists, economics trumps culture.’51 Livy describes 
Rome’s gradual moral decline as a result of Rome’s new wealth 
after the end of the Punic Wars. Montesquieu ascribes the collapse 
of the Roman Republic to Rome’s military expansion, which he 
argues was inherently unsustainable. Cantor fi nds in Shakespeare’s 
Antony and Cleopatra, in particular, a prescient warning regard-
ing what we now call ‘globalisation’. Rome’s ‘commitment to its 
traditional republican way of life’ is ‘subverted by exposure to the 
foreign cultures Rome brings within its orbit’. ‘As the capital of a 
vast and diverse Empire, Rome becomes increasingly cosmopolitan, 
the crossroads for a wide variety of competing visions of life, some 
of them antithetical to its republican traditions.’52 
Problems arise, however, when Cantor moves to align Nietzsche, 
as well as Shakespeare, with the materialist explanation of Rome’s 
decline that he discerns in Hegel, Livy and Montesquieu. In Human, 
All Too Human, Nietzsche describes ‘the spread of Christianity’ 
as ‘the principal cause’ of ‘the decline of Roman culture’.53 With 
this claim, Nietzsche stands in a long tradition of antagonists to 
St Augustine’s defence of Christianity in The City of God, includ-
ing most notably Edward Gibbon, as well as Machiavelli. But he is 
very far from Marx, or even the Austrian School. In one of his last 
books, The Antichrist, written on the brink of insanity, Nietzsche 
strenuously denounces what is, in effect, Cantor’s thesis. ‘It is not, 
as is supposed, the corruption of antiquity itself, of noble antiquity, 
that made Christianity possible. The scholarly idiocy which upholds 
such ideas even today cannot be contradicted loudly enough.’54 
Cantor turns, therefore, to Nietzsche’s notebooks. ‘Why did 
Nietzsche not embrace the idea that Roman corruption prepared 
the way for Christianity?’ Cantor asks. ‘If the Roman Empire 
was such a rock-solid organization, if it was on course to last for 
thousands of years, how did a rag-tag gang of Christian outcasts 
ever bring it down?’55 In his Nachlass, Nietzsche presents a more 
complex, incremental account of what he calls ‘the slave revolt in 
morals’. ‘Christianity’, he writes, ‘could grow only in the soil of 
Judaism, i.e. amidst a people that had absolutely renounced politics 
and lived a kind of parasitic existence within the Roman order of 
things. Christianity is a step further on.’56 Nor is Judaism, it turns 
out, the only precursor of Christianity. Nietzche also condemns the 
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pagan mystery religions which fl ourished in late antiquity: ‘Isis, 
Mithras, Dionysius, the “Great Mother”.’57 Nietzsche fi nds fertile 
ground for Christianity, as well, in the pervasive infl uence of Greek 
philosophy. ‘Greek moral philosophy had already done everything 
to prepare the way for and make palatable moral fanaticism even 
among Greeks and Romans.’ Nietzsche describes Plato, in particu-
lar, as ‘the great viaduct of corruption’, ‘already marked by Jewish 
bigotry’, in keeping with legends that he had visited Egypt.58 Chris-
tianity ‘could only take root in decayed soil,’ he insists. ‘Moral 
fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed paganism.’59 
Looking at the evidence Cantor brings to bear, what remains 
missing is any sense that Nietzsche sees either geographic expan-
sion or increasing wealth as fundamental causes of the changes 
in ideology he describes: the emergence of Greek moral philoso-
phy, then Greek mystery religions, then Judaism, then Christianity. 
Material conditions, for Nietzsche, are not explanatory bedrock. 
Money and territory are not fi rst-order causes, but instead can be 
better understood as second-order effects of more primary devel-
opments within the history of ideas. Christianity alone is not to 
blame, in Nietzsche’s account of the decline and fall of Rome. But 
ideology is, in the form of ‘slave morality’, of which Christianity 
is one example, alongside Judaism, mystery religions and ancient 
Greek ethics. In this sense, Nietzsche as historian is much closer to 
Gibbon or Machiavelli, or even St Augustine, than he is to Mon-
tesquieu or Livy. Christianity is not a symptom of the collapse of 
Roman civilisation. As the culmination of ‘slave morality’, Chris-
tianity is itself the reason, ‘the principal cause’, as Nietzsche says, 
why the historical change that Stone calls ‘the crisis of the aristoc-
racy’, and Elias, ‘the civilizing process’, has not been reversed. 
For Nietzsche, religious conversion is not a refl ection of a 
change in political regime (politeia), but instead the engine that 
drives such political transformation. Changes in the concept of 
the ideal self, he would say, are the reason why so-called ‘masters’ 
still today have not shaken off their subjugation to the interests of 
‘slaves’. Those gifted souls who might once have styled themselves 
optimates are instead constrained by atavistic caritas, a sense of 
obligation to those less fortunate which Habermas, like Nietzsche, 
has identifi ed as a legacy of Christianity, even among those who 
see themselves as secular. Shakespeare shares this sense of Chris-
tianity as an ethical revolution, but with Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic 
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value-judgements turned back right-side up. In the case of Rome, 
the problem with the Romans, as Shakespeare sees it, is, to put it 
simply, that they are not Christians. They are not even Ciceroni-
ans. They have the wrong ideal in mind, one that leaves no room 
for pity or concession. This wrongheadedness is not the effect, but 
the cause, of the fall of the Roman Republic. 
‘Constancy’ and ‘Frailty’: Femininity as Roman Other
In the previous section, I argued that the most signifi cant distin-
guishing characteristic of Shakespeare’s Romans is their discom-
fort with human passibility. They are reluctant to be vulnerable 
to being acted upon, whether emotionally or physically, and 
therefore attempt either to dominate others entirely or else to 
escape their infl uence altogether. This all-or-nothing dynamic 
shapes their interpersonal interaction within the private sphere 
of marriage, just as it does within the public sphere of politics. 
In this section, I argue that femininity for Shakespeare often 
serves as a symbol of passibility. The sidelined women in Julius 
Caesar, Portia and Calpurnia, represent in part their own hus-
bands’ stunted and repressed faculty of pity. Femininity is not 
the only symbol of human ‘frailty’, however. Other forms of per-
ceived weakness include old age, infertility, wounds, bleeding, 
Caesar’s ‘falling sickness’ and mortality. In order to explain how 
these aspects of embodiment challenge and undermine putative 
masculine ‘constancy’, I introduce Bakhtin’s distinction between 
‘grotesque’ and ‘classical’ representations of the body and apply 
it to a close reading of Caesar’s speeches just before his assas-
sination, in which he compares himself to ‘Olympus’ and claims 
to be ‘constant as the northern star’.
Women in Shakespeare’s Roman plays, especially Julius Caesar, 
serve as the primary symbol of the passibility or ‘vulnerability’ 
Shakespeare’s Romans strive to escape. In particular, women 
represent susceptibility to pity. Women are also associated with 
emotion more generally, however, as well as embodiment. The 
supposed ‘frailty’ of their fl esh, as well as their reason, makes 
them an apt symbol of ‘inconstancy’, even when that incon-
stancy occurs in men. Coppélia Kahn observes that Julius Caesar 
seems at fi rst glance an odd play to choose for a discussion of 
Shakespeare’s perspective on ‘sexual difference per se’. In terms 
5877_Gray.indd   115 12/09/18   3:31 PM
116 ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic
of women on stage, ‘it has only two characters, Portia and 
Calpurnia, the wives of Brutus and Caesar, and each of them 
speaks in only two scenes’. As Kahn suggests, however, ‘the sexual 
difference that really counts in Julius Caesar . . . does not depend 
on the presence or absence of female characters’.60 The gendering 
that Shakespeare examines in this play is not ‘male or female’, in 
the strict biological sense, but instead the division of both sexes’ 
shared human experience into separate, more abstract categories, 
‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’. 
Seen in this light, the very intensity of the repression of femi-
ninity apparent in Julius Caesar, extending even to the cast list, 
only makes it more revealing: a case study in extremis of a gender 
bias that seems characteristic of Roman culture. Citing Barbara 
Babcock, Kahn describes the feminine in Julius Caesar as ‘socially 
peripheral’, yet ‘symbolically central’.61 I agree, to some extent, 
but I would also want to modify what I take to be Kahn’s intended 
sense. Femininity is ‘symbolically central’ in Shakespeare’s Roman 
plays as a symbol, not as itself what is being symbolised. Femi-
ninity represents human passibility. Roman bias against the femi-
nine is not fundamental but instead can be better understood as 
one variety among many of a pervasive, distinctive Roman fear of 
weakness; an anxiety about ‘vulnerability’ which is the obverse of 
their characteristic libido dominandi.
My misgivings about Kahn’s explanation of Roman gender bias 
hinge upon questions of cause and effect. Shakespeare’s vision of 
historical causation, right or wrong, gives greater weight to value-
systems as cause rather than effect of social practice than Kahn 
herself seems inclined to grant. Kahn presents Roman concepts of 
gender as a symptom of Roman patriarchy, rather than its origin: 
men as subjects are interpellated by an ideology of masculinity 
which is itself in the service of patriarchy, as well as the ‘cul-
tural practice’ of ‘emulation’ or male rivalry, and one effect of this 
interpellation is disdain for women. Political structures through 
ideology determine the activity, as well as the beliefs, of any given 
individual. 
Shakespeare himself, however, does not assign such ontologi-
cal primacy to politics. From his perspective, individuals choose 
between competing moral paradigms, and that choice then mani-
fests itself in their ad hoc response to whatever political dilemmas 
they may happen to encounter. In this case, Roman noblemen such 
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as Brutus and Caesar dissociate themselves from the feminine, seen 
as private and passive, in order to preserve their sense of them-
selves as public fi gures, capable of masculine agency. Individuals 
(Romans) adopt a value-system (the pursuit of imperium) which 
leads to a political structure (patriarchy). Shakespeare’s Romans 
idealise worldly power: self-suffi cient independence, invulnerabil-
ity, a capacity for overwhelming violence against any opponent. 
Their admiration for this kind of power leads them to be contemp-
tuous of women and to prevent their full participation in soci-
ety. Women seem to them to be weak; worse, women make them 
aware of disconcerting weaknesses in themselves.
Kahn at one point suggests that Shakespeare’s understanding of 
social relations adumbrates that of Althusser. ‘Because Rome was a 
patriarchal society, Romanness per se is closely linked to an ideology 
of masculinity.’ Shakespeare ‘dramatized precisely this linkage and, 
in doing so, demystifi ed its power’.62 Shakespeare’s view of history, 
however, much more closely resembles that of Sallust or Cicero, 
with their emphasis on moral decline, than it does the Marxist per-
spective of Althusser’s own preferred playwright, Bertolt Brecht.63 
By far the closest analogue, however, is St Augustine.64 I agree in 
this sense with J. L. Simmons, who argues that ‘the most signifi cant 
historical factor’ in Shakespeare’s Roman plays is ‘the historically 
pagan environment out of which each tragedy arises’, ‘antedating 
of Christian revelation’. Drawing on St Augustine’s City of God, 
Simmons interprets the fall of the Roman Republic in Julius Caesar 
and Antony and Cleopatra as in large part Shakespeare’s conscious 
demonstration of the inevitable failure of what St Augustine calls 
‘the Earthly City’. ‘All attempts at idealistic vision by the tragic 
heroes, all attempts to rise above the restrictions of man and his 
imperfect society, are tragically affected by the absence of revela-
tion and the real hope of glory.’65 
John Cox presents the infl uence of St Augustine’s political real-
ism as mediated in a more diffuse manner through the precedent 
of medieval drama. As he writes, 
My point is not that Shakespeare can be collapsed back into 
Augustine – much less that he should be – but that the attempt 
to make Shakespeare look forward is inevitably complicated by a 
residual tradition that antedates Shakespeare himself by more than 
a thousand years.66 
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In the conclusion to my analysis of Julius Caesar, ‘Shakespeare’s 
Passion Play’, I take up Cox’s suggestion that the representation 
of powerful fi gures such as Caesar, Herod and Satan in medieval 
mystery plays, as well as Shakespeare’s histories and tragedies, 
owes much to St Augustine’s account of the reasons for Rome’s 
decline. Shakespeare’s Romans represent not only the contem-
porary English aristocracy, but also and more generally what St 
Augustine calls ‘the City of Man’, torn apart by competitive libido 
dominandi. In Julius Caesar, as Peter Lake suggests, Shakespeare 
‘stages and reanimates’ a ‘neo-Roman’ ideology which is ‘almost 
entirely secular’, then ‘tests it to the breaking point by subjecting 
it, not merely to a secular historical and political critique, but also 
to a religious, indeed, a Christian critique’.67 
In contrast to Kahn, I am inclined to think that Shakespeare 
in Julius Caesar sees not only Roman concepts of gender, but also 
Roman politics and Roman attitudes towards the body, as alike 
products of a tragically fl awed value-system. His Romans are ill at 
ease with a basic given of the human condition: our vulnerability 
to each other’s infl uence. The ‘zero-sum game’ of Roman politics, 
the ‘socially peripheral’ status of Roman women, and the Roman 
propensity for ‘pitiless’ physical cruelty are all effects, as well as 
subsequent, reinforcing causes, of a characteristic Roman tendency 
to idealise power per se, even at the cost of peaceful coexistence. 
In the absence of the Christian revelation, impassibility, like that 
which classical philosophers attribute to the gods, comes to be seen 
as an end unto itself, the summum bonum. This fantasy of abso-
lute power, however, and with that power, absolute security from 
shame, prevents the healthy functioning, not only of the Roman 
Republic, but also of Roman friendships, because it leaves no room 
for compromise or interdependence. In particular, it damages the 
‘little commonwealth’ of marriage, including Caesar’s marriage 
with Calpurnia, as well as Brutus’ with Portia. 
Seen in this light, the unusually circumscribed role of female 
characters in Julius Caesar is not adequately explained simply as 
a refl ection of a tendency in Roman culture to limit female agency 
to the oikos, in order to reinforce male authority in the polis. This 
‘cultural practice’ of ‘male dominance’ is itself a symptom of a 
deeper malady. The systematic restriction of women’s participa-
tion in political decision-making is a manifestation of characteris-
tic Roman fears about the power of the feminine more generally 
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considered, or rather, what it is that femininity is held to symbolise, 
passibility, a quality shared by both men and women. Femininity 
represents an aspect of the human condition which Shakespeare’s 
Romans tend to see as humiliating, because it is in confl ict with 
their understanding of the ideal self. In Julius Caesar, the Roman 
patriciate sees the fact that they are susceptible to being acted upon, 
even if only by virtue of their very nature as human, as so intoler-
ably shameful that male aristocrats like Caesar and Brutus tend not 
to acknowledge it at all, but instead to take refuge in various psy-
chological mechanisms of denial. Calpurnia and Portia should be 
interpreted by this light, not only as characters in their own right, 
but also as representations of disavowed pieces of their husbands’ 
respective psyches. They personify emotions or ‘passions’ such as 
pity, grief, anger and fear which Brutus and Caesar both at times 
feel but are both reluctant to acknowledge as their own.
The idea that Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar is in part an exercise 
in projection in the manner of a psychomachia is not entirely new. 
Feminist critics such as Gail Kern Paster, Madelon Sprengnether and 
Coppélia Kahn have identifi ed wounds, blood and bleeding in the 
play as symbols of femininity; more specifi cally, feminine aspects of 
the masculine self which the men in the play are anxious to deny. 
A counter-discourse of consistent foils, however, such as statues, 
processions and ‘the northern star’ (3.1.60), reveals a running ten-
sion throughout the play between images of ‘constancy’ and symbols 
of ‘frailty’. It is not so much the feminine as such that Roman men 
such as Brutus and Caesar are trying to avoid as any kind of pas-
sibility whatsoever, of which femininity is one important instance. 
Other examples include feeling emotions, being defeated in battle 
and succumbing to physical exhaustion. Even to have a body at 
all is felt to be an embarrassing weakness: Caesar would rather 
see himself as a bodiless ‘star’ than as ‘fl esh and blood’ (3.3.67). 
Like old age, illness and Caesar’s own recurrent epileptic seizures, 
wounds and bleeding emphasise the vulnerability or ‘frailty’ of cor-
poreality, an aspect of themselves which characters such as Caesar, 
Portia and Caius Ligarius go to great lengths to disavow.
The damage done to women in this play, both physically and 
emotionally, and the disdain apparent for their potential contri-
bution as political advisors should be interpreted as one part of 
a much larger, tragic pattern. Shakespeare’s Rome is a place of 
relative intolerance for human weakness, and this unforgiving 
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rigour proves in the end self-destructive. Most obviously, a paral-
lel unwillingness to acknowledge that they are vulnerable to forces 
outside their own control cripples the better judgement of both 
Caesar and Brutus at key moments of political crisis. Discomfort 
with passibility, however, is not limited to these two characters. 
Rather, Roman culture in general, as Shakespeare sees it, is defi ned 
in Julius Caesar by a distinctive, pervasive tendency to exalt ‘con-
stancy’ and stigmatize ‘frailty’. 
One way to understand Shakespeare’s Romans’ unease with 
femininity is to compare it to their discomfort with embodiment 
in general. Both tendencies are grounded in a fundamental fear of 
passibility. Depending on how it is evoked, ancient Rome can just 
as easily call to mind the bacchanalian luxury of Petronius’ Satyri-
con as the severe, off-putting rigour of Plutarch’s ‘Cato the Censor’. 
For Shakespeare, however, Rome is inextricable from, on the one 
hand, fi erce aggression towards others, as in the case of Coriola-
nus; on the other, an equally fi erce repression of the physical and 
emotional self, as in the case of Brutus. Rome as he presents it is 
a thought-experiment designed to evaluate the origins, effects and 
limits of both subjective and objective libido dominandi, including 
the traditional bellicosity of medieval and early modern English 
nobility, as well as the more inward, psychological conquests at 
the heart of the new Neostoicism. Shakespeare’s Rome, therefore, 
is that of the warrior or the philosopher, rather than that of the 
sycophant or oversexed sybarite. In so far as Shakespeare’s Romans 
remain within the psychological confi nes of this limited concept 
of Rome, distinguished by its ethos of impassibility, their attitudes 
towards the body can be aptly described by recourse to Bakhtin’s 
familiar distinction between the ‘grotesque’ and the ‘classical’.
 In his work on Rabelais, Bakhtin introduces the concept of the 
‘grotesque’ as part of his description of what he calls the ‘carni-
valesque’: the ‘uncrowning’, ‘degradation’ or ‘lowering’ of ‘all that 
is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract . . . to the sphere of the earth and 
body’. The ‘grotesque’ body as it appears in medieval festivals, 
as well as Rabelais’s comic novels, emphasises ‘those parts of the 
body that are open to the outside world, that is, the parts through 
which the world enters the body or emerges from it’, ‘apertures 
or convexities’ such as ‘the open mouth, the genitals, the breasts, 
the phallus, the potbelly, the nose’. Just as consciousness is inevi-
tably ‘multiple’, intertwined with and inseparable from other 
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‘consciousnesses’, so also the ‘grotesque’ body is incessantly, mate-
rially engaged with other bodies and other objects out there in the 
world. Like Kuzner’s ‘open subjects’, the grotesque body is ‘open’: 
its dependence, vulnerability and embeddedness are ostentatious 
and essential. ‘The grotesque unfi nished and open body (dying, 
bringing forth, and being born) is not separated from the world by 
clearly defi ned boundaries; it is blended with the world.’ It is not 
‘separated from the world’, ‘a closed complete unit’. It ‘discloses 
its essence’ in activities such as ‘copulation, pregnancy, childbirth, 
the throes of death, eating, drinking, and defecation’.68 
 What Bakhtin calls the ‘classical’ body is the exact opposite: 
‘a strictly completed, fi nished product . . . isolated, alone, fenced 
off from other bodies. It is ‘self-suffi cient’, like a statue.69 Bakhtin 
associates the embrace of the ‘grotesque’ body with the Middle 
Ages and a new preference for the ‘classical’, by contrast, with the 
Renaissance, a change in depictions of the body which he attri-
butes to the revival of ‘the literary and artistic canon of antiquity’.70 
The dichotomy proposed is, of course, reductive.71 What Bakhtin 
does aptly describe, however, is a characteristic Renaissance misin-
terpretation: the identifi cation of the ‘classical’ with the neoclassi-
cal.72 Renaissance artists such as Shakespeare may not always have 
agreed with this canon or abided by it, but they did recognise it and 
recognise it as distinctively ‘antique’; meaning in their case, for the 
most part, ‘Roman’.
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, for example, begins with two tri-
bunes, Murellus and Flavius, ‘pulling scarves off Caesar’s images’ 
(1.2.284–5). ‘Disrobe the images,’ Flavius exhorts his companion, 
‘if you do fi nd them decked with ceremonies’ (1.1.65–6), meaning 
here by ‘images’, statues of Caesar, and by ‘ceremonies’, decora-
tions. ‘May we do so?’ (1.1.67) Murellus asks. ‘You know it is 
the feast of Lupercal’ (1.1.68). ‘It is no matter’ (1.1.69), Flavius 
replies. ‘Let no images / Be hung with Caesar’s trophies’ (1.1.70). 
This opening conversation is rich in symbolic import, but its sig-
nifi cance depends in part on two anachronisms. First, the tribunes 
here do not come across as representatives of the people, as they 
were historically, and as they are represented in Shakespeare’s 
later Roman play, Coriolanus. Instead, they are scornful upper-
class antagonists, rebuking the people as ‘mechanical’. Casca 
mentions them with sympathy in his conversation later with his 
aristocratic co-conspirator, Cassius, aligning them further with 
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the patriciate. Second, Shakespeare conceives of Roman statues 
here as they appeared initially to later centuries, relatively bare 
and plain, whereas we know now they were originally painted in 
garish polychrome.
Shakespeare’s slight anachronisms in this case are integral to the 
symbolic signifi cance of the scene. On-stage, the ‘grotesque’ body 
associated with coarse, comical ‘mechanicals’ and ‘trades’ such as 
carpenters and cobblers is literally, physically transformed by force 
into the ‘classical body’ favoured by the elites: a bare, silent, static, 
stripped-down statue. Like Murellus and Flavius themselves, later, 
the ‘images’ are, in a metaphorical sense, ‘put to silence’ (1.2.284). 
Shakespeare acknowledges the presence of the grotesque even 
within the classical in his allusion to the Lupercalia, an ancient 
Roman celebration of fertility Plutarch describes in his ‘Life of 
Caesar’, and which featured heavy drinking, nudity and animal 
sacrifi ce. Shakespeare then adds a pun: Flavius’ remark about the 
Lupercalia, ‘It is no matter.’ Ostensibly, Flavius means, ‘it does not 
matter, that is to say, it is not important, that today is the feast of 
the Lupercal.’ The compressed statement, however, placed where it 
is, suggests a more metaphysical truth. The ‘classical’ body seeks to 
escape embodiment itself; to be independent of materiality per se. 
As Gail Kern Paster observes, with regards to Bakhtin, the ‘classi-
cal’ body is not ‘a new form of bodiliness’. Instead, it can be better 
understood as ‘a denial of common bodiliness tout court’.73 The 
‘classical’ body is in this sense, as Flavius says, ‘no matter’.
Sometimes Christianity is misperceived as likewise opposed 
to the body. For example, in his study of shame in Shakespeare, 
Ewan Fernie claims that ‘Christianity explicitly regards the human 
condition itself as shameful’, especially ‘the body’.74 Shame about 
the body is not intrinsic or integral to Christianity, however. 
Instead, like kudzu in the American South, it is a pervasive, alien 
interloper; characteristic, but misperceived if seen as indigenous; 
a legacy of the persistent but extrinsic infl uence of pre-Christian, 
Graeco-Roman thought.75 Christianity emerged in the context of 
Roman Stoicism, as well as Greek Neoplatonism; in the case of 
St Augustine, especially, as well as other Latin Church Fathers 
such as his contemporary St Jerome, it is a common criticism that 
they never truly put aside their training as young pagans in clas-
sical philosophy. For all his dismay about the misbehavior of the 
‘fl esh’, St Paul, by contrast, insists on the resurrection of the body: 
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a radical departure from his intellectual Zeitgeist. Contemporary 
Neoplatonists, Manicheans and Gnostics all sought escape from 
the body, not its return. In the context of its origin, the remark-
able thing about Christianity, what St Paul calls ‘folly (moria) to 
the Gentiles’, is precisely not its rejection of ‘the body’. What was 
shocking about Christianity to ancient Romans was on the con-
trary its exaltation of ‘the human condition’ at its most vulnerable, 
including our embodiment. ‘We preach Christ crucifi ed’ (1 Cor. 
2:10), St Paul insists: a broken, bleeding, mortal human, not as a 
symbol of shame, but as a symbol of glory. What Bakhtin calls the 
‘grotesque’ body becomes instead divine, ideal. 
In their work on Shakespeare’s Roman plays, especially Julius 
Caesar, feminist critics have directed particular attention to the 
symbolism of wounds, blood and bleeding. For them, the wound, 
with its attendant blood, is most obviously a symbol of feminin-
ity, imperiling Roman protagonists’ sense of themselves as mascu-
line. Of Antony’s botched suicide, for example, Cynthia Marshall 
writes, ‘Wounded, bleeding, and lacking agency, Antony takes on a 
typically feminine position.’ Dying in this fashion, he ‘troubles an 
audience’s notions of what it means to be a (masculine) hero.’76 Gail 
Paster argues that ‘in bleeding the male body resembles the body 
of a woman’, the ‘leaky vessel’ of contemporary humoral theory, 
which Paster aligns with Bakhtin’s concept of the ‘grotesque’ body. 
In the case of Caesar’s assassination, ‘the conspirators use blood as 
a signifi er that differentiates their bodies from Caesar’s’, ‘marking 
him discursively with the shameful stigmata of ambiguous gender, 
especially the sign of womanly blood’.77
All of these authors also maintain, however, that wounds, blood 
and bleeding can be recovered by what Paster calls ‘the patriar-
chal ethos’ and transformed through rhetoric into their opposite: 
symbols of masculinity.78 This reformulation of the import of the 
wound, these feminist critics tend to present as relatively artifi -
cial or ‘constructed’, however, in comparison to its more natural, 
immediate function as a telling revelation of the feminine ‘other’ 
within the masculine ‘selfsame’. Kahn, for example, describes the 
‘wounds’ of her book’s subtitle, ‘Warriors, Wounds, and Women’, 
as ‘the most problematic, self-cancelling fi guration of masculinity 
in the Roman works’. They are a ‘fetish’ (Portuguese, feticheria; fr. 
Latin, facticius), meaning in this case, something made, not natu-
ral, and therefore especially useful indices of the ‘artifi ce’ involved 
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in ‘representations of cultural difference’.79 Madelon Sprengnether 
draws attention to Portia; by deliberately wounding herself, Por-
tia ‘reveals the underlying paradox of the play, which equates 
manliness with injury, so that the sign of masculinity becomes 
the wound’.80 Her attempt to prove herself capable of manly 
‘constancy’ by appropriating its symbol, the ‘voluntary wound’, 
instead reveals the artifi cial nature of that ‘sign’.
Again, however, the question of causal priority interposes dif-
fi culties. What is tenor, and what is vehicle? Feminist critics tend 
to interpret agency in Shakespeare’s Roman plays as a symbol 
of idealised masculinity. I am more inclined, by contrast, to see 
masculinity in this context as itself a symbol of idealised agency. 
What Romans really admire, at base, is power; that the kind of 
power they respect is associated with masculinity is a secondary 
construction. So also, that the opposite of such power, passibility, 
is associated with femininity. What makes a wound like Portia’s 
masculine is its prior, more defi nitive status as ‘voluntary’. What 
makes a wound like Antony’s, by contrast, feminine is its prior, 
more defi nitive status as involuntary, or at least, as introducing an 
unintended, unpleasant outcome. Antony does mean to stab him-
self, but not to linger on afterwards in considerable pain.
In his discussion of fi gurative conceits in Shakespeare’s Roman 
plays, Maurice Charney writes of Julius Caesar that ‘the central 
issue about the meaning of the play is raised by imagery of blood’.81 
Citing Charney, Paster fi nds in blood, much as Kahn and Spreng-
nether do in wounds, an ambiguous metaphor: ‘shedding blood 
signifi es self-control or its lack’. Considered in its own right, bleed-
ing is a symbol of femininity: ‘in bleeding the male body resem-
bles the body of a woman’. Under pressure from the demands of 
patriarchal ideology, however, male bleeding can be reconfi gured, 
somewhat speciously, as a symbol of violent activity. Paster cites as 
an example Adelman’s analysis of Volumnia’s reaction to Virgilia’s 
horror at the thought of Coriolanus bleeding:
Away, you fool! It more becomes a man
Than gilt his trophy. The breasts of Hecuba,
When she did suckle Hector, look’d not lovelier
Than Hector’s forehead when it spit forth blood
At Grecian sword, contemning.
(1.3.39–43)
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As Adelman explains, in Volumnia’s conceit, ‘feeding, incorporat-
ing, is transformed into spitting out, an aggressive expelling . . . 
the wound spitting blood thus becomes not a sign of vulnerability 
but an instrument of attack.’82 Paster agrees: ‘male bleeding is rep-
resented as a “spitting forth,” the combative verb serving to deny 
any causative power to the Grecian swords and to endow the fore-
head itself with voluntary agency and passion.’ The forehead itself 
is ‘the seat of reason’, and it will bleed ‘voluntarily from contempt’ 
rather than ‘involuntarily from an enemy’s blow’. Like Adelman, 
Paster sees in this passage an indication of the origin of Coriola-
nus’ characteristic ‘fear of dependency’. To bleed ‘contemning’, 
as Volumnia imagines, is ‘to reverse the imputation of wounded-
ness and vulnerability, to deny permeability.’83 Hector, a proxy for 
Coriolanus, moves over the course of the conceit from a depen-
dent child at the breast, embedded in the world of the ‘grotesque’ 
body, to an independent, invulnerable adult, scoffi ng at attempts 
to impair his agency. 
In her discussion of bleeding, Paster distinguishes in effect 
between what she takes to be its natural or prima facie signifi -
cance and what she describes, by contrast, as a factitious, dubious 
sense of its symbolic import. Inherently, bleeding represents femi-
ninity. With some Procrustean rhetoric, it can be reconfi gured as a 
symbol of masculinity; this reframing of its meaning, however, is 
suspect and diffi cult to sustain. Setting aside for the moment this 
second-order reinterpretation of bleeding as a sign of masculinity, 
I would like to address the fi rst. In Julius Caesar, blood, like the 
body itself, is a symbol of passibility in general, not just feminin-
ity. As Paster herself observes, the crux of the difference between 
blood as feminine and blood as masculine is ‘self-control, self-pos-
session, voluntarism’.84
In keeping with this principle, in Julius Caesar, the opposite of 
the bleeding body is not the masculine body, but the fi xed (‘con-
stant’), immutable and bodiless, represented here by the stars, 
especially, the pole star, the one star that does not seem to move. 
For Caesar to insist that his ‘blood’ cannot ‘rebel’ or be ‘thawed’, 
that he is ‘constant as the northern star’, is a sign that he believes 
that he has transcended, not only the imputation of femininity, but 
still more radically, his own humanity (3.1.40–1). Geoffrey Miles 
points out the similarity in this respect between Caesar and another 
character who denies his own passibility, Angelo in Measure for 
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Measure. Shakespeare is ‘conscious of the folly of this desire to 
be “perfect” – an aspiration which drives a series of tragicomic 
fi gures from the academicians of Love’s Labour’s Lost, through 
the would-be angelic Angelo, to the Olympian Caesar and Cori-
olanus’.85 The stage Puritan, like the Roman, is introduced as a 
man ‘whose blood / Is very snow-broth’, ‘one who never feels / The 
wanton stings and motions of the sense’ (1.4.57–9). When he falls 
for Isabella, however, Angelo fi nds himself forced to confess a very 
different, more accurate understanding of his own human nature. 
‘Blood, thou art blood’ (2.4.17). Caesar’s comeuppance is bloodier 
still. As Paster writes, ‘the assassination . . . discloses the shameful 
secret of Caesar’s bodiliness’.86
Caesar’s claims to transcendence are already in doubt, however, 
even as he makes them. Shakespeare lays groundwork for suspi-
cion in the second scene of the play, in Cassius’ anecdotal sketch of 
Caesar’s various physical weaknesses: his ‘fever’ (1.2.119), his ‘fi t’ 
(1.2.120), his inability to swim across the Tiber without Cassius’ 
help. ‘And this man / Is now become a god’ (1.2.115–16), Cassius 
concludes, disgusted. Cassius’ sarcastic description of Caesar refers 
here, not just to public opinion, but also to Caesar’s own opinion of 
himself. For example, at the high point of a later speech in the Senate, 
just before the conspirators attack, Caesar insists that although ‘men 
are fl esh and blood’ (3.1.67), he and he alone is in contrast ‘unshaked 
of motion’ (3.1.70). As an epileptic, this boast is indeed a remark-
able claim for him to make. It bespeaks a thorough-going, delusional 
identifi cation on his part with his own ego ideal. 
Cassius insists on exactly the opposite word, ‘shaked’, in his 
account of Caesar’s weaknesses. ‘He had a fever when he was in 
Spain, / And when the fi t was on him I did mark / How he did 
shake’ (1.2.119–21). Cassius even repeats the word for emphasis, 
and again speaks sarcastically of Caesar as a ‘god’. ‘’Tis true, this 
god did shake’ (1.2.121). Later Cassius vows, in similar terms, to 
take Caesar down a peg. ‘Let Caesar seat him sure, / For we will 
shake him, or worse days endure’ (1.2.321–2). As if then to adum-
brate Caesar’s fate, the very next scene begins with Casca describ-
ing the very world itself as less than ‘sure’ in its ‘seat’. ‘Are you not 
moved,’ he asks Cicero, ‘when all the sway of earth / Shakes like a 
thing unfi rm?’ (1.3.3–4).
Caesar insists, however, just before he is killed, that he is an 
exception to the norms of human nature. Just as the pole star 
5877_Gray.indd   126 12/09/18   3:31 PM
 Constancy and Passibility in Julius Caesar [ 127
differs from other stars, so too he differs from other men. As the 
conspirators gather about him in the Senate, ostensibly pleading 
for a pardon for Metellus Cimber’s brother, Publius, but in fact 
preparing to stab their new dictator perpetuo, Caesar dismisses 
their cries and supplications.87 When they persist nonetheless, 
now including Brutus among their number, Caesar is surprised. 
‘What, Brutus?’ (3.1.54) he remarks. Nevertheless, he stays fi rm 
(‘constant’) in his refusal to rescind his previous decree. He seems 
to think that he does not by nature ever change or need to change 
his mind, as if he had indeed become divine. As Seneca writes in 
his essay De providentia, ‘The great author and ruler of all things 
wrote the decrees of fate indeed, but he also follows them. He 
decreed them once for all; he continually obeys them.’88 As Paul 
Cantor writes, ‘Ultimately the tyrannical desire of the Roman 
heroes takes the form of a will to apotheosis. Spurning any con-
ventional sense of the limits of humanity, these heroes wish to 
become gods.’89
Caesar’s description of himself at this fraught, climactic moment, 
an epic simile in which he compares himself to ‘the northern star’, 
bespeaks a remarkably unbridled megalomania. Throughout, he 
seems to see no gap, no incongruity, between himself as he is in fact 
and that impassible, ideal self which Shakespeare’s Romans, like 
classical philosophers, more typically identify with the divine:
I could be well moved if I were as you:
If I could pray to move, prayers would move me.
But I am constant as the northern star,
Of whose true-fi xed and resting quality,
There is no fellow in the fi rmament.
The skies are painted with unnumbered sparks:
They are all fi re, and every one doth shine;
But there’s but one in all doth hold his place.
So in the world: ’tis furnished well with men,
And men are fl esh and blood, and apprehensive.
Yet in the number I do know but one
That unassailable holds on his rank
Unshaked of motion. And that I am he
Let me a little show it even in this,
That I was constant Cimber should be banished
And constant do remain to keep him so.
(3.1.58–73)
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The speech gives several signs of interplay with classical philoso-
phy, capturing the basic gist of its theology. First, the emphasis on 
the contrast between motion and immobility: ‘true-fi xed’, ‘rest-
ing’, ‘unshaked’ vs. ‘moved’, ‘move’, ‘motion’. Caesar presents 
himself here as the equivalent of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover. In 
his treatise De constantia, Lipsius presents Non moveri (‘Not to be 
moved’) as the motto of the successful Neostoic. ‘Lofty against all 
accident, and upright, consistent in a single demeanor, as in a bal-
ance heading neither up nor down, you will lay claim to that great 
and virtually divine Non moveri.’90 Second, and on a related note, 
the emphasis on ‘constancy’, the signature ideal of contemporary 
Neostoicism: Caesar describes himself here three times as ‘con-
stant’. Third, the indifference to ‘prayers’: like Lucretius’ gods, 
Caesar is not swayed by the pleas of mere men. When Cinna con-
tinues, nonetheless, to press for Cimber’s pardon, Caesar rebukes 
him sharply. ‘Hence! Wilt thou lift up Olympus?’ (3.1.74). The 
disdain communicated is truly ‘Olympian’, in today’s sense; men 
are beneath his notice. The direct, third-person reference to him-
self as ‘Olympus’ reveals Caesar’s sense of himself as divine, as 
well as his belief that he is utterly impassible. He can no more be 
‘moved’ than a mountain. 
‘If I could pray to move, prayers would move me.’ The pro-
tasis of this conditional is the most interesting part. ‘If I could 
pray to move . . .’ What Caesar reveals here is that he sees him-
self not only as indifferent to the prayers of others, but also 
as himself incapable of praying. ‘Constancy’ becomes a kind 
of constraint: he cannot plead with other people, persuade 
them, ‘pray to move’ them, because to do so would require 
some degree of passibility on his own part, as well as theirs. As 
I addressed in more detail in the second section of the previ-
ous chapter, ‘ “A marble statue of a man”’, persuading other 
people requires fi rst being persuaded oneself. Cicero, especially, 
argues that the orator can only bring others to feel an emotion 
if he himself, like an actor, or like Mark Antony in his funeral 
oration, fi rst feels that emotion himself. Both in Caesar’s case 
here, rejecting petitions, alienating his peers, and in Brutus’, in 
his coldly rational, off-putting funeral oration, the attempt to 
live out an ideal of absolute ‘constancy’, neither pleading with 
others, nor heeding their pleas (‘prayers’), proves incompatible 
with effective political action.
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Caesar’s diction also invites inquiry, in so far as it reveals his 
perception of other people. The world is ‘furnished well with 
men’: the word ‘furnished’ here is disturbing. To see other men as 
furnishings is to see them as passive objects for use, not as inde-
pendent centers of agency. These men, Caesar also describes as 
‘sparks’. ‘The skies are painted with unnumbered sparks: / They 
are all fi re, and every one doth shine.’ The generosity is patron-
ising. To speak of these ‘sparks’ as ‘painted’ on the skies sug-
gests that their glory or ‘shine’ is merely superfi cial. To describe 
them as ‘unnumbered’ suggests that they are not important; the 
word ‘unnumbered’ stands in sharp contrast to the same passage 
from Scripture that Hamlet cites, when he mentions the ‘fall of a 
sparrow’: ‘the very hairs of your head are all numbered’ (Matt. 
10:30).91 Caesar’s ideal self is indifferent to hoi polloi, not ani-
mated, like the Christian God, by concern for the minutiae of each 
and every man’s life.
‘Sparks’, too, seems to have had in contemporary English a spe-
cifi c, now-obsolete meaning, a slang denotation too informal and 
too specifi c to Shakespeare’s England for Caesar to intend here, and 
which introduces, therefore, an element of dramatic irony, akin to 
that produced by the myriad of allusions to Christian Scripture in 
Antony and Cleopatra. Parolles in All’s Well That Ends Well calls 
Bertram a ‘spark’ (2.1.25), and also addresses other young lords 
who head off to war as ‘good sparks’ (2.1.40). The word ‘spark’ 
serves in this context as a slang term for a young man who is, 
as Montaigne says, bisognosi d’honore. In an essay on ‘Caesar’s 
Methods of Making War’, Montaigne writes:
That is what the Italians say when they want to reprove that 
foolhardiness that is seen in young men, calling them ‘needy of 
honour’, bisognosi d’honore; adding that they, being still in such 
great famine and dearth of reputation, are right to seek it at any 
price whatsoever, which men who have already acquired enough 
of it should not do.92 
When Caesar uses the term ‘sparks’ to refer to the other Roman 
citizens whom his ambition has sidelined, his description not 
only hints at his own danger, surrounded, literally, by men with 
so little to lose, but also aligns them with the young noblemen 
in Shakespeare’s own time who were likewise ‘needy of honour’: 
courtiers and frustrated would-be war heroes such as the Earl 
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of Essex. Less fl attering to such malcontents, ‘spark’ could also 
have yet another colloquial sense, however, and again one con-
nected to the contemporary crisis of the aristocracy. Specifi cally, 
‘spark’, with a pejorative connotation, could mean something 
like ‘dandy’ or ‘popinjay’: ‘a young man who affects elegance of 
dress’.93 This connotation speaks to Caesar’s description of the 
sky as ‘painted’ with such ‘sparks’. ‘Painting’ suggests femininity, 
make-up, superfi ciality: all the hypocritical niceties and obliga-
tions of a royal court. 
‘There is no fellow in the fi rmament.’ Caesar’s fantasy of him-
self here is a paradigmatic example of the characteristic desire of 
Shakespeare’s tragic Roman protagonists somehow to transcend 
or break free from their own inescapable, vulnerable embedded-
ness in a world of multiple, fl uctuating and interdependent con-
sciousnesses. ‘Fellow’ in this case is signifi cant in its sense of ‘like, 
match, resemblance’, as well as its connotation of ‘fellowship’, as 
in ‘jolly good fellow’. That kind of camaraderie, a relationship of 
equals, Caesar here forswears as beneath his dignity. ‘Firmament’ 
means most obviously the heavens, but also conveys, in a double, 
punning sense, the moral quality of ‘fi rmness’. No one, Caesar 
asserts, is his peer in the possession of the character trait of ‘fi rm-
ness’ or ‘fi rmament’, a quality akin to constancy. The heavens as 
‘fi rmament’ are the opposite, especially, of ‘fl esh and blood’. Blood 
here is not a symbol of femininity, but instead of fl uidity, instabil-
ity; as a liquid, it cannot be ‘true-fi xed’ or ‘constant’. So, too, fl esh, 
unlike a star, can be touched; can be wounded; can decay. 
‘Men are fl esh and blood, and apprehensive.’ In the previous 
section of this chapter, ‘Power and Passibility’, I mentioned that 
the inspiration for Timothy Reiss’s appropriation of the technical 
term ‘passibility’ for literary criticism was Aristotle’s discussion 
of the role of passibility in cognition in his treatise on psychology, 
De anima. To explain the more subtle implications of this line 
of Caesar’s speech, it may be helpful to explain that reference a 
bit more fully here. In brief, Aristotle recognises that perception 
by nature requires some degree of passivity. In order to grasp or 
‘apprehend’ the outside world, the mind in its character as ‘pas-
sive intellect’ (Scholastic Latin, intellectus passibilis) must some-
how internalise impressions that it does not already possess, being 
altered in the process. The experience of experience itself reveals 
that the mind is in some sense less than complete, lacking, as well 
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as mutable. Otherwise, how could it ever sense new phenomena? 
How could it learn? At the beginning of his ‘Life of Cato Utican’, 
Plutarch observes that Cato, for example, from his youth was by 
nature ‘infl exible, imperturbable, and altogether steadfast’, and 
that as a result, ‘when he came to study, he was sluggish of com-
prehension and slow’. ‘Cato’s reluctance to be persuaded made 
his learning anything more laborious. For, to learn is simply to 
allow something to be done to you.’94
Taking up something like the same philosophical problem, 
but in more concrete terms, Shakespeare suggests that to be ‘con-
stant’, like a marble statue, is also to be dangerously oblivious. In 
this scene, the most obvious symbol of that danger is the dramatic 
irony of Caesar boasting of his impassibility, even as the conspira-
tors press about him, preparing to kill him. The audience knows 
what it is about to happen, and it makes Caesar’s vaunting here 
look foolish, rather than impressive, even well before the knives 
come out. To be ‘apprehensive’ is to be afraid, which Caesar sees 
as beneath his dignity; to be ‘apprehensive’ is also to ‘apprehend’, 
however, that is, to understand, to perceive. That Caesar’s pride 
in himself as ‘Caesar’, invulnerable, impassible, is the source 
of his obliviousness appears even more clearly earlier, when he 
explains to Antony that Cassius is ‘very dangerous’ (1.2.209) but 
then catches himself. ‘I rather tell thee what is to be feared / Than 
what I fear: for always I am Caesar’ (1.2.210–11). Shakespeare 
then, without historical precedent, introduces a physical symbol 
of Caesar’s wilful impercipience: deafness. ‘Come on my right 
hand,’ he tells Antony, ‘for this ear is deaf, / And tell me truly 
what thou think’st of him’ (1.2.212–13).
Caesar is not the only one, however, in this tragedy who underes-
timates human passibility, including especially the symbolic power 
of blood. The surreal bloodbath which Shakespeare invents and 
attributes to the conspirators, at Brutus’ prompting, is analogous 
to Caesar’s boasting about his superiority to mere ‘fl esh and blood’ 
in that it represents Brutus’ belief that he, too, is somehow capable 
of transcending the emotional volatility and instability of human 
nature. Still more remarkably, Brutus seems to believe that he can 
take the Roman people with him; that at his instruction, they, too, 
can shed their humanity and become creatures of pure, disinterested 
reason. Like the pugilistic, counterintuitive claims of Stoic philoso-
phers, Brutus’ insistence that he and the other conspirators paint 
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themselves and their swords with Caesar’s blood before they appear 
before the public is a deliberate fl outing of reality. What victory is it 
to convince someone of something that he already believes? To com-
mand an empire, for Brutus, is not suffi cient. Like many an ambi-
tious intellectual, Brutus wants to conquer something even more 
powerful: common sense.
Just before Brutus suggests that he and the other conspirators 
‘bathe’ their hands in Caesar’s blood, he pauses for a moment 
to engage with Casca in precisely the kind of eristic dialectic for 
which Stoic philosophers in antiquity had been notorious, moving 
by rapid-fi re syllogisms to markedly, even ostentatiously implau-
sible conclusions:95
CASCA
 Why, he that cuts off twenty years of life
 Cuts off so many years of fearing death.
BRUTUS
 Grant that, and then death is a benefi t.
  So are we Caesar’s friends, that have abridged
 His time of fearing death.
(3.1.102–6)
In his De oratore, Cicero complains about Stoic philosophers rede-
fi ning words at will, just as Brutus does here with ‘death’: 
The Stoics hold a different view of good and bad from all their 
fellow-citizens . . . and give a different meaning to ‘honour’, ‘dis-
grace’, and ‘reward’ . . . if we were to adopt their terminology, 
we would never be able to express our meaning intelligibly about 
anything.96 
Nuttall describes Brutus’ ‘idiom’ here as ‘donnishly abstract’.97 
The incongruity between his tone, that of a scholar at his leisure, 
and the pressing political problem of having only moments before 
assassinated a wildly popular military commander provides a for-
mal parallel to the discrepancy in Brutus’ argument between his 
counter-intuitive description of that assassination as a ‘benefi t’ 
to Caesar and the way that Caesar himself, one imagines, likely 
understood the same event. 
The same sort of verbal would-be conquest of reality that 
redefi nes murder as a friendly favour occurs earlier in the play, 
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as well, in Brutus’ notorious soliloquy, ‘It must be by his death.’98 
‘Since the quarrel’, Brutus concludes, ‘will bear no colour for the 
thing he is, / Fashion it thus [etc.]’ (2.1.28–30). Vawter says of 
this speech, ‘Nothing more clearly illustrates the historical Cicero’s 
charge against the Stoics that they construct false syllogisms and 
practice “verbal legerdemain.”’99 Nuttall sees a troubling ‘streak 
of self-satisfaction’ in Brutus’ ‘rationalising’. It is the sophist’s 
delight in his own powers of persuasion: the more outrageous the 
claim that he can somehow make stick, the greater his sense of his 
own accomplishment. Cicero is said to have boasted of his defence 
of Cluentis, for example, that he ‘threw dust in the eyes of the 
jury’.100 Gorgias boasts at the end of his Praise of Helen, ‘So I, by 
words, have made a bad woman good.’101 
Quintilian, defending the study of oratory, insists that the ora-
tor is not himself deceived by his own rhetoric. Brutus, however, 
like Cleopatra, is fairly clearly fi rst and foremost interested in fool-
ing himself. As Nuttall writes, ‘The root of our unease is a sense 
that Brutus is contriving to forget or erase actuality.’102 Moreover, 
I would add, Brutus takes pride in doing so. Denial serves as yet 
another feat of spectacular self-control.
 Stoop, Romans, stoop,
And let us bathe our hands in Caesar’s blood
Up to the elbows, and besmear our swords;
Then walk we forth even to the marketplace,
And, waving our red weapons o’er our heads,
Let’s all cry, ‘Peace, freedom, and liberty!’
(3.1.106 –11)
Waving bloody swords and crying ‘peace’: George Orwell captures 
the sort of stomach-churning disjunction between truth and pro-
paganda that Shakespeare evokes here in his description of what 
he calls ‘doublespeak’. Big Brother tells the citizens of his dystopia, 
‘War is peace’, and they are to believe it. 
Brutus’ leadership of the conspiracy against Caesar is marred 
afterwards by an attempt to validate his power as an intellectual 
over other people, as well as himself, moulding their value-system 
into the shape of his own. He turns Hamlet’s fantasy of life in the 
‘nutshell’ of his own thoughts outwards, as if it could encompass 
the world. ‘There is nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so’ 
(2.2.249 –50). What Brutus and the other conspirators discover, 
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however, is they cannot simply redefi ne instinctive moral value-
judgments arbitrarily. As Michael O’Connell observes, ‘blood itself 
has a power that cannot be controlled by their attempts to assign 
it meaning.’103 Roused by Antony’s more sympathetic rhetoric, as 
well as the sight of Caesar’s bloody cloak and corpse, the mob of 
plebeians runs amok. Antony taps into an inescapable susceptibil-
ity to pity that Brutus wilfully ignores, the ‘heart’ that blood here 
represents, and unleashes it as chaotic rage: anger, aptly enough, 
at those, like Brutus, who have repressed it, heaped scorn upon it, 
and denied it the full scope of its force.
The fi gurative opposition in this play between fi xity and fl uid-
ity, ‘constancy’ and ‘passibility’, of which blood is a part, a dia-
lectic between, on the one hand, blood, tears and the river Tiber, 
and on the other, statues, stars and the monumental architecture of 
the Capitol, appears throughout the play, not only as a relatively 
simple contrast between motion and imperturbable stasis, but 
also as a more complex opposition between two different kinds of 
motion, the linear, triumphant march David Quint associates with 
epic and the erratic wandering that he associates with romance; 
or, as Quint calls it, ‘the loser’s epic’.104 In the speech that imme-
diately precedes Caesar’s description of himself as ‘Olympus’ and 
‘the northern star’, Caesar draws a sharp, if implicit, distinction 
between his own purposeful action, cleaving to ‘pre-ordinance and 
fi rst decree’, and the relatively aimless existence of ‘children’, free 
at least in theory from set goals:
 I must prevent thee, Cimber:
These couchings and these lowly courtesies 
Might fi re the blood of ordinary men, 
And turn pre-ordinance and fi rst decree
Into the lane of children. . . .
Thy brother by decree is banished.
If thou dost bend and pray and fawn for him
I spurn thee like a cur out of my way.
(3.1.35–9, 44–6)
Caesar compares his own progress along a straight line here, like 
that of an idealised Roman soldier, to the counterfactual indignity 
of a ‘turn’ down a ‘lane of children’: a return, Kahn might say, 
from the polis back to the oikos. The shiftless roaming of a ‘cur’ 
serves as a foil for the predetermined way, ‘my way’, Caesar calls 
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it, of the man who ‘spurn[s]’ that ‘cur’ aside. Caesar glorifi es the 
advance of the juggernaut, like that of an emperor in triumph, and 
vilifi es, by contrast, the wandering of a meddling stray dog. It is a 
fi ne irony, therefore, that Caesar’s defeat, which follows not long 
after this speech, is in part a result of his unwillingness to ‘turn’ 
aside from his procession through the streets of Rome, just as he 
refuses to do here, and read a petition from Artemidorus, warning 
him of the imminent attempt on his life. 
As Shakespeare sees it, the same staunch self-control, proud 
disdain for self-pity, and resolute determination not to give an 
inch of ground in a fi ght that proved tremendous assets to the 
Romans on the battlefi eld – in a word, their ‘constancy’ – also 
proves their undoing in the end. In the case of Shakespeare’s 
Caesar, fear of acknowledging his own vulnerability manifests 
itself as a pronounced fear of acknowledging fear itself. To admit 
that he feels fear, as he obviously does, when he asks Antony for 
his further thoughts on Cassius, would be to admit that he has 
some reason to be afraid; in short, that he is vulnerable. Caesar 
would rather believe that nothing is more powerful than he him-
self. As he boasts to Calpurnia, ‘Danger knows full well / That 
Caesar is more dangerous than he’ (2.3.44–5). 
 Calpurnia remains unconvinced, however. A reluctance to own 
up to their anxieties, confessing to themselves the danger that their 
wives already see, is a large measure of the reason why both Brutus 
and Caesar alike, at one point or another, push away their wives in 
defensive scorn. These women, in their femininity, represent that 
part of themselves which, despite their bravado, remains ‘liable to 
fear’ (1.2.200). ‘Alas, my lord,’ Calpurnia observes, ‘Your wisdom 
is consumed in confi dence’ (2.2.48–9). Calpurnia for her part is 
content to serve as scapegoat, as long as it keeps Caesar safe. ‘Do 
not go forth today,’ she pleads. ‘Call it my fear / That keeps you in 
the house, and not your own’ (2.2.50 –1). Caesar is initially open 
to the stratagem, calling it with contempt her ‘humour’ (2.2.56), 
but in the end cannot bear the thought of what Decius calls ‘a 
mock / Apt to be rendered’ (2.2.99). ‘If Caesar hide himself, shall 
they not whisper, “Lo, Caesar is afraid”?’ (2.2.100–1). ‘How fool-
ish do your fears seem now, Calpurnia!’ (2.2.105) Caesar blusters. 
‘I am ashamed I did yield to them. / Give me my robe, for I will go’ 
(2.2.106–7). So, too, Brutus dismisses Portia’s concerns about his 
evident agitation. She complains, ‘You answered not / But with 
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an angry wafture of your hand / Gave sign for me to leave you’ 
(2.1.244–6).
In her study of masculinity in Shakespeare’s Rome, Kahn 
argues that ‘heroic male subjectivity is, for the most part, con-
fi gured through the stigmatization or sacrifi ce of a feminized 
private realm of emotion, interiority, and dependency.’105 Turn-
ing to Julius Caesar, Kahn documents how Caesar and Brutus 
both alike engage in defensive projection, blaming their wives for 
feeling what are really their own anxieties, as well.106 ‘Some of 
Shakespeare’s women provide, in effect, an alibi for the heroes 
with whom they are paired – in that, when impulses inimical to 
manly virtue are associated with women, such impulses can be 
disavowed.’107 I agree; in fact, I think this line of thought can be 
pursued even further. Projection is also at work here in a different 
sense, as a component of Shakespeare’s characterisation.
In his study of allegory, Angus Fletcher defi nes ‘projection’ as 
a type of allegory in which the nature of a more central protago-
nist such as Brutus or Caesar is ‘revealed, facet by facet’, in more 
minor characters who represent ‘aspects of himself’. Spenser’s 
Faerie Queene provides Fletcher with the most obvious contem-
porary examples of this practice: heroes such as Sir Guyon or Sir 
Calidore ‘generate’ other, less developed characters through ‘split-
ting’ or ‘fractionating’ their own more complex personality.108 For 
example, on a much smaller scale, Shakespeare sometimes repre-
sents men’s emotions as a personifi ed ‘woman’ within themselves. 
‘Frailty, thy name is woman’ 1.2.146), Hamlet proclaims. King 
Lear calls his hysteria a ‘mother’ (2.2.236) swelling up towards his 
heart. Laertes breaks down in tears at the news of Ophelia’s death, 
but insists that when his tears are ‘gone’, ‘the woman will be out’ 
(4.8.187–8), meaning, presumably, his grief at the loss. Cassius 
describes his anger at Brutus as a ‘rash humour’ which his mother 
gave him; Brutus then personifi es that choler as Cassius’ mother 
herself. ‘Henceforth, / When you are overearnest with your Brutus, 
/ He’ll think your mother chides, and leave you so’ (4.2.175–7).
Kahn sees Portia and Calpurnia as scapegoats for their hus-
bands’ disavowed weaknesses. They are also external, symbolic 
representations, however, of these more central male characters’ 
own quality of passibility. Above all, they represent their hus-
bands’ ignored, mutilated faculties of compassion: the pity Neos-
toicism seeks to suppress. Kahn cites Shoshana Felman: ‘The 
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feminine refuses its assigned position “outside the masculine, [as] 
its reassuring canny opposite,” and stubbornly remains “inside 
the masculine, its uncanny difference from itself.”’109 Portia her-
self makes something like the same point, if fi guratively, when she 
describes herself to Brutus as ‘your self, your half’ (2.1.271), and 
refers to their marriage as ‘that great vow / Which did incorporate 
and make us one’ (2.1.272). Calpurnia’s sterility, an invention on 
Shakespeare’s part, represents her husband’s, Caesar’s, barren fac-
ulty of mercy, as well as his rejection of the ‘grotesque’ body. So, 
too, the relative dearth of female characters in the play represents 
the way in which empathy in Roman culture as a whole tends to 
be repressed or, fi guratively speaking, kept off-stage.
Female characters in Shakespeare’s Roman plays, as well as 
femininity in a more abstract sense, represent most immediately 
pity, including self-pity or concern for one’s own safety. The chief 
tension in the Roman psyche, however, is not just between com-
passion and cruelty, still less between masculinity and femininity, 
but instead more generally between idealised power and shameful 
passibility. When Cassius mocks Caesar in absentia for acting like 
‘a sick girl’ (1.2.128), he invokes three different kinds of analogous 
weakness at once: not just femininity, but also youth and ill health. 
In another simile from the same speech, Cassius compares himself 
carrying the ‘the tirèd Caesar’ out of the Tiber, lest he drown, to 
Aeneas carrying his father, ‘the old Anchises’, out of ‘the fl ames of 
Troy’ (1.2.114–17). Here, the vehicles for disparaging Caesar’s all-
too-human passibility are old age and physical exhaustion. What 
is shameful in Shakespeare’s Rome is not so much to be female or 
feminine but to lack power of a certain kind in any sense whatso-
ever: political power, associated here with health, middle age and 
force of arms, as well as being male. Caesar’s epilepsy comes up 
repeatedly, and Shakespeare attributes a further weakness to him, 
deafness in one ear, which, unlike Caesar’s ‘falling sickness’, seems 
to be entirely his own addition.110 Geoffrey Miles presents a sum-
mary list of these and other ways in which Shakespeare insists in 
this tragedy in particular on the physical limitations of the human 
condition: ‘epilepsy, fever, deafness, shortsightedness, ague, insom-
nia, fanting, illness real and pretended’.111
For Shakespeare’s Romans, the ideal self is not the incarnate, 
suffering, sympathetic Christian God of love, tears, anger and 
death by crucifi xion, but instead classical philosophers’ utterly 
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impassible, wholly immaterial Unmoved Mover. Humanity is 
defi ned in contrast to the divine by its susceptibility to external 
infl uence, physical as well as emotional: a condition that Roman 
protagonists such as Portia, as well as Caesar and Brutus, strive to 
transcend. To be human is to bleed, to be vulnerable, to fall sick, 
to age, to die. As Gail Kern Paster argues, the difference between 
Bakhtin’s two bodily canons can be understood as the difference 
between man and woman. More fundamentally, however, for 
Shakespeare’s Romans, it is the difference between Godhead  and 
the human condition. The ‘grotesque’ is the self as it is: embodied, 
passible, prone to pity. The ‘classical’, by contrast, is the ideal self: 
‘the northern star’. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART I: SHAKESPEARE’S 
PASSION PLAY
Shakespeare’s representation of Julius Caesar differs notably from 
that of his contemporaries, as well as from the picture of Caesar 
that emerges from his most obvious classical source, Plutarch’s Lives. 
Plutarch’s Caesar is shrewd, resilient and relatively dignifi ed; Shake-
speare’s, by contrast, is physically weak and surprisingly obtuse; 
prey to laughable grandiosity. Other early modern authors such as 
Marc-Antoine Muret and William Alexander model their versions of 
Caesar on Seneca’s Hercules, as well as Plutarch’s biography. Shake-
speare, however, seems to draw inspiration for his departure from 
Plutarch from the conventional depiction of Julius Caesar’s successor, 
Augustus, in medieval English mystery plays, as well as other tyrants 
such as Herod the Great. Over the course of these pageants, depict-
ing Christian salvation history, protagonists such as Moses and Isaac 
set up a typology of Christ.1 Meanwhile, however, secular antago-
nists such as the Pharaoh of Egypt establish a contrary pattern: a 
typology of Antichrist. Like Lucifer, as well as Antichrist himself, 
‘Caesar’ in the mystery plays is typecast as a blustering, comically 
inadequate parody of Godhead. Vaunting speeches proclaiming his 
supreme worldly might echo the language of God the Father. These 
boasts are then belied, however, by his inability to forestall the com-
ing of Christ, whom he fears as potential political rival. Mystery 
plays, naturally enough, tend to focus on Augustus Caesar, emperor 
of Rome at the time of Christ’s Nativity.2 Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar, however, stands in the same medieval tradition. As a type of 
Antichrist, he is a foil for the future Christ. His failure sets the stage 
for a different and paradoxically more powerful Messiah. 
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In the nineteenth century, Shakespeare’s representation of 
Caesar as a self-important blowhard met with cries of critical 
dismay.3 ‘We do not much admire the representation given here 
of Julius Caesar,’ William Hazlitt complains, ‘nor do we think 
it answers to the portrait of him in his commentaries. He makes 
several vapouring and rather pedantic speeches, and does noth-
ing.’4 George Bernard Shaw is less restrained. ‘It is impossible for 
even the most judicially-minded critic to look without revulsion 
of indignant contempt at this travestying of a great man as a silly 
braggart.’5 James Boswell, son of the famous biographer, saw 
the problem as evidence of Shakespeare’s proverbial ‘small Latin 
and less Greek’.6 Citing Caesar’s Gallic Wars, Boswell writes, 
‘There cannot be a stronger proof of Shakespeare’s defi ciency in 
classical knowledge than the boastful language he has put in the 
mouth of the most accomplished man of all antiquity, who was 
not more admirable for his achievements, than for the digni-
fi ed simplicity with which he recorded them.’7 By the twentieth 
century, the problem of the ‘two Caesars’ was well-established.8 
G. Wilson Knight sums up the dilemma: 
We are, indeed, aware of two Caesars: the ailing and petulant old 
man, and the giant spirit standing colossal over the Roman Empire 
to be. There is an insubstantial, mirage-like uncertainty about this 
Caesar. How are we to see him? He is two incompatibles, shifting, 
interchanging.9 
In his commentary on Plutarch’s ‘Life of Julius Caesar’, C. B. Pelling 
observes that the Greek biographer seems to admire Caesar.10 Or, 
at least, Plutarch’s portrait of Caesar is more studiously neutral 
than that of many other classical authors. Suetonius, for instance, 
praises Caesar for his ‘admirable moderation and clemency both 
in administration and as victor in the civil war’, but concludes that 
‘the balance is tilted by his other actions and words, so that he is 
thought to have abused his power and to have been justly killed’.11 
Plutarch, by contrast, ends with the remarkable claim that ‘noth-
ing cruel or tyrannical sprang from [“Caesar’s rule”]’. On the con-
trary, he maintains, ‘it seemed that the state needed monarchy, 
and Caesar was Heaven’s gift to Rome as the gentlest possible 
doctor’.12 Throughout Plutarch’s account, Caesar comes across 
as a man of superlative natural gifts, honed by discipline. He is 
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generous, merciful, physically tough, an expert general, and a poli-
tician of uncanny shrewdness and foresight. 
Shakespeare’s Caesar is considerably less dashing and char-
ismatic; less sympathetic and less extraordinary. Shakespeare is 
much more disparaging about Caesar’s epilepsy, for example, than 
Plutarch is. Plutarch acknowledges the handicap: ‘concerning the 
constitution of his body, he was lean, white, and soft skinned, and 
often subject to headache, and otherwhile to the falling sickness.’ 
But he frames Caesar’s debility as a cause for wonder rather than 
reproach. ‘That he always continued all labour and hardness, 
more than his body could bear . . . fi lled them all [i.e. all the sol-
diers under his command] with admiration.’ Caesar 
yielded not to the disease of his body, to make it a cloak to cherish 
him withal, but contrarily took the pains of war as a medicine to 
cure his sick body, fi ghting always with his disease, travelling con-
tinually, living soberly, and commonly lying abroad in the fi eld.13 
In Shakespeare’s play, by contrast, Caesar’s ‘falling sickness’ 
(1.2.253) is presented as an occasion for derision.14 ‘He fell down 
in the marketplace, and foamed at mouth, and was speechless’ 
(1.2.251–2). According to Casca’s bitter conceit, Caesar’s ‘swoon’ 
was brought on by the ‘stinking breath’ of the ‘rabblement’ 
(1.2.245–7), cheering for him to become their king. ‘I durst not 
laugh,’ he quips, ‘for fear of opening my lips and receiving the bad 
air’ (1.2.248–9).
Cassius complains about Caesar’s epilepsy, as well, and, like 
Casca, in notes of disdain. He describes him as a man of ‘feeble tem-
per’ (1.2.129), compares him to ‘a sick girl’ (1.2.128), and mocks 
his plaintive request for a drink, as he lay recovering from a seizure 
in Spain. The request is an interpolation; Plutarch says simply that 
‘the falling sickness . . . took him the fi rst time, as it is reported, in 
Corduba, a city of Spain’.15 Shakespeare also invents a backstory 
of a swimming-match between Cassius and Caesar, a race across 
the river Tiber on ‘a raw and gusty day’ (1.2.100). Caesar not only 
loses the contest, but in the end almost drowns; Cassius is obliged 
to rescue him and carry him bodily ashore. Plutarch, by contrast, 
describes Caesar as a preternaturally strong swimmer. At one point, 
fi ghting in Alexandria near the lighthouse of Pharos, Caesar fi nds 
himself surrounded by hostile Egyptians:
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But he, leaping into the sea, with great hazard saved himself by 
swimming. It is said, that then, holding divers books in his hand, 
he did never let them go, but kept them always upon his head 
above water, and swam with the other hand, notwithstanding they 
shot marvellously at him.16 
The sharpest contrast, however, between Shakespeare’s Caesar 
and Plutarch’s lies in their assessment of his political savvy. Plu-
tarch presents Caesar as a politician of consummate skill, laying 
the groundwork for his ascent to power years in advance through 
shrewd alliances with other power brokers such as Pompey and 
Crassus, as well as carefully arranged displays of generosity, clem-
ency and eloquence. To illustrate Caesar’s ‘craftiness’, Plutarch 
recounts his foresight in anticipating his later rivalry with Pompey:
Now Caesar had of long time determined to destroy Pompey, and 
Pompey him also. For Crassus being killed amongst the Parthians, 
who only did see that one of them two must needs fall . . . Till 
then Pompey had not long feared him, but always before set light 
by him, thinking it an easy matter for him to put him down when 
he would, sith he had brought him to that greatness he had come 
unto. But Caesar contrarily, having had that drift in his head from 
the beginning, like a wrestler that studieth for tricks to overthrow 
his adversary: he went far from Rome to exercise himself in the 
wars of Gaul, where he did train his army, and presently by his 
valiant deeds did increase his fame and honour. 
In Plutarch’s account of Caesar’s rise to power, Caesar’s initial dis-
ingenuousness is so convincing that only the wisest of his con-
temporaries, Cato and Cicero, suspect his ultimate aim, until it 
is too late to prevent his success. ‘Cicero, like a wise shipmaster 
that feareth the calmness of the sea, was the fi rst man that, mis-
trusting his manner of dealing in the commonwealth, found out 
his craft and malice, which he cunningly cloked under the habit 
of outward courtesy and familiarity.’17 North’s terms, ‘craft and 
malice’, are more pejorative than Plutarch’s own diction; the origi-
nal reads ‘tyrannikēn . . . dianoian’, meaning simply ‘his intention 
to become an absolute ruler’.18 Like Cassandra, or Shakespeare’s 
Calpurnia, Cicero and Cato fi nd that their warnings go unheeded. 
‘Cato, that then foresaw and prophesied many times what would 
follow, was taken but for a vain man.’19 
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Shakespeare, by contrast, omits all the political skulduggery, 
battlefi eld gambles and feats of personal derring-do by which, as 
Montaigne says, Caesar was able ‘to become Caesar’.20 Caesar 
appears straightaway at the height of his power. Given his wilful 
obliviousness, moreover, it is diffi cult to understand how he ever 
could have won it. He comes across more like Plutarch’s Pompey 
than he does like Plutarch’s Caesar.21 Speaking to Antony about 
Cassius, he shows some vestige of political insight: ‘Yond Cassius 
has a lean and hungry look; / He thinks too much: such men are 
dangerous’ (1.2.193–4). Yet his willingness to act upon that sound 
intuition is limited by an overwhelming drive to assert his own 
invincibility instead. ‘But I fear him not’ (1.2.197), he insists. 
‘I rather tell thee what it is to be fear’d / Than what I fear; for 
always I am Caesar’ (1.2.210 –11). This lack of self-awareness then 
segues into outright comedy. ‘Come on my right hand,’ he asks 
Antony, ‘for this ear is deaf, / And tell me truly what thou think’st 
of him’ (1.2.212–13). That Caesar is partially deaf is Shakespeare’s 
own invention; it represents his consistent refusal to heed others’ 
counsel, as well as his own generally sensible misgivings. 
Later in the play, on the day itself of his assassination, Caesar’s 
wife, Calpurnia, begs him not to go to the Capitol. There are 
reports of ‘horrid sights’ (2.2.15), and she herself has had a dream 
which suggests he might be murdered. Caesar dismisses her con-
cerns. ‘Caesar shall forth’ (2.2.10), he maintains. ‘The things that 
threaten’d me / N’er look’d but on my back; when they shall see 
/ The face of Caesar, they are vanished’ (2.2.10–12). Caesar casts 
himself here as an irresistible force. Yet the conceit also shows the 
limits of his self-awareness, in its suggestion of an attack from 
behind. As the audience is aware, that very day Caesar will be 
stabbed in the back. ‘Alas, my lord,’ Calpurnia laments, ‘Your wis-
dom is consumed in confi dence’ (2.2.48–9). Caesar fi nally starts to 
give in to Calpurnia’s pleas when he is interrupted by one of the 
conspirators, Decius Brutus. He then proves surprisingly suscep-
tible to fl attery, as well as fear of being mocked for staying home: 
Decius Brutus is able to convince him, despite his wife’s objections, 
to come with him to the Capitol. The basic premise throughout 
that Caesar is the gull, the dupe, the victim of manipulation, rather 
than its master, runs very much counter to the spirit of Plutarch’s 
biography. Nevertheless, Shakespeare’s characterisation is consis-
tent: Caesar can see, but only in one direction; he can hear, but 
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only out of one ear. He has a blind spot, and it is what G. Wilson 
Knight aptly identifi es as a boundless ‘egotism’, an ‘almost super-
stitious respect for his own importance’. He sees himself as at once 
both man and god: ‘almost divinity’. ‘Hence his rapid changes, his 
admixture of fi ne phrases resonant of imperial glory with triviali-
ties, platitudes, absurdities.’22
In an attempt to solve the problem of the ‘two Caesars’, Harry 
Morgan Ayres suggests that Caesar suffered towards the end of his 
life from what we would now call mania: ‘a touch of that obfusca-
tion of the judgment which sometimes attacks the wielders of unlim-
ited power, leading to extravagance in language and to schemes, 
not wholly impossible in themselves, which come to naught’. Ayres 
compares this condition to the ancient Greek concept of atē: ‘the 
infatuation, the judicial blindness laid by the gods on those whose 
destruction they are premeditating’. Ayres does not assume, how-
ever, that Shakespeare had any degree of familiarity with ancient 
Greek literature. Instead, he suggests a more immediate precedent: 
Shakespeare was bound by convention to appease ‘the preconcep-
tions of his audience’, a mental construct which he calls ‘the Eliza-
bethan Stage-Caesar’. ‘If we could discover . . . they conceived him 
as a man that thunders, lightens, and roars’, then it is easy enough 
to understand Shakespeare’s departure from Plutarch. ‘Shakespeare 
must of necessity endow him with a little strut, a touch of grandios-
ity, if his audience is to believe that Caesar stands before them.’23 
For Ayres, the most likely source of this ‘pomposity of manner and 
of language’ is Seneca’s Hercules. He examines several roughly 
contemporary plays about Julius Caesar, including the Latin Julius 
Caesar (1544) of Marc-Antoine Muret, the French César (1558) of 
Jacques Grévin and the English Julius Caesar (1604) of Sir William 
Alexander, and he fi nds that they all draw extensively on Seneca’s 
tragedy Hercules furens, as well as the pseudo-Senecan Hercules 
Oetaeus. Shakespeare himself was familiar with Seneca’s tragedies, 
as well, in part due to an infl uential collection of English transla-
tions, Seneca his tenne tragedies (1581). 
Ayres’ analysis of Seneca’s Hercules, however, is oddly tone-
deaf. To describe the protagonist of Hercules furens or Hercules 
Oetaeus as a comic fi gure is a jarring misreading. In keeping with 
classical notions of decorum, Seneca’s creative work observes a 
strict separation of the comic and the tragic. In his prose sat-
ire, the Apocolyntosis Claudii or ‘Pumpkinifi cation of Claudius’, 
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Hercules does make an appearance as a blustering simpleton, 
unsure what to make of the Emperor’s wandering spirit. In Sen-
eca’s tragedies, however, Hercules is a sublime, exemplary Stoic 
hero. Having completed all his labours, including very literally 
bearing the world on his shoulders, like Atlas, as well as bringing 
Cerberus back from the Underworld, Hercules now faces a differ-
ent task: to overcome himself. As Seneca writes elsewhere, in his 
letters to Lucilius, imperare sibi maximum imperium est (‘To rule 
oneself is the greatest empire’).24 In Hercules furens, Juno affl icts 
Hercules with madness, leading him fi rst to attempt to conquer 
heaven itself, like the Titans, then to kill his own wife and chil-
dren, thinking them instead related to his enemy, Lycus. Once he 
returns to his senses, he is tempted to lose hope and kill himself, 
but he chooses instead to remain alive, stronger than his own 
suffering. In Hercules Oetaeus, he endures the excruciating pain 
caused by the fatal Shirt of Nessus, then kills himself by burning 
himself alive on Mount Oeta. Throughout the entire process of 
self-immolation, the playwright emphasises Hercules’ indomitable 
and admirable Stoic composure. As in Hercules furens, he is cast 
as an exemplar of dignity in misfortune, revealing the potential 
strength of the human spirit even in the worst of circumstances.25 
To fi nd comedy in such material seems misplaced. To be fair to 
Ayres, however, his interpretation of Seneca’s Hercules does refl ect 
a former critical consensus. According to some early twentieth-
century critics, Juno represents an impulse within Hercules himself, 
a tendency towards proud overreaching.26 More recently, however, 
other critics have objected that Hercules shows no sign of inap-
propriate ambition or troubling impiety, outside a sharply circum-
scribed episode of insanity. The beginning and end of that psychotic 
break with reality is clearly defi ned: it begins with a hallucination 
of an eclipse and ends with his falling down unconscious. For these 
critics, the tragedy is not a tale of justice, designed to show the con-
sequences of sacrilegious pride, but instead a study in a more Stoic 
vein, designed to show Hercules’ heroic resistance to overwhelming 
feelings of grief, guilt and despair.27 
A comparison between this vision of Seneca’s Hercules and 
Shakespeare’s Caesar is still illuminating, but not for the reasons 
that Ayres proposes. Hercules has no choice but to go mad; he is at 
the mercy of Juno’s anger. He is a pawn; a means for her to exact 
revenge on her wayward husband, Jupiter. Shakespeare’s Caesar, 
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by contrast, seems able to rein in his delusions of grandeur, when 
the mood strikes him. He may be deaf, but only in one ear. The 
‘baffl ing’ vacillation that G. Wilson Knight identifi es in Caesar’s 
language, oscillating between ‘two Caesars’, one ‘a frail man’, the 
other ‘almost divinity’, is signifi cant, because it shows that Caesar, 
for all his occasional, outrageous grandiosity, is also capable of 
lucid moments, grounded in awareness of his own human weak-
ness. He could come down from the heights of his infl ated self-
image; he simply does not want to. As a result, he seems more 
blameworthy, more laughable, than Seneca’s Hercules. His mis-
takes are wilful, human, rather than the result of intractable divine 
opposition.
Ayres also seems to have been misled by the allusion to Sen-
eca’s Hercules in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, a passage which 
he cites as an interpretive touchstone.28 When Peter Quince casts 
Bottom as a lover, Pyramus, the endearing ham actor is sorely 
disappointed. ‘My humor is for a tyrant’ (1.2.24), he explains. 
‘I could play Ercles rarely, or a part to tear a cat in, to make all 
split’ (1.2.25–6). He then declaims a few lines:
The raging rocks
And shivering shocks
Shall break the locks
Of prison gates;
And Phibbus’ car
Shall shine from far
And make and mar
The foolish Fates.
(1.2.27–34)
This spoof confl ates two passages from John Studley’s translation 
of Hercules Oetaeus.29 ‘Phibbus’ car’ appears in the opening two 
lines, Sator deorum, cuius excussum manu / utraeque Phoebi sen-
tient fulmen domus (‘Sire of the gods, whose hand launches the 
thunderbolts felt by both homes of Phoebus . . .’), which Studley 
translates, ‘O LORDE of Ghostes whose fyrye fl ashe (that forth 
thy hand doth shake) / Doth cause the trembling Lodges twain 
of Phoebus car to quake . . .’30 ‘Raging rocks’ that ‘break the 
locks’ appear in Deianira’s nurse’s boast about the scope of her 
magic powers, habuere motum saxa, discussi fores / umbrasque 
Ditis (‘rocks have started to move; I have shattered the doors and 
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darkness of Dis’), which Studley renders as ‘the roring rocks have 
quaking sturd, and none thereat hath pusht. / Hell gloummy gates 
I have brast oape.’31 Essentially, Shakespeare combines the fi rst 
two lines of the play, as if to signal his source, with another two 
lines from further in, chosen to refl ect the speaker, Bottom, and the 
situation. Like Deianira’s nurse, Bottom is a lower-class character, 
claiming unusual power. He is attempting to help, in this case, 
Peter Quince with his casting decision, and, as with Deianira and 
her nurse, his solicitous attention does more harm than good.
Bottom himself, however, is very satisfi ed with this piece of 
doggerel. ‘This was lofty!’ (1.2.35) he concludes. ‘This is Ercles’ 
vein, a tyrant’s vein’ (1.2.36). Bottom’s admiration for ‘Ercles’ 
seems to have led Ayres to imagine that Shakespeare saw Seneca’s 
Hercules as akin to Bottom himself. But the butt of the joke is 
more the translation, as well as outmoded methods of acting, 
than it is Hercules. Bottom mangles his source material, much as 
he does the two Greek names he attempts: ‘Ercles’ for Hercules, 
‘Phibbus’ for Phoebus. It is also worth noting that Bottom himself 
does not intend to be amusing. From his perspective, the material 
is ‘lofty’. The problem is not Hercules, but rather Bottom’s own 
inadequacy and grandiosity. A similar mismatch occurs in another 
early comedy, as well, Love’s Labour’s Lost, and again in a play-
within-a-play, the pageant of the Nine Worthies. Like Bottom, the 
character playing Hercules is woefully ill-suited for the role, albeit 
physically, rather than intellectually: the slightly built page, Moth, 
falls far short of Herculean stature. ‘Great Hercules is presented 
by this imp’ (5.2.609), explains Holofernes. ‘Quoniam he seemeth 
in minority / Ergo I come with this apology’ (5.2.613–14).32 The 
introduction of Hercules here suggests Shakespeare may indeed 
have seen some sort of connection between Hercules and Caesar: 
the original set of the Nine Worthies, established by tradition on 
the Continent in the Middle Ages, did not include Hercules, but 
instead Julius Caesar.33
The analogy to be drawn, however, is not between Caesar and 
Hercules himself, but instead between Shakespeare’s Caesar and 
Shakespeare’s comic actors, Moth and Bottom. Like them, he has 
set himself a role which exceeds his true capacity. In Hercules furens, 
Hercules describes his accomplishments in terms which could seem 
like bravado. He recounts his legendary Twelve Labours and main-
tains that he can defeat any remaining monster which Juno might 
5877_Gray.indd   153 12/09/18   3:31 PM
154 ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic
send against him. In context, however, these statements are not idle 
boasts. Juno agrees with his self-assessment: the only recourse that 
remains, as she sees it, is to set Hercules against himself. Some crit-
ics such as Denis Henry and Elisabeth Walker see Hercules’ asser-
tions as arrogant, even laughable. Others, however, such as Anna 
Lydia Motto and John R. Clark see this criticism as oddly blind to 
the assumptions of Seneca’s imaginary world. Hercules is not to be 
measured by the standards of an ordinary human being. He is half-
divine, the son of Zeus, capable of slaying monsters, returning alive 
from the Underworld, and standing in for the Titan Atlas. His life 
ends with an apotheosis, joining the gods among the stars. Within 
this mythological context, his claims about his own capabilities are 
not absurd or overblown; they are simply matter of fact. Shake-
speare’s Julius Caesar, by contrast, is a very different case. He has 
no superhuman powers, although he sometimes seems to imagine 
that he does. He is not the son of a god. When he compares himself 
to ‘the northern star’ (3.1.60) or to ‘Olympus’ (3.1.74), his implicit 
claim to something like Godhead is unfounded; at odds with his 
own merely human nature. 
 To think of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar as a Christian nar-
rative, even if only by deliberate contrast, may seem counter-
intuitive. The play does not include any explicit reference to 
Christianity. As Steve Sohmer suggests, however, it makes sense 
that an Elizabethan Englishman, steeped in the stories of the 
Gospels, required to attend church regularly, and old enough to 
remember the great spectacle of his youth, the Coventry Corpus 
Christi plays, would have seen ready analogies to Christ’s Pas-
sion in Plutarch’s account of Caesar’s assassination. ‘In North’s 
Plutarch,’ Sohmer imagines, ‘Shakespeare and lettered Eliza-
bethans would have encountered a series of uncanny parallels 
between the lives of Julius Caesar and Jesus Christ.’34 Helen 
Cooper argues that ‘audiences of the cycle plays’ were ‘trained 
to recognize such theatrical analogy’: within a given cycle, ‘every 
individual pageant is a subplot in the greater drama of salvation 
. . . related to it, not just as a chronological step in the sequence, 
but by typology, by likeness within difference.’35
Seen in light of this analogical habit of mind, the story of Caesar’s 
rise and fall lends itself by nature to an intertextual typology of Christ 
and Antichrist. Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon is like Jesus’ entry into 
Jerusalem on Palm Sunday. Caesar arrives at the head of an army, 
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however, whereas Jesus arrives in deliberate self-abasement, riding 
on a donkey’s colt. Caesar is betrayed by a close friend, Brutus, per-
haps even his own son; Jesus is betrayed by a chosen disciple, Judas. 
Caesar is a military commander and a populist, the beloved political 
leader of the most powerful nation in the world. Jesus, by contrast, 
refuses to take up arms. His nation is conquered and weak; he him-
self spurns violence, and as a result he is rejected by his own people. 
Caesar is pierced by knives; Christ is pierced by nails and a spear. 
Both of their deaths are attended by prodigies and omens. Each story 
can be seen as the polar opposite of the other, at once similar and 
diametrically opposed. 
Caesar is mentioned repeatedly in the Gospels, and always as 
a foil for true divinity. ‘Give therefore to Caesar the things which 
are Caesar’s,’ Jesus says, ‘and give unto God, those things which 
are God’s’ (Matt. 22:21; cf. Mark 12:17 and Luke 20:25). This 
contrast is invoked again when the Jews insist that Jesus is a rival 
to Caesar, an accusation which fi nally forces Pilate’s hand. ‘Pilate 
sought to loose him, but the Jews cried, saying, If thou deliver 
him, thou art not Caesar’s friend: for whosoever maketh him-
self a King, speaketh against Caesar’ (John 19:12; cf. John 19:15 
and Luke 23:2). Not so directly a reference to Caesar, but in the 
same vein, is Christ’s rejection of Satan’s offer of worldly political 
power during his temptation in the wilderness. ‘All this power 
will I give thee, and the glory of those kingdoms,’ the devil prom-
ises; ‘if thou . . . wilt worship me, they shall all be thine’ (Luke 
4:6–7). ‘Hence from me, Satan,’ Christ replies, ‘for it is written, 
Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him alone thou shalt 
serve’ (Luke 4:8).
In support of his suggestion that Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar 
resembles a Passion play, Sohmer points out that Shakespeare 
incorporates a number of slight but revealing departures from 
Plutarch, serving to bring his version of events more closely 
in line with the Gospel account of the events of Easter week.36 
For instance, in Shakespeare’s play, but not in Plutarch’s ‘Life’, 
Caesar is assassinated at ‘about the ninth hour’ (2.4.23). In all 
three Synoptic Gospels, Christ fi nally dies on the Cross at ‘the 
ninth hour’ (Luke 23:44–5; Matt. 27:26; Mark 15:34). In Antony’s 
funeral oration, Naseeb Shaheen identifi es an allusion to the 
events of Palm Sunday.37 Protesting with false modesty, Antony 
proclaims that if he only had Brutus’ rhetorical skill, he would 
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‘put a tongue / In every wound of Caesar that should move / The 
stones of Rome to rise and mutiny’ (3.2.221–3). In the Gospel 
of Luke, when Jesus enters Jerusalem, ‘the whole multitude of 
disciples began to rejoice, and to praise God with a loud voice’ 
(19:37). The Pharisees ask Jesus to rebuke the disciples for wel-
coming him ‘in the Name of the Lord’ (19:38), and he replies, 
‘I tell you, that if these should hold their peace, the stones would 
cry’ (19:40). Shakespeare also introduces Brutus’ curious drive 
to conceive of the assassination as ‘a controlled and dignifi ed rit-
ual’, akin to a Christian liturgy. Instead, David Kaula argues, the 
conspirators produce ‘a disastrous imitation of the true redemp-
tive action’.38 
More recently, Hannibal Hamlin has identifi ed a remarkable 
array of anachronistic allusions to the Bible running throughout 
Shakespeare’s Roman plays, ranging from references to the Book 
of Revelation in Antony and Cleopatra to suggestions of the Old 
Testament in Coriolanus.39 In the case of Julius Caesar, ‘Shakespeare 
repeatedly draws Julius Caesar into parallel with Christ, by this 
means calling into question not only his divinity, but the sacrifi cial 
nature of his death, and its meaning for the people of Rome (and, 
in Shakespeare’s own day, England).’40 Hamlin sees the Icarus-like 
trajectory of Shakespeare’s Brutus, as well, as a representation of a 
failed, proleptic attempt at a purely political salvation, foreshadow-
ing but not fulfi lling Jesus’ later role. As he is about to die, Brutus 
tells Volumnius, ‘I know my hour is come.’ The formulation recalls 
the Gospels, when Jesus foresees that his Passion is imminent. ‘Jesus 
knew that his hour was come’ (John 13:1). ‘Behold, the hour is at 
hand,’ he says (Matt. 26:45).41 Brutus wants to see himself as a ‘sac-
rifi cer’, a ‘purger’, rather than a ‘butcher’: Hamlin sees this language 
as recalling Hebrews 9–10: 
Brutus and Cassius hope that the blood ritual they enact (or wish 
to think they are enacting) will be repeated by Romans in years to 
come, in commemoration of the original act, suggesting the sac-
rifi ce of Christ regularly commemorated when the participants in 
the Eucharist consume the ‘saving blood’ of Christ.42 
When they wash their hands in Caesar’s blood, when they imagine 
themselves represented on stage to future generations, Brutus and 
the other conspirators try and fail to set up what amounts to a 
secular alternative to Christianity. 
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Another episode from Julius Caesar which both resembles and 
adumbrates the conspirators’ odd preoccupation with Caesar’s 
blood is Calpurnia’s dream.43 As part of the plot, a neglected 
warning, it resembles the dream of Pilate’s wife. The original epi-
sode appears in only one line in one Gospel, the Book of Matthew: 
‘when he was set down upon the judgment seat, his wife sent to 
him, saying, Have thou nothing to do with that just man: for 
I have suffered many things this day in a dream by reason of 
him’ (27:19). Pilate’s wife also appears in a much-expanded role, 
however, in the York mystery plays. In the Tapisters’ and Couch-
ers’ play, the Devil hopes to forestall Christ’s crucifi xion, lest he 
lose control of men’s souls, so he tells Pilate’s wife in the guise 
of a dream that Jesus is innocent, and that if he is condemned to 
die, she and Pilate will lose their wealth and station. She sends a 
message to Pilate, advising him that Jesus is innocent, but Ana-
nias and Caiaphas convince him to ignore it as ‘wicchecrafte’ 
(292).44 Their fl atteries, bowing and scraping before Pilate, seem 
to anticipate Shakespeare’s Decius Brutus. 
Plutarch presents two different versions of Calpurnia’s dream, 
both relatively simple. ‘She dreamed that Caesar was slaine, and 
that she had him in her armes.’ Or perhaps, he goes on: 
as amongst other, Titus Livius writeth . . . it was in this sorte. The 
Senate having set upon the toppe of Caesars house, for an orna-
ment and setting foorth of the same, a certaine pinnacle: Calpurnia 
dreamed that she sawe it broken downe, and that she thought she 
lamented and wept for it.45 
Shakespeare, by contrast, introduces much more detail. As Caesar 
explains to Decius Brutus:
She dreamt tonight she saw my statue
Which, like a fountain with an hundred spouts,
Did run pure blood; and many lusty Romans
Came smiling and did bathe their hands in it. 
(2.2.76–9)
Calpurnia herself interprets this dream as a ‘warning’ and ‘portent’ 
of ‘evils imminent’ (2.2.80–1). Decius Brutus, however, proposes a 
more favourable spin.
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Your statue spouting blood in many pipes
In which so many smiling Romans bathed
Signifi es that from you great Rome shall suck
Reviving blood, and that great men shall press
For tinctures, stains, relics, and cognizance.
(2.2.85–9)
Kaula stresses the anachronism of the key word ‘relics’ and intro-
duces as a possible historical precedent ‘something members of 
Shakespeare’s audience could have witnessed in their own city: the 
avid quest for relics by the followers of Catholic missionary priests 
executed at Tyburn’.46 As A. O. Meyer explains: 
Great as was the care taken to prevent people showing reverence 
to the relics of the martyrs, or dipping cloths in their blood, all was 
in vain. Relics were secured after every execution, and sometimes 
it was the executioner himself who sold to Catholics the martyrs’ 
bloodstained garments.47 
 Later in the play, Antony tells the gathered crowd that if they heard 
Caesar’s fi nal ‘testament’, ‘they would go and kiss dead Caesar’s 
wounds, / And dip their napkins in his sacred blood, / Yea, and beg 
a hair of him for memory’ (3.2.133–5). ‘Evoked in Decius’ fl attery’, 
Michael O’Connell suggests,
is the image of angels receiving the blood of the crucifi ed Christ in 
chalices, an image at once medieval and baroque, as well as a possible 
mystery-cycle episode of Veronica’s veil. The cure of Longinus’ blind-
ness comes in the vivifying blood that runs from Christ’s wounded 
side into his eyes, which is portrayed in the extant cycles of York, 
Towneley, and Chester.48 
Crucial here, however, is the fact that Decius Brutus’ fl attering inter-
pretation of Calpurnia’s dream is dangerously false. As O’Connell 
notes, ‘the sense of saving blood is maintained at several levels of 
removal from any possible realization.’49 Hamlin wonders if ‘the 
proper response to Antony’s speech is to recognize the inappro-
priateness of worshipping Caesar or any other man, since he is no 
saint, and saints in the Catholic sense were in any case to be rejected 
by Shakespeare’s original audience, at least by the Protestant major-
ity.’50 Antony, too, is not merely venting his grief. He uses the sight 
of Caesar’s wounds to provoke mob violence, aimed at unseating 
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the conspirators themselves. Each time the Romans eerily antici-
pate Christian ritual, treating Caesar as if he were Christ, the result 
is not security, ‘salvation’, but instead violent chaos. Caesar is fl at-
tered by Decius Brutus’ vision of him as a Christlike redeemer. Put 
to the proof, however, he is inadequate in that role. He cannot 
serve in the end as the linchpin of Rome’s long-term well-being; he 
cannot save it from itself. What would be a Passion play is instead 
marred by an insuffi ciency at its centre.
For Shakespeare, the most important difference between 
Caesar’s assassination and Christ’s Passion is the relationship in 
each case between divine power and human vulnerability. As it is 
presented in the Gospels, Christ’s death on the Cross is the story 
of the voluntary suffering of the ‘one man’, ‘one only man’, who 
is in fact divine. The transcendent, awe-inspiring God of Moses 
and Job is shown as immanent, human: ‘fl esh and blood’ (3.1.67). 
This man, Jesus, seems at fi rst incomprehensibly weak, out of all 
proportion to his status as divine. He repeatedly calls himself ‘the 
Son of Man’, rather than the Son of God. He allows himself to 
be put to death in the most humiliating fashion, crucifi xion, that 
the Romans could devise. In the end, however, this mysterious, 
non-violent Messiah proves surprisingly powerful: able to conquer 
death itself. In the Garden of Gethsemane, St Peter draws a sword, 
but Jesus tells him to put it away. ‘Do you think that I cannot 
now pray to my Father, and he will provide me with more than 
twelve legions of angels?’ (Matt. 26:53). Jesus’ death is a conscious 
choice, a temporary setback that he himself is able to overcome.
The tragedy of Caesar’s assassination, as Shakespeare sees it, 
is a counterpoint to this familiar narrative. Caesar seems all but 
omnipotent at fi rst, but he is not in fact divine. His grandiosity 
is punctured, disproved. He seems unassailable, like a jugger-
naut, but turns out to be merely ‘fl esh and blood’ (3.1.67), like 
other men. He styles himself the salvation of Rome, but instead 
proves the rallying cry for a chaotic civil war. The would-be king 
of Rome, the man whom Cassius mocks bitterly and enviously 
for setting himself up as ‘one man’ (1.2.152, 154), ‘one only man’ 
(1.2.56), bestriding all others like a ‘Colossus’ (1.2.135), ends up 
as a ‘bleeding piece of earth’ (3.1.254). 
Shakespeare’s sense of Caesar as a wrongheaded, secular pseudo-
Messiah is especially apparent towards the end of Antony’s fune-
ral oration, in a sequence which invokes the iconography of the 
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Resurrected Christ in medieval English mystery plays, as well as 
English churches before the ravages of Protestant iconoclasm. As 
Pamela King and Clifford Davidson explain, the conventional depic-
tion of the Resurrected Christ in pre-Reformation England showed 
him ‘with a piece of cloth’, that is, a cloak or mantle, ‘draped over 
his shoulders (the wound in his side is visible)’ and ‘making visible 
the wound created by the nails in his palm, sometimes extending his 
arm’. As an example, they draw attention to ‘the much damaged fi f-
teenth-century Resurrection presented in sculpture on a door frame 
in the chancel of the Holy Trinity Church in Stratford-upon Avon’: 
‘here the remains of three soldiers are present in a seated posture 
before the coffer tomb, and above it the torso of a much mutilated 
Christ rises.’51
In his funeral oration, Antony fi rst shows the crowd Caesar’s 
‘mantle’, torn and bloody: ‘our Caesar’s vesture wounded’ (3.2.168, 
194). Then he shows them Caesar’s body itself, ‘marred’ (3.2.195). 
Antony describes this ‘corse’ at some length in an earlier solilo-
quy, when he compares Caesar’s ‘wounds’, which ‘stream forth . . . 
blood’, to ‘eyes . . . weeping’ (3.1.199–201). The crowd is outraged: 
‘O piteous spectacle!’ (3.2.196); ‘O most bloody sight!’ (3.2.198). 
Antony’s presentation of Caesar’s wounds closely resembles, in 
other words, the story of Christ’s Resurrection, but undermined; 
ironised. The play even includes its own secularised version of the 
ransom theory of the Atonement: Antony goes on to explain that 
Caesar in his will has left ‘to every Roman citizen . . . / To every 
several man, seventy-fi ve drachmas’ (3.2.234–5), as well as ‘all his 
walks, / His private arbours and new-planted orchards, / On this 
side Tiber’ (3.2.238–40).
The success of Antony’s speech turns upon the same coup de 
théâtre which seems to have been at the centre of the Resurrection 
play in England. As Pamela Sheingorn suggests, the audience ‘fi rst 
. . . may have seen a Christus triumphans and heard his victory sung 
by the angels; then, perhaps with a simple motion of pulling aside 
his cloak and opening out his hands, he became the Christus patiens 
who suffered and continues to suffer for mankind.’52 Jesus’ entrance 
in the Towneley play of the Resurrection is an apt example: he 
appears on-stage to the sound of angels singing ‘Christus resurgens’, 
then draws attention to his wounds. ‘Behold how dere I wold the 
by!’ (26.236) he tells the audience. ‘My woundys ar weytt and all 
blody’ (26.237); ‘From harte and syde the blood out-ran’ (26.244). 
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Behold my body, in ilka place 
How it was dight – 
All to-rent 
And all to-shentt, 
Man, for thi plight.
(26.250–4)
Compare Antony describing Caesar’s mantle: ‘Look, in this place 
ran Cassius’ dagger through: / See what a rent the envious Casca 
made, [etc.]’ (3.2.172–3). The Towneley Jesus continues: ‘This 
depe woundys,’ he insists, ‘Tholyd I the fore’ (26.260–1). ‘Behald 
my shankes and my knees, / Myn armes and my thees, / Behold 
me well, looke what thou sees’ (26.269–71). The speech goes on 
at great length, with unmistakeable emphasis: ‘Four hundredth 
woundys and v thowsand,’ Jesus explains, ‘Here may thou se’ 
(26.292–3). 
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus’ unwillingness to show his wounds 
to the public as part of his bid for consul is in marked contrast, 
not only to the Jesus of the Corpus Christi plays, but also to 
the version of Coriolanus’ life Shakespeare found in Plutarch, 
where Coriolanus, by contrast, does not object to the practice. 
As Hannibal Hamlin notes, ‘during the mandatory ritual, Corio-
lanus is, visually, at his most Christlike.’ Despite his ‘gown of 
humility’ (2.3.41), however, he refuses to play the part. As Hamlin 
suggests, Shakespeare’s use of ‘creative anachronism’ may have 
been modelled on Plutarch’s own comparative technique in his 
Lives, juxtaposing Greek and Roman noteworthies. ‘By means of 
anachronistic allusions, Shakespeare spins webs of analogies in 
which the tragedies of the protagonists are all measured against 
the tragedy (if it is one) of Christ.’53 Departing here from his clas-
sical source, Shakespeare represents his Coriolanus, unlike Plu-
tarch’s, as unwilling to show his wounds, in order to emphasise 
the disparity between Coriolanus and Jesus, especially, the Jesus 
of medieval biblical drama. ‘In the pageants after the Passion,’ 
Michael O’Connell notes, the resurrected Christ would continue 
to display ‘open and bleeding wounds’.54 
In Julius Caesar, the irony is of a slightly different kind. Caesar 
does not return from the dead, like the resurrected Christ. The 
appearance of his wounded body is not reassuring, a sign of hope, 
but instead a provocation to riot. ‘Revenge!’ the plebeians cry: 
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‘About! Seek! Burn! Fire! Kill! Slay!’ (3.2.198). ‘Sweet Caesar’s 
wounds’, as Antony calls them, ‘move / The stones of Rome to 
rise and mutiny’ (3.2.218). That is to say, the ‘piteous spectacle’ 
of Caesar’s ‘corse’ provokes, in the end, the same kind of worldly 
rebellion against Roman power that his fellow Jews hope for from 
Jesus in the Gospels, and that he, by contrast, pointedly abjures. 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar maps the story of Caesar’s assassina-
tion on to the framework of Christ’s Passion in order to emphasise 
telling points of incongruity. Caesar serves as what David Kaula 
calls a ‘distorted replica’ or ‘imperfect imitation’ of the Jesus of the 
Gospels: a saviour who proves, as Nietzsche says, ‘human, all too 
human’.55 As Peter Lake observes, ‘For all his world-dominating 
achievements and well-nigh universal fame, Caesar’s efforts to 
transform the Roman state end not only in his own assassina-
tion but also with the descent of the Roman world into chaos and 
civil war.’56
What the infl uence of Christian Scripture does not explain, 
however, is the comic aspect of Shakespeare’s depiction of Caesar. 
Caesar in the New Testament is foreboding, distant, frightening; not 
a fi gure of fun. The obtuse, incongruous bullheadedness of Shake-
speare’s Roman emperor, undermining his pretention to this kind 
of grandeur, is not drawn from the Bible itself; at least, not directly. 
Instead, Shakespeare’s tone in this case can be better understood 
as a legacy of the distinctive infl uence of medieval English bibli-
cal drama. In his discussion of ‘comic relief’ in Shakespeare, A. P. 
Rossiter observes that Shakespeare writes ‘in the same spirit’ as 
the anonymous authors of the earlier ‘Miracle Plays’, ‘juxtaposing 
the religious and the farcical, the moving-pathetic and the brutal-
comic’.57 Mulling over Shakespeare’s distinctive style, Erich Auer-
bach concludes, ‘the mixture of the sublime with the low cannot 
in the last analysis come from any other sources than the medieval 
Christian theatre.’58 
In keeping with these critics’ intuition, the most likely source 
for the distinctive strain of foolhardy, comic braggadocio in 
Shakespeare’s characterisation of Julius Caesar, the element which 
Ayres associates with ‘the Elizabethan Stage-Caesar’, and which 
so distressed nineteenth-century fi gures such as Hazlitt and Shaw, 
is neither Seneca’s Hercules nor the Caesar of the Gospels, but 
instead the stage tyrants of medieval cycle plays, including fi g-
ures such as Herod, Lucifer and Antichrist, as well as Augustus 
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Caesar.59 Heather Mitchell-Buck singles out this archetype, ‘the 
‘ranting tyrant’, as ‘the superstar of the early English stage’: 
‘Characters like Herod, Pilate, and Caesar were dressed in the 
most lavish costumes, assigned the longest and most elaborate 
speeches, and often supplied the actors who brought them to life 
with a substantial wage.’60 These antagonists introduce an ele-
ment of comedy which Shakespeare appropriates, much against 
the grain of his classical sources. 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar was most likely written and produced 
in 1599.61 Performances of mystery plays, especially Passion plays, 
continued well into the 1570s, despite Puritan opposition. At least 
some members, therefore, of the original audience for Shakespeare’s 
tragedy, those in their twenties and older, would have been familiar 
with the conventions of this form of traditional theatre. Shakespeare 
himself could have easily attended the Coventry cycle, which was 
staged annually until 1579, when he was in his mid-teens. Coventry 
is less than a day’s walk from Stratford-upon-Avon, and its Corpus 
Christi plays were famous nationwide as an especially spectacular 
instance of the genre.62 John Cox notes that the Coventry Herod 
comes across as ‘the liveliest and most memorable’ of the various 
Herods that appear in extant cycle plays, and cites as an example a 
stage direction prompting the tyrant to rage ‘in the pagond and in 
the strete also’.63 In Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra, the cycle-
play Herod proves a precedent for Shakespeare’s own histrionic 
Eastern tyrant, Cleopatra. ‘That Herod’s head I’ll have’ (3.3.4–5), 
she exclaims.64 Vowing to treat Herod as he himself did St John the 
Baptist, Cleopatra threatens very literally, as Hamlet says, to ‘out-
Herod Herod’ (3.2.14).65 
Taken together with his tendency to boast and bluster, Caesar’s 
failed pretensions to Godhead connect him to the depiction of his 
successor, Augustus Caesar, as a comic tyrant in medieval English 
Corpus Christi plays, alongside other overweening, over-the-top 
antagonists such as Pharaoh and Lucifer. Other examples include 
the Towneley Pilate, as well as the fi gure of Antichrist himself. In his 
study of the genre, John Parker identifi es a typology of Antichrist, as 
well as Christ: worldly potentates such as Herod, ‘one of Antichrist’s 
fi ner incarnations’, present a ‘parodic and false approximation’ of 
a saviour who is still to come.66 ‘Impotent and false in themselves’, 
their limitations presage ‘the deferred arrival of yet another, more 
effective Messiah’.67 This future fi gure is Christ at the time of his 
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Second Coming, when he will be revealed beyond all doubt as the 
heir of God the Father and sweep aside any and all would-be com-
petitors. Until then, however, deluded claimants to divine power 
such as Lucifer and Antichrist enjoy some degree of liberty. They 
strut and posture for a time on the stage, as a comic prelude to their 
inevitable, long-foreseen defeat. 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar is a braggart in this vein: a Chris-
tian variation on the alazōn or miles gloriosus. From the perspec-
tive of Elizabethan England, he and his successor, Augustus, are 
among the few men in human history who came closest to possess-
ing power like that of God the Father: autocratic rule of ancient 
Rome. Nevertheless, they fall short of full divinity. Unfortunately, 
all but two of the original Coventry Corpus Christi plays are no 
longer extant. Given, not least, their likely infl uence on Shake-
speare, Michael O’Connell describes ‘the historical lacuna of the 
Coventry plays’ as ‘the most grievous theatrical loss of the period’: 
‘the missing link between the epic religious theatre whose perfor-
mance extended from the late fourteenth century into the middle 
of Elizabeth’s reign and the professional theatre that followed it’.68 
‘Caesar’ does appear prominently, however, in two other pag-
eants, the Towneley plays and the Chester Whitsun cycle, and his 
character there serves as an apt example of a medieval English 
stage tyrant, illustrating variations as well as continuities within 
such characters’ role, and perhaps allowing us to triangulate what 
a Coventry Caesar might have been like. In the Towneley plays, 
‘Caesar Augustus’ is a vain, foolish braggart throughout. He revels 
in the thought of the unprecedented scope of his political domin-
ion and scoffs at the thought of any possible rival. When his min-
ions cannot fi nd the prophesied Christ Child, he grows frustrated, 
then frantic, to comic effect. In the Chester cycle, ‘Octavian the 
Emperor’ begins with stock boasts about his unassailable worldly 
might. When he learns about Jesus, however, he becomes more 
thoughtful and subdued. Some of the Roman senators try to pro-
claim him a god, but he resists their fl attery, instead reminding 
them of his mortality, weakness and ignorance.
Medieval mystery plays typically begin with God the Father 
giving a grand speech, explaining his own omnipotence. At the 
opening of the Chester cycle, God announces, ‘Ego sum alpha et 
oo.’69 He then grounds this pre-eminence in in the absolute effi cacy 
and unchanging nature of his will: ‘It is my will it shoulde be soe; / 
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hit is, yt was, it shalbe thus’ (1.1–4). The beginning of the fi rst 
of the Towneley plays is very similar. ‘Ego sum alpha et o,’ God 
proclaims.70 ‘I am the fi rst, the last also, / Oone god in mageste’ 
(1.1–3). The Towneley God then goes on to emphasise that he 
alone is divine, pre-emptively undermining any subsequent claim-
ants. ‘I am god alone’: ‘oone god in mageste’, ‘on god in trinyte’, 
‘oone god in persons three, / which may neuer twynnyd be’ (1.8, 
1, 2, 6–7).
Types of Antichrist such as Lucifer and Herod make similar 
claims throughout both sets of plays. The Chester Lucifer boasts, 
‘I ame pearlesse’ (1.184). The Chester Herod: ‘I am the greatest 
above degree / That is, or was, or ever shalbe’ (8.180–1). The 
Chester Antichrist: ‘I am verey God of might. / All thinges I made 
through my might’ (22.221–2). The Towneley Lucifer asks, ‘In 
heuen, therfor, wit I wold, / Above me who shuld won. / ffor I am 
lord of blis, / ouer all this warld’ (1.91–4). The Towneley Pharoah 
proclaims his worldly sovereignty, and like Lucifer, complains that 
he is not treated with the degree of respect he believes is his due: 
‘All Egypt is myne awne / To leede aftyr my law; / I wold my myght 
were knawne / And honoryd, as hyt awe’ (8.9–12). The Towneley 
Pilate introduces himself as ‘leyf leder of lawes’, and insists, like 
Lucifer, as well as Pharaoh, that he deserves his pride of place: 
‘was neuer kyng with crowne / More wor[thy]’ (20.8, 13–14).
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar fi ts this pattern, alongside the 
Towneley Augustus and the Chester Octavian. The Towneley 
Caesar protests himself different in kind from all other men: ‘Sych 
an othere / In all thys warld, is none’ (9.35–6). He claims absolute 
authority: ‘I am lord and syr ouer all, / All bowys to me, both 
grete and small, / As lord of euery land’ (9.19–21). And, like God 
himself, he insists on the omnipotence of his will: ‘I am he that 
mighty is, / And hardely all hatheness / Is redy at my will’ (9.25–7). 
Such rhetoric echoes the Towneley God: ‘Withoutten me ther may 
be noght, / For all is in my sight; / Hit shall be done after my will’ 
(1.14–16). 
The Chester God warns against pretenders, emphasising from 
the outset that he is unique: ‘Never shalbe twyninge’ (1.10). ‘Was 
never none so like me,’ he explains, ‘soe full of grace, / nor never 
shall as my fi gure’ (1.120–1). Thus, when the Chester Caesar 
advances similar claims, the audience is primed to be suspicious. 
God describes himself as ‘Prince principall’ (1.22); Octavian 
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deems himself ‘preeved prince most of powere’ (6.185). ‘Under 
heaven highest am I here’ (6.186). Like these fi gures from medi-
eval drama, Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar insists he is unique: ‘but 
one in all’ (3.1.65). Like ‘the northern star’, he maintains, he has 
‘no fellow in the fi rmament’ (3.1.60, 62). He compares himself 
to ‘Olympus’ (3.1.74) and boasts about his ‘unassailable’ might 
(3.1.69). 
Maynard Mack points out that Caesar’s procession, much akin 
to a triumph, is Shakespeare’s own invention: ‘“Caesar,” says Plu-
tarch, “sat to behold.”’71 In his fateful visit to the Senate on the day 
of his assassination, Shakespeare’s Caesar invokes another charac-
teristic of medieval English stage tyrants: their role in clearing and 
quieting a crowd. Meg Twycross cites her experience of modern 
productions of medieval drama: ‘a lot has been talked about the 
folk play “ritual” of clearing the magic circle for the players: it is 
also a physical necessity, as anyone who has performed with an 
unstructured audience will tell you.’ Twycross speculates that this 
condition of performance, the audience encroaching on the act-
ing space, led to metatheatrical play upon ‘practical necessity’. ‘If 
an actor has to push his way through the audience, he can’t just 
pretend they are not there, so one might as well write pushing into 
the part.’72 
For practical purposes, then, it is perhaps no coincidence that the 
opening speech of various stage tyrants in the Towneley plays tends 
to be an exhortation laced with threats, urging the audience to sit, 
kneel, clear the way and/or fall silent. Pharaoh begins: ‘Peas, of payn 
that no man pas; / bot kepe the course that I commaunde’ (8.1–2). 
Herod begins, ‘I shall tame thare talkyng’ (16.80). ‘Sesse all this 
wonder,’ he commands, ‘ffor I ryfe you in sonder’ (16.86–8). ‘Peasse 
both yong and old at my bydyng, I red, / ffor I haue all in wold, in 
me standys lyfe and dede; / who that is so bold I brane hym thrugh 
the hede’ (16.91–3). 
The Towneley Caesar’s opening lines seem designed in like vein 
not only to establish his character, but also to clear a space for the 
play itself.
Be styll, beshers, I commawnd yow,
That no man speke a word here now
Bot I my self alon;
And if ye do, I make a vow,
5877_Gray.indd   166 12/09/18   3:31 PM
 Shakespeare’s Passion Play [ 167
Thys brand abowte youre nekys shall bow,
ffor thy be styll as ston:
And looke ye grefe me noght,
ffor if ye do it shall be boght,
I swere you by mahowne;
I wote well if ye knew me oght,
To slo you all how lytyll I roght,
Ston styll ye wold syt downe. 
(9.1 –11)
So, too, in the York cycle, Moses and Pharaoh begins with Pha-
raoh declaring, ‘O pees, I bidde þat no man passe, / But kepe þe 
cours þat I comaunde’ (11.1–2). The Slaughter of the Innocents 
begins with Herod exclaiming ‘Stente of youre steuenes stoute / 
And still as stone ʒe stande’ (19.3–4), and so on. At the beginning 
of Christ before Pilate, Pilate threatens violence:
Yhe cursed creatures þat cruelly are cryand,
Restreyne you for stryuyng for strengh of my strakis;
Youre pleyntes in my presences vse plately applyand,
Or ellis þis brande in youre braynes sone brestis and brekis.
(30.1–4)
In his procession through the Capitol, Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar recreates this imperious tendency towards physical imposi-
tion. He airily dismisses Artemidorus’ petition, unaware it is a warn-
ing about the conspiracy against him. As he walks across the Senate 
fl oor, surrounded by an entourage of pleading Senators, he cuts short 
their ‘couchings’ and brushes past their ‘lowly courtesies’ (3.1.36). 
‘Thy brother by decree is banished,’ he tells Metellus Cimber. ‘If thou 
dost bend and pray and fawn for him / I spurn thee like a cur out of 
my way’ (3.1.44–6). He is unswerving, directorial, right up until the 
point he is cut down.
Like the Chester God, the Chester Caesar insists on the unfail-
ing power of his will. ‘Wholey all this world, iwys, / is readye at 
my owne will’ (6.195–6). Or again, ‘all the world dose my willing’ 
(6.230). The Towneley Augustus sees ‘both ryche and poore, more 
& les / At my lyking for to redress, / Whether I wyll saue or spyll’ 
(9.28–30). The Chester Octavian scoffs at the very idea of oppo-
sition. ‘Through vertue of my degree,’ he boasts, ‘All this world, 
withowten were — / kinge, prynce, batchlere — / I may destroy in 
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great dangere’ (6.189–92). The bluster recalls Shakespeare’s Julius: 
‘Danger knows full well / That Caesar is more dangerous than he’ 
(2.2.44–5). Despite such swaggering speeches, both medieval Cae-
sars turn out in the end, however, to be troubled and surprisingly 
weak. The Towneley Caesar admits early on, ‘oone thing doys me 
full mych care, / I trow my land wyll sone mysfare / Ffor defawte 
of counsel lele’ (9.37–9). When he hears of the coming of Christ, 
who shall his ‘force downe fell’ (9.72), he is distraught; he sends 
ruffi ans to try to fi nd the boy and kill him, but without success. 
‘Out, harrow, full wo is me!’ (9.74), he cries, agitated and anxious.
The Chester Octavian proves more complex. Over the course 
of the play, after he hears about Christ, he undergoes a change 
of heart, making peace with the limits of his own powers. When 
senators come to honour him as a God, he refuses and instead 
maintains, despite their objections, that he is merely a man. His 
mortality undercuts any pretence to divinity. ‘Godhead’ has ‘noe 
begininge’ or ‘endinge’ (6.329–30), he explains, whereas he him-
self is already growing old: ‘of my life most parte is gone, / age 
showes him soe in mee’ (6.327–8). ‘I must dye I wotte not what 
day’ (6.319). To help convince the senators, he visits the Sibyl, 
whom he asks, ‘shall ever be any earthlye kinge / to passe mee of 
degree?’ (6.347–8). He hears her prophesy of the coming Christ 
Child with interest, but without any sign of envy, and retires 
peacefully.
The Towneley Caesar entertains an amusing streak of vanity: 
‘Cesar august I am cald, / A fayrer cors for to behald, / Is not of 
bloode & bone’ (9.31–3). He speaks as if he transcended the very 
stuff from which he is made, simply by virtue of his own supposed 
good looks. The Chester Caesar, however, insists, by contrast, 
on the fragility of his own materiality. ‘Neyther of iron, tree, ne 
stonne / am I not wrought’ (6.325–6), he protests. ‘For of all fl esh, 
blood, and bonne / made I am, borne of a womane’ (6.321–2). 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar acknowledges that ‘men are fl esh and 
blood’ (31.67), but he sees himself as exempt from the vulnerabil-
ity of that condition: ‘one / that unassailable holds on his rank / 
Unshaked of motion’ (3.1.68–70). His ‘blood’, he suggests, is not 
like that of ‘ordinary men’ (3.1.37). The Chester Octavian is wiser. 
‘Though I bee highest worldly kinge,’ he concludes, ‘of godhead 
have I noe knowinge. / Hit were unkynde’ (6.333–6). ‘Unkynde’: 
unlike Shakespeare’s Caesar, the Chester Caesar recognises that he 
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is a human being, different in ‘kind’ from the divine. The Towne-
ley Augustus is foolish, but the Chester Octavian is surprisingly 
self-aware.
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar strongly resembles the Towneley 
Augustus, as well as other medieval English stage tyrants such as 
Herod and Pharaoh. Like these fi gures, he is a failed pretender to 
Godhead, a wilfully oblivious alazōn. His power at the beginning 
of the play seems to resemble that of God himself. By the end, 
however, he turns out to be limited, as we all are, by the most 
basic givens of the human condition: embodiment, old age, mor-
tality and, especially, ignorance. He is not God, as Christ is; he is 
less, not more, than he seems to be at fi rst. Over the course of the 
play he is deliberately stripped of his initial glamour, because he is 
designed to serve as a foil of the true Messiah: a comic Antichrist. 
Shakespeare’s indebtedness to what John Parker calls the 
typology of Antichrist is not limited to Julius Caesar. The same 
overarching, didactic plot-structure of punctured delusion recurs 
consistently throughout Shakespeare’s plays. John Cox sees a simi-
lar pattern in King Lear, for example, albeit without the comedy. 
Although Lear’s ‘rhetoric is more temperate’ than that of the typi-
cal medieval stage tyrant, it is still ‘terrifying’ and ‘arrogant’. Like 
Shakespeare’s Caesar, or the Coventry Herod, he ‘cannot brook the 
slightest threat to his authority’. And in the end, like these more 
bombastic, comic fi gures, Lear is ‘shorn of his power, his dignity, 
and his seemingly invulnerable self-reliance’. This reversal, Cox 
argues, ‘has potent dramaturgical precedent in centuries of popular 
drama whose central images involved making the high low and the 
low high’. Seen in light of medieval English drama, Caesar’s assas-
sination and the humbling of Lear’s arrogance can be understood 
as variations on a common theme:
The defeat of Lucifer, the exile of Cain, the destruction of Pharaoh, 
the conversion of Octavian, the death of Herod, the tricking of 
Pilate, the abasement of King Robert, all involve essentially the 
same movement that we see in Lear: the powerful are reminded 
by the example of their own humiliation that they are no better 
than fools.73 
The critical problem of the ‘two Caesars’ is not an inconsistency 
to be explained away; still less, a product of ignorance; but, instead, 
a revealing expression of a choice of allegiance. Shakespeare departs 
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from classical sources such as Plutarch’s Lives in order to tap into 
the vernacular tradition of the mystery plays. Like the contrast 
between Christ and Caesar in the Gospels, or between Christ and 
a stage tyrant in a Corpus Christi pageant, Shakespeare’s charac-
terisation of Julius Caesar is designed to foreground the contrast 
between divine power and human vulnerability. This gulf between 
God and man is reconciled and overcome in the person of Christ; 
for all others, however, human weakness is an insurmountable limit, 
dangerous to ignore. Differences between the two most developed 
extant versions of the medieval stage Caesar, the Chester and the 
Towneley, hinge upon their grasp of this fundamental truth about 
their own human nature: the fact that human ‘fl esh and blood’ 
falls short of divine omnipotence. John Cox describes the medieval 
dramaturgical tradition as keenly interested in what St Augustine 
calls potentia humilitatis: ‘the power of humility’.74 In its typology 
of Antichrist, however, medieval biblical drama also presents what 
might be called humiliatio potentatuum: ‘the humbling of the pow-
erful’. This dynamic is what Shakespeare moves to capture, in his 
vision of the fall of Julius Caesar.
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Antony and Cleopatra
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CHAPTER 3
‘THE HIGH ROMAN FASHION’: SUICIDE AND 
STOICISM IN ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA
In Julius Caesar, Shakespeare focuses on the most obvious forms of 
human passibility: our mortality, our physical weakness, and our 
susceptibility to passions such as anger, grief and pity. In his later 
Roman play, Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare turns to a differ-
ent and more subtle aspect of human vulnerability: our sensitivity 
to shame. In the general introduction, I suggested that, whereas 
Julius Caesar shows the end of the dying Republic, Antony and 
Cleopatra shows the beginning of the Roman Empire, and that this 
transition mirrors the contemporary English ‘crisis of the aristoc-
racy’. In this later tragedy, Shakespeare considers the attractions of 
art itself as an escape, given the deep-set sense of humiliation that 
this kind of crisis can provoke. English aristocrats who once prided 
themselves on being warriors found to their chagrin that they were 
now obliged to become courtiers, instead: the yes-men they had 
once so heartily despised. Shakespeare mocks such spineless fl atter-
ers in the form of characters such as Osric in Hamlet and Oswald 
in King Lear. The English nobility did not blithely relinquish their 
traditional conception of themselves, but instead met the diminu-
tion of their power with anxiety, indignation and occasional out-
breaks of reactionary violence. Essex’s ill-considered rebellion is 
the most obvious example; others include duelling, privateering, 
foolhardiness on the battlefi eld, and an effort to revive medieval 
chivalric practices such as jousting. 
As traditional martial autonomy became ever more circum-
scribed, the same class of noblemen who sought solace in the late 
Elizabethan chivalric revival also found consolation in the new 
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philosophy of Neostoicism. As it once had in ancient Rome long 
before, the characteristic will to power St Augustine calls libido 
dominandi turned inwards towards conquering the self rather than 
the world at large. In Antony and Cleopatra, as in Julius Caesar, 
Shakespeare is keenly interested in the mutability and volatility of 
this kind of thwarted ambition. Uncertain how best to proceed, 
Roman protagonists such as Brutus and Antony move back and 
forth, vexed, between the objective pursuit of political indepen-
dence and the subjective cultivation of emotional invulnerability. 
Brutus abandons his initial Stoicism to become a man of action, 
but too late. Even when he does try his hand at politics, he cannot 
shake off his tendency to approach oratory as if it were a game 
within his own mind, a logical puzzle to be solved by pure ‘reason’ 
(3.1.237). Antony in Julius Caesar proves, by contrast, the master 
of embracing his own passibility, like an actor. He uses the methods 
of Ciceronian oratory, but against the Republic, as a demagogue, 
rather than in the service of the ‘common good’ (5.5.73). 
Antony in Antony and Cleopatra is more like his former antag-
onist in Julius Caesar, Brutus, than he might seem prima facie. 
Much as Brutus oscillates between Ciceronian engagement in 
Roman politics and Senecan retreat into ‘philosophy’, Antony 
alternates between Roman ‘labor’ (4.14.48) and Egyptian ‘idle-
ness’ (1.3.94). The two other major characters, his rival, Octavian, 
and his lover, Cleopatra, symbolise these two poles of his own 
split existence. Octavian represents the objective pursuit of politi-
cal dominance, an aspect of life Antony fi nds bothersome and bor-
ing, but also, despite his desultory efforts, inescapable. Cleopatra 
represents, by contrast, a subjective retreat into his own imagina-
tion, a world of endless feasts, revelry and games where everything 
answers to his slightest whim, as if he were a god – or a play-
wright. Shakespeare seems to see in the opposition between Rome 
and Alexandria something like the opposition between the world 
as it is, at times a grim and inhospitable place, and the world as it 
can be in the mind’s eye, the ‘dream’ that comes to life in poetry, 
as well as on the stage. In the language of the play, ‘fancy’ is more 
enchanting than ‘nature.’ Like a stage-play, however, or a dream, 
‘fancy’ cannot be sustained ad infi nitum.
Coriolanus serves here, too, as a useful point of both compari-
son and contrast. Like Antony, Coriolanus is exquisitely sensitive to 
shame. He is humiliated by anything that suggests that he depends 
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on anyone other than himself, since it would reveal that he falls short 
of an idealised self-suffi ciency. Much as Coriolanus is reluctant to 
canvass for votes, Antony is deeply upset at the thought of having to 
beg for mercy from his rival, Octavian. After his defeat at Actium, 
he laments, ‘Now I must / To the young man send humble trea-
ties; dodge / And palter in the shifts of lowness’ (3.11.61–3). This 
indignity is itself a result, however, of a cause for deeper ‘shame’ 
(3.11.52): his ‘unnoble swerving’ (3.11.49) at Actium. As he con-
fesses, he is bound as if in ‘strong Egyptian fetters’ (1.2.123) by his 
love for Cleopatra. Coriolanus, too, proves bound to his mother, 
Volumnia: ‘O mother, mother! / What have you done?’ (5.3.183–4) 
he asks. His question is the opposite of a divine fi at; the agency in 
the scene is fi nally hers, not his. Like Antony with Cleopatra, he 
proves unexpectedly, profoundly passible. 
Defeated earlier in the play by ‘the beast / With many heads’ 
(4.1.1–2), Coriolanus is banished from Rome. And, humiliated, 
he then tries to project that banishment back on to his opponent. 
‘I banish you!’ (3.3.123) he replies, indignant. ‘There is a world 
elsewhere’ (3.3.135). Similar language appears in Richard II. 
When Bolingbroke is banished, his father exhorts him to consider 
his exile from the perspective of a ‘wise man’: a reference, per-
haps, to the Stoic sapiens. ‘All places that the eye of heaven visits / 
Are to the wise man ports and happy havens’ (1.3.275 –6). For 
example, Gaunt suggests, ‘Think not the king did banish thee, / 
But thou the king’ (1.3.279–80). Bolingbroke insists that there are 
sharp limits, however, to the consolation provided by this kind of 
retreat into subjective fantasy. Introspective dissociation, driving 
a wedge of sheer will between the mind and the world, is not as 
easy or sustainable as his father makes it out to be. ‘O who can 
hold a fi re in his hand,’ he protests, ‘by thinking on the frosty 
Caucasus?’ (1.3.294–5). Coriolanus possesses, if anything, even 
less capacity to retreat into his own counterfactual imagination 
than Bolingbroke. When he says, ‘I banish you!’ he does not mean 
it in the sense that Gaunt does. He is not imagining a different, fi c-
tional world. Rather, he means more literally that he banishes the 
Romans from his protective presence, as former defender of their 
safety. ‘Here remain with your uncertainty!’ (3.3.124) he goes on. 
‘Let every feeble rumor shake your hearts!’ (3.3.125). When he 
says, ‘There is a world elsewhere!’ he does not mean, like Hamlet, 
the ‘nutshell’ (2.2.254) of his own mind; instead, he means more 
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objectively that there are other places where he believes he can live 
and maintain more autonomy, such as with the Volscians. 
Although Antony in some ways represents the same kind of 
‘Herculean hero’ as Coriolanus, he is also markedly different, 
both in circumstances and in character.1 Like Coriolanus, once 
he is defeated objectively, he tries to withdraw objectively: he 
asks Caesar ‘To let him breathe between the heavens and earth, 
/ A private man in Athens’ (3.12.14–15).2 For Antony, however, 
unlike Coriolanus, there is no such ‘world elsewhere’. Octavian 
is the ‘universal landlord’ (3.13.72), and he dismisses Antony’s 
request out of hand. What Antony does possess, by contrast, that 
Coriolanus does not is an imagination. He is able to escape sub-
jectively, into a world of make-believe much akin to that of the 
theatre. ‘Let’s have one other gaudy night’ (3.13.188), he tells 
Cleopatra, after his defeat at Actium. ‘Call to me / All my sad 
captains. Fill our bowls once more. / Let’s mock the midnight bell’ 
(3.13.188–90). Even in the face of utter ruin, Antony is capable of 
living instead in a world ‘as if’, a counterfactual alternate reality 
much like that of an actor on stage. Cleopatra fi nds his bravado 
comforting: ‘Since my lord / Is Antony again, I will be Cleopatra’ 
(3.13.190–1). 
Coriolanus has no such companion. Much as Portia and Cal-
purnia in Julius Caesar represent their husbands’ faculty of pity, 
which they suppress to a fault, Cleopatra represents Antony’s dis-
tinctive faculty of imagination or ‘fancy’, which he indulges to 
excess. This capacity Coriolanus utterly lacks, even to his own 
detriment. As A. D. Nuttall says, ‘he has no inside’.3 ‘Would 
you have me / False to my nature?’ (3.2.14 –15) Coriolanus asks, 
incredulous. ‘Rather say I play / The man I am’ (3.2.15–16). He 
cannot give an oration like Antony’s in Julius Caesar, not because, 
like Brutus, he is too intellectual, but because he is not intellectual 
enough. He cannot dissociate the external world from his own 
internal self-perception, his ‘bosom’s truth’ (3.2.57). Despite his 
mother’s desperate attempts to coach him to ‘dissemble’ (3.2.62), 
Coriolanus cannot bring himself to play the ‘mountebank’ 
(3.2.132). As Leah Whittington explains, 
It is not simply a question of being unable to tolerate a disjunction 
between outer expression and inner being; Coriolanus believes that 
going through the physical motions of pleading will transform him 
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into a new, corrupted self. The gestures of supplication – smiling, 
weeping, pleading, kneeling – threaten to imprint themselves on his 
character, teaching his mind ‘a most inherent baseness’ that threat-
ens the integrity of his selfhood.4 
Hence Coriolanus’ restless drive in exile to return to Rome and 
defeat it decisively; he cannot simply forget Rome or pretend as 
if it does not exist, but instead feels compelled in this, as in every 
circumstance, to take objective action in the public sphere. He can-
not console himself, as Antony does, with a bowl of wine and the 
company of a woman. He must validate his sense of himself as 
invincible on the battlefi eld or die trying: there is no other option. 
Coriolanus thus stands at one end of a spectrum of manifesta-
tions of the will to power, the ne plus ultra of the objective expres-
sion of libido dominandi. Shakespeare is also fascinated, however, 
by the subjective expression of this impulse: the desire to be mas-
ter of one’s own experience, independent of the world at large. 
Antony’s tendency to escape into a dream-world of revelry and 
drunkenness, like Brutus’ Stoicism, is but one example among 
many of this tendency, one version of a story that Shakespeare tells 
again and again, in various guises: a retreat from a shared, public 
reality into a more isolated, private alternative, as a response to the 
loss of power. Seeking refuge in fantasy or ‘fancy’ reappears repeat-
edly as a response to the rise of a hostile, absolutist government. 
Lear escapes into outright madness; Edgar, like Hamlet, into its 
semblance. Richard II takes refuge in self-aggrandising storytelling: 
a theatrical reimagining of himself much akin to Cleopatra’s fi nal 
moments. Achilles sulks by his ship, watching Patroclus imitate his 
countrymen: a kind of play within a play. Timon of Athens tricks 
his fellow citizens into attending a satirical feast, a bit like a dumb-
show, then abandons the city for a cave in the wilderness. The com-
mon thread in these disparate narratives is a fl ight from the world 
‘as-is’ into another world ‘as if’, modelled on Shakespeare’s experi-
ence of the theatre.5 The mind fl ees the intransigent givenness of 
an unaccommodating world in favour of self-generated, solipsistic 
delusions of grandeur. 
In his infl uential study Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and 
Philosophy, Christopher Gill distinguishes between what he calls 
‘objective-participant’ and ‘subjective-individualist’ concepts of 
selfhood, ‘a contrast that functions’, he insists, ‘both within modern 
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thinking’ and ‘between Greek and (some) modern thinking about 
the person’. In the subjective-individualist tradition, the self is 
‘characteristically conceived’ as ‘a solitary center of consciousness, 
a unitary “I”’. ‘The sense of being the centre of a unique, subjective 
(fi rst-personal) perspective is seen as constitutive of personal iden-
tity.’6 As Thomas Pfau observes, this ‘modern, autonomous self’, 
‘the quintessentially modern, solitary individual confi ned to his 
study’, is ‘familiar from the candle-lit interior of Descartes’ Medita-
tions all the way up to the cork-lined refuge where Proust would 
labor on his magnum opus’. Examples include ‘Descartes’ cogito, 
Locke’s “consciousness,” and Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s “founding 
act” (Tathandlung).’7
Modern thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams 
and, more recently, Thomas Pfau criticise what Gill describes 
as the ‘subjectivist-individualist’ concept of selfhood as deraci-
nated. In particular, they object to ‘Kant’s thesis that the moral 
response involves, or implies, an act of “autonomy” or self-
legislation, by which the individual agent binds herself to uni-
versal principles.’ ‘For Kant himself,’ Gill notes, ‘the idea of the 
autonomy (self-legislation) of the person as (individual) moral 
agent is coupled with a stress on the universality of the moral 
principles thus legislated.’ ‘Some subsequent thinkers’, however, 
such as Nietzsche and Sartre, ‘conceive of the autonomy of the 
individual agent in markedly subjective (and subjectivist) terms. 
Only the individual herself (the possessor of a uniquely subjec-
tive viewpoint) can determine the validity of the rules that she 
legislates for herself.’8
In the ‘objective-participant’ tradition, by contrast, ‘thought 
and other psychological processes’ tend to be presented as an 
‘inner dialogue’, rather than a ‘unitary “I”’. ‘The ethical life of the 
human being is, at the most fundamental level, shared rather than 
private and individuated.’ We arrive at ethical conclusions through 
‘shared debate’ rather than ‘by adopting an individual stance of 
autonomy or self-legislation’ or ‘by embarking on a program of 
(individual) self-realization’.9 As Pfau insists, ‘in both its genesis 
and its eventual awareness, the self is essentially bound up with its 
relation to other persons.’ ‘There is not an autonomous Cartesian 
self’; ‘rather, there is the reciprocity and acknowledgment of one 
person by another in a dynamic of ipsëity, alterity, and community 
that is as profound as it is fragile.’10 
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As an example of this point of view, Pfau enlists a surprising 
ally: Coleridge. ‘His late explorations in Trinitarian theology’, Pfau 
explains, ‘complete a refl ection about the “self-insuffi cingness” of 
the person that had arisen from a critique of modern, autonomous, 
and self-conscious agency begun in The Friend and continued in 
the Biographia and the Lay Sermons.’11 ‘No human individual is 
self-suffi cing (αυτάρκης),’ Coleridge observes.12 Towards the end of 
his life, refl ecting on the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Coleridge 
turns against ‘the modern Cartesian confl ation of “consciousness” 
with “self-identity”’.13 ‘Consciousness itself has the appearance 
of another,’ he maintains.14 ‘There could be no opposite, and of 
course no distinct or conscious sense of the term “I” as far as the 
consciousness is concerned, without a “Thou”.’15 
In a later study, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman 
Thought, Gill argues that ‘Hellenistic–Roman thought on person-
ality, like Classical Greek thinking, is best interpreted as “objec-
tive-participant” in approach.’ This view, he acknowledges, ‘runs 
counter to the claim sometimes made that the Hellenistic–Roman 
period sees a shift toward a more subjective and individualistic 
approach to self’.16 A. A. Long, for example, sees in Stoicism ‘a 
new focus on consciousness, on the individuality of the perceiving 
subject, as the fundamental feature of the mental’.17 In her study 
of ‘vision, sexuality, and self-knowledge in the ancient world’, The 
Mirror of the Self, Shadi Bartsch takes her conceptual categories 
from Gill, but fi nds that ‘developments of Roman Stoicism, and 
in particular the thought of Seneca, innovate in ways that cannot 
ultimately be contained within the model he sets out for ancient 
Greek philosophy.’18 Like Paul Cantor, Bartsch attributes this 
emerging new form of subjectivity to the change from Republic to 
Empire. By way of explanation, she draws an analogy to Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon, the ingenious but disturbing form of con-
fi nement Foucault draws upon as a metaphor in Discipline and 
Punish. In this hypothetical circular prison, eerily similar to what 
we now might recognise as an ‘open-plan offi ce’, every inmate is 
housed in a lighted glass cell visible to a single warden in a central 
tower. ‘It is the fact of being constantly seen, of always being able 
to be seen,’ Foucault explains, ‘that maintains the disciplined indi-
vidual in his subjection.’19 
Bartsch argues that the Panopticon does not make sense as a 
metaphor for the Rome of the Republic. There is ‘no reciprocity 
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of the gaze’, whereas ‘in republican Rome entire social groups are 
engaged in reciprocal acts of watching and evaluating’. Bartsch 
cites Andrew Bell: ‘In a true republic no citizen monopolizes the 
gaze.’20 As a symbol for the court of the Julio-Claudian emperors, 
however, the Panopticon is apt. ‘One of the most salient aspects of 
the transition to empire’ is the ‘breakdown’ of ‘the reciprocity of 
the gaze’.21 As Foucault puts it, ‘in the peripheric ring, one is totally 
seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything 
without being seen.’22 ‘In Seneca’s description of the situation in 
De tranquillitate,’ Bartsch observes, ‘he seems to catapult us . . . 
into a kind of Foucauldian scopic regime.’ ‘Constant observation 
of oneself is torturous,’ Seneca complains. ‘It’s not a pleasant life, 
nor one free from anxiety, to live constantly wearing a mask.’23 As 
a form of defence, Carlin Barton suggests, ‘The Romans donned, 
as it were, the armor of hypocrisy.’ ‘The face became a façade.’24
For Bartsch, the transition from Republic to Empire brings a 
‘turn of emphasis from the public eye to the self-generated eye’, 
‘from the mirror of the community to a form of mirroring that 
relied upon a doubling of the self’. For fi gures such as Homer’s 
Hector or Achilles, the imagined observer Bernard Williams calls 
‘the internalized other’ is ‘an unconscious development’, ‘a part 
of the self that has so thoroughly adopted the values of the com-
munity that it itself acts as an audience to the actions of the indi-
vidual’. ‘Socrates’ daimonion is not a product of his decision to 
provide himself with an ethical interlocutor; Cicero’s conscience 
can plague him against his will.’ As in the case of the kind of 
moral self-legislation Gill associates with Kant, however, in Sen-
eca’s thought ‘the internalized other is a conscious product of the 
will of the Stoic individual’. ‘One must set up a Cato or an Epi-
curus in one’s mind and pretend he is watching.’ ‘Can we still 
speak in terms of a community-sanctioned ethics,’ Bartsch asks, 
‘when the community has shrunk to a number of idealized (dead) 
watchers, and when even this tiny community is absent barring 
an act of will?’25
As she makes plans to kill herself, Cleopatra appropriates the 
language of the ‘noble Roman’. Her suicide, she claims, will be in 
‘the high Roman fashion’, that is, in the style of austere statesmen 
such as Cato and Brutus. The incongruity seems jarring, given her 
very un-Stoic tendency throughout towards extravagant accesses of 
emotion. Cleopatra’s suicide is consistent with Stoicism, however, 
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because, like Stoicism, it represents a wilful dissociation from real-
ity. ‘Can Stoicism, the anti-passion philosophy, be turning into, of 
all things, Romanticism?’ A. D. Nuttall asks. ‘That is exactly what 
is happening.’ Cleopatra aims to fl ee from ‘nature’ into ‘fancy’ and 
sees suicide as a means to that end. ‘As Stoicism is subjectivized,’ 
Nuttall explains, ‘as the impersonal, rational cosmos fades, a curi-
ous internal excitement develops.’26 Like Shakespeare’s Romans, 
Cleopatra as a pagan queen aims in the end to escape passibil-
ity itself. Suicide is the culmination of a progressive involution of 
the will to power, the fi nal step towards a longed-for subjective 
autarkeia. As Eric Langley suggests, like many other early mod-
ern authors, Shakespeare in his Roman plays uses ‘Stoic structures 
of politicized self-ownership and aggressive individualism’ to rep-
resent and refl ect upon the early modern pursuit of neo-Roman 
liberty. Suicide as ‘Stoic assertion of autonomous ownership’ pre-
fi gures the distinctive character of modern selfhood.27
In The Roots of Romanticism, Isaiah Berlin acknowledges 
the diffi culty inherent in separating the substance of the move-
ment from its accidents. Nevertheless, he maintains, ‘There was 
a Romantic movement; it did have something which was central 
to it; it did create a great revolution in consciousness; and it is 
important to discover what this is.’ ‘The general proposition of 
the eighteenth century,’ Berlin explains, ‘indeed of all previous 
centuries,’ is ‘that there is a nature of things, there is a rerum 
natura.’ For the Romantics, by contrast, ‘there is no structure of 
things. There is no pattern to which you must adapt yourself.’ 
‘You create values, you create goals, you create ends, and in the 
end you create your own vision of the universe, exactly as artists 
create works of art.’ ‘The universe is as you choose to make it, to 
some degree at any rate.’28 
In Romantic literature, the result is ‘admiration of wild genius, 
outlaws, heroes, aestheticism, self-destruction’. ‘Rules must be blown 
up as such.’29 Nietzsche in this respect is in effect a late Romantic. 
As Paul Cantor observes, ‘what really attracted Nietzsche to Shake-
speare’ was ‘larger-than-life characters, transgressive and even law-
breaking, living (in Nietzsche’s later formulation) “beyond good 
and evil”’.30 Probably the best example is Schiller’s Robbers, a play 
Nietzsche greatly admired. Centre stage now belongs to the glamor-
ous outlaw, the Byronic antihero. Among philosophers, Berlin fi nds 
in Fichte the most thoroughgoing Romantic. At the core of Fichte’s 
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thought is an ‘important proposition’: ‘things are as they are, not 
because they are so independent of me, but because I make them 
so; things depend upon the way I treat them, what I need them for.’ 
The only teleology that matters, that exists, is the one that we our-
selves invent and impose upon the malleable, meaningless, mutable 
world. ‘I am not determined by ends,’ Fichte proclaims; ‘ends are 
determined by me.’31 Rousseau puts it more simply: ‘What I feel to 
be right is right.’32
Shakespeare’s canonisation was assured in the eighteenth cen-
tury, when he became a darling of German precursors of Romanti-
cism such as Lessing and Herder, as well as Schiller and the Sturm 
und Drang movement. Goethe calls him unser Shakespeare (‘our 
Shakespeare’). Romantic rhapsodising about Shakespeare, how-
ever, tends to misinterpret the movement of his mind. Like Blake, 
placing Milton on the side of Satan, Romantic critics too readily 
identify Shakespeare himself with characters such as Richard II 
and Falstaff, as well as Cleopatra, whom he goes out of his way to 
undermine. To read the second tetralogy of English history plays 
from the point of view of Falstaff is like reading Lolita from the 
perspective of Humbert Humbert. 
At the outset of his neo-Romantic defence of Cleopatra, 
Richard Strier cites Peter Holbrook: ‘Shakespeare anticipates 
the Romantic revolution in morals.’33 I agree, but I think that 
Shakespeare sees this development as a dangerous mistake, 
rather than an improvement. As I argue elsewhere, the moral 
error Shakespeare seems to fi nd the most beguiling is a kind of 
self-absorption: the ‘transvaluation of all values’ that would 
eventually develop into what we now know as Romanticism.34 
Shakespeare as an artist anticipates Romanticism because ‘the 
whole movement’, as Berlin observes, is ‘an attempt to impose 
an aesthetic model upon reality, to say that everything should 
obey the rules of art.’35 It makes sense that the great temptation 
for a playwright would be the fantasy that the world is like a 
play; that other people are like characters; that the control that 
he enjoys in the privacy of his imagination, the ‘infi nite space’ 
of artistic possibility, might also be available somehow outside 
what Hamlet calls the ‘nutshell’ of the mind. Shakespeare’s 
Cleopatra is the purest expression of this fantasy. But she is 
prefi gured by, of all people, Shakespeare’s Brutus, and behind 
him, Seneca. As A. D. Nuttall explains, ‘We have seen how the 
5877_Gray.indd   186 12/09/18   3:31 PM
 Suicide and Stoicism in Antony and Cleopatra [ 187
exertion of reason by the Roman Stoics can increasingly become 
a way of denying rather than truly representing reality.’36
Stoic Suicide as ‘Hobgoblin’: Cleopatra and the Question 
of Consistency
I begin this section by examining Brutus’ apparent inconsistency 
in committing suicide, both in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar and in 
Plutarch’s ‘Life of Marcus Brutus’. Shakespeare’s Brutus condemns 
Cato for killing himself; suicide, he maintains, is less consistent 
with his ‘rule of philosophy’ than ‘patience’ to endure whatever 
may befall him in life. Brutus echoes here a criticism of Stoic 
suicide that can be found in Montaigne’s essay, ‘A Custom of the 
Island of Cea’, as well as St Augustine’s City of God. Nevertheless, 
Brutus does kill himself in the end, dismayed at the thought of 
being led in triumph. A mistranslation in North’s Plutarch exag-
gerates Brutus’ inconsistency in this respect. In the original Greek, 
Brutus’ change of heart about suicide emerges gradually with age, 
whereas in North’s version it comes across as a startling, spur-of-
the-moment decision. Shakespeare uses this textual crux to dra-
matic effect. Brutus’ psychological lability becomes a symbol of 
the impossibility of Stoic ‘patience’.
Shakespeare continues to investigate the tension between 
Stoic ‘constancy’, understood as a kind of performance, and 
suppressed human passibility in his later play, Antony and 
Cleopatra. In the character of Cleopatra, Shakespeare exagger-
ates the same kind of inconsistency that he fi nds in Brutus ad 
absurdum. Cleopatra frames her suicide in language that evokes 
Stoicism, but herself seems as a character the very opposite of a 
Stoic sapiens. Even so, her suicide is not inconsistent. Egyptian 
pastimes such as drinking, fi shing and billiards represent, like 
Brutus’ Stoicism, Cleopatra’s attempts to escape awareness of 
a world outside her own control, retreating instead to a more 
private, subjective space in which she can be absolute domina 
(‘mistress’). Understood psychologically, rather than in terms of 
abstract ethical principles, Cleopatra’s suicide is not so much a 
non sequitur as the logical culmination of a lifelong involution 
of her libido dominandi. Like other pagan characters, Cleopa-
tra turns inwards in order to escape the shame of outward 
weakness.
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In Julius Caesar, Shakespeare adumbrates the more extended 
treatment of the horror of being led in triumph that he presents 
in Antony and Cleopatra. As Brutus and Cassius prepare for the 
Battle of Philippi, Cassius is troubled by inauspicious omens. 
‘Let’s reason with the worst that may befall’ (5.1.96), he suggests 
to Brutus. ‘If we do lose this battle,’ he asks, ‘What are you then 
determined to do?’ (5.1.97–8). Brutus’ thoughts turn immediately 
to suicide, prompted by the memory of another, earlier opponent 
of Caesar, Cato of Utica.
Even by that rule of philosophy
By which I did blame Cato for the death
Which he did give himself – I know not how,
But I do fi nd it cowardly and vile,
For fear of what might fall, so to prevent
The time of life – arming myself with patience
To stay the providence of some high powers
That govern us below.
(5.1.100–7)
In plays such as Hamlet which are set in a Christian context, the 
argument against suicide is one sense relatively simple. ‘O God! 
God!’ Hamlet cries. ‘O . . . that the Everlasting had not fi x’d / 
His canon ’gainst self-slaughter’ (1.2.129–32). Hamlet’s notorious 
reluctance to act extends, of course, beyond simple fear of damna-
tion. Nevertheless, he does see suicide in a very different light than 
an ‘antique Roman’ (5.2.346). For a character such as Brutus, the 
question of the moral rectitude of suicide must be answered, not 
in terms of service or obedience to the Godhead, but instead in 
terms of its impact on his reputation. How will he appear in the 
history books? If he were to commit suicide, would that act be 
seen by posterity as brave or ‘cowardly’? Noble or ‘vile’? How he 
will be remembered is, for Shakespeare’s Brutus, the equivalent of 
what heaven or hell is to a Christian. In this respect, as Gordon 
Braden points out, Shakespeare brings Brutus closer, in fact, to his 
historical original than the Brutus that he encountered in his most 
important source for the play, Sir Thomas North’s English transla-
tion of Jacques Amyot’s French translation of Plutarch’s Lives.37 
Once it becomes clear that he has been defeated, Brutus does 
eventually commit suicide, despite the objections that he presents to 
Cassius here, and it is some question why he reverses his position. 
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In North’s version of his life, Brutus justifi es the decision by saying 
that his good deed in assassinating Caesar, a kind of martyrdom 
for the sake of his country, is enough to guarantee him a pleasant 
afterlife, even if he does subsequently commit suicide. ‘I gave up my 
life for my contry in the Ides of Marche, for the whiche I shall live in 
another more glorious worlde.’38 Shakespeare’s Brutus, by contrast, 
makes no such reference to life after death. As Gordon Braden points 
out, this line in North’s Plutarch is a mistranslation, however, intro-
duced not initially by North himself, but rather by Jacques Amyot, 
whose French translation from the Greek served as his source.39 In 
the second edition of his Lives, but not the fi rst, Amyot changes 
the tense of the original verb, ‘I have lived’ (ezēsa; aorist), from the 
perfect to the future. North amends the sentence still further, intro-
ducing the idea of ‘another more glorious worlde’. In the original, 
what Brutus says rather is that since the Ides of March, he has lived 
‘another life [bion allon], free and of good repute [eleutheron kai 
endoxon]’.40 In the context of his larger argument about suicide, 
what Plutarch’s Brutus seems to be saying, in other words, is that he 
is more comfortable with the prospect of committing suicide than 
he might be otherwise, because he has already won so much glory 
by securing his own freedom. Shakespeare is therefore more correct, 
perhaps, than he even knew in making Brutus’ calculations those 
of honour in this world, rather than glory in the next. Brutus’ chief 
concern is not divine approval, but the praise of other men (doxē; 
cf. endoxon): he wants his peers to admire him, both now and ad 
perpetuum, much as he admires his own most illustrious ancestor, 
Lucius Junius Brutus, celebrated foe of the tyrannical Tarquins.
What is perhaps most intriguing about Marcus Junius Brutus, 
however, in comparison to his namesake, is that he is not con-
tent to be remembered simply as a courageous patrician. It is not 
enough for him to be the leader of the optimates, fi ghting like Cas-
sius or Casca for the Good Old Cause (so to speak) of the Roman 
Republic. He wants to be known as a philosopher, as well. As 
his late-night reading habits suggest, along with Cassius’ teasing 
him about his ‘philosophy’, Brutus prides himself, like Cato before 
him, on being educated in what was at the time a relatively new 
Greek import, and on his adherence to its theoretical precepts. 
When he considers suicide, Brutus is concerned about its implica-
tions for his legacy in this respect, as well: his understanding of 
himself as strictly rational. If he killed himself, like Cato, would 
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that act be perceived as an illogical access of emotion, or instead 
as consistent with the principles of his ‘philosophy’? 
The observation that the Stoics’ glorifi cation of suicide seems 
to be at odds with their more general ethical theory is not Brutus’ 
alone. ‘This does not pass without contradiction,’ Montaigne 
writes. In his essay on the ethics of suicide, ‘A Custom of the 
Island of Cea’, Montaigne criticises Cato in much the same terms 
as Brutus does here. ‘There is much more fortitude in wearing 
out the chain that binds us than in breaking it, and more proof 
of strength in Regulus than in Cato. It is lack of judgment and of 
patience that hastens our pace.’41 In his City of God, St Augus-
tine makes the same comparison, and to the same end.42 Even by 
the standards of the pagans, St Augustine argues, suicide is, as 
Brutus says, ‘cowardly’. 
If you look at the matter more closely, you will scarcely call it 
greatness of soul, which prompts a man to kill himself rather than 
bear up against some hardships of fortune. . . . Is it not rather 
proof of a feeble mind, to be unable to bear either the pains of 
bodily servitude, or the foolish opinion of the vulgar? And is 
not that to be pronounced the greater mind, which rather faces 
than fl ees the ills of life, and which . . . holds in small esteem the 
judgment of men, and specially of the vulgar, which is frequently 
involved in a mist of error?43 
Montaigne makes the same point a bit more vividly. ‘It is an act 
of cowardice, not of virtue, to go and hide in a hole, under a 
massive tomb, in order to avoid the blows of fortune.’44 More-
over, he adds, ‘there being so many sudden changes in human 
affairs, it is hard to judge just at what point we are at the end of 
our hope.’ As an example of an admirable tenacity, he cites the 
story of Josephus, who, he says, ‘did well to hang on stubbornly 
to his hopes’, and in contrast censures Brutus, as well as Cassius. 
‘Cassius and Brutus, on the contrary, demolished the last rem-
nants of Roman liberty, of which they were the protectors, by 
the rash haste with which they have killed themselves before the 
proper time and occasion.’45
In North’s version of Plutarch, what changes Brutus’ mind 
about suicide includes the conviction that he will enjoy a ‘glorious’ 
afterlife. In Plutarch’s original, that motive turns out to be, instead, 
a sense of self-satisfaction. Come what may, Brutus concludes, he 
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is still the man who secured Roman liberty; he is the tyrannicide 
who prevented the return of a would-be Tarquin, and no subse-
quent stain can entirely blot out that achievement. Another aspect 
of his openness to suicide, however, in Plutarch’s original as well as 
Amyot’s French, is a new spirit of moral pragmatism: a willingness 
to compromise his ideals, which Brutus associates with growing 
older. In North’s translation, this motive drops out of the picture, 
due to an error in punctuation. North writes:
Brutus aunswered him, being yet but a young man, and not over-
greatly experienced in the world: I trust, (I know not how) a cer-
taine rule of Philosophie, by the which I did greatly blame and 
reprove Cato for killing of him selfe . . . but being nowe in the 
middest of the daunger, I am of a contrary mind. For if it be not 
the will of God, that this battell fall out fortunate for us: I will look 
no more for hope, neither seeke to make any new supply againe, 
but will rid me of this miserable world, and content me with my 
fortune.46 
Corrected in light of the original, the punctuation here (as it does 
in Amyot’s translation) should run instead: ‘Brutus aunswered 
him: being yet but a young man, and not overgreatly experienced 
in the world’, and so on. ‘I trust’ should also be emended to 
something more like ‘I let loose, put forward’ (aphēka), with the 
sense of ‘carelessly expounded’: again, the Greek aorist seems 
to have presented diffi culties. Here, it should be translated in 
the past tense, rather than the present. In modern English, the 
basic sense of this part of the sentence is: ‘When I was young 
[neos, with the suggestion of ‘new’, ‘fresh’], I let slip an opinion 
[logon] about philosophy’, and so on. In the Greek, ‘daunger’ 
also is more ambiguous: allois . . . tychais (‘different fortunes/
circumstances’). 
North’s version of this speech presented a potential stumbling-
block for Shakespeare, because it makes it seem as if Brutus 
changes his mind about suicide abruptly out of cowardice (fear 
of ‘daunger’), rather than as a result of humbling experience and 
increasing years. M. W. MacCallum presents Shakespeare here, 
rather than eliding the incongruity, as turning the textual distortion 
to his advantage as a dramatist, ‘making Brutus’s latter sentiment 
the sudden response of his heart, in defi ance of his philosophy, to 
Cassius’ anticipation of what they must expect if defeated’.47 To 
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do so, Shakespeare fl eshes out North’s interpolation, ‘daunger’, 
giving it more specifi c form and pressure. 
CASSIUS Then, if we lose this battle,
 You are contented to be led in triumph
 Thorough the streets of Rome?
BRUTUS
 No, Cassius, no: think not, thou noble Roman, 
 That ever Brutus will go bound to Rome.
 He bears too great a mind.
(5.1.107–12)
What in Shakespeare’s source had come across as a disruption of 
psychological mimesis becomes instead a masterstroke. Shake-
speare uses this interchange to reveal the dissonance of Brutus’ 
double ambition: his desire to be honoured both as a philosopher 
and as a public man. The two aims prove incompatible; forced to 
choose between them, Brutus’ instincts as a traditional statesman 
turn out to run deeper. A reputation for philosophical rigour is a 
welcome bonus; at the end of the day, however, Brutus is not will-
ing, like Alexander the Great, to trade places with Diogenes. Still 
less is he willing to be Christ, spat upon and jeered at as a failed 
Messiah. There is a limit to Brutus’ willingness to sacrifi ce his con-
siderable social and political status, simply for the sake of a ‘rule 
of philosophy’.48 
Like Hamlet, Brutus is deeply attracted to the idea of an escape 
from politics into the privacy of his own ‘mind’: his study, his books, 
his own subjective experience. There, he believes, he can be more 
completely in control. What he discovers, however, is that he can-
not entirely give up his desire for public approbation. The external 
world impinges upon his consciousness; he cannot simply scoff at 
the ‘foolish opinion of the vulgar’, like St Augustine. To be exposed 
to the scorn of the masses would be more than he believes that he 
can endure; to be ‘led in triumph’ would be to lose that ‘greatness of 
mind’, Aristotle’s megalopsychia, which, like Cleopatra, Brutus sees 
as integral to his own self-defi nition. That pride in his own idealised 
self-image is more precious to him than life itself. 
Above all, Brutus cannot bear even to imagine the prospect of 
being displayed to the public as a captive, or to suppose that Cassius 
is doing so: ‘think not, thou noble Roman’, he begins. He is not will-
ing to operate in a world in which such a possibility is conceivable. 
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The epithet, ‘noble Roman’, indicates what is at stake: he is remind-
ing Cassius, thereby, of their shared identity. He, like Cassius, is 
‘noble’, not a commoner. He is a ‘Roman’, not a suppliant. He is not 
willing to put these attributes in doubt. They are part of a dichotomy 
which for him must remain absolute. He must be, as Antony says, 
‘the noblest Roman of them all’, whether or not the world accepts 
that moral judgement.
Much literary-critical energy has been spent trying to identify 
what Cassius calls simply Brutus’ ‘philosophy’ with this or that 
specifi c ancient school of thought.49 Brutus’ own book On Virtue 
is no longer extant; judging from Cicero, however, Brutus seems to 
have been relatively sympathetic to Stoicism; more so than Cicero 
himself. Historically speaking, Brutus, like Cicero, was a fol-
lower of Antiochus of Ascalon, a Greek-speaking expatriate who 
claimed to be reviving what he called the Old Academy, and whose 
thought is a complicated synthesis of Platonism, Aristotelianism 
and Stoicism. What exactly it means to say that Brutus or Cicero 
was a student of Antiochus is unclear, however. Students do not 
always agree with every one of their teacher’s conclusions. More 
importantly, painstaking inquiries into the philosophical opinions 
of the historical Brutus are in this case beside the point. Even if his 
long-lost works were rediscovered, in all their subtlety, they would 
not necessarily provide a master key to the ‘philosophy’ of Shake-
speare’s Brutus. Looking back on this debate, Geoffrey Miles sees 
‘a blind alley’. 
It seems undeniable that to represent the ‘Romanity’ of Brutus, 
and to a lesser extent of other characters, Shakespeare draws 
upon the Stoic traditions descending from Seneca and Cicero, and 
attributes to them attitudes and actions which his audience would 
clearly have identifi ed as ‘stoical’.50 
Shakespeare’s Cleopatra, by contrast, easily seems the furthest 
thing from a Roman Stoic. In her rapid oscillation between love 
and anger, she evokes Seneca’s tragic heroines, not his idealised 
Stoic sapiens.51 In her decision to kill herself, nonetheless, Cleopa-
tra imagines herself, as well as her chambermaids, as entering Stoic 
hagiography. ‘What’s brave, what’s noble / Let’s do’t after the high 
Roman fashion / And make death proud to take us’ (4.5.90–2). 
Considered as Stoic rhetoric, the word ‘fashion’ here is out of place, 
with its suggestion of the external and the momentary. In its very 
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incongruity, the slip in diction does reveal, however, the nature 
of her relationship with Stoicism: ad hoc, superfi cial. Cleopatra’s 
new Stoicism is in one sense deadly serious; her description of it as 
a ‘fashion’, however, suggests that it is merely another stratagem, 
like billiards or fi shing, to escape from the press of reality. ‘Now 
from head to foot / I am marble-constant,’ she proclaims. ‘Now 
the fl eeting moon / No planet is of mine’ (5.2.238–40). Repeated 
at the head of both of these sentences is the key word ‘now’: ‘now’, 
at this moment, but not necessarily before or after. Cleopatra’s sui-
cide, unlike Cato’s, is not the culmination of a lifelong attempt to 
abide by Stoic principles. Instead, Cleopatra’s consistency inheres 
in her very inconsistency itself. She is so mutable that she can even 
become, for a time, the apparent opposite of that mutability.
Stoic philosophers tend to emphasise logical consistency, even 
to a fault. Plutarch in particular mocks them in his Moralia for 
insisting that there can be no degrees in virtue, ‘just as in the sea 
the man a cubit from the surface is drowning no less than the one 
who has sunk 500 fathoms’.52 Among Stoics, Seneca is relatively 
pragmatic; even Seneca, however, applies this rule to Cato, as part 
of his emphasis on the continuity between the Stoic sage’s suicide 
and his other actions. ‘Cato’s honourable death was no less a good 
than his honourable life, since virtue admits of no stretching.’ Like 
a ‘carpenter’s rule’, virtue ‘admits of no bending’; like ‘truth’, it 
does not ‘grow’, but instead ‘has its due proportions and is com-
plete’.53 By this inhuman standard, Cleopatra falls short; even her 
‘marble-constant’ suicide, howsoever ‘noble’ or ‘brave’, does not 
represent a lifetime of sustained Stoic virtue. Her behaviour, how-
ever, is not simply capricious. As Polonius says of Hamlet: ‘Though 
this be madness, yet there is method in’t’ (2.2.205–6). 
The key here is to see Stoicism as a means, rather than an end. 
Stoic ethical ideals are not the framing narrative, the standard by 
which Cleopatra is to be measured. Instead, her adoption of Stoic 
practice should itself be examined in light of a different criterion of 
consistency, that of psychological mimesis. How does a Stoic sui-
cide illustrate Cleopatra’s character? What common thread ties it 
to her other behaviour? Stoicism itself, moreover, is not necessar-
ily what it proclaims itself to be. Citing Hannah Arendt, Gordon 
Braden argues that ‘there is considerable justifi cation for taking 
Stoicism as less a philosophy of its announced themes of reason 
and virtue than a philosophy of the will – even, as Arendt has it, of 
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“the omnipotence of the will”.’54 In an essay on Epictetus, Arendt 
explains that, although he sees man as ‘entirely powerless in the real 
world’, he also sees him as able ‘to reproduce the outside – complete 
but deprived of reality – inside his mind, where he is undisputed 
lord and master’. In practice, however, that mastery is in doubt. 
‘The constant question is whether your will is strong enough not 
merely to distract your attention from external, threatening things 
but to fasten your imagination on different “impressions” in the 
actual presence of pain and misfortune.’55 Hamlet for his part reg-
isters this diffi culty. Speaking to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, he 
proclaims, ‘I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a king 
of infi nite space – were it not that I have bad dreams’ (2.2.254–6). 
A. D. Nuttall observes that Hamlet here, ‘separating dream from 
reality’, ‘transposes his “dream” to another place in the system’: ‘the 
bad dream is the site not of an illusion but of shocking veracity’.56 
‘Dreams’ in this case mean the world at large, impinging on Ham-
let’s attempt, like a Stoic, to retain control over his own experience. 
As it turns out, the mind is not entirely, as Milton’s Satan says, ‘its 
own place’.57 Instead, it is passible, permeable, ‘vulnerable’ to the 
painful impressions Hamlet calls ‘bad dreams’. 
Looking back to Shakespeare’s sources, the interest apparent in 
Antony and Cleopatra in the idea of the mind as a refuge from 
the world owes perhaps most to the infl uence of Samuel Daniel’s 
Cleopatra.58 There, in his opening speech, Caesar explains what 
is chiefl y at stake in this, Daniel’s version of the story: Cleopatra’s 
assent to be Caesar’s subject. ‘Behold, my forces vanquisht have 
this Land’ (269), Octavian says. ‘Onely this Queene, that hath lost 
all this all, / To whom is nothing left except a minde: / Cannot into 
a thought of yeelding fall’ (273–5). Caesar wants to rule ‘hearts and 
minds’, not just bodies. As he recognises, however, this winning of 
the will of the other is beyond his power to force outright. ‘I see 
mens bodies onely ours, no more, / The rest, anothers right, that 
rules the minde’ (267–8).
Kingdoms I see we winne, we conquere Climates, 
Yet we cannot vanquish hearts, nor force obedience.
Affections kept in close-concealed limits,
Stand farre without the reach of sword or violence.
Who forc’d do pay us dutie, pay not love:
Free is the heart, the temple of the minde[.]
(257–62)
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Shakespeare’s play upon this premise is to focus on perception, 
especially self-perception, rather than ‘affections’ such as ‘love’. 
His Antony and Cleopatra want to see themselves as gods, that 
is, as incarnations of their own ideal selves, and that perception 
is under threat from without. A retreat into the mind, enabled 
by withdrawal into some relatively isolated place, such as Alex-
andria (in comparison to Rome), or the queen’s monument (in 
comparison to Alexandria, besieged) as well as the selection of a 
sympathetic audience, helps enable the self to preserve its power of 
self-fl attering, self-aggrandising self-defi nition. 
Seen in this light, Cleopatra’s suicide is not at all inconsistent 
with her character, but instead the continuation of a pattern in 
place from the very beginning of the play. ‘Give me to drink man-
dragora’ (1.5.4), she asks Charmian, ‘That I might sleep out this 
great gap of time / My Antony is away’ (1.5.5–6). Any time her 
power proves less than absolute, Cleopatra longs to dissociate 
from reality itself, through means as mundane as sleep, wine or 
fantasising about sex, or as exotic as the supposed soporifi c power 
of mandrake root. Suicide is simply the most radical version of this 
retreat into a world of ‘dreams’, a creation of the beholder’s own 
imagination or ‘fancy’. ‘I dreamt there was an emperor Antony. / 
O such another sleep, that I might see / But such another man!’ 
(5.2.75 –7). 
Shakespeare draws the connection between suicide and drugged 
or inebriated dissociation from the world, Cleopatra’s and 
Antony’s pursuit both alike of what Pompey calls ‘Lethe’d dull-
ness’ (2.1.27), by foreshadowing Cleopatra’s unusual method of 
suicide, deliberate exposure to the bite of an asp, in two earlier 
references to ‘poison’. When Caesar rebukes Antony for having 
denied him ‘arms and aid’ (2.2.94), Antony excuses himself for 
having been out of sorts. ‘Neglected, rather,’ he protests, ‘and then 
when poison’d hours had bound me up / From mine own knowl-
edge’ (2.2.95–7). When Cleopatra in Antony’s absence amuses 
herself with fantasies of him, in like manner, musing about her, 
she imagines him ‘murmuring, “Where’s my serpent of old Nile?”’ 
(1.5.26). Cleopatra does indeed prove Antony’s ‘serpent’, as fatal 
to him in the end as the asp is to her. She pauses here, however, and 
reproaches herself for having let herself become lost in a possibly 
counterfactual reverie. ‘Now I feed myself / With most delicious 
poison’ (1.5.27–8). Imagination becomes in her fi gurative language 
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an unhealthy narcotic, one that she administers to Antony, and he 
to her, like a serpent biting its victim. Watching Iras succumb to the 
asp’s poison, Cleopatra compares the ‘stroke of death’ wistfully to 
‘a lover’s pinch’ (5.2.294).
‘Fancy’ vs. ‘Nature’: Self-deception as Pleasure and Peril
In the previous section, I argued that Cleopatra’s suicide is not 
inconsistent with her character, but instead the culmination of her 
characteristic escapism. Under pressure, she fl ees from unpleasant 
objective fact into soothing fantasies, and she often encourages 
Antony to do the same. In this sense, Cleopatra is a symbol of 
Antony’s own imagination, as well as ‘fantasy’ or ‘fancy’ more gen-
erally considered, the faculty that allows the involution to the subjec-
tive characteristic of Brutus, as well as Antony, and that Coriolanus, 
by contrast, seems to lack altogether. Like Brutus retreating to his 
study, or Hamlet to the ‘nutshell’ of his own mind, Antony and 
Cleopatra repeatedly withdraw from the world ‘as-is’ into another, 
more subjective world ‘as if’. Two celebrated speeches reveal this 
preference for ‘fancy’ over ‘nature’ in particular detail: Enobarbus’ 
description of Cleopatra’s arrival by barge at Antony’s camp upon 
the banks of the river Cydnus, and Cleopatra’s description of her 
‘dream’ of Antony to her Roman guard, Dolabella. 
In the fantasy of themselves that Antony and Cleopatra con-
struct, they represent themselves as divine, ideal fi gures: Mars and 
Venus, Isis and Osiris. Over the course of the play, however, objec-
tive reality insistently intrudes upon this subjective transforma-
tion. The free play of the imagination turns out to be limited, not 
only by rivalry with Octavian, but also by more impersonal forces 
such as time and fortune. Anonymous messengers and soothsay-
ers represent a world of fact which the two lovers tend to dismiss 
or ignore, with tragic consequences. At once actors and audience, 
they enable each other, like playgoers, to escape their own aware-
ness of mundane obligations, constraints and humiliations. They 
imbue each other with glamour and create an alternate, mythic 
vision of themselves. Shakespeare suggests, however, that this folie 
à deux comes at a cost. An escape into subjective fantasy that 
begins as a voluntary respite from the burdens and indignities of 
objective passibility becomes in the end an involuntary exile from 
objective power. 
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Cleopatra herself is a symbol of the imagination: Aristotle’s 
phantasia.59 Like this faculty of the mind, Cleopatra is at once 
alluring and suspect; the natural ally of Antony’s irrational and 
unchecked passion. She is, in one sense, Antony’s own imagina-
tion, personifi ed and rendered external, even though she is also, at 
the same time, a fully rounded character, much as Portia represents 
Brutus’ own faculty of pity, even though she, too, has her own 
internal confl icts. For instance, Cleopatra is repeatedly described 
in terms of another common symbol of fantasy or ‘fancy’: magic. 
Pompey describes her as assailing Antony with ‘witchcraft’ 
(2.1.22) and ‘charms’ (2.1.20). Scarus, too, speaks of Antony as 
‘the noble ruin of her magic’ (3.10.19). Antony himself describes 
her variously as ‘enchanting’ (1.2.135), a ‘great fairy’ (4.8.12), ‘my 
charm’ (4.12.16), a ‘grave charm’ (4.12.25), a ‘gypsy’ (4.12.30; 
cf. 1.1.10), a ‘spell’ (4.12.28) and a ‘witch’ (4.12.47). Caught up 
in such a reverie, like a wandering knight in a romance, Antony 
no longer feels the need to impose his will upon the entire Roman 
world; instead, he can enjoy a feeling of absolute power, if not its 
reality, ready at hand. As Cleopatra’s favourite, he can feast, drink 
and enjoy all the pleasures of Egypt’s wealth, without the headache 
of Roman politics. Like ‘mandragora’, Cleopatra enables Antony 
to escape into a ‘dream’ of himself. 
Like Cleopatra’s suicide, Antony’s ignominious fl ight from the 
Battle of Actium is not unprecedented, but instead the culmination 
of a characteristic escapism. His retreat, like his suicide, is a synec-
doche. The play itself opens, for example, with Philo complaining 
that his commander’s ‘goodly eyes’, which once ‘glowed’ over ‘the 
fi les and musters of the war’, ‘now bend, now turn / The offi ce and 
devotion of their view / Upon a tawny front’ (1.1.2–6). In Egypt, in 
his ‘lascivious wassails’ (1.4.57), Antony fi nds an easier way to feel 
like a god than the hardships of the kinds of military campaigns 
so vividly described, by contrast, by his rival, Octavian: ‘famine’ 
(1.4.60) and lack of water, for example, as Antony and his men 
fl ed across the Alps from Modena. 
In dying, Antony refl ects upon the ‘miserable change’ (4.15.53) 
in his fortunes. ‘Please your thoughts’, he tells Cleopatra, ‘In feed-
ing them with those my former fortunes, / Wherein I lived the 
greatest prince o’th’world, / The noblest’ (4.15.54–7). Antony 
is consoling himself in this moment, as well as his mistress; he 
returns here, if only in memory, to his former days of glory, much 
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as she does later when she proclaims herself ‘again for Cydnus’ 
(5.2.227). Imagination of another world ‘as if’, in this case, ‘as if’ 
the past were the present, provides, like suicide, an alternative to 
an unpalatable, present reality. So also Othello, just before he kills 
himself, returns in memory to his former days of glory as a soldier 
for Venice against the Turk: ‘in Aleppo once [etc.]’ (5.2.350). As 
T. S. Eliot says, he is ‘cheering himself up’; ‘endeavoring to escape 
reality’. Eliot’s tone is cruelly unsympathetic, but his assessment 
nonetheless contains an element of truth. We see in Othello’s last 
moments, as well as those of Antony and Cleopatra, some degree 
of what he calls ‘bovarysme’: ‘the human will to see things as they 
are not’.60
Shakespeare provides two touchstones of the fantastical image 
of themselves that Antony and Cleopatra aim to preserve, even 
in death. The fi rst is Cleopatra’s fi rst meeting with Antony ‘upon 
the river of Cydnus’ (2.2.197), as recounted by Enobarbus. The 
second is the dream of Antony that Cleopatra describes to the 
Roman soldier Dolabella.61 The speeches are familiar; in both, 
the lover in question appears larger than life, like a deity. Cleopatra 
is compared to Venus; Antony, to Atlas, or perhaps, the Colossus 
of Rhodes; grander, even. ‘His legs bestrid the ocean; his reared 
arm / Crested the world’ (5.2.81–2), and so on. The lines recall 
Cassius’ description of Julius Caesar: ‘he doth bestride the nar-
row world / Like a colossus’ (1.2.135–6). As in that speech, the 
emphasis is on Antony’s seemingly unlimited power, akin to that 
of the god Jupiter. He is able ‘to quail and shake the orb’ like 
‘rattling thunder’ (5.2.84–5); to give away ‘realms and islands’ 
(5.2.90). ‘For his bounty, / There was no winter in’t’ (5.2.85–6). 
Cleopatra for her part, in Enobarbus’ account, makes ‘defect per-
fection’ (2.2.241), so that even ‘holy priests / Bless her when she 
is riggish’ (2.2.249–50). ‘Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale 
/ Her infi nite variety’ (2.2.245–6). 
These two well-known speeches, Enobarbus’ on Cleopatra and 
Cleopatra’s on Antony, are united, moreover, by two other con-
ceits. One is that their subjects are held to exceed even the scope 
of the most outrageous hyperbole. From Enobarbus’ perspective, 
Cleopatra cannot be adequately depicted, no matter how high 
the comparison. ‘As for her person,’ Enobarbus declares, ‘It beg-
gared all description’ (2.2.207–8). Cleopatra describes her vision 
of Antony as ‘past the size of dreaming’ (5.2.96). This repeated 
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turn to apophasis, normally associated with descriptions of the 
Godhead, fl ags a reaction against the inherent ‘givenness’ of 
language, as well as the ‘givenness’ more generally of the larger 
world. The speakers reject their own proffered metaphors in the 
same way that mystics insist their meagre, thread-bare analogies 
cannot adequately even begin to approach the actual glory of the 
divine. To connect the subject of their description to the world by 
fi gurative language, as tenor to vehicle, is to introduce a sense of 
limitation that they see as fundamentally alien to its nature. 
The other shared conceit is that of a confl ict between ‘fancy’ 
and ‘nature’. Anne Barton calls it ‘an Elizabethan cliché, the 
conceit of an art more realistic than reality itself’.62 Realism is 
not the criterion here, however, so much as idealism. In a speech 
that otherwise follows its source, Plutarch’s ‘Life of Marcus 
Antonius’, almost word for word, Enobarbus describes Cleopa-
tra as ‘O’erpicturing that Venus where we see / The fancy out-
work nature’ (2.2.210–11). The contest implied between ‘fancy’ 
and ‘nature’ is a Shakespearean interpolation; Plutarch says 
only that Cleopatra was ‘apparelled and attired like the god-
desse Venus, commonly drawen in picture.’63 Building on this 
brief description, Shakespeare introduces a much more complex 
analogy. Cleopatra represents the ideal woman more accurately 
than an unspecifi ed, but presumably extraordinary, picture of 
Venus, just as that image of the divine, which is itself a creation 
of ‘fancy’, exceeds ‘nature’ (presumably, human nature); women 
as they typically tend to be, out in the world at large. The nadir 
that serves as the counterpoint to this zenith is Cleopatra’s own 
lament immediately after Antony’s death, ‘No more but e’en 
a woman [etc.]’. Caught off guard, Cleopatra describes her-
self here, in a moment of rare lucidity, as ‘commanded / By’, 
rather than commanding, ‘passion’, and compares herself, in her 
shared susceptibility to grief, to ‘the maid that milks / And does 
the meanest chares’ (4.15.77–9).
The same concept of a confl ict between ‘fancy’ and ‘nature’ 
reappears in even more complicated guise in Cleopatra’s defence of 
her dream of Antony to Dolabella. ‘Think you there was or might 
be such a man / As this I dreamt of?’ (5.2.92–3) she asks. ‘Gentle 
madam, no’ (5.2.93), he replies. She rebukes him indignantly. ‘You 
lie up to the hearing of the gods!’ (5.2.94). They are alone; Cleopatra 
in her grandiosity, as well as desperation, aligns her own ‘hearing’ 
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with that of ‘the gods’. After fi rst accusing Dolabella baldly of lying, 
Cleopatra’s reply becomes more nuanced: 
But if there be nor ever were one such,
It’s past the size of dreaming. Nature wants stuff
To vie strange forms with fancy; yet t’imagine
An Antony were nature’s piece against fancy,
Condemning shadows quite.
(5.2.95–9)
The fi rst line of the passage cited is confusing, because it sug-
gests that Cleopatra has become infected, if only for a moment, 
with Dolabella’s doubt. She does not say simply ‘there is’ or ‘was’ 
‘one such’, namely, such as Antony; instead, she introduces an 
‘if’. ‘But’ also implies that she is going to qualify her immediately 
prior accusation, ‘You lie’, by granting it some degree of truth. 
Her doubt, however, is not complete. The use of ‘be’ as well as 
‘were’ in the protasis, combined with the use of present tense in 
the apodosis (elided ‘is’ in ‘It’s’) makes it unclear whether the con-
ditional is counterfactual. ‘Nor’ implies a negative assertion, but 
is not confi rmed in this case by any negative correlative such as 
‘nor’ or ‘neither’. 
Cleopatra defends her ‘dream’ of Antony by arguing that the 
possibility that the idealised, all-powerful version of Antony that 
she has just attempted to describe might in fact exist exceeds 
the scope of the limited human imagination. ‘It’s past the size of 
dreaming.’ She says, in effect, much as Enobarbus says of her, ‘for 
[his] person, it beggar[s] all description’. Nature lacks (‘wants’) 
the wherewithal (‘stuff’) to compete with ‘fancy’ in the elabora-
tion of ‘strange forms’. ‘Yet’ if it ‘were’ possible, then ‘t’imagine / 
An Antony’ would be ‘nature’s piece’, that is, its ‘[master]piece’, in 
its competition with ‘fancy’. Cleopatra’s past subjunctive (‘were’) 
implies that the conditional at the core of her dream is counter-
factual: if the imagination (‘fancy’) could produce an image of 
Antony representative enough of Antony to be called ‘an Antony’, 
then imagination itself, as part of ‘nature’, a faculty of the human 
mind, would surpass itself, ‘condemning quite’ its other, more chi-
merical products, such as ‘dreams’, in comparison as merely thin, 
insubstantial imitations (‘shadows’). In other words, Cleopatra 
in her response to Dolabella does not forgo so much as double 
down on her hyperbole, inserting a wedge of apophasis between 
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her description and its object. Dolabella is right to say that ‘such a 
man’ never existed, but for the wrong reasons; Cleopatra’s dream 
of Antony as a kind of ‘colossus’, considered self-consciously as a 
speech-act, is not exaggerated, as she sees it, but inadequate. Ant-
ony was even grander, she claims, than ‘fancy’ itself can compass.
Other examples of the two lovers’ conception of themselves as 
larger than life are easier to grasp. Antony repeatedly compares 
himself to Hercules; Cleopatra compares him to Mars, as well. 
Caesar reports that Cleopatra appears frequently ‘in the public 
eye’ in Alexandria ‘in th’habiliments of the goddess Isis’ (3.6.17), 
and that Antony accompanies her in the style of an Eastern mag-
nate, much to the disgust of the people of Rome, whom Caesar 
describes as ‘queasy with his insolence’. ‘Here’s the manner of’t’ 
(3.6.2), Caesar explains. ‘I’th’ market-place, on a tribunal silvered, 
/ Cleopatra and himself in chairs of gold / Were publicly enthroned’ 
(3.6.3–5). In this guise as king, Antony gave Cleopatra ‘the stab-
lishment of Egypt’, and also proclaimed her ‘Absolute Queen’ of 
‘lower Syria, Cyprus, Lydia’ (3.6.9–11). Ironically, Octavian, as 
the later Augustus Caesar, went on in history to hold almost pre-
cisely the same kind of power whose display he disparages here. 
Like Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, however, pushing away a crown, 
the historical Augustus was much more careful than Antony is 
in Egypt to avoid the obvious trappings of authoritarianism. He 
styled himself princeps, for example, rather than rex. Antony 
and Cleopatra are caught up in a ‘dream’ of themselves as deities 
in the much more open, Egyptian tradition of the Pharaoh, the 
God-King.64 
Several forces recur throughout the play as threats to the pro-
tagonists’ grandiose sense of themselves. The most obvious such 
opponent is Octavian. Others, however, are more abstract: time, 
old age, ‘Fortune’, ‘destiny’. In Virgil’s Aeneid, the rise of Augustus 
and the fate of Aeneas seem so inextricably intertwined that it 
can be diffi cult at times to distinguish one from the other. So also 
here, each of these forces, including Octavian, can be understood 
as an analogue for any other. Collectively, they represent objective 
reality itself, encroaching upon a cherished, unsustainable sub-
jective alternative: the world ‘as if’, in which the subject has the 
power, if only in ‘fancy’, to dismiss such concerns. What Antony 
and Cleopatra are trying to escape, in a word, is what Heidegger 
would call our ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit). They rebel against 
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the shared facticity of fact, in favour of the malleability of their 
own private fantasies.
In Egypt, Antony and Cleopatra enjoy fabled, apparently unlim-
ited wealth: ‘eight wild boars roasted whole at a breakfast, and but 
twelve persons there’ (2.2.189–90). It makes sense, therefore, that 
Shakespeare would turn to time, rather than money, as his example 
of a limiting factor. Time is a resource of which even the wealthiest 
and most powerful have only a fi nite supply. Most obviously, time 
appears in the lovers’ age, as they themselves at times acknowl-
edge: Antony’s ‘head’ is ‘grizzled’ (3.13.17); Cleopatra is ‘wrinkled 
deep in time’ (1.5.30), her ‘salad days’ behind her (1.5.76). Flush 
with the thrill of victory, Antony prefers, nonetheless, to minimise 
their manifest years. Cleopatra, he calls ‘girl’ (4.8.19), an incon-
gruous form of address. He himself, he boasts, ‘is able to get goal 
for goal of youth’, ‘Though grey / Do something mingle with our 
younger brown’ (4.8.20–2). 
The other sense in which time fi gures as an antagonist is more 
subtle. Time, it turns out, is not infi nitely tractable.65 Instead, time 
appears in Antony and Cleopatra as what an economist might 
call a fi xed or illiquid asset, prone to depreciation. The author of 
Ecclesiastes writes, ‘To every thing there is a season, and a time to 
every purpose under heaven’ (3:1). So also in Shakespeare’s trag-
edy, particular moments seem to be designated, as if objectively, to 
certain set purposes, which the protagonists ignore at their peril. 
The most obvious instance of such negligence is Antony’s fl ight 
from the Battle of Actium. Not only did he turn away, Scarus 
complains, but he fl ed ‘i’th’ midst o’th’ fi ght / When vantage like 
a pair of twins appeared / Both as the same – or, rather, ours the 
elder’ (3.10.11–13). The problem of opportunity or ‘vantage’ is 
not limited to Antony and Cleopatra: the pirate Menas abandons 
Pompey’s service, precisely because he is not willing to seize an 
opportune moment to secure his power. ‘For this,’ Menas vows, 
 ‘I’ll never follow thy pall’d fortunes more. / Who seeks, and 
will not take when once ’tis offer’d, / Shall never fi nd it more’ 
(2.7.82–5).
Arthur Bell sees ‘the relentless tempo of time and “the times”’ 
as a ‘standard’ or ‘norm’ by which ‘Antony’s degeneration’ can 
be ‘measured and explained’, a standard which he argues Shake-
speare derives most immediately from his chief source, Plutarch’s 
‘Life of Marcus Antonius’. In North’s version, Plutarch writes that 
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Antony ‘spent and lost in childish sports . . . and idle pastimes the 
most precious thing a man can spend, as Antiphon saith: and that 
is, time’.66 Shakespeare, Bell argues, ‘preserved the same sense of 
time’s relentless surge as the inexorable condition confronting all 
his characters’.67 David Kaula argues that ‘the world of the play 
is generally dominated by a heightened sense of temporal change’, 
and that ‘major characters’ such as Antony, Cleopatra and Caesar 
‘may be distinguished’ in part by their ‘sharply differing responses 
to this condition’.68 Later in the play, as their rivalry comes to 
a head, Antony marvels at Caesar’s effi ciency in execution. ‘Is it 
not strange,’ he says,  ‘He could so quickly cut the Ionian sea, / 
And take in Toryne?’ (3.7.20–3). Canidius agrees: ‘This speed of 
Caesar’s / Carries beyond belief’ (3.7.74–5). Cleopatra upbraids 
Antony for his relative delay:  ‘Celerity is never more admired / 
Than by the negligent’ (3.7.24–5). What Antony acknowledges as 
his ‘slackness’ (3.7.27), however, is as much her fault as his. When 
she joins Antony on the battlefi eld, Enobarbus is distraught; her 
distracting his commander at such a juncture, even though it has 
already been happening, in a less obvious sense, from the very 
beginning of the play, seems to him preposterous.  ‘Your presence 
needs must puzzle Antony; /  Take from his heart, take from his 
brain, from’s time, / What should not then be spared’ (3.7.10–12).
For Cleopatra, whom Antony calls ‘idleness itself’ (1.3.94), 
time is an enemy: an empty space which she tries, often in vain, to 
while away with amusements such as fi shing, billiards, and listen-
ing to Mardian sing, and which she would most prefer to fi ll with 
Antony’s company. Antony himself, by contrast, is torn between 
competing impulses. ‘Struck’ by a ‘Roman thought’ (1.2.88), he 
recognises early on that ‘the strong necessity of time commands / 
Our services a while’ (1.3.43–4). More often, however, he is unwill-
ing to sacrifi ce time at play with Cleopatra in order to attend to 
affairs of state. 
For the love of Love and her soft hours
Let’s not confound the time with conference harsh.
There’s not a minute of our lives should stretch
Without some pleasure now. What sport tonight?
(1.1.45–9)
These same ‘soft hours’ Antony will describe as ‘poison’d’ later, 
back in Rome, when he is confronted with the consequences of 
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his negligence (2.2.96). In Alexandria, however, pleasure replaces 
business, just as night replaces day. In Rome, recollecting his time 
in Egypt, Enobarbus brags, ‘we did sleep day out of countenance, 
and made the night light with drinking’ (2.2.187–8). Caesar, how-
ever, is not impressed: Antony, he complains, ‘wastes / The lamps 
of the night in revel’ (1.4.4–5).
The last and most mysterious force that opposes Antony and 
Cleopatra is ‘Fortune’ or ‘destiny’. The difference between these 
two concepts is not stressed; instead, the salient point is that they 
both represent a world that is to some extent fi xed or ‘given’. The 
self is not the only locus of authority and agency; vital outcomes 
depend, instead, on an unassailable, immutable and external power, 
akin to that of divine providence. Cleopatra rails against ‘the false 
huswife Fortune’ (5.15.26), seeing that she favours ‘the full-for-
tuned Caesar’ (5.15.25). Since his success depends on ‘Fortune’, 
however, ‘’Tis paltry to be Caesar’ (5.2.2). ‘Not being Fortune, he’s 
but Fortune’s knave, / A minister of her will’ (5.2.3–4). What is 
glorious is to be autonomous, self-suffi cient. In contrast to what 
she represents as Caesar’s passive reliance on chance, her suicide, 
Cleopatra argues, will be all the more grand. To commit suicide is, 
as she sees it, to escape all such ignoble dependence. 
 And it is great
To do that thing that ends all other deeds,
Which shackles accidents and bolts up change,
Which sleeps and never palates more the dung,
The beggar’s nurse and Caesar.
(5.2.4–8)
Cleopatra’s language here recalls that of Hamlet, as well as, espe-
cially, Duke Vincentio in Measure for Measure. To ‘exist’, the Duke 
tells Angelo, is not ‘noble’, because it means to be dependent on 
‘many a thousand grains that issue out of dust’ (3.1.20–1). Embodi-
ment itself impinges upon a prized autarkeia. This understanding 
of suicide as an escape from what Cassius calls ‘accidental evils’, 
and Hamlet, ‘the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune’, seems 
to be characteristic of aristocratic culture at its most extreme. The 
sense of death as annihilation more easily possible in pagan cul-
ture allows Cleopatra to imagine, as Hamlet and Claudio fi nd they 
cannot, death as a ‘sleep’ untroubled by ‘dreams’.69 To die, for 
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her, seems simply to become immune to all further infl uence from 
without: death guarantees invulnerability.
Antony’s relationship with ‘Fortune’ is not so much a full-
throated and indignant protest at its humiliations, as in the case 
of Cleopatra, as it is a self-conscious, uneasy denial of its force. 
A soothsayer tells Antony that Caesar’s ‘fortunes’ will ‘rise higher’ 
(2.3.15) than his, and, after dismissing the man, Antony confesses 
that he ‘hath spoken true’ (2.3.32). ‘The very dice obey him; / And 
in our sports my better cunning faints / Under his chance: if we 
draw lots, he speeds’ (2.3.32–4). Caesar has luck on his side: his 
fi ghting cocks beat Antony’s, as well as his quails. Before the Battle 
of Actium, swallows build their nests in Cleopatra’s sails, a poor 
omen: ‘the augurers /  Say they know not, they cannot tell; look 
grimly, / And dare not speak their knowledge’ (4.12.4–6). Antony 
himself alternates between ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ (4.12.8); he knows too 
well, on account of these signs, that he cannot defeat Caesar, yet 
he repeatedly convinces himself that somehow, nonetheless, he has 
a fi ghting chance.
At Cleopatra’s court, the kind of destiny or ‘Fortune’ that so 
haunts Antony seems, by contrast, to be scarcely understood. 
After wine is served, itself a symbol of a fl ight from objective 
reality, Charmian gives her hand to a ‘soothsayer’, evidently a 
palm-reader, and makes an odd request. ‘Good sir, give me a good 
fortune’ (1.2.14–15). The verb ‘give’ here is a false note. ‘I make 
not,’ the soothsayer protests, ‘but foresee’ (1.2.16). Charmian 
is undaunted: ‘Pray then, foresee me one’ (1.2.17). She misun-
derstands the fortune-teller’s art; he himself is not the author of 
the future he discerns. ‘In nature’s infi nite book of secrecy,’ he 
explains, ‘a little I can read’ (1.2.10–11). Alexas, a Greek lord, 
is more respectful: ‘Vex not his prescience!’ (1.2.22). The word 
‘prescience’ suggests knowledge, certainty (Latin, scientia, knowl-
edge); Alexas implies thereby that he accepts the fortune-teller’s 
own understanding of ‘fortune’ or ‘destiny’ as an external struc-
ture of reality, rather than his own creation. Charmian, however, 
remains dismissive: ‘Hush!’ (1.2.23).
The palm-reader’s prophecies do in fact all come true, even 
those which Charmian fi nds objectionable. The riddling manner 
in which he presents his predictions is in keeping, however, with 
the ambiguous nature of reality itself, considered as an object of 
perception. For example, the soothsayer tells Charmian, ‘You have 
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seen and proved a fairer former fortune / Than that which is to 
approach’ (1.2.35–6). These words do indeed prove prophetic: 
Charmian dies young in a barren monument. Charmian herself, 
however, takes the enigmatic epigram more lightly, as a suggestion 
that she will give birth to bastards. ‘Then belike my children will 
have no names’ (1.2.37–8). Or, for example, the soothsayer pre-
dicts that Charmian will be ‘far fairer’ (1.2.18) than she already 
is. He means, with the pallor of death; Charmian, however, takes 
it as a prognostication of middle-aged embonpoint. ‘He means in 
fl esh’ (1.2.19). Iras disagrees: ‘No, you shall paint when you are 
old’ (1.2.20). Like Charmian, Iras takes the soothsayer’s warning 
in jest. Shakespeare, however, does not. In contrast to Cleopatra’s 
chambermaids, Shakespeare seems to accept here the premise that 
the future is to some degree fi xed without irony or doubt. Even 
Enobarbus’ mocking imitation of an oracular pronouncement 
proves reliable. When Menas suggests that Antony’s marriage to 
Octavia will lead to peace between him and Octavian, Enobar-
bus dismisses the notion. ‘If I were bound to divine of this unity, 
I would not prophecy so’ (2.6.118–19). 
Shakespeare’s point in this case seems to be that reality has 
its own objective, independent existence, including the reality of 
future events. The world exists outside the mind, following its 
own separate course. Nevertheless, reality does not command or 
enforce upon the observer any single, reliable interpretation of 
its own nature. It can be recognised, but it can also be denied. 
More specifi cally, Shakespeare sees individual human recogni-
tion of the truth, including especially, the truth about the self, as 
something that is worked out in the context of relationships with 
other human beings. We establish what we accept as true through 
conversations with other people. Conversely, we prevent ourselves 
from being obliged to acknowledge unpleasant realities by avoid-
ing interaction with other people who bring those facts to our 
attention: snubbing them, shunning them, banishing them; even at 
times killing them outright.70 
To present recognition of the truth as a process grounded in 
social interaction is not the same, however, as presenting truth 
itself as a social construct. From Shakespeare’s perspective, there 
is something out there to be discerned, regardless of any given 
society’s or individual’s ability or willingness to do so. Objective 
reality exists, independent even of humanity itself. Truth is not a 
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human invention or fi ction; it is what a phenomenologist such as 
Jean-Luc Marion would call a ‘given’, literally, a datum (Latin, 
‘given’).71 Given the long shadow of Virgil’s Aeneid, with its sad 
sense of inevitability, it is perhaps only fi tting that in this particu-
lar tragedy, Antony and Cleopatra, the Roman play closest to the 
Aeneid in its subject matter, the truth in its nature as ‘given’ or 
objective ‘data’ is represented by a Virgilian sense of impersonal, 
occasionally cruel ‘destiny’. Cleopatra’s chambermaids do not 
understand it; for them, the world is a product of will, and the 
only question is whose: their own or someone else’s. Cleopatra 
herself tries to escape it by the desperate expedient of suicide, see-
ing it as a gross indignity to be acted upon, rather than agent. Ant-
ony tries to pretend he does not sense its hold over him. Caesar, 
however, fi nds it a consolation. When Octavia becomes distraught, 
hearing of Antony’s infi delity, he counsels her simply to accept it 
as a fact. ‘Let determined things to destiny / Hold unbewail’d their 
way’ (3.6.86–7).
In Antony and Cleopatra, the role of other people as vehicles of 
truth is represented by two types of characters: for future events, 
‘soothsayers’ or ‘augurers’; for past events or present facts, ‘messen-
gers’.72 For the most part, these characters are not named; in a play 
about the relationship between character and misperception, their 
very anonymity serves as an index of their relative reliability. They 
have no strongly distinct personality, and no proportionate pro-
pensity, therefore, towards what Bacon calls the ‘Idols of the Cave’. 
They present instead an idealised one-to-one correspondence with 
the external world. How Antony, Cleopatra and Octavian respond 
to these characters reveals much, therefore, about their more gen-
eral relationship to the world at large: specifi cally, the extent to 
which they each choose to live in a state of denial. 
In light of Shakespeare’s notorious predilection for puns, it is 
useful to distinguish in this case between two possible interpreta-
tions of the term itself, ‘soothsayer’, which he uses to describe 
the Egyptian equivalent of a Roman augur or haruspex. To be a 
‘soothsayer’ is to be a kind of prophet, like Tiresias or Cassan-
dra; one might say less grandly, a fortune-teller. To be a sooth-
sayer in this sense, however, is not to be a ‘soothsayer’ in another. 
More commonly in Shakespeare, ‘to soothe’ means ‘to fl atter’. 
A ‘soother’ in this case is a yes-man, a toady, a fl attering courtier. 
For example, in 1 Henry IV, Hotspur boasts, ‘By heaven, I cannot 
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fl atter: I defy / The tongues of soothers’ (4.1.6–7). In Richard III, 
Margaret warns Buckingham not to ‘soothe the devil’ (1.3.298), 
meaning Richard. Richard himself, wooing Anne, protests disin-
genuously, ‘I never could learn sweet soothing words’ (1.2.156); 
one might compare this outrageous self-misrepresentation to his 
later, equally misleading description of himself as a ‘plain man’ 
(1.3.45). ‘I cannot fl atter and look fair,’ he claims: ‘Smile in men’s 
faces, smooth, deceive, and cog’ (1.3.46–7). In Richard II, Richard 
complains to Aumerle of the humiliation of having to utter ‘words 
of sooth’ (3.3.137): the ‘gentle words’ and ‘kind commends’ 
(3.3.127) that he fi nds himself obliged to convey to the newly 
victorious Bolingbroke.73
The word itself, ‘soothe’, can be traced back to the Middle English 
verb soðien, ‘to confi rm, verify, affi rm as true’, itself derived from the 
adjective soth, ‘true’. In the Renaissance, the word comes to mean 
something more precise, as well as perilously close to the opposite 
of this older sense. ‘To soothe’ in Shakespeare’s language means not 
simply ‘to affi rm’ but instead more specifi cally, ‘to fl atter or humor 
with feigned agreement; to placate or propitiate by means of disin-
genuous assent’. To soothe, in other words, means to tell someone 
that what he or she is saying is true, even though – and here is the 
Renaissance addition – one knows full well it is false. Soothing is the 
opposite of ‘giving the lie’. It is this kind of ‘soothsaying’, a ‘truth-
saying’ which ironically is anything but, that Cleopatra’s attendant 
Charmian seems to hope for from Alexas’ ‘soothsayer’, not, as she 
receives instead, any kind of earnest prophecy. She wants the same 
type of fl attery that her mistress, Cleopatra, seems to crave from her, 
and, like Cleopatra, she is only disappointed when she is presented 
with its opposite. 
For instance, Cleopatra asks Charmian at one point if her former 
love for Caesar was ever the equal of her present love for Antony. 
Cleopatra expects a certain answer: no, of course not; Antony is the 
obviously the better man. Charmian, however, seizes the opportu-
nity to make fun of her, instead. ‘O that brave Caesar!’ (1.5.70) she 
cries, imitating Cleopatra’s characteristic hyperbole, and thereby 
defl ating its present application to a different man. ‘Be choked with 
such another emphasis!’ (1.5.71). Cleopatra replies. ‘Say, the brave 
Antony’ (1.5.72). But Charmian persists. ‘The valiant Caesar!’ 
(1.5.72). ‘By Isis,’ Cleopatra replies, ‘I will give thee bloody teeth, 
/ If thou with Caesar paragon again / My man of men’ (1.5.73–5). 
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Swearing by Isis, Cleopatra evokes her understanding of herself as 
a goddess; it is this view of herself as an ideal, superhuman entity 
that Charmian’s mockery endangers. Cleopatra’s reciprocal threats 
to silence Charmian are also typical: a comical version of the much 
more serious threats and even physical violence that she brings to 
bear against the unfortunate messenger who brings her the news 
that Antony has married Octavia. As throughout, Cleopatra’s char-
acteristic method for dealing with an unpleasant truth is to deny 
it, either by dissociation, up to and including suicide, or by, as the 
saying is, ‘shooting the messenger’. She prefers an echo-chamber 
of compliant courtiers to an accurate assessment of the world 
outside. 
As often in Shakespeare’s plays, the fi rst scene is a microcosm 
of what is to come. A messenger arrives with ‘news’ for Antony 
‘from Rome’ (1.1.18). Cleopatra interrupts the emissary, how-
ever, before he can present even ‘the sum’ of his message, taunting 
Antony mercilessly (1.1.19). ‘Nay, hear them, Antony’ (1.1.20), 
she insists, mocking him. ‘Call in the messengers!’ (1.1.30). Then 
again: ‘The messengers!’ (1.1.33). And again: ‘Hear the ambas-
sadors!’ (1.1.49). From Cleopatra’s perspective, to be concerned 
enough about the external world to interrupt a moment of plea-
sure is a shameful sign of dependence; a failure of autonomy, like 
a pet responding to a tug at a leash. Stung by her sarcasm, Ant-
ony fi nally sends the messenger away unheard. ‘Speak not to us’ 
(1.1.56), he says. ‘No messenger but thine’ (1.1.53), he reassures 
Cleopatra, will he deign to receive. Caesar rebukes him for such a 
rebuff later: ‘You / Did pocket up my letters, and with taunts / Did 
gibe my missive out of audience’ (2.2.77–9).
Eventually, however, Antony changes course. ‘A Roman 
thought hath struck him’ (1.2.88), Cleopatra complains, and true 
to her description, Antony enters almost immediately afterwards 
deep in conversation with a second messenger, plying the man with 
requests for further details. ‘Well, what worst?’ (1.2.100) he asks. 
The messenger balks. ‘The nature of bad news infects the teller’ 
(1.2.101), he protests, and with reason, given the kind of reac-
tion to such news we see later from Cleopatra. Antony, however, 
scoffs at the objection. ‘When it concerns the fool or coward. On!’ 
(1.2.102). Much in contrast to Cleopatra, Antony claims, at least, 
that he prefers truth to fl attery. ‘Things that are past are done with 
me’ (1.2.103), he says. That is to say, he accepts the independent 
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reality of time; past events are a given, over which he grants that 
he has no sway or mastery. 
Antony even actively solicits criticism of his own behavior, as 
well as Cleopatra’s. ‘Speak to me home; mince not the general 
tongue: / Name Cleopatra as she is call’d in Rome’ (1.2.111–2). 
He asks his attendants to call in a second messenger: ‘From Sicyon 
how the news? Speak there!’ (1.2.119). ‘He stays upon your 
will’ (1.2.121), the attendant replies; to which Antony, ‘Let him 
appear’ (1.2.121). Such lines might seem superfl uous, but they 
have a symbolic signifi cance. Shakespeare here as elsewhere is try-
ing to express an observation about human perception: recogni-
tion of external fact depends upon the internal assent of the ‘will.’ 
Antony’s attitude towards messengers goes back and forth; some-
times he welcomes them, sometimes he tosses them out without 
a hearing. Caesar and Cleopatra, by contrast, present consistent, 
characteristic, diametrically opposed reactions to the messengers 
they each receive. In the scene in which Caesar fi rst appears, for 
instance, a messenger arrives and informs him that his ‘biddings’ 
have been done: ‘every hour’, he reassures him, Caesar will receive 
‘report / how ’tis abroad’ (1.4.34–5). As if in confi rmation, another 
messenger arrives only moments later, bringing him news of 
Pompey’s progress. 
Lepidus for his part admires and strives to emulate Octavian’s 
obvious command of information. In the same scene, he reassures 
Caesar that, the next day, he will be ‘furnish’d to inform [him] 
rightly’ (1.4.77) what he can offer in terms of troops, and asks 
him, moreover, to let him be ‘partaker’ of anything new that he 
might learn ‘meantime’ of what ‘stirs abroad’ (1.2.82–4). Lepidus 
is no match for his supposed ally, however, in ruthless engage-
ment with reality. Later, when Octavia comes to Caesar to com-
plain about his falling-out with her new husband, Antony, Caesar 
explains that her husband has been unfaithful to her and reveals 
that he maintains spies as well as messengers in his service. ‘I have 
eyes upon him,’ he says, meaning, Antony, ‘and his affairs come to 
me on the wind’ (3.6.63–4).
The contrast with Cleopatra could scarcely be more clear-cut. 
She uses messengers almost solely to keep tabs on Antony, and 
even then is very reluctant to hear anything that does not serve 
to confi rm her hold over him. ‘How goes it with my brave Mark 
Antony?’ (1.5.40) she asks Alexas, ignoring all other questions of 
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world affairs. Fortunately for him, he brings back a token of Ant-
ony’s continuing affection: an ‘orient pearl’ (1.5.43). Later on, an 
anonymous Egyptian servant does not fare so well. He brings word 
that Antony has married Octavia, and this news comes as a sharp 
blow to Cleopatra’s hopes. How she reacts to this shock reveals 
much about her willingness to acknowledge a reality over which 
she does not reign as absolute mistress. In a surprisingly long scene, 
about a hundred lines, in a play where some scenes barely make 
it to a dozen, Cleopatra oscillates rapidly between promising the 
man rich rewards such as ‘gold’ (2.5.28, 31), ‘a shower of gold’ 
(2.5.45), ‘rich pearls’ (2.5.46) and even a ‘province’ (2.5.68), if he 
tells her what she wants to hear, that is, if he lies, recanting his tid-
ings of Antony’s marriage, and threatening him with horrifying tor-
ture if he persists instead in telling the truth, ranging in kind from 
the relatively straightforward (gouging out his eyes [2.5.63 –4], 
ripping out his hair [2.5.64]), to the more inventive (pouring mol-
ten gold down his throat [2.5.32–4], whipping him with wires 
[2.5.65], stewing him in brine [2.5.65]). She strikes him herself, 
then draws a knife to stab him, at which point he takes to his heels; 
Cleopatra’s maidservants are only with much ado able at last to 
bring him back before her. ‘Should I lie, madam?’ (2.5.93) he asks, 
bewildered. Her reply is telling: ‘Oh, I would thou didst!’ (2.5.93). 
Such long interchanges between Cleopatra and her messenger 
are not idle by-play, but instead should be understood as reveal-
ing indications of Cleopatra’s more general relationship to the 
world outside herself. She is extremely reluctant to acknowledge 
any aspect of external reality as a ‘given’ a priori, independent of 
her desires, and therefore manipulates those around her, through 
her considerable powers of reward and punishment, into becom-
ing collaborators, whether they like it or not, in elaborate and 
mutually sustained processes of denial. She surrounds herself with 
what psychoanalysts would call ‘enablers’: ‘yes-men’ and ‘yes-
women’ such as Mardian, Charmian and Iras. By far Cleopatra’s 
preferred method for fortifying her delusions, however, is to see 
them refl ected and confi rmed in the subjectivity of some other, 
more independent individual, a lover, who in this case serves as 
a kind of fl attering mirror. Even one such man, a Caesar or an 
Antony grand enough to overtop all others, can seem suffi cient to 
validate her own grandiose self-image. Given her superabundance 
of personal charms, as well as her relative lack of military might, it 
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is much easier for Cleopatra to cultivate the self-abasement of one 
such renowned general than to exact tribute more directly from 
the world at large. 
Nor is the deal altogether one-sided. Antony for his part is able 
to fi nd in Cleopatra a welcome respite from the gruelling hardship 
involved in securing his part of the Empire: fi ghting Parthians with 
his lieutenant Ventidius out in the borderlands to the east, or else 
eating bark and ‘strange fl esh’ (1.4.68) in Alpine passes, as he fl ees 
from his own countrymen. Having won Cleopatra’s affections pro-
vides Antony an easier, more immediate validation of himself as a 
world-bestriding conqueror than the toil and slog of such thank-
less, risky and unpleasant military campaigns. Cleopatra’s status 
as a celebrated prize makes her seem suffi cient as a substitute for 
a larger, more hostile world. ‘Fall not a tear,’ he says, comforting 
her: ‘one of them rates / All that is won and lost’ (3.11.69–70). 
This tear, worth all, Antony says, that he has lost at Actium, is 
one of several symbols of what he describes in the fi rst scene of 
the play as ‘new heaven, new earth’ (1.1.17): the private world 
of the two lovers, which they hope to recover in the afterlife. The 
fi nal representation of this shared, self-enclosed subjective space 
is the tomb-like ‘monument’ which serves as the setting for the 
play’s fi nal scenes: a less-solitary version of Hamlet’s solipsistic 
‘nutshell’ (2.2.254). The tomb is a symbol of their fi nal, immor-
tal grandeur as fi gures of the imagination: the kind of ‘marble’ 
or ‘gilded monument’ which Shakespeare emulates and aims to 
exceed in his sonnets.74 As a symbol of a retreat into ‘fancy’, how-
ever, the monument is also a kind of prison, cutting them off from 
the world outside. Withdrawal from the world which began as 
voluntary becomes in the end involuntary. 
Another example of this separate world ‘as if’ is the ‘orient pearl’ 
which Alexas delivers to Cleopatra from Antony as a gift upon 
his departure. Antony calls it ‘the treasure of an oyster’ (1.5.46), 
and bestows upon it, before handing it over, ‘many doubled kisses’ 
(1.5.42). To call the pearl that Antony sends to Cleopatra ‘orient’ 
casts it most immediately as a symbol of a place, the Orient: ‘the 
East’, as Antony also calls it. ‘I’ th’ East my pleasure lies’ (2.4.39). 
Yet this place, the ‘orient’, is itself a symbol of a more imaginary, 
immaterial locale: the virtual reality, so to speak, Antony shares 
with Cleopatra. ‘Here is my space’ (1.1.35), Antony proclaims, 
embracing her: the pearl represents the referent of that exuberant, 
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indefi nite ‘here’. To call it ‘the treasure of an oyster’ calls to mind 
Erasmus’ ‘Silenus box’: Antony’s and Cleopatra’s shared subjec-
tive ‘space’ looks one way from the outside, another from within.75 
The adjective ‘doubled’, applied here to Antony’s kisses, suggests 
not only the degree of his affection, but also the sense in which he 
depends upon Cleopatra as a ‘double’, and she upon him. They 
‘double’ each other like refl ections in a mirror, refl ecting back in 
each case the other that the other most wants to see. 
Shakespeare’s most charming representation of the two lovers’ 
‘space’, self-enclosed like that of a pearl in an oyster, is the scene 
the morning before the second battle outside Alexandria, when 
Cleopatra helps Antony don his armour. The scene is a Shake-
spearean interpolation, and rich in a signifi cance that shades over 
into outright allegory. It may seem strange to speak of this scene 
as representative of Antony’s and Cleopatra’s private reality, when 
technically speaking there is another character there, too, Antony’s 
attendant, Eros. Eros, however, can be understood in this case as 
an allegorical representation of love itself (Greek, erōs, ‘romantic 
love’). Shakespeare fi nds the character’s name in Plutarch, but he 
also makes the most of his material. ‘Eros! Mine armor, Eros!’ 
Antony repeatedly cries (4.4.1, 3). It is the same literary device, a 
symbolic apostrophe to a personifi ed infl uence, which Shakespeare 
uses in Macbeth, when he shows Macbeth in like manner crying 
out repeatedly for his manservant ‘Seyton’ (sc. the homophone 
‘Satan’) to come help him arm himself for battle.76 
But to return to the scene: Eros helps Antony arm for battle, 
with the help of Cleopatra, and both prove inept at their task. 
This clumsiness foreshadows the more abstract truth that love 
does not, in the end, prove as apt a defence from external reality 
as lovers themselves might wish. ‘Eros’ is Antony’s ‘armor’: the 
juxtaposition in his apostrophe, repeated for emphasis, confi rms 
the symbolism. Like Eros himself, however, that armour will prove 
fallible. When Cleopatra comes to help Eros arm Antony, Antony 
at fi rst tries to prevent her. ‘Ah, let be, let be!’ he tells her. ‘Thou art 
/ The armorer of my heart. False, false!’ (4.4.6–7). Antony osten-
sibly draws a distinction between the two armourers, Eros and 
Cleopatra, but instead ironically fl ags a similarity: a complex anal-
ogy between the literal, physical stage business, his transformation 
into what Cleopatra calls ‘a man of steel’ (4.5.34), and the psy-
chological effects of his overwhelming investment in Cleopatra’s 
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approbation, to the exclusion of a more prudent, more general 
concern for the approval of others. Cleopatra protects his sense of 
himself as a grand, godlike fi gure, his ‘heart’, from being subject to 
anyone else’s opinion but her own; when he gives himself over to 
his love for her, he feels as if he were invulnerable. He is safe from 
scorn or defeat within the shelter of their comforting folie à deux; 
each partner protects the other’s delusions of grandeur from out-
side attack, in the manner of a suit of armour. Ultimately, however, 
this armour proves ‘false, false’. 
A lover’s admiration may be reassuring, may even seem an 
impenetrable shield, but it is not in the end an adequate defence 
on its own against what Hamlet calls ‘the slings and arrows of 
outrageous fortune’. Like Coriolanus with his mother or actors 
with an audience, Antony is vulnerable to unexpected disapproval, 
even outright betrayal; much more vulnerable than he realises. 
Exposure to the possibility of shame is not so much eliminated 
altogether as concentrated in a single, highly fraught relationship. 
Thus Antony’s unmitigated distress at the thought that Cleopatra 
has betrayed him, as well as hers when she fi nds out that he has 
married Octavia. The more that Antony succumbs to the allure of 
the folie à deux, the more insulated he becomes from the worka-
day humiliations of the outside world. The more at the mercy, 
however, he becomes, as well, of the other partner in question. 
His feeling of invincibility comes, paradoxically, at a steep cost in 
actual emotional sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 4
‘A SPACIOUS MIRROR’: INTERPELLATION AND 
THE OTHER IN ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA
In her infl uential reading of Antony and Cleopatra, Janet Adelman 
argues that the problem of moral judgement is central to the expe-
rience of the tragedy, not just for the characters themselves, but 
also for the audience.1 ‘The desire to judge and be judged correctly 
is one of the dominant passions of the play.’ ‘The dramatic design 
of Antony and Cleopatra forces us to acknowledge the process of 
judgment at every turn.’ In keeping with this focus on ethical eval-
uation, ‘the most characteristic dramatic technique in Antony and 
Cleopatra is the discussion of one group of characters by another.’ 
This recurrent ‘framing’ of the action, as if it were a play within a 
play, draws in the audience and forces us to participate, as well, in 
the act of judging. ‘For we are, in a sense, the most minor of the 
characters who stand aside and comment; or at least we as audi-
ence are silent extensions of them.’2 
Anne Barton sees the position of the audience in Antony and 
Cleopatra in much the same light. ‘Our place of vantage is basi-
cally that of Charmian or Enobarbus: people suffi ciently close to 
their social superiors to witness informal and often undignifi ed 
behavior, without participating in its motive and refl ection like the 
confi dantes in Garnier and Jodelle.’ Antony and Cleopatra have a 
quality of ‘opacity’, a ‘moral ambiguity’, that elicits what Barton 
calls ‘evaluation’, and Adelman, ‘judgment’, from other charac-
ters, as well as the audience. ‘In this tragedy,’ Barton writes, ‘other 
characters are continually trying to describe Cleopatra and Antony, 
to fi x their essential qualities in words.’ Like Adelman, however, 
Barton sees this ‘dilemma of judegment’ as interminable, insoluble. 
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And, like Adelman, she cites Cleopatra’s description of Antony 
as akin to a perspective painting, one way a ‘Gorgon’ (2.5.116), 
the other way a ‘Mars’ (2.5.117), as a paradigmatic symbol. Like 
Antony here, Antony and Cleopatra, as Barton and Adelman see 
the play, simultaneously evokes and frustrates the desire for defi ni-
tive moral judgement. ‘In effect,’ Adelman writes, ‘we are forced to 
judge and shown the folly of judging at the same time.’3
The concept of interpellation that I introduce in this chapter, mod-
ifying Althusser’s antihumanist version, further develops Adelman’s 
insights into ‘judgment’, as well as Barton’s thoughts on ‘evaluation’. 
Adelman observes, ‘Judgment depends on where one stands.’ Each 
moral judgement ‘tells us as much about the judge and his perspective 
as it does about the accused’.4 I agree; I use the term ‘interpellation’, 
however, rather than ‘judgement’, because I want to emphasise not 
only, like Adelman, that judgement is grounded in a subjective rela-
tionship with another person, rather than in impersonal, objective 
fact, but also that such judgements are not merely inert, solipsistic 
expressions of the judging self. Instead, for Shakespeare, judgements 
possess a kind of power over the other. To judge other people, if they 
know about that judgement, is to alter their perception of themselves, 
unless they are able to muster some sort of psychological resistance. 
Even that resistance, moreover, may be broken down. By being led 
in triumph, for example, or defeated in open battle, people can be 
forced to change the way they see themselves. 
Shakespeare sees the fall of the Roman Republic as a tragedy, 
and the way that he describes it evokes, probably not coincidentally, 
a contemporary decline in the political power of the English nobil-
ity. Like Wayne Rebhorn, John Cox and J. L. Simmons, I would 
suggest, nonetheless, that Shakespeare himself does not see the crisis 
he describes in such terms, as an effect of economic forces such as 
Norbert Elias’s ‘monopoly mechanism’. The rise of the great dema-
gogue, Julius Caesar, and Rome’s transition to Empire is in part, as 
he sees it, a backlash against the injustices of patrician oligarchy. The 
generosity which Antony attributes to Caesar in his account of Cae-
sar’s will goes far to help him win the support of the Roman plebs. 
But these promises of material gain are not on their own enough to 
secure the success of his oration.5 Without Brutus’ cold, standoff-
ish emphasis on disinterested reason and Antony’s own contrary 
ability, like an actor, to weep, rail, gesticulate and walk among the 
people, to show them Caesar’s wounded body and elicit pity, it is 
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some question whether the pledges that he claims to have discov-
ered in Caesar’s will would have been enough to sway the crowd. 
If pity itself, especially, were not so pervasively repressed, Antony 
would not be able to manipulate it so successfully. 
Shakespeare recognises that political structures can shape his-
torical change. Like St Augustine, however, as well as Cicero, he 
sees the collapse of Rome’s traditional political institutions as 
more immediately a result of a fl awed moral paradigm. The impas-
sibility that his Roman characters tend to idealise is incompatible 
in the long run with a functioning civil society, because it leaves 
no room for compromise or concession. If everyone aims to be a 
law unto himself, then the only possible end result is what Hobbes 
calls ‘the war of all against all’: civil strife, culminating in the 
rule of a strongman. The exaltation of individual autonomy that 
drives this political confl ict is articulated in Shakespeare’s Roman’s 
images of the ideal self: the Stoic sapiens, the marble statue, ‘the 
northern star’, Mount Olympus. And it is rooted in a set of charac-
teristic misconceptions about the nature itself of selfhood. Shake-
speare’s Romans seem to believe, at times, that passibility can be 
transcended, when in fact it is a given of the human condition. 
They also tend to assume that the relation between self and other 
is necessarily antagonistic, a zero-sum game, when in fact it can be 
peaceful, collaborative and mutually benefi cial. 
In this chapter on Antony and Cleopatra, the vulnerability to 
shame that I describe in terms of interpersonal ‘interpellation’ 
should be understood as one more instance of the same basic human 
condition of passibility that I described in simpler terms in my anal-
ysis of Julius Caesar. Human beings by their very nature as human, 
as opposed to divine, are vulnerable to others’ moral judgement 
of their character, just as they are vulnerable to being physically 
wounded. Shadi Bartsch notes, for example, that the gaze in ancient 
Rome was seen as capable of playing a ‘sinister role’, as well as an 
admiring one, in ‘interpersonal dynamics among both the elite and 
commoners’, a role captured in the superstitious fear of the so-called 
‘evil eye’ evident in apotropaic Roman iconography. 
The individual on display could suffer the debilitating effects of the 
evil rather than the emulatory eye, of aggression and Schadenfreude 
rather than admiration. This form of the gaze could be fi gured as 
a weapon, and was sometimes imagined as penetrating its human 
object, or else feeding itself on the sight of suffering.6 
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Coriolanus’ crisis, when he is confronted by his mother, illustrates 
this problem. By leading the Volscians’ sack of Rome, Coriolanus 
imagines that he will be able to blot out the Romans’ earlier cen-
sure of his behaviour, as well as the humiliation of his banishment. 
As Volumnia explains to him, however, Coriolanus will not thereby 
free himself from all opprobrium. The world is larger than Rome, 
and posterity cares about other things outside and beyond the simple 
exercise of military might. If Coriolanus succeeds, he will go down in 
history as a traitor, not as vindicated. 
 If thou conquer Rome, the benefi t
Which thou shalt thereby reap is such a name
Whose repetition will be dogg’d with curses,
Whose chronicle thus writ: ‘The man was noble,
But with his last attempt he wip’d it out,
Destroy’d his country, and his name remains
To th’insuing age abhorr’d.
(5.3.142–8)
Antony and Cleopatra imagine that they will fi nd a refuge from 
such fi nal judgement in the afterlife, in each other’s company. As 
I explain here, however, in the conclusion to my analysis of Antony 
and Cleopatra, ‘The Last Interpellation’, Shakespeare introduces 
some signifi cant cause for doubt that the two lovers’ imagined 
escape to Elysium will turn out in the manner they expect. 
Ontologically speaking, Shakespeare recognises that the other 
is an integral participant in self-defi nition. The other may be divine 
or human; unchosen or chosen. What it cannot be, however, is 
altogether eradicated from self-awareness. Without the other as its 
ground of self-awareness, the self falls into a tautological abyss: 
a sense of meaninglessness N. K. Sugimura describes as akin to 
Sartre’s existential ‘nausea’.7 When Antony believes that Cleopatra 
has betrayed him, he is utterly bewildered. ‘I made these wars for 
Egypt’ (4.14.15), he explains. Cleopatra and her soldiers, as well 
as his, represent for Antony what Timothy Reiss calls ‘spheres’ or 
‘circles’, the matrix of human relationships which he sees as defi n-
ing passible, pre-modern selfhood. Cleopatra is part of Antony’s 
understanding of himself, the anchor of a constitutive network: 
‘the Queen – / Whose heart I thought I had, for she had mine, / 
Which, whilst it was mine, / Had annexed unto’t / A million more, 
now lost’ (4.14.15–18). Deprived of his consort, Antony compares 
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himself to a ‘cloud’ or ‘vapor’ which for a time looks like a ‘cita-
del’ or a ‘mountain’, but then abruptly ‘dislimns’ and becomes 
‘indistinct’ (4.14.1–14). 
The impossibility of self-defi nition without reference to another 
also appears earlier and in a more humorous light in Antony’s 
drunken description of a crocodile. ‘What manner o’ thing is your 
crocodile?’ (2.7.41) Lepidus asks. ‘It is shaped, sir, like itself,’ Ant-
ony explains. ‘It is as broad as it hath breadth. It is just so high 
as it is [etc.]’ (2.7.42 –3). ‘What color is it of?’ (2.7.46) Lepidus 
asks. ‘Of it own color too’ (2.7.48). The point of the joke is that it 
is impossible to describe anything without some sort of reference 
to something other than itself. The selfsame without the other is 
incomprehensible. Antony fi nds himself in like case later on, when 
he believes that Cleopatra has abandoned him for his rival. The 
patent inadequacy of his response to Lepidus is amusing at the 
time, but also a prefi guration of the fate that awaits him, alone and 
confused on the Egyptian coast after the battle of Actium. 
Much as Shakespeare suggests here, in this bit of drunken ban-
ter, in his account of what he calls ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung), 
Hegel advances a claim which at fi rst might seem paradoxical: our 
individual self-defi nition is not and cannot be autonomous, but 
instead can be better understood as emerging out of interpersonal 
relations between the self and the other.8 Sticking strictly to philos-
ophy, rather than theology (Buber) or literary criticism (Bakhtin), 
the most infl uential twentieth-century inheritors of this Hegelian 
sense of the importance of the other are Sartre and Ricœur: that is, 
the claim that the other plays a constitutive role in self-perception, 
where the other is understood as other people, rather than as God 
(Lévinas), language (Lacan), ‘ideology’ (Althusser) or ‘discourse’ 
(Foucault).9 Sartre for his part is dismayed by the intersubjective 
relatedness Hegel emphasises; the tangling-up of one self-awareness 
with another that Arendt, as well, considers part of what she calls 
‘plurality.’ This inextricable connection between one conscious-
ness and the next, as Sartre sees it, introduces painful feelings of 
shame, undermining the very possibility of peaceful human socia-
bility. The self and the other are doomed to perpetual confl ict: each 
aims to reduce the other to an object, an ‘it’ rather than a ‘thou’, 
in order to preserve an incompatible sense of itself as what Arendt 
would call ‘sovereign’. Enjoying one’s own agency, Sartre suggests, 
is possible only at someone else’s expense. Ricœur, by contrast, is 
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more optimistic. Like Hegel, he believes that an alternative to the 
‘master–slave dialectic’ is possible: a state of mutual ‘recognition’ 
which he sees exemplifi ed in healthy romantic relationships, prac-
tices of ritual gift-exchange, and the legal recognition of individual 
rights.10 Sartre’s sense of the relationship between self and other 
as a ‘zero-sum game’ resembles that of Shakespeare’s Romans, 
doomed to oscillate between autocracy and civil war. Ricœur’s, by 
contrast, like Cicero’s, envisages a viable republican alternative. 
Much akin to this contrast between Sartre and Ricœur, Shake-
speare’s Coriolanus presents two competing models of the circu-
lation of political and economic power. The fi rst paradigm of 
distribution, that of the patricians, leads to commoners on the dole, 
as a result of aristocratic hoarding: ‘storehouses cramm’d with 
grain’ (1.1.79–80). The other, that of the plebeians, consists of free 
trade in an open market. Much of the stage business of the play, 
for example, consists in Coriolanus going to and from ‘the market-
place’.11 Menenius and Volumnia convince him to visit it, however, 
only much against his wishes. When what he calls the ‘price o’ the 
consulship’ (2.3.74) proves too high, Coriolanus leaves in a huff. He 
is unwilling to negotiate; like Sartre, he assumes that a concession 
to another is simply a loss, rather than perhaps the basis for a long-
term gain. It is signifi cant therefore that the plebeians are described 
repeatedly, by contrast, as ‘trades’ (3.2.134, 4.1.13). Theirs is a tacit 
bargain, like that of a ‘marketplace’: I will honour you, if you will 
honour me. What Ricœur identifi es as ‘recognition’ thrives upon 
collaboration, founded in mutual respect. People greet each other in 
the street; each ‘citizen’ or ‘neighbour’ knows and is known; praises 
and is praised in return. After Coriolanus is banished, the tribune 
Sicinius rejoices to see ‘tradesmen singing in their shops and going / 
About their functions friendly’ (4.6.8–9). As Annabel Patterson 
suggests, in Coriolanus, ‘Shakespeare’s audience is invited to con-
template an alternative political system’: the early Republic.12 James 
Kuzner, as well, sees here an inspiring depiction of ‘a limited yet 
germinal version of participatory government’.13 
Francis Fukuyama takes up this model of shared ‘recognition’ in 
his discussion of what he calls ‘the end of history’: the emergence 
of liberal democracies in the modern period. ‘The failure to under-
stand the thymotic component of what is normally thought of as 
economic motivation leads to vast misinterpretations of politics and 
historical change.’ For example, ‘virtually the entire civil liberties 
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and civil rights agendas, while having economic components, are 
essentially thymotic contests over recognition.’14 Fukuyama’s defi -
nition of thymos connects Braden’s take on what St Augustine calls 
libido dominandi with Ricœur’s emphasis on ‘recognition’, as well 
as Charles Taylor’s concept of a ‘politics of recognition’. ‘Thymos is 
something like an innate human sense of justice: people believe that 
they have a certain worth, and when other people do not recognize 
their worth at its correct value – then they become angry.’ Thymos 
becomes disordered and unmanageable when characters such as 
Coriolanus are unwilling to accept others’ assessment of that worth 
as anything less than infi nite, divine. A peaceful ‘commonwealth’ 
(4.16.14) requires the interdependent exchange of mutually rein-
forced self-esteem or ‘recognition’. Coriolanus, however, balks at 
this prospect. Like Sartre, he is unable to see the other as anything 
other than a threat to his own absolute autonomy. This distrust of 
his fellow citizens is an effect of what Rebhorn calls the ‘imperial 
self’, a vision of himself that leaves no room for their indepen-
dent agency. As Volumnia says, ‘thou hadst rather / Follow thine 
enemy in a fi ery gulf / Than fl atter him in a bower’ (3.2.90–2). For 
Coriolanus, as for Sartre, ‘hell is other people’.15
How did Shakespeare arrive at such a prescient understand-
ing of the relation between the self and the other, anticipating the 
conclusions of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Continental phi-
losophy? The analogy to Ricœur is revealing, in part because his 
avowed intellectual indebtedness to Aristotle, in addition to other, 
more modern thinkers such as Hegel, provides a clue to what may 
be, with some degree of historical plausibility, Shakespeare’s own 
philosophical source. Part of the inspiration for Ricœur’s insis-
tence that self-knowledge requires the other is Aristotle’s descrip-
tion of friendship in his Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, in 
which the philosopher describes the friend as allos autos, ‘another 
self’.16 Aristotle argues that, since friends are by nature similar, to 
perceive a friend is, in a sense, to perceive oneself. Cicero picks up 
on the idea in his De amicitia, translating it by the now-famous 
phrase alter idem (literally, ‘another the same’).17 
Shakespeare, however, may have also encountered Aristotle’s 
thought about friendship in another incarnation, as well, the so-
called Magna moralia, a treatise once thought to have been written 
by Aristotle, but whose authorship is now disputed, and which as 
a result has drifted into relative obscurity. In the Magna moralia, 
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the author, whoever he may be, vividly compares the friend to a 
mirror, and Shakespeare seems to take up this conceit, not without 
some interesting modifi cation, in two conversations much-noted 
for their philosophical implications. The fi rst exchange, in Julius 
Caesar, begins when Cassius asks Brutus if he can see his own face. 
The second, much analogous, appears in a slightly later play, Troi-
lus and Cressida, when Achilles asks Ulysses what he is reading. 
As Christopher Tilmouth suggests, Troilus and Cressida is ‘neces-
sarily central to any discussion of Renaissance intersubjectivity’.18 
Throughout the play, as Lars Engle observes, crises of evaluation 
‘turn refl exively on themselves and become debates over the nature 
of the activity of valuing’, bringing on ‘an anxiety about assess-
ment amounting almost to vertigo’. ‘How may value in men and 
women be assessed?’19
‘Eye to eye opposed’: Shakespeare’s ‘strange fellow’
I begin this section by comparing Cassius’ conversation with Brutus 
at the beginning of Julius Caesar about Brutus’ inability to see his 
own potential with Ulysses’ conversation with Achilles in Troilus 
and Cressida about the impossibility of maintaining honour in 
isolation. The basic premise of both of these discussions is a com-
monplace of present-day philosophical anthropology: self-image 
is constructed through relation with the other. Within his much 
earlier historical context, however, the degree of sophistication 
Shakespeare brings to bear upon the subject is unusual. In order 
to explain Shakespeare’s sense of the role of the other in self-
perception, I draw upon the example of Bakhtin’s analysis of 
Dostoyevsky. Bakhtin’s chief source for his concept of intersub-
jectivity is Buber, and it is some question whether Shakespeare, 
too, might have been inspired by some more abstract thinker. 
Ulysses in Troilus and Cressida claims to derive his ideas from a 
‘strange fellow’, whom he never names, but whose book he enters 
reading, and critics have put forward various hypotheses about 
this author’s possible identity. Several have suggested Plato’s First 
Alcibiades. Others propose Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations. 
I propose here that the most likely real-world model for 
Ulysses’ book is a summary of Aristotle’s ethics, the Magna 
moralia, once thought to have been written by Aristotle, but 
now considered of dubious authenticity. The theory of friendship 
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that Aristotle or pseudo-Aristotle articulates in this treatise 
strongly resembles the idea of the other as a refl ection of the self 
that appears in Antony and Cleopatra when Maecenas describes 
Antony as Octavian’s ‘spacious mirror’, and that seems likely 
to have inspired similar descriptions of the other as a ‘mirror’ 
or ‘glass’ in Julius Caesar and Troilus and Cressida. The friend 
is ‘another self’ (allos autos). Shakespeare greatly complicates 
Aristotle’s original conceit, however. In brief, Shakespeare 
grants the other a much greater degree of independent agency 
in shaping self-perception than Aristotle does in his theory of 
friendship, even though he articulates the relationship between 
self and other in similar fi gurative language.
Near the beginning of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, Cassius asks 
Brutus an odd question. ‘Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your 
face?’ (1.2.51). The question comes across in context as an abrupt 
non sequitur. Brutus, however, being of a philosophical bent, does 
not seem taken aback. Instead, he replies in kind; apparently, he 
is ready at any moment, without blinking, to enter into a Socratic 
dialogue or (a more likely model) a Ciceronian philosophical dis-
putation. ‘No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itself / But by refl ection, 
by some other things’ (1.2.52 –3). Cassius, expecting just such an 
answer, seizes on the concession as an opportunity to begin to fl at-
ter his interlocutor:
 Tis just,
And it is very much lamented, Brutus,
That you have no such mirrors as will turn
Your hidden worthiness into your eye
That you might see your shadow[.]
(1.2.54–8) 
Suspecting what game is afoot, Brutus asks Cassius to clarify his 
intent. ‘Into what dangers would you lead me, Cassius, / That you 
would have me seek into myself / For that which is not in me?’ 
(1.2.63–5) Cassius replies.
Since you know you cannot see yourself
So well as by refl ection, I your glass 
Will modestly discover to yourself
That of yourself which you yet know not of.
(1.2.67–70)
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Cassius, of course, wants to convince Brutus that he is capable 
of recreating the glorious accomplishment of his ancestor, Lucius 
Junius Brutus, in driving out Tarquin Superbus, by joining him 
and the other conspirators in overthrowing Caesar. For present 
purposes, however, what is notable about the exchange is the 
emphasis on the necessity of the other in self-perception, mediated 
through a recurrent metaphor of a mirror or ‘glass’. The trope is 
not uncommon in ancient literature; for example, in their essays 
on anger, both Plutarch and Seneca cite the benefi ts of looking in 
a mirror when angry. ‘To see oneself looking so unnatural and all 
confused,’ Plutarch writes, ‘is no small step toward the discredit-
ing of this ailment.’20 As Jean-Pierre Vernant explains, 
In seeing your face in a mirror you know yourself as others know 
you, face-to-face, in an exchange of glances. Access to the self is 
gained through an external projection of that self, through being 
objectifi ed, as if one were another.21 
A very similar exchange occurs in a slightly later play, Shake-
speare’s Troilus and Cressida, where it receives much more sub-
stantial elaboration. Like Cassius with Brutus, Ulysses wants to 
persuade his interlocutor, Achilles, to return to the fi eld of action, 
and he begins his work of persuasion with an unusual opening 
stratagem: a markedly contemplative conversation, abstract and 
seemingly divorced from any topical concern. He enters reading, 
as if oblivious to Achilles’ presence; earlier, he specifi cally instructs 
the other Greeks to ignore Achilles, so as to set the stage. His curi-
osity piqued, Achilles falls for the trap. ‘What are you reading?’ 
(3.3.95) he asks.
ULYSSES A strange fellow here
 Writes me that man, how dearly ever parted,
 How much in having, or without or in,
  Cannot make boast to have that which he hath,
 Nor feels not what he owes but by refl ection;
 As when his virtues shining upon others
 Heat them, and they retort that heat again
 To the fi rst giver.
ACHILLES This is not strange, Ulysses.
 The beauty that is borne here in the face
 The bearer knows not, but commends itself 
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 To others’ eyes; nor doth the eye itself,
 That most pure spirit of sense, behold itself,
 Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed
 Salutes each other with each other’s form;
 For speculation turns not to itself
 Till it hath traveled and is married there
 Where it may see itself. This is not strange at all.
ULYSSES I do not strain at the position –
 It is familiar – but at the author’s drift;
 Who in his circumstances expressly proves
 That no man is the lord of anything – 
 Though in and of him there be much consisting –
 Till he communicate his parts to others;
 Nor doth he of himself know them for aught
 Till he behold them formed in th’applause
  Where they’re extended; who, like an arch,
                      reverb’rate
 The voice again, or, like a gate of steel
 Fronting the sun, receives and renders back
 His fi gure and his heat. 
(3.3.95–123)
The continuity between this conversation and that of Cassius and 
Brutus has been widely recognised, and the identity of the ‘strange 
fellow’ who seems to be at the heart of it all, the author of the 
supposed book in Ulysses’ hand, has for decades been a subject 
of much speculation. Inevitably, any source that Shakespeare 
might have had in mind would post-date Homer; one reason why 
he does not name the author, then, might be because he recog-
nises that to do so would be to introduce a jarring anachronism. 
On the other hand, he does not hesitate to have Hector mention 
Aristotle elsewhere in the play. From another perspective, then, 
what is striking about this conversation is how up-to-date it seems. 
If the scene had been written yesterday, rather than several centu-
ries ago, the fi eld of possible candidates for the ‘strange fellow’ 
would be crowded with contenders, including among the most 
prominent Hegel, Sartre and Ricœur, as well as Buber on what he 
calls the ‘I –thou’ relationship. The analogy between Shakespeare’s 
theory of the other and Buber’s, in particular, is remarkable. I will 
explore one other such analogue, Bakhtin, in more detail here, 
before turning back to the question of possible sources. 
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In 1961 Mikhail Bakhtin wrote up a set of notes, ‘Toward a 
Reworking of the Dostoyevsky Book’, which were published post-
humously. Bakhtin was strongly infl uenced by Martin Buber, who 
himself owed much to Hegel and Heidegger, and presents in these 
notes what seems to be a summary of his understanding of Buber’s 
central claim that relationships with other people, as well as God, 
are the most fundamental given of human existence. 
To be means to communicate. Absolute death (non-being) is the state 
of being unheard, unrecognized, unremembered . . . To be means to 
be for another, and through the other, for oneself. A person has no 
internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the bound-
ary; looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with 
the eyes of another.22 
As a literary critic, Bakhtin’s purpose in evoking this line of 
thought is to harness it to the claim that Dostoyevsky’s greatness 
consists chiefl y in his artistic method, which is not simply to put 
forward aspects of his own self, a tendency Bakhtin calls ‘mono-
logism’, but instead to allow his characters to take on a life of 
their own. ‘Here, a multiplicity of consciousnesses is opened up’: 
the ‘polyphony’ that Bakhtin sees as the distinctive feature of the 
novel at its best. Bakhtin is reacting here against an idea which he 
encountered in German criticism, that Dostoyevsky ‘only projected 
the landscape of his own soul’, or, in other words, that the artist at 
his craft is essentially a microcosm of Hegel’s World-Soul, making 
his own nature manifest to his own consciousness by making it sep-
arate from himself.23 To draw an analogy to Shakespeare studies, 
this latter interpretation of Dostoyevsky’s art, the one that Bakhtin 
rejects, closely resembles Coleridge’s account of Shakespeare’s 
method. Reacting against Dr Johnson, Coleridge mocks the idea of 
Shakespeare ‘going about the world with his Pocket-book, noting 
what hears and observes’.24 Instead, like the spider in Swift’s Battle 
of the Books, Shakespeare spins out his characters from his own 
internal cogitation – or so Coleridge maintains. ‘Whatever forms 
they assumed, they were still Shakespeare.’ Coleridge insists that 
Shakespeare created ‘a vast multiplicity of characters’ by ‘simple 
meditation’: ‘he had only to imitate such parts of his character, or 
to exaggerate such as existed in possibility, and they were at once 
nature and fragments of Shakespeare.’25 
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Bakhtin would be horrifi ed by such solipsism. In contrast to 
Coleridge, Bakhtin argues that the great artist does not derive his 
material from within, but from without, in his openness to the 
subjectivity of the other. Dostoyevsky’s subject is not himself, but 
instead, ‘interaction among consciousnesses’, ‘the interdependence 
of consciousnesses’. ‘He depicts confession and the confessional 
consciousnesses of others in order to reveal their internally social 
structure.’ Dostoyevsky in particular, as well as the novel more 
generally in its ‘polyphony’, reveals a great truth about human 
nature. ‘I cannot manage without another, I cannot become 
myself without another; I must fi nd myself in another by fi nding 
another in myself (in mutual refl ection and mutual acceptance). 
Justifi cation cannot be self-justifi cation, recognition cannot be 
self-recognition.’26 It is not a stretch to apply Bakhtin’s praise for 
Dostoyevsky and the novel to Shakespeare and the drama. Shake-
speare, in fact, explicitly acknowledges the intersubjectivity that 
Bakhtin describes, whereas Dostoyevsky’s awareness of this aspect 
of human existence remains more implicit.
The question remains, however: how much of Shakespeare’s 
remarkable philosophical prescience is his own, and how much 
does he owe to other sources?27 In brief, the fi rst major source 
to have been proposed for Shakespeare’s thought about the role 
of the other in self-perception is Plato’s First Alcibiades.28 The 
authenticity of the dialogue is now disputed, but in antiquity it 
was considered an ideal introduction to Plato’s thought. As Steven 
Forde notes, 
The neo-Platonist Iamblichus wrote that the Alcibiades I contains 
the whole philosophy of Plato, as in a seed. The Islamic sage and 
Platonic commentator Alfarabi concurs, saying in effect that in 
the Alcibiades I all the Platonic questions are raised as if for the 
fi rst time.29 
In the First Alcibiades, Plato’s Socrates presents a very early 
account of a phenomenon that, two millennia later, proves to fas-
cinate John Donne, as well as Shakespeare. There is ‘something of 
the nature of a mirror in our own eyes’: ‘the eye looking at another 
eye . . . will there see itself.’30 Or, as Shakespeare writes, ‘eye to eye 
opposed / Salutes each other with each other’s form’ (3.3.108 –9). 
Plato’s application of this conceit, however, is very different from 
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Shakespeare’s.31 As an alternative to the First Alcibiades, T. W. 
Baldwin suggests Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, available in 
English in John Dolman’s 1561 translation, as a possible source 
and highlights this passage: ‘The soule is not able in this bodye 
to see him self. No more is the eye whyche although he seeth all 
other thinges, yet (that whiche is one of the leaste) can not discern 
his owne shape.’32 Cicero’s application of the metaphor of the eye, 
however, is again very different from Shakespeare’s. Cicero himself 
probably has in mind Plato’s First Alcibiades; as in that dialogue, 
his larger argument here is that the soul exists and is distinct from 
the body, even though it cannot be seen. 
In the First Alcibiades, Socrates draws an analogy. ‘If the eye is 
to see itself, it must look at the eye.’ He then refi nes the position 
further: to see itself, the eye must not only look at the eye, but ‘at 
that part of the eye in which the virtue of the eye resides’, namely, 
‘sight’. So also self-knowledge depends upon the soul looking at 
that part of itself ‘in which virtue resides’, that part of the soul 
‘which has to do with wisdom and knowledge’ and which thus 
‘resembles the divine’. To fulfi l the Delphic precept, ‘Know thy-
self’, Alcibiades must ignore his own handsome body, popularity 
and great wealth, and instead focus on his intellect: that part of 
himself which is able to access ‘wisdom’. In sum, Socrates’ aim 
here is not to convince Alcibiades that his honour, like Achilles’, 
requires other people’s confi rmation. On the contrary, he urges 
Alcibiades to ignore ‘the Athenian people’, lest his ‘true self’ be 
‘spoiled and deformed’. As Shadi Bartsch explains,
the kind of mirroring that takes place here might be designated 
vertical rather than horizontal: what it shows back to the viewer 
is the godlike quality of his own soul, rather than any social truth 
about himself or his visual partner.33 
Strictly speaking, it is possible that Shakespeare had access to 
the First Alcibiades in various contemporary editions of Ficino’s 
Latin translation. More immediately, however, Shakespeare may 
have encountered the conceit of eyes refl ecting other eyes in the 
work of his English contemporaries. Kenneth Deighton points out 
a brief parallel in Nashe’s Unfortunate Traveller: ‘the eye that sees 
round about it selfe, sees not into it selfe.’34 Baldwin draws atten-
tion to similar passages in Sir John Davies’ Nosce Teipsum, both 
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of which echo Cicero fairly closely. ‘The minde is like the eye . . . 
Whose rayes refl ect not, but spread outwardly, / Not seeing it selfe, 
when other things it sees.’ And again: ‘Mine Eyes . . . Looke not 
into this litle world of mine, / Nor see my face, wherein they fi xed 
are.’35 The introduction of the ‘face’ here lends plausibility to the 
idea that these passages may have inspired Cassius’ introductory 
question, ‘Can you see your face?’ Nevertheless, much is missing, 
in particular Shakespeare’s emphasis in both conversations on the 
metaphor of ‘refl ection’. 
In the Library chapter of James Joyce’s Ulysses, John Eglinton, 
proud of his learning, complains of Shakespeare that ‘he puts Bohe-
mia on the sea-coast and makes Ulysses quote Aristotle’.36 The fi rst 
charge is obviously correct, but what about the second? In their 
studies of allusions in Ulysses, Weldon Thornton and Don Gifford 
both see Eglinton as simply mistaken.37 In Troilus and Cressida, it is 
Hector, not Ulysses, who name-drops Aristotle. Debating whether or 
not to return Helen to the Greeks, Hector accuses Paris and Troilus 
of speaking ‘not much / Unlike young men, whom Aristotle thought / 
Unfi t to hear moral philosophy’ (2.2.167–8). The reference is to the 
beginning of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where in discussing his 
method Aristotle emphasises the importance of empirical evidence, 
rather the more abstract ‘demonstrative proofs’ typical of Plato. ‘A 
young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for 
he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life . . . and further, 
since he tends to follow his passions.’38 The reference is not isolated, 
although it is more explicit than usual; W. R. Elton identifi es a num-
ber of other debates, as well, in Troilus and Cressida derived from 
ideas about virtue presented in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.39
Joyce, or Joyce’s Eglinton, may well be right, however, if not per-
haps in the sense that he intended. Shakespeare’s Ulysses does, in 
fact, ‘quote Aristotle’; or at least, pseudo-Aristotle. Shakespeare’s 
chief source for his understanding of the role of the other in self-
perception seems to be Aristotle’s concept of friendship, as mediated 
in particular by an arresting description of the friend as a ‘mirror’, 
needful even for the ‘self-suffi cing man’, in the Magna moralia. ‘The 
way of thinking about self-knowledge expressed in these Aristote-
lian passages’, Christopher Gill observes, ‘is in sharp contrast to 
the idea, central to the Cartesian tradition in modern thought, that 
consciousness or knowledge of oneself is primary and fundamental 
to other kinds of awareness.’40 Within Shakespeare studies, the key 
5877_Gray.indd   234 12/09/18   3:31 PM
 Interpellation and the Other in Antony and Cleopatra [ 235
passage comparing the friend to a mirror has been overlooked as 
a possible source for Troilus and Cressida, most likely because it 
appears in a treatise whose authorship is now disputed, and which 
has largely dropped out of the standard Aristotelian canon.41 In clas-
sics, however, the metaphor has sparked renewed interest, fi guring 
as a touchstone in work by Martha Nussbaum and Shadi Bartsch 
on conceptions of selfhood in antiquity. For Nussbaum, this section 
of this treatise, which she sees as authentically Aristotelian, pres-
ents ‘the clearest version’ of ‘Aristotle’s argument’ that ‘one further 
benefi t of friendly love’ is ‘the increase in self-knowledge and self-
perception that comes of seeing and intuitively responding to a per-
son about whom you care’.42 
The Magna moralia is relatively short, despite its name; schol-
arly opinion remains divided whether it is Aristotle’s own early 
draft of the more complex thought that appears in his Nicoma-
chean and Eudemian Ethics or a simplifi ed epitome put together 
by a later author. For brevity’s sake, I will simply refer to its 
author as ‘Aristotle’; ‘Aristotle’ is who Shakespeare, if he did 
read the work, most likely would have thought its author to be. 
The most relevant passage runs as follows: 
As then when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking 
into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves 
we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the 
friend is, as we assert, a second self. 
The context of the passage is an inquiry about the ability of 
human beings to be self-suffi cient, in the manner of Aristotle’s 
God: ‘for if God is self-suffi cing and has need of none, it does 
not follow that we shall need no one.’43 To be self-suffi cient is 
portrayed as an ideal state, one which the idealised ‘self-suffi cing 
man’, like the Stoic sapiens, can to some degree approximate. Even 
he, however, cannot do without friendship. ‘If, then, it is pleasant 
to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this without having 
someone else for a friend, the self-suffi cing man will require friend-
ship in order to know himself.’44 
Several details suggest that this passage is the primary source 
behind Ulysses’ ‘strange fellow’, as well as Cassius’ proffering him-
self as Brutus’ ‘glass’. Plato’s observations about the eye in the 
First Alcibiades are not irrelevant; Shakespeare may well have been 
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aware of the conceit through one indirect route or another, per-
haps by way of Cicero, perhaps by way of Sir John Davies, and he 
does seem to press it into service here. The argument which he uses 
it to illustrate, however, is not Plato’s, but instead, a variation on 
Aristotle’s theory of friendship. First, the context: Ulysses is trying 
to convince Achilles that he cannot be self-suffi cient, specifi cally, 
that his pride cannot sustain itself, but instead depends upon the 
approbation of other people. Similarly here, Aristotle introduces 
the necessity of friendship for self-knowledge as a limit upon what 
he calls the ‘self-suffi cing man’. Second, the conceit: the emphasis 
throughout both of the passages from Shakespeare’s plays, both 
the one in Julius Caesar, and the one in Troilus and Cressida, on 
‘mirrors’ and ‘refl ection’, ranging from Cassius as Brutus’ ‘glass’ 
to Ulysses’ later and more artful variations on this theme: an ‘arch’ 
that returns the echo of a ‘voice’; a ‘gate of steel’ that refl ects both 
the ‘heat’ and ‘fi gure’ of the ‘sun’. Third and last, Cassius’ descrip-
tion of himself as an idealised friend: a like-minded member of the 
aristocratic elite. ‘Be not jealous on me, gentle Brutus’ (1.2.71), 
Cassius asks. 
Were I a common laughter, or did use
To stale with ordinary oaths my love
To every new protestor; if you know 
That I do fawn on men, and hug them hard,
And after scandal them; or if you know
That I profess myself in banqueting 
To all the rout, then hold me dangerous.
(1.2.72–8)
This emphasis on one singular, virtuous friend, separate from 
the crowd, is very much in the spirit of Aristotle. In the Magna 
moralia, the friend is only a ‘second self’ if he is ‘very great’: ‘as 
the saying has it, “Here is another Hercules, a dear other self.”’ 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says bluntly, ‘such men 
are rare’. Moreover, ‘such friendship requires time and familiar-
ity’. It is only this kind of friendship, however, ‘the friendship of 
the good’, which is ‘proof against slander’.45 That such a friend 
would be compared to a mirror makes more sense, perhaps, if 
we remember that mirrors were once a luxury good. As Shadi 
Bartsch observes:
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we moderns tend to take mirrors for granted: a cheap one can be 
bought for a few cents at any drugstore, and they surround us in 
our lives from the fi rst bathroom stumbles of the morning. The 
ancient mirror, by contrast, was an object of comparative rarity 
and considerable expense.46 
Shakespeare does not simply rest upon what he receives from 
Aristotle, however. Instead, he gradually revises Aristotle’s theory 
of the role of the other in self-perception, so that it comes to rep-
resent his own, rather different social reality instead. Aristotle’s 
sympathies are aristocratic; his social circle, like Plato’s, was hoi 
kaloikagathoi (‘the beautiful and the good’): the upper-class men 
of Athens. The opinion of the dēmos, the people at large, was held 
in relative contempt. The milieu was overwhelmingly homosocial. 
Wealthy, educated men’s primary emotional relationships were, for 
the most part, with each other, often shading over into homosexual 
romance. Aristotle’s idea of the friend as a ‘second self’ shares, as a 
result, many of the qualities that people today might more typically 
look for in a marriage or other romantic partnership. 
Shakespeare, by contrast, was a petit bourgeois, a man from 
the provinces who came to London to seek his fortune. His world 
was primarily that of the theatre, and the theatre as marketplace, 
a freewheeling, entrepreneurial endeavour. For Shakespeare, the 
sturdy support of a single male friend, like Antonio in The Mer-
chant of Venice or Antonio in Twelfth Night, is a great boon; akin, 
one might say, to securing a patron. These characters’ relation-
ships with Bassanio and Sebastian, respectively, are portrayed 
sympathetically, and prove occasions for admirable self-sacrifi ce. 
For all their inherent nobility, however, such friendships also 
prove, in the end, doomed and inadequate. Shakespeare rose to 
prominence hard-pressed by other concerns, as well: those of the 
hustling, cash-poor capitalist. In such circumstances, the esteem of 
one friend is not really enough. 
‘What’s aught but as ’tis valued?’ (2.2.53) Shakespeare’s Troilus 
asks, speaking of Helen. As a professional playwright, Shakespeare 
lived under pressure of much the same question, one with immedi-
ate, economic force. For him, unlike Aristotle, the other that deter-
mines the ‘value’ of the self is not one but many, not a ‘second self’ 
but hoi polloi: the people out there paying to see his plays. As Lars 
Engle points out,
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Shakespeare’s theatre, itself subject to varied contemporary eval-
uations and occasionally threatened with closure by the more 
adverse of them, produced plays for money; the plays so produced 
were subjected to immediate valuation from audiences; through 
them actors strove to please. 
As I discussed in the introduction to this chapter, in Coriolanus, 
especially, Shakespeare uses ‘the marketplace’ as a metaphor for the 
social component of self-esteem regulation. Here, I want to focus 
instead on a related metaphor, that of the theatre. Shakespeare lays 
the groundwork for this underlying conceit in Julius Caesar and 
Troilus and Cressida, and it comes to a head in the play that is 
the subject of this chapter in particular, Antony and Cleopatra. As 
Engle observes, ‘the contingency of evaluation served as a recurrent 
enabling irritant for Shakespeare’s creativity. Problems of worth, 
price, and value everywhere vex his texts.’47 
In Julius Caesar, Cassius invokes the classical topos of the sin-
gle, privileged male friend. At the same time, however, he is care-
ful to suggest that he is only one of many. He speaks not just of 
himself as Brutus’ ‘glass’, but also of ‘mirrors’, plural, and ‘eyes’, 
plural. ‘Many of the best respect in Rome’ (1.2.59), he says, ‘have 
wished that noble Brutus had his eyes’ (1.2.62). He has the con-
spirators scatter anonymous letters to Brutus, so that it seems as 
if an eager audience, the Roman people, is already in place, wait-
ing only for Brutus to act in order to bestow their plaudits. Most 
telling, however, is a conversation between Cassius and Brutus, 
immediately after they assassinate Caesar. 
CASSIUS How many ages hence
 Shall this our lofty scene be acted over
 In states unborn and accents yet unknown?
BRUTUS How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport
 That now on Pompey’s basis lies along,
 No worthier than the dust?
CASSIUS So oft as that shall be,
 So often shall the knot of us be called
 The men who gave their country liberty.
(3.1.111–18)
No such conversation occurs in Plutarch; it is a Shakespearean 
interpolation, of a kind that will return again at more length in 
Antony and Cleopatra. It is also deeply anachronistic. 
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For Roman optimates such as the historical Brutus and 
Cassius, keenly conscious of their aristocratic status, to be asso-
ciated with the theatre would have been a cause for concern, not 
celebration. Mark Antony’s great love of the theatre, for exam-
ple, like the Emperor Nero’s later on, was seen among the sena-
torial class as scandalous, especially among those more mindful 
of traditional class distinctions.48 Conservative statesmen such 
as Brutus and Cassius did not aim to be represented on stage. 
In Antony and Cleopatra, a later play, Shakespeare corrects the 
lapse in his own historicism; Cleopatra is plausibly horrifi ed at 
the thought of being imitated before the public eye. What we 
see here, by contrast, in Julius Caesar, in addition to some rich 
irony, is Shakespeare’s own concept of success, success as a play-
wright, bleeding over into his characterisation of these ancient 
fi gures. He makes sense of the conspirators’ desire for lasting 
glory as liberators of Rome by comparing it to his own desire for 
immortality as an author. The same kind of shading over into 
his own experience occurs in Troilus and Cressida, as well, when 
Ulysses speaks of ‘applause’. The ‘arch’, reverberating with the 
sound of speech, which Shakespeare substitutes there for Aris-
totle’s ‘mirror’ is an allusion to another echoing, circular space: 
the ‘wooden O’ of the theatre. 
Not every play meets with ‘applause’, however. As Brutus 
and Cassius soon discover, their ‘lofty scene’ does not prove the 
smash hit they had expected it to be. Shakespeare’s keen aware-
ness of his own dependence as a playwright on the approval of 
his audience seems the most likely basis for the most radical revi-
sion that he makes to the understanding of the role of the other 
in self-perception that he found in his primary source, Aristotle’s 
theory of friendship. For Aristotle, the friend who serves as the 
‘second self’ is chiefl y an object of contemplation, rather than 
himself a thinking subject. He is not a physician, giving a diagno-
sis; that kind of evaluation is reserved for the self alone. Instead, 
he is more like a portrait of the self, ‘warts and all’, in which 
one’s moral failings can be discerned at one remove. ‘We are not 
able to see what we are from ourselves,’ Aristotle says. 
That we cannot do so is plain from the way in which we blame 
others without being aware that we do the same things ourselves; 
and this is the effect of favor or passion, and there are many of 
us who are blinded by these things so that we judge not aright.49 
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Cicero makes much the same point in De offi ciis: ‘Somehow it is 
the case that we can detect failings better in others than in our-
selves. Consequently a very easy way for pupils to be corrected 
is if their teachers imitate their faults in order to remove them.’50
For Aristotle, a ‘second self’ is valuable, because it allows 
the self to see itself as if it were disinterested. What that second 
self thinks of the self, the other’s opinion of the self, is not really 
important. Shakespeare includes an example of this kind of ‘mir-
ror’ in Antony and Cleopatra, when Caesar receives the news that 
Antony is dead and begins to weep. ‘Caesar is touched’ (5.1.33), 
Agrippa observes. Maecenas replies: ‘When such a spacious mir-
ror’s set before him, / He needs must see himself’ (5.1.34–5). In 
this moment of apparent grief, Caesar invokes Aristotle’s concept 
of the single, extraordinary friend, ‘another Hercules’, describ-
ing Antony in death as ‘my brother, my competitor / In top of all 
design, my mate in empire, / Friend and companion’ (5.1.42–4). 
The comparison fl atters the speaker, however, as well as its subject; 
by praising Antony in these terms, Octavian moves to appropriate 
his dead rival’s residual grandeur for himself.
For Shakespeare, the other is not merely an object, however, 
like a statue or in Antony’s case, a dead body, but an indepen-
dent subjectivity. The other judges the self, and that judgement 
has weight. This independence of the other, a freedom either to 
approve or disapprove of the self, is, in fact, his or her most impor-
tant quality. Whether or not the other resembles the self in exter-
nal, objective respects such as social status, wealth or gender is 
not nearly as important to Shakespeare as it is to Aristotle (or 
Octavian). Instead, what matters is the other’s internal, subjective 
opinion of the self. This new emphasis on the other as a thinking 
subject is the reason why Shakespeare complicates Aristotle’s rela-
tively simple image of a mirror by introducing an additional, much 
more complex simile, the self and the other as two eyes refl ect-
ing each other: a conceit that he borrows, perhaps, from Plato. 
Shakespeare wants to stress the idea that the other is not merely 
an object, like a ‘glass’, but instead itself sentient, itself a locus of 
consciousness. The self looks at the other, and the other, of equal 
dignity, also looks back: ‘eye to eye opposed / Salutes each other 
with each other’s form’ (3.3.108–9). 
In the conversations about intersubjective ‘refl ection’ in Julius 
Caesar and Troilus and Cressida, Shakespeare’s primary point 
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seems to be that the self requires the approval of the other in order 
to sustain its own positive self-image. He points out, in other 
words, the fatal fl aw in narcissism. Narcissus starving beside his 
own refl ection is a symbol of the inability of the proud to sustain 
their pride without Echo, that is, without other people.51 In Troilus 
and Cressida, Agamemnon complains about Achilles’ arrogance 
in terms that evoke, not only Narcissus, but also Shakespeare’s 
Roman paragon of pride, Coriolanus. ‘He that is proud eats up 
himself. Pride is his own glass, his own trumpet, his own chronicle; 
and whatever praises itself but in the deed, devours the deed in the 
praise’ (2.3.156–8). The last conceit here is much compressed, and 
may therefore be obscure; what Agamemnon means is that who-
ever praises himself in any way other than doing the deed itself for 
which he would be praised, forestalls whatever praise would have 
otherwise accrued to him for that deed. 
Agamemnon’s basic premise, that pride leads to a kind of emo-
tional starvation, appears again as a central motif in Coriolanus. 
As Volumnia says, indignant, ‘Anger’s my meat: I sup upon myself / 
And so shall starve with feeding’ (4.2.50 –1). Bakhtin describes 
such narcissism as ‘proud solitude’: the attempt ‘to do without 
recognition, without others’. This would-be escape from the other, 
which he sees as the essence of pride, Bakhtin also sees as pro-
foundly impossible. The proud man cannot heal his wounded hon-
our in isolation, because, Bakhtin explains, ‘no human events are 
developed or resolved within the bounds of single consciousness’. 
‘A single consciousness is contradiction in adjecto. Conscious-
ness is in essence multiple. Pluralia tantum.’ Like Shakespeare, as 
opposed to Aristotle, Bakhtin insists that the other is not simply 
an object of perception, but instead itself an independent, thinking 
subject, collaborating in the very act of perception itself, even as 
it is being perceived. ‘Not another person remaining the object of 
my consciousness, but another autonomous consciousness stand-
ing alongside mine, and my own consciousness can only exist in 
relation to it.’52
In Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare takes the idea that the 
other is a thinking subject, rather than an object, still one step 
further. The other is not merely a necessary sounding-board or 
refl ective device, required to sustain a positive self-image. The 
other is also active, possessed of agency. It need not simply accept 
whatever self-representation the self puts forward, like wax 
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taking on the impress of a seal. Instead, the other can reject that 
image and put forward an alternative, a representation of the 
self that might well be less than fl attering. The self, now on the 
receiving end, is then obliged somehow to metabolise that bitter 
medicine. Just as the other is surprisingly active, so also the self 
can be surprisingly passive. The self can be acted-upon, can have 
its self-image forced into a different shape, whether it wants to 
accept that revision or not. In a lucid moment early on, Antony 
presents this process in a surprisingly positive light, as akin to 
plowing a fi eld or ‘earing’: a pun on ‘hearing’. ‘Oh, then we bring 
forth weeds / When our quick minds lie still, and our ills told us / 
Is as our earing’ (1.2.115–17). Without feedback from others 
regarding our ‘faults’, Antony suggests, we are prone to fall prey 
to delusions about ourselves: ‘weeds’. ‘Speak to me home,’ he 
says. ‘Mince not the general tongue’ (1.2.111).
What if the self, however, does not have such ‘ears to hear’ 
(Ezek. 12:2; Matt. 11:15, 13:9, 13:43; Mark 4:9, 4:23, 7:16; Luke 
8:8, 14:35)? We are not immediately or entirely obliged to change 
our understanding of ourselves, in response to external feedback; 
we can deny the validity of criticism, repress our awareness of 
it, or project it onto someone else; perhaps even the accuser. For 
other people to be able to introduce humbling changes in our self-
perception, the kind of reality check Antony calls ‘earing’, either 
we ourselves must be receptive to that change, or the other must 
be suffi ciently powerful, somehow, to be able to overcome our 
psychological defences: mechanisms such as denial, repression and 
projection, supported by a combination of intelligence, confi dence 
and charisma. That power of the other over the self can come 
about through a single, unusually strong cathexis, such as that 
of Coriolanus with Volumnia or Antony with Cleopatra. It can 
also be a function of sheer, stupefying number, however, as, for 
instance, when the other is not a single person, but an entire popu-
lace: a massive, hostile crowd lining the streets of Rome. Hence the 
signifi cance of the Roman triumph in Shakespeare’s thought: the 
triumph is a species of involuntary theatre, the scenario in which 
the power of the other over the self, a power to revise the self’s 
proffered version of itself, is most keenly evident. To be led in tri-
umph is public exposure of powerlessness at its most extreme: an 
exaggerated, clear-cut version of life’s many other, less overwhelm-
ing occasions for embarrassment.
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‘I would not see’t’: Suicide as Audience Management
In the previous section, I set out Shakespeare’s understanding of the 
relation between self and other in some detail. What are the limits 
of our ability to deceive ourselves, in the interests of preserving an 
internal sense of control? Through the power of the imagination, 
the grandiose self can often persevere, at least temporarily, as if 
sceptical, nay-saying critics were powerless, or did not exist, and 
could not therefore redefi ne its self-image, through their power 
of ‘refl ection’, as less than ideal. This construction of a separate 
world ‘as if’ requires the cooperation, however, of an enabling, 
sympathetic other such as Achilles’ Patroclus or Antony’s Cleopa-
tra. The actor cannot buy into his own ‘supreme Fiction’ without a 
willing audience. In this section, I explain more fully how the idea 
of the other as a ‘mirror’ or ‘glass’ that appears at the beginning of 
Julius Caesar, as well as Brutus’ horror in the end at the thought of 
being led in triumph, becomes in Shakespeare’s later Roman play, 
Antony and Cleopatra, a much more complex investigation of the 
ability of the other to impose moral judgment on the self, a process 
that I call ‘interpellation’, albeit in a different sense than Althusser. 
Human beings are not only passible physically and emotion-
ally, but also ethically. That is to say, we are vulnerable to being 
shamed, despite our ability to retreat into a separate, more subjec-
tive space of imaginative freedom, the interior world Katharine 
Maus describes as ‘inwardness.’ The objective world can intrude 
upon that idyll in the form of the other, even given the surprising 
strength of psychological defences such as denial and dissociation. 
In this section, I focus on the motives behind the cultural prac-
tice Cleopatra calls ‘the high Roman fashion’. The simplest expla-
nation for Roman suicide is that it is a way to turn defeat into 
a kind of victory. Apparent powerlessness becomes instead an 
opportunity for a spectacular display of agency. Once Antony dies, 
Cleopatra the sybarite turns against materiality itself, for example, 
in terms that recall Hamlet, as well as Duke Vincentio in Measure 
for Measure. Now that she is no longer in command, life as a pas-
sible human being, embedded in the ‘grotesque’ material world, 
seems to her to be subject to innumerable indignities. Suicide, by 
contrast, seems to offer the subjective restoration of her former 
sense of omnipotence. Above all, what Antony and Cleopatra both 
alike hope to escape by committing suicide is the possibility of 
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being exposed to moral judgement. To be led in triumph through 
Rome, or to see themselves mocked on stage represents for them 
an intolerable instance of the process that I call ‘interpellation’, in 
which the other forces the self to revise its own self-image, despite 
its efforts to resist that alteration. Caesar would extend his victory 
from the objective world of fact inwards, into the subjective realm 
of self-perception.
In order to forestall this possibility, both Antony and Cleopatra 
turn to the expedient of suicide. As long as they do not let them-
selves see themselves being seen by others as defeated, they believe 
they can preserve their sense of themselves as fi nally victorious. 
Suicide forestalls being exposed to the critics that they know they 
will encounter, if they are ever taken alive to Rome. Instead, the 
two lovers carefully limit their audience to people whom they trust 
to see them as they wish to be seen. This tactic of limiting exposure 
to shame by recourse to what I will call here ‘audience manage-
ment’, as opposed to ‘event management’, also appears in Seneca’s 
advice to aspiring Stoic philosophers. Like Roman suicide, Roman 
‘philosophy’ such as Brutus’ is a performance for a sympathetic 
coterie. Cleopatra’s performance of her own death, as if she were 
again arriving to meet Antony on the banks of the river Cydnus, 
illuminates this theatrical quality of Senecan Stoicism. The histri-
onic nature of the quintessential ‘noble Roman’, Brutus, appears 
in a more obvious, exaggerated form as the efforts of an Egyptian 
queen to preserve her sense of herself as akin to a goddess, Venus. 
Both characters want to see themselves as exemplars of glamorous 
autonomy: the liberty of the Roman patrician; or, in Cleopatra’s 
case, the licence, luxury and imperious autocracy of the Eastern 
potentate. They can identify with these godlike ideal selves, how-
ever, if and only if they can persuade their audience that these 
personae are in fact who they really are.
For Shakespeare’s Romans, the simplest and most immediate 
reason for committing suicide is to thwart an opponent. By rob-
bing an enemy of something he desires, even if only the opportunity 
to gloat, the defeated protagonist demonstrates a fi nal, contrarian 
agency. For instance, Plutarch reports that when Julius Caesar heard 
of Cato’s suicide, he saw it as a blow to his glory, since it robbed 
him of a chance to appear magnanimous. ‘O Cato, I begrudge thee 
thy death; for thou didst begrudge me the sparing of thy life.’53 
From this reply, St Augustine concludes that Cato’s suicide, rightly 
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understood, was an act of envy. Cato ‘envied’ Caesar ‘the glory of 
pardoning him (as indeed Caesar himself is reported to have said); 
or if envy is too strong a word, let us say he was ashamed that this 
glory should be his.’54 When Shakespeare’s Cleopatra tries to kill 
herself, her Roman guard Proculeius protests, ‘Cleopatra, / Do not 
abuse my master’s bounty by / Th’undoing of yourself’ (5.2.41–3). 
So also in Daniel’s version, Proculeius laments: 
Ah Cleopatra, why shouldst thou, (said I)
Both injurie thy selfe and Caesar so?
Barre him the honour of his victorie,
Who ever deales most mildly with his foe?
(303–6)
Suicide is a kind of sabotage, like that committed by a kami-
kaze pilot. It prevents the antagonist from being able to display 
his otherwise-superior power, and that outcome is seen as desir-
able, at whatever cost; even if that power might have been used 
to pardon. ‘’Tis sweet to die when we are forced to live’ (74), says 
Daniel’s Cleopatra. In Shakespeare’s version, Proculeius, trying to 
calm Cleopatra, seems not to realise that he is only exacerbat-
ing her frenzy to escape. ‘Let the world see / His nobleness well 
acted, which your death / Will never let come forth’ (5.2.43–5). 
To act ‘his nobleness’, not her own: that is what Cleopatra refuses 
to accept, no matter how comfortable the terms. She sets up an 
alternative performance of our own, one that she herself can cho-
reograph, precisely to replace and prevent the one that Caesar has 
in mind. 
Above all, suicide forestalls the possibility of being led in tri-
umph. Antony takes satisfaction in the fact that ‘Not Caesar’s 
valor hath o’erthrown Antony, / But Antony’s hath triumphed 
on itself’ (4.15.15–16). When Antony asks Eros to kill him, he 
reassures him, ‘Thou strik’st not me; ’tis Caesar thou defeat’st’ 
(4.14.69). Likewise, Cleopatra maintains, Antony’s wife, Octa-
via, ‘with her modest eyes, / And still conclusion, shall acquire 
no honour / Demuring upon me’: ‘If knife, drugs, serpents, have / 
Edge, sting, or operation, I am safe’ (4.15.26–30). A more thor-
ough explanation of these characters’ suicide would require some 
investigation, however, of the extraordinary distress that they feel 
at the thought of being led in triumph. The ground of such an 
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explanation, I propose, is a feature of human existence that these 
characters instinctively discern and fear: the power of the other to 
interpellate the self.
The concept of interpellation is associated with Althusser, 
who uses it to explain what he sees as the relationship between 
‘ideology’ and the individual: 
Ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ sub-
jects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ 
the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very 
precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and 
which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace 
everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’55 
The metaphor is familiar, and for that reason useful here, although 
it makes more sense in this case to assign it a different tenor. What 
Althusser imagines an impersonal force, ‘ideology’, doing to indi-
viduals, Shakespeare sees individuals incessantly doing to each other. 
Each individual consciousness is at once active and passive, inter-
pellating others and being interpellated in turn, like eyes refl ecting 
other eyes. Such interpellation can be resisted, but not entirely. In 
the perpetual negotiation with the other over self-perception that I 
have described, at times a peaceful collaboration, but at other times a 
violent confl ict, a triumph is the nuclear option, penetrating even the 
most hardened, wilfully solipsistic, self-enclosed self-consciousness. 
Only one escape seems to remain: pre-emptive suicide. 
The relationship between triumph and suicide Shakespeare 
explores in Antony and Cleopatra elaborates upon a germinal ver-
sion of the connection that he found in Daniel’s Cleopatra. There, in 
her opening monologue, Cleopatra spends some time refl ecting on 
the particular horror of being ‘seene’ as powerless, and its incom-
patibility with her own understanding of her ‘selfe’: 
Thinke Caesar, I that liv’d and raign’d a Queene
Doe scorne to buy my life at such a rate,
That I should underneath my selfe be seene,
Basely induring to survive my state:
That Rome should see my scepter-bearing hands
Behind me bound, and glory in my teares,
That I should passe whereas Octavia stands,
To view my miserie that purchas’d hers.
(63–70)
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Shakespeare’s Cleopatra replies to Proculeius:
 Know, sir, that I 
Will not wait pinioned at your master’s court,
Nor once be chastis’d with the sober eye
Of dull Octavia. Shall they hoist me up
And show me to the shouting varletry
Of censuring Rome? Rather a ditch in Egypt
Be gentle grave unto me!
(5.2.51–7)
The images here of being pinioned and hoisted aptly convey the 
powerlessness, the sense of being transformed into object, which 
Cleopatra hopes to escape. As before, she emphasises the gaze: 
Octavia’s ‘sober eye’ seconds the image of her ‘modest eye’, ear-
lier, in Cleopatra’s conversation with Antony. Cleopatra’s stated 
preference to stay in Egypt, under whatever circumstances, further 
clarifi es the nature of her distress. It is not simply public expo-
sure that is the problem, but the attitude of that public, hostile or 
friendly. ‘Rather make / My country’s high pyramids my gibbet 
/ And hang me up in chains!’ (5.2.59–61). If she must perforce 
undergo some sort of public humiliation, Cleopatra would rather 
that it happen in Egypt, because she believes that she will fi nd 
there a more sympathetic audience. The Egyptian peasants would 
be respectful, deferential, or so she seems to imagine, not ‘shout-
ing’ or ‘censuring’ as they would be in Rome.
In more general terms, however, Cleopatra is no great admirer 
of the working class. She associates them with being acted upon, 
that is, the state of passibility matter itself represents. Antony and 
Cleopatra opens with Antony denouncing ‘kingdoms’ as ‘clay’ and 
the ‘earth’ as ‘dungy’, feeding alike both ‘beast and man’ (1.1.36–7). 
‘The nobleness of life’, he proclaims, is in contrast ‘to do thus’ 
(1.1.37–8), presumably, embracing or kissing Cleopatra. What is 
‘noble’ is to escape from the restrictions upon the self that matter 
imposes into an alternative, mutually sustained fantasy world of 
infi nite, godlike splendor: ‘new heaven, new earth.’ Antony dead, 
Cleopatra fi nds herself brought back down, however, to ‘this dull 
world’, which she now sees as ‘no better than a sty’ (4.15.63–4): 
‘the dung’, she calls it, which is both ‘the beggar’s nurse and 
Caesar’s’ (5.2.7–8). Cleopatra is often interpreted as a voluptu-
ary, and for most the play she is. What we see here, however, is a 
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reversal of that perspective: a marked disdain for matter, once it is 
no longer under her control. 
Cleopatra’s retreat from materiality appears later, as well, in 
a conversation with her chambermaid Iras, as they discuss Dola-
bella’s report that Caesar intends to send them to Rome. ‘Now, 
Iras, what think’st thou?’ (5.2.206) she asks:
Thou an Egyptian puppet shall be shown
In Rome as well as I. Mechanic slaves
With greasy aprons, rules and hammers shall
Uplift us to the view.
(5.2.207 –10)
‘Puppet’ here recalls ‘pinioned’, earlier, and ‘uplift’, ‘hoist’; the 
point is that Cleopatra and Iras will no longer be autonomous cen-
tres of agency, but instead acted upon from without, like blocks of 
wood – or like victims of a crucifi xion. ‘Slaves’ reinforces the idea 
of a loss of ‘liberty’. ‘Rules and hammers’ echoes Antony’s vow to 
Octavia, just after their marriage: ‘I have not kept my square, but 
that to come / Shall all be done by th’ rule’ (2.3.6–7). Cleopatra’s 
reference to such ‘mechanic’ tools, ‘rules and hammers’, in so far 
as it recalls Antony’s ‘rule’ and ‘square’, reveals her fear of being 
subjected to either form of constraint, the moral (‘patience’, ‘tem-
perance’) as well as the material (‘pinioned’). 
The other underlying strain in Cleopatra’s portrait of the 
Roman people is disgust at the basic fact of human embodiment. 
The description of the plebeians’ aprons as ‘greasy’, for exam-
ple, recalls her earlier description of the entire ‘world’ as a ‘sty’. 
Cleopatra continues, to Iras’ horror: ‘In their thick breaths, / Rank 
of gross diet, shall we be enclouded / And forced to drink their 
vapour’ (5.2.210 –12). Cleopatra’s disdain for people of Rome, 
forced, as she sees them, by their poverty to do ‘mechanic’ labour, 
their breath ‘thick’ with the stink of ‘gross diet’, is itself inspired by 
a reaction against the nature of matter itself as acted upon, rather 
than agent. As imprisonment, like old age, can make all too pain-
fully clear, the body itself is a curb upon the autonomy of the will, 
more often than it is its uncomplaining instrument. 
Cleopatra’s desire to escape the ‘dung’ of ‘this dull world’, once 
it is no longer hers to command, a disgust that she projects on 
to symbols of embodiment, is not far afi eld from Hamlet’s wish 
that his ‘fl esh’ would ‘melt, / Thaw and resolve itself into a dew’ 
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(1.2.129–30). Hamlet is not simply or solely Puritanical here; his 
revulsion at the fl esh is the obverse of his desire to escape from 
what he sees as a kind of prison. The Neoplatonic, Gnostic fantasy 
of becoming pure soul, bodiless, is misunderstood if conceived of 
as mere priggery. In extremis, a desire to escape being ‘fl esh and 
blood’ can also be interpreted as a manifestation of the aristocrat’s 
characteristic desire for liberty at whatever price, even death: the 
characteristic effort of the ‘noble Roman’ to transcend passibility 
itself.
The climax of Cleopatra’s speech on the horrifying indignities 
that await her and Iras in Rome is the prospect of being mocked 
on stage.
 The quick comedians
Extemporally will stage us and present
Our Alexandrian revels; Antony
Will be brought drunken forth; and I shall see
Some squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness
I’th’ posture of a whore.
(5.2.215–20)
‘Extemporally’: the ‘quick’ comedians now, not Cleopatra, will be 
the ones with the power to be spontaneous, to act upon a whim, 
independent of that ‘time’ (ex tempore) that I have described 
already as her enemy. Not only that, but worse, they will redefi ne as 
low, mundane and reprehensible (‘drunken’, ‘squeaking’, ‘whore’) 
those moments, ‘our Alexandrian revels’, which for Cleopatra were 
the height of her ‘greatness’: Antony at her beck and call, amid all 
the riches of Egypt. Finally, worst of all, Cleopatra will be forced 
to ‘see’ all this herself; she will be among the audience. Iras, in 
response, proposes a solution. ‘I’ll never see’t, for I am sure my 
nails / Are stronger than mine eyes!’ (5.2.222–3). The suggestion 
is characteristic of Cleopatra and her court. Iras’ proposal to blind 
herself echoes Cleopatra’s threat to ‘spurn’ the ‘eyes’ of the messen-
ger who brings her news of Antony’s marriage; physical mutilation 
is a physical analogue of Cleopatra’s wilful, self-imposed blindness 
throughout to the limits on her own power, as well as Antony’s. 
Her and her chambermaids’ response to a loss of power is, in gen-
eral, denial. If the relational process of self-perception starts to tip 
towards a loss of prestige, they opt out; metaphorically speaking, 
they rip out their own eyes, like Oedipus. 
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Understood as a means to an end, suicide is not inconsis-
tent with Cleopatra’s character, a sudden outbreak of unwonted 
Roman Stoicism, but instead the culmination of a lifelong ten-
dency towards wilful obliviousness. Hence the subtitle of this sec-
tion: ‘Suicide as Audience Management’. In this play, one way of 
dealing with humiliation, the Roman way, is what I would call 
‘event management’: to strive to change the external world, so 
that that humiliation dissipates. The quintessential Roman, once 
checked or slighted in some way, becomes aggressive, like Corio-
lanus. Taking up arms, he aims to acquire compensatory power 
‘out there’, outside his own imagination, as Octavian does, for 
example, in his relentless rivalry with the other triumvirs. Another 
way of dealing with humiliation, however, the Egyptian way, is 
what I would call ‘audience management’: to limit exposure to 
the other to a carefully selected, sympathetic audience, so that the 
humiliation in question can be successfully denied. As I proposed 
earlier, Rome in this play represents the objective expression of 
libido dominandi, whereas Egypt represents its inward involution. 
That turn to the subjective cannot be accomplished in isolation, 
however. It requires collaboration, like that which can be found in 
a romantic relationship.
The other can conceivably serve as a catalyst for the recognition 
of the truth. But exposure to the other can also be fi nessed. Con-
trarian voices can be suborned; pressed into the service of some 
pleasing falsehood. Intransigent naysayers can be dismissed. Yes-
men can be promoted. This kind of cultivation of a coterie audi-
ence is not alien to Roman Stoicism, but in fact deeply woven into 
its working structure. Considered as an abstraction, the Stoic wise 
man should, of course, be indifferent to the opinion of others. In 
practice, however, Stoicism, like Cleopatra’s suicide, is a perfor-
mance for an elite audience, a small group of fellow sages who are 
‘in the know’. A. D. Nuttall sees in Shakespeare’s Brutus ‘a con-
scious Stoic’, performing ‘an aggregate of intellectual and social 
postures’.56 His behaviour is theatrical, performative, like that of 
Richard II; he is trying to convince an audience, and thereby, indi-
rectly, himself, that he really is what in fact he is only pretending 
to be. 
For whom, exactly, is Brutus performing? Who is the Stoic’s 
audience? In his Letters, Seneca urges Lucilius not to seek approval 
from the masses, like too many of the other self-proclaimed 
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‘philosophers’ of his time. ‘Hucksters’, he calls them (circulatores, 
lit. ‘mountebanks, travelling showmen’). ‘For what is baser than 
philosophy courting applause?’ ‘Scorn the pleasure which comes 
from the applause of the majority.’ Seneca recognises, however, 
that the strenuous effort involved in the actual practice of Sto-
icism, especially early on, cannot be sustained without some sort 
of audience, whose approval the Stoic hopes to win. ‘While it is 
not yet safe to withdraw into solitude, seek out certain individuals; 
for everyone is better off in the company of someone or other – no 
matter whom – than in his own company alone.’ Better anyone 
than no one: ‘I am content only if you act, in whatever you do, as 
you would act if anyone at all were looking on, because solitude 
prompts us to all kinds of evil.’ Seneca would prefer, however, 
that Lucilius associate with ‘good men’. ‘Nothing is more success-
ful in bringing honourable infl uences to bear upon the mind or 
in straightening out the wavering spirit that is prone to evil than 
association with good men.’57
Seneca advises Lucilius, the would-be Stoic, to seek approval 
for his actions from what could be described as an audience of 
ever-increasing interiority.58 ‘Withdraw into yourself as far as you 
can. Associate with those who will make a better man of you.’ 
He urges Lucilius to retreat from the population at large to the 
confi nes of a small coterie; even to the tutelage of a single mentor. 
‘We should . . . have a guardian to pluck us continually by the 
ear and dispel rumors and protest against popular enthusiasms.’ 
It is ‘indispensable’, he says, ‘that we have some advocate with 
upright mind and, amid all the uproar and jangle of falsehood, 
hear one voice only’ (94.59). Ideally, Lucilius would live among 
the philosophers themselves that he admires and attempt to win 
their approval by imitating their day-to-day life. ‘The living voice 
and intimacy of a common life will help you more than the writ-
ten word.’59 
Seneca then imagines Lucilius’ reply. ‘“Whom,” you say, “shall 
I call upon? Shall it be this man or that?” There is another choice 
also open to you; you may go to the ancients; for they have the 
time to help you. We can get assistance not only from the living, 
but also from those of the past.’ If the Stoic tyro cannot fi nd wise 
men among the living, then he should imagine that he is perform-
ing for some great man from the past. ‘Choose a master whose life, 
conversation and soul-expressing face have satisfi ed you; picture 
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him always to yourself as your protector or your pattern.’ ‘Choose 
. . . Cato, or if Cato seems too severe, choose some Laelius, a gen-
tler spirit.’ ‘Set as a guard over yourself the authority of some man, 
whether your choice be the great Cato, or Scipio, or Laelius.’60 For 
Shakespeare’s Brutus, this watchful model seems to be chiefl y his 
ancestor Lucius Junius Brutus. Cassius tells Cinna, for example, to 
be sure to post a letter urging Brutus to oppose Caesar ‘upon old 
Brutus’ statue’ (1.3.146).
For Seneca, which master, exactly, the aspiring Stoic sage 
chooses as his mentor is not terribly important: what is important 
is that he imagine an audience of some sort, and that this audience 
be limited to those who would approve of Stoicism. ‘Live as you 
would live under the eyes of some good man, always at your side.’ 
‘Live with the Catos, with Laelius, with Tubero. Or, if you enjoy 
living with the Greeks also, spend your time with Socrates and 
with Zeno . . . Live with Chrysippus, with Posidonius: . . . they 
will bid you be stout of heart and rise superior to your threats.’ 
The ultimate ideal, however, is one of unfettered self-suffi ciency, 
in which even this imaginary audience of wise men from the 
past becomes unnecessary. Ideally, the Stoic sapiens is his own 
audience; he performs for himself and needs no one’s respect or 
approval other than his own. ‘You are engaged in making yourself 
the sort of person in whose company you would not dare to sin . . . 
When you have progressed so far that you . . . have respect for 
yourself, you may send away your attendant.’ ‘Be your own spec-
tator; seek your own applause.’61
In Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare recreates this kind of 
‘audience management’, but divorces it from what might be called 
the ‘usual suspects’: severe Roman Republican optimates such as 
Cato and Brutus. Instead, we have their polar opposites, Cleopatra 
and her court, performing the characteristic withdrawal from the 
world Seneca so strongly advocates. Alone together in the end in 
an isolated monument, Cleopatra and her court cultivate a coterie 
audience, themselves, so as to protect their imperiled self-esteem. 
It may seem startling to say so, but the scene recalls, in a sense, 
the death of Socrates, or of Seneca himself: the philosopher fac-
ing death in the company of a few select disciples. ‘Adopting high-
Stoic rhetoric of resolute suicide,’ Eric Langley observes, ‘Cleopatra 
successfully unifi es the Roman and Egyptian, bringing both models 
together in a single act.’62
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When Cleopatra appropriates buzzwords of Stoic rhetoric such 
as ‘liberty’ and ‘constancy’, Shakespeare drives a point home that 
he had already begun to make more subtly in Julius Caesar. The 
point is not that Cleopatra, posing as a Stoic, is an emblem of 
hypocrisy, but rather that Stoicism itself, like Cleopatra, is inher-
ently a species of ‘hypocrisy’ (Greek, hypocrisis, literally ‘play-act-
ing, role-playing’). The Stoic is just as histrionic as the Egyptian 
queen; he just happens to be playing a different role, for a different 
audience. Cleopatra takes refuge in the thought of Antony; so also 
the Stoic novice, in imagining the approval of some great man from 
the past. So, too, St Augustine, contemplating how he will stand 
before God. Safe in the thought of one person’s approval, they 
are each able, to a surprising extent, to disregard all others. Clif-
ford Ronan sees this aspect of Stoicism as especially pronounced 
in early modern English depictions of Stoic suicide. ‘The element 
of pose and display in ancient Stoicism is strongly refl ected in the 
Renaissance stage treatment of suicidal constancy, where there is 
only a fi ne line between heroism and heroics.’63
Having lost Antony, facing the imminent prospect of being 
led in triumph, Shakespeare’s Cleopatra, like Brutus before her, 
knows that she must take pre-emptive action. Otherwise, she will 
be forced to suffer an irresistible interpellation; she will fi nd herself 
redefi ned, even to herself, as less than absolute mistress of her-
self. Antony faces the same predicament earlier, when he comes 
to believe that Cleopatra is dead. Like Cleopatra addressing Iras, 
imagining herself being parodied on-stage, Antony explains to his 
manservant, Eros, ‘th’inevitable prosecution of / Disgrace and hor-
ror’ (4.14.66–7) which he foresees, if he should live.
Wouldst thou be windowed in great Rome and see
Thy master thus with pleached arms, bending down
His corrigible neck, his face subdued
To penetrative shame, whilst the wheeled seat
Of fortunate Caesar, drawn before him, branded
His baseness that ensued?
(4.14.73–8)
‘I would not see’t’ (4.14.78), Eros replies, foreshadowing Iras’ 
more dramatic vow that she would rather tear out her own eyes. 
Eros also blinds himself, in a sense, but by a different means: sui-
cide. ‘Thus’, he says, ‘do I escape the sorrow / Of Antony’s death’ 
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(4.14.95–6). Even in the absence of stage directions, it is fairly 
clear that Antony in some sense enacts the scene he describes: ‘thy 
master thus [etc.]’, he says. In ‘bending down’ to await the death 
blow that he expects from Eros, he foreshadows what it would 
look like if he were led in triumph; by turning from him, he shows 
what Eros himself is doing by committing suicide: averting his 
eyes. Eros’ sense of himself, like Cleopatra’s, is so tightly bound to 
Antony’s that he cannot bear to live, if he must fi rst see his master 
either dead or defeated; it would be an intolerable humiliation for 
him, as well, by association. As Ewan Fernie explains, ‘the subject 
of shame may be ashamed of itself directly or because of others 
upon whom its honour depends.’64 Suicide allows Eros to escape 
the shame that Enobarbus, too, fi nds intolerable; the ignominy of 
seeing the source, if only by proxy, of his own sense of self, his 
master, rendered powerless. 
Although distraught over Antony’s death, Cleopatra aims for 
more, however, than merely ending her own ability to perceive. 
She wants to change the narrative, so that she can see herself as 
once again the powerful queen she once was. As if to replace 
even the prospect in the mind of possibly being led in triumph, 
a kind of involuntary theatre, Cleopatra sets up her suicide as a 
stage-show of her own design, one in which she will be again, if 
only in her own imagination, as she was at the moment of her 
own greatest triumph, her fi rst meeting with Mark Antony on the 
banks of the river Cydnus. ‘Show me, my women, like a queen’ 
(5.2.226), she says. ‘Go fetch / My best attires. I am again for 
Cydnus / To meet Mark Antony’ (5.2.226–8). ‘Bring our crown 
and all’ (5.2.231), she adds, a moment after. Then, once the asp 
arrives: ‘Give me my robe. Put on my crown’ (5.2.279). ‘I have 
immortal longings in me,’ she reveals (5.2.279–80). She is dream-
ing of the afterlife, one in which, she believes, such fi nery will be 
appropriate.
Immediately following Antony’s death, Cleopatra’s fi rst response 
is to lament how empty the world seems without him. ‘All’s but 
naught’ (4.15.82), she says. Now, however, she sees a way out of 
her ‘desolation’: ‘a better life’ (5.2.1). She will meet Antony in the 
afterlife, and they will live there again as lovers, as before, scoff-
ing at their enemies; praising each other; even enjoying each oth-
er’s embrace. ‘Methinks I hear / Antony call’ (5.2.282–3), she tells 
Iras. ‘I see him rouse himself / To praise my noble act. I hear him 
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mock / The luck of Caesar’ (5.2.283–5). When Iras dies fi rst, 
Cleopatra makes haste to join her. ‘If she fi rst meet the curled Ant-
ony, / He’ll make demand of her, and spend that kiss / Which is my 
heaven to have’ (5.2.300–2). ‘Husband, I come!’ she cries (5.2.286). 
Cleopatra’s language echoes Antony’s own, earlier, as he prepares 
to kill himself, believing that Cleopatra has already gone on ahead. 
‘I come, my queen,’ he says. ‘Stay for me’ (4.14.51). 
Where souls do couch on fl owers we’ll hand in hand
And with our sprightly port make the ghosts gaze,
Dido and her Aeneas shall want troops,
And all the haunt be ours. 
(4.14.52–5)
Like Cleopatra’s play within a play, ‘again for Cydnus’, the after-
life becomes here in Antony’s imagination the opposite of the tri-
umph that he fears. In the next world, he and Cleopatra will draw 
all eyes upon them, as Cleopatra did upon her arrival at his camp; 
they will be objects of admiration, however, not scorn, as they 
would be now, if they arrived in Rome as captives of Octavian. 
They will have ‘troops’, as they now no longer do; they will be 
masters of the next world, ‘all the haunt’, as they now can no 
longer hope to be in this one. They may even enjoy the pleasures 
of sexual relations: ‘couch’ is suggestive, as are the two lovers’ 
separate descriptions of their deaths. Cleopatra compares the asp’s 
bite to ‘a lover’s pinch’. Antony compares his suicide to a wedding 
night: ‘I will be / A bridegroom in my death and run into’t / As to 
a lover’s bed’ (4.14.100–2). 
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CONCLUSION TO PART II: THE LAST 
INTERPELLATION
For Janet Adelman, Antony and Cleopatra both manage in the end 
to avoid any kind of defi nitive moral judgement. There is no ‘privi-
leged observer’ who can provide a fi nal answer; no omnipotent 
judge who can impose a decisive interpellation. Through metathe-
atrical ‘framing’, the audience is kept at a distance from the action, 
uncertain which perspective to take, as centuries of divided assess-
ments attest. Anne Barton for her part observes that Octavian seems 
for a time as if he might possess the power of a fi nal judgement. 
‘If only’ he can manage to return to Rome with Cleopatra, leading 
her in triumph, then ‘he will fi x the qualities of the story forever in 
his terms, which are those of the strumpet and the gorgon, not the 
lass unparallel’d and the Mars’. Cleopatra will ‘fade into a mere 
parody queen’. Through suicide, however, the two lovers seem to 
be able to escape even him. Shakespeare combines Robert Garnier’s 
and Samuel Daniel’s earlier versions of the story into what Barton 
calls a ‘divided catastrophe’: fi rst Antony’s death, then Cleopatra’s. 
Antony, clearly, ‘bungles his death’. Cleopatra, however, ‘dies per-
fectly, as a tragedy queen’. She not only forces Octavian ‘to become 
an actor in her tragedy’, but also ‘redeems the bungled and clumsy 
nature of Antony’s death’.1
These interpretations are not so much incorrect as incomplete. 
Barton misses the fact that Shakespeare includes a third catastrophe, 
this one truly fi nal: ‘doomsday’ (5.2.231). Adelman misses Shake-
speare’s hints that there might be, in fact, a ‘privileged observer’: 
God. Adelman recognises that the protagonists’ ‘vision of themselves’ 
is ‘merely one in a series of competing visions’. As she observes, ‘the 
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device of framing forcibly dissociates us from the lovers’. ‘For much 
of the play, we live outside their immediate universe and see them 
with distressing clarity from perspectives which are alien to their 
own.’2 What Adelman does not recognise, however, is that one of 
those ‘perspectives’ or ‘visions’, introduced through ironic allusion 
to Scripture, is that of the person Katharine Maus calls ‘the hyposta-
sized divine observer’. As Maus explains, for a Christian, each indi-
vidual is ‘simultaneously the object of a double scrutiny: of a human 
vision that is fallible, partial, and superfi cial, and of a divine vision 
that is infallible, complete, and penetrating’.3 
Ewan Fernie, citing Maus, advises, ‘If we are to reconstruct 
even an approximation of the experience of the persons of the 
early modern period, we must imagine them as more or less aware 
at any particular moment of existing simultaneously in society 
and before God.’4 Fernie then gives an intriguing example: Shake-
speare’s Richard II imagining himself as this ‘divine observer’, con-
fronting Bolingbroke. 
When this thief, this traitor Bolingbroke,
Who all this while hath reveled in the night
Whilst we were wandering with the Antipodes,
Shall see us rising in our throne, the east,
His treasons will sit blushing in his face, 
Not able to endure the sight of day, 
But self-affrighted, tremble at his sin.
(3.2.47–53)
Maus cites the Anglican Book of Common Prayer: God is him 
‘unto whom all hearts be open, all desires known, and from whom 
no secrets are hid’.5 So, too, Octavian seems to wish he could be, 
face to face with his archrival. When Antony arrives in Rome, 
Octavian confronts him forthwith with his ‘defects of judgement’ 
(2.2.60), only to be thwarted and made to look ridiculous by Ant-
ony’s ‘excuses’ and unshakable disdain (2.2.61). God, by contrast, 
would not be so easily disregarded. Fernie writes:
If they felt that they were acting on the stage of the world, 
Renaissance people also knew that the play would soon be taken 
over and judged by God. In fact, God is always taken to be 
watching, looking down on his theatrum mundi, his judgment 
necessarily more defi nitive than that of any earthly audience.6
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As Jesus says in the Gospels, ‘there is nothing covered, that shall 
not be disclosed, nor hid, that shall not be known’ (Matt. 10:26).
Literary critics infl uenced by Romanticism, including most 
notably Schlegel, Hugo, Hazlitt, Swinburne and Bradley, tend to 
sympathise with Cleopatra and even exalt her as transcendent.7 
She is for them Shakespeare’s portrait of an artist creating herself, 
her own persona, in defi ance of a more mundane reality. Like later 
modernists, these critics fi nd in art an alternative to traditional 
religion, a secular substitute which they seek to glorify. Art is for 
them what Wallace Stevens calls ‘the supreme Fiction’.8 Cleopatra 
as artist, staging her own glorious demise, opting without shame 
or qualifi cation for ‘fancy’ over ‘nature’, seems by this light an 
ethical exemplum. Her effort to transmute the lead of the world 
into the gold of her own fantasy is not quixotic, but heroic.9 
This problem with this vein of criticism is that it is too one-sided; 
too partial to Cleopatra herself. It accurately represents her point 
of view, but her perspective is not that of the play as a whole.10 To 
read Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra from the point of view 
of Cleopatra is like reading The Sorrows of Young Werther from 
the perspective of Werther. It is that rara avis these days, a failure 
of due critical suspicion. In a conversation with his friend, Johann 
Peter Eckermann, later in life, Goethe explained that writing The 
Sorrows of Young Werther ‘freed’ him from a ‘stormy element’, 
including a temptation to commit suicide, much as Werther does. 
‘I felt, as if after a general confession, once more happy and free, 
and justifi ed in beginning a new life.’ To his horror, however, the 
book was misunderstood, prompting a wave of copy-cat suicides. 
‘While I felt relieved and enlightened by having turned reality into 
poetry, my friends were led astray by my work,’ Goethe recalled. 
For they thought that poetry ought to be turned into reality, that 
such a moral was to be imitated, and that, at any rate, one ought 
to shoot oneself. What had fi rst happened here among a few, 
afterwards took place among the larger public.11 
If Antony and Cleopatra are correct about what they will 
experience in the afterlife, then they achieve in death a rare vic-
tory. Through the intensity of their romance, an extravagant folie 
à deux, as well as their noble resolution in committing suicide, 
they manage to avoid being forced to sustain any perception of 
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themselves as less than divine. By relying on each other, they pro-
tect themselves from being interpellated by any sceptical other, 
ranging from Octavian, to Octavia, to Antony’s own men, who 
denounce him and abandon him after his ignominious fl ight 
from Actium. Even Octavian fi nds himself forced to grant them a 
degree of grandeur, in the end. He weeps for Antony and consents 
to allow Cleopatra to be buried with him. 
Their suicides are a gamble, however. An atheist and aesthete 
such as Swinburne can praise Cleopatra in the strongest pos-
sible terms as ‘an ideal incarnation’, ‘the perfect and everlasting 
woman’, because he assumes with blithe confi dence that there is 
no afterlife, except in art, and that Shakespeare, the playwright in 
question, her creator, surely would agree.12 If death is the end of 
our affairs, then Antony and Cleopatra do indeed win a kind of 
victory. They may not meet each other once more in Elysium in the 
way that they expect, but they still manage to preserve an admira-
ble degree of autonomy. Even if their hope for a new life together 
after death, like their grandiose image of themselves in this life, 
is only ‘fancy’, a mere ‘dream’, it is theirs, their ‘space’, which 
they work together to create and protect. They manage to pre-
serve their delusion safe from the designs of the conniving, ruth-
less Octavian, and that degree of ‘liberty’, that control over their 
own subjectivity, is itself a glorious display of agency. Moreover, 
they have the atheist’s version of the afterlife, earthly fame. ‘No 
grave upon the earth shall clip in it / A pair so famous,’ Octavian 
proclaims (5.2.358–9). The dead lovers have won what Enobarbus 
calls ‘a place i’th’ story’ (3.13.47). 
The possibility that death is simply the end of consciousness 
is evoked by the recurrent comparisons between death and sleep, 
just as the possibility that Antony and Cleopatra will meet again 
after death is evoked by Cleopatra’s account of her ‘dream’ of 
Antony. Another possibility remains, however, albeit one that 
may not be to every critic’s taste. In contrast to the encomia of 
nineteenth-century critics such as Swinburne, Schlegel and Hugo, 
this off-stage, adumbrated ending runs contrary to the play’s pro-
nounced, sympathetic strain of what we would now call Roman-
ticism: its exaltation of the idea that we can escape through the 
power of our imagination, as well as sheer passionate intensity 
of purpose, into an alternative world that we ourselves create.13 
Over the course of the play, Shakespeare includes several pointed 
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suggestions that the afterlife might be neither annihilation, nor 
the Elysium of the lovers’ ‘fancy’, but instead, as indeed, most of 
the theatergoers of his time would have believed, an encounter 
with the Christian God. 
In his use of allusion in Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare 
capitalises on the gap between his characters’ idealised imagina-
tion of what they will encounter and Christian beliefs about their 
more likely fate. Pagan ignorance of Christian revelation stands in 
sharp contrast to the Christian sense of an inevitable Day of Judge-
ment. Cleopatra wonders aloud at one point: ‘Is it sin / To rush 
into the secret house of death / Ere death come to us?’ (4.5.84–6). 
As Paul Cantor notes, ‘this is the only moment in all three Roman 
plays in which anyone regards suicide as a sin’.14 Shakespeare 
introduces an anachronism here in order to signal to the audience, 
in Cleopatra’s own voice, not to consider her a reliable narrator. 
Her knowledge of the ‘secret house of death’, like Antony’s, is 
incomplete. 
‘Where souls do couch on fl owers’: Antony’s description of what 
he expects to experience in the afterlife, although enchanting, gives 
room for pause. As the more learned in the audience would have 
known, ‘Dido and her Aeneas’ do not end up together in the under-
world. When Aeneas visits Dido in Hades, she refuses to speak to 
him, still angry at having been betrayed, and chooses instead to 
remain with her husband Sychaeus.15 T. S. Eliot describes the scene 
as ‘perhaps the most telling snub in all of poetry’.16 Antony has no 
way of knowing the true state of ‘Dido and her Aeneas’; he has 
made no Virgilian katabasis himself. But the audience, so to speak, 
does ‘know’, because they have read the Aeneid, just as they also 
know about Christian revelation. 
In his study of the Roman plays in early modern England, 
Clifford Ronan points out that their tendency towards occa-
sional anachronism was long misunderstood or slighted by later 
scholars as mere ignorant error, when in fact it is often used to 
convey important shades of meaning. From Ronan’s perspective, 
‘all literature employs multiple chronotypes simultaneously’. ‘By 
its very nature,’ he argues, ‘a history play will refl ect language, 
beliefs, and customs not just of the age during which it is fi ctively 
set, but also of the age when the dramatist and his audience are 
living.’ ‘The most interesting moments to analyze’ are, therefore, 
‘those when the dramatist prompts a spectator to travel from the 
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play’s chief historical chronotope to some present-day or eternal 
one.’ ‘Ancient Judeo-Christian allusions’, for example, ‘make 
audiences confront the differences between pagan and Christian 
lifestyles.’17
More recently, Ronan notes, critics have come to appreciate 
and even emphasise the possibility of deliberate dramatic irony. 
For Phyllis Rackin, for example, anachronism serves in context 
as a kind of Brechtian ‘alienation device’. Much like the ‘framing’ 
that Adelman sees as characteristic of the dramatic structure of 
Antony and Cleopatra, the intrusion of some obvious reference 
to the future introduces dramatic irony, highlighting the limita-
tions of the characters’ perspective in comparison to that of the 
audience. When Cleopatra imagines seeing some ‘squeaking’ child 
actor ‘boy’ her ‘greatness’ (5.2.219), or Brutus and Cassius imag-
ine their assassination of Caesar being reenacted ‘in states unborn 
and accents yet unknown’ (3.1.113), ‘the anachronistic reference 
to the present theatrical occasion reminds the audience of the vast 
gulf of time and awareness that separates them from the historical 
events represented on stage.’18
Out of all of Shakespeare’s Roman plays, Antony and Cleopa-
tra contains the most allusions to Christian Scripture. Christian-
ity in this play is less anachronistic than it might be in others; the 
events that it describes coincide more closely in time with key 
events of Christian history than those of any other Roman play. 
Octavian’s ascent as ‘Augustus Caesar’ corresponds very closely 
to the emergence of the Christian Messiah. When Cleopatra 
calls Antony ‘Lord of lords’ (4.8.22; cf. Rev. 17:14) or Caesar 
proclaims, ‘The time of universal peace is near’ (4.6.5), these 
statements have an irony beyond the awareness of the characters 
themselves.19 They invoke the Christian sequel to their ‘place i’ 
th’ story’.20 
In an article on dramatic irony in Antony and Cleopatra, 
William Blissett points out that Shakespeare incorporates repeated 
references to ‘Herod of Jewry’. To be fair, Herod appears in Plu-
tarch, as well, as part of the political action.21 Shakespeare, how-
ever, takes pains to make the allusions specifi cally Christian. For 
instance, when Charmian asks a soothsayer for a good fortune, 
she asks specifi cally, as if in jest, for ‘a child at fi fty, to whom 
Herod of Jewry may do homage’ (1.2.29–30). The allusion to 
the ‘child at fi fty’ is an oblique reference to Elizabeth, mother 
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of John the Baptist, who miraculously conceived in her old age, 
after many decades of infertility. When Cleopatra vows in comic 
anger, ‘That Herod’s head I’ll have’ (3.3.4–5), Shakespeare plays 
again upon the story of John, Salome and Herod, reversing the 
power dynamic. Cleopatra will, as Hamlet warns against, ‘out-
Herod Herod’ (3.2.14).22 Other allusions refer, however, not 
to the First Coming of Christ, but to the Second. As Hannibal 
Hamlin points out, most of the allusions to the Bible in Antony 
and Cleopatra are drawn neither from the Gospels, nor even the 
Old Testament, as one might perhaps expect, given the setting in 
Egypt, but instead from the eschatological Book of Revelation.23 
For instance, ‘Lord of Lords’, as Cleopatra calls Antony, is not a 
title of the Christ Child, but rather, written upon the thigh of the 
Word of God in his glory, when he returns on horseback ‘to smite 
the nations’ (Rev. 19:16). 
When Antony and the other triumvirs meet on Pompey’s ship, 
Lepidus struggles to keep up with Antony’s drinking. The servants, 
unimpressed, dismiss him as a mere ‘name’. One of them remarks, 
‘To be called into a huge sphere and not to be seen to move in’t, 
are the holes where eyes should be, which pitifully disaster the 
cheeks’ (2.7.14–16). Lepidus becomes a hollow-eyed skull, a 
painter’s memento mori, and as such a harbinger of Antony’s own 
eventual fate.24 The punning conceit of a ‘sphere’ ‘dis-astered’ 
refers to one of the spheres of the Ptolemaic universe losing one 
of its stars (Latin, aster, ‘star’) and foreshadows Antony’s own 
later description of himself in defeat. Comparing himself to 
Caesar, Antony laments, ‘my good stars that were my former 
guides / Have empty left their orbs and shot their fi res / Into the 
abysm of hell’ (3.13.145–7). As Cleopatra applies the asp to her 
breast, Charmian cries, ‘O eastern star!’ (5.2.306). So, too, as 
Antony lies dying, one of his attendants cries, ‘The star is fall’n’ 
(4.14.106). Hamlin connects these passages to recurrent images 
in the Book of Revelation of stars falling from the heaven, where 
they are fi gures for the fall of Satan, in keeping with the prophet 
Isaiah’s description of Lucifer as a falling star:
How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morn-
ing? And cut down to the ground, which didst cast lots upon the 
nations? Yet thou saidest in thine heart, I will ascend into heaven, 
and exalt my throne above beside the stars of God: I will sit also 
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upon the mount of the congregation in the sides of the North. I 
will ascend above the height of the clouds, and I will be like the 
most high. But thou shalt be brought down to the grave, to the side 
of the pit. They that see thee, shall look upon thee and consider 
thee, saying, Is this the man that made the earth to tremble, and 
that did shake the kingdoms? (14:12–16) 
The allusions to falling stars in Antony and Cleopatra align the 
two lovers, in effect, with the same typology of Antichrist appar-
ent in Julius Caesar: the plot-structure of punctured delusion that 
I described earlier as humiliatio potentatuum, and which I believe 
reveals the infl uence of medieval biblical drama, even in these 
ostensibly secular plays. ‘There fell a great star from heaven, burn-
ing like a torch,’ St John writes (8:10). And again, ‘I saw a star fall 
from heaven unto the earth, and to him was given the key of the 
bottomless pit’ (9:1).25
In the opening scene of Antony and Cleopatra, the two lovers 
have a mock-debate about the extent of Antony’s love, one that 
recalls in some ways Lear’s debate with Cordelia at the beginning 
of King Lear:
CLEOPATRA
 If it be love indeed, tell me how much.
ANTONY
 There’s beggary in the love that can be reckoned.
CLEOPATRA
 I’ll set a bourn how far to be beloved.
ANTONY
 Then must thou needs fi nd out new heaven, new earth. 
(1.1.14–17)
As Richard Strier points out:
in Antony’s second line here, Shakespeare gives his strumpet’s fool 
a reference that no Biblically literate member of the audience – of 
which there were no doubt many – could have missed, a reference 
to one of the grandest and most resonant apocalyptic promises of 
the New Testament.26 
In the Second Epistle of Peter, as well as the Revelation of St John, 
the world after the Second Coming of Christ is described as ‘a 
new heaven and a new earth’ (2 Pet. 3:13; Rev. 21:1).27 Moreover, 
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as Hannibal Hamlin points out, St Peter and St John themselves 
allude here to God’s prophecy in the Book of Isaiah: ‘I will create 
new heavens and a new earth’ (65:17).28 St John recalls his vision:
They were judged every man according to their works. And death 
and hell were cast into the lake of fi re. This is the second death. 
And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast 
into the lake of fi re. And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for 
the fi rst heaven and the fi rst earth were passed away; and there 
was no more sea. And I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, 
coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride for her 
husband. (Rev. 20:13–21:1) 
Strier fi nds Antony’s unwitting allusion to Christian eschatology as 
baffl ing as it is remarkable. ‘Why would Shakespeare give Antony 
such a line?’ he asks. ‘Perhaps the line is meant to undercut the 
speaker.’ ‘From a dramatic point of view,’ however, he concedes, 
‘instead of the line being undercut by some sort of gross gesture, it 
is allowed to hang in the air, as a vision or a prophecy, for after it, 
the dialogue momentarily stops, and a messenger enters.’29 I would 
say, by contrast, that it makes sense that Antony’s ironic allusion 
is allowed to come across as so portentous. Antony boasts that the 
only way that Cleopatra will be able to ‘set a bourn how far to be 
beloved’ is if she can ‘fi nd out new heaven, new earth’, a task which 
he implies is, of course, impossible. According to Christian revela-
tion, however, such a ‘new heaven’ and ‘new earth’ will indeed be 
found; the limit to their erotic love that Antony casts as counter-
factual, inconceivable, is precisely what awaits them after death. 
As Jesus explains in the Gospels, ‘They which shall be accounted 
worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, 
neither marry, nor are given in marriage’ (Luke 20:35). 
The sense that Shakespeare has Judgement Day on his mind 
is supported by another, less complex allusion, as well, which 
Cleopatra makes in passing just before she commits suicide. 
‘When thou hast done this chare,’ she tells Charmian, ‘I’ll give 
thee leave / To play till doomsday’ (5.2.230–1). As before the Last 
Judgement was the limit on earthly, romantic love, so, too, here, 
‘doomsday’ is the end of Charmian’s ‘play’. In Hamlet, Claudius 
acknowledges that the world is often unjust. ‘Offence’s gilded 
hand may shove by justice’ (3.3.58). ‘But’, he adds, ‘’tis not so 
above’ (3.3.60).
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There is no shuffl ing, there the action lies 
In his true nature, and we ourselves compell’d 
Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults 
To give in evidence.
(3.3.61–4) 
God’s interpellation, ‘doomsday’, is irresistible. In Antony and 
Cleopatra, Shakespeare evokes divine judgement, not, I think, 
because he is trying to be a spoilsport, but rather because here, as 
in his other Roman plays, he is refl ecting deeply on the role of the 
other in self-perception. And, like many philosophers and theo-
logians in the twentieth century, including Buber and Ricœur, as 
well as Lévinas, Shakespeare wants to include in his notion of the 
other the divine, as well as the human. Antony and Cleopatra are 
able to forestall Octavian’s planned interpellation; they will not be 
forced to redefi ne themselves as prisoners, led in triumph through 
the streets of Rome. Shakespeare speculates, however, that there 
may be nonetheless another, more fi nal interpellation, of a more 
mysterious outcome, that they cannot so easily escape.
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up” against the widest and most splendid panorama Shakespeare . . . 
ever painted, and are magnifi ed, not dwarfed, by it because it is repre-
sented as mere clay or dung in comparison to them’. William Shake-
speare, Antony and Cleopatra, ed. John Dover Wilson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1950), xxv. See also Sigurd Burckhardt, 
Shakespeare’s Meanings, and Markels, Pillar of the World. For a 
more recent neo-Romantic account of Cleopatra’s suicide, see Strier, 
Unrepentant Renaissance, 98–125.
10. For less sympathetic evaluations of Cleopatra’s character, as well as 
her and Antony’s affair in general, see Stempel, ‘The Transmigra-
tion of the Crocodile’, and Gervinus, Shakespeare Commentaries, 
353–86. For the play as a whole as a tragedy, even satire, of delu-
sion and self-aggrandisement undercut by irony and distance, see 
Blissett, ‘Dramatic Irony’, 151–66; Stirling, Unity in Shakespearean 
Tragedy, 157–92; and Chambers, Shakespeare: A Survey, 249–57. 
For example: ‘Shakespeare did not “see life truly and think about it 
romantically” . . . there is no meretricious sublimity cast even over 
the ending of Antony and Cleopatra’ (Stirling, 159). George Bernard 
Shaw notoriously attacks Shakespeare as too sympathetic to the two 
lovers’ delusions of grandeur. ‘Shakespeare fi nally strains all his huge 
command of rhetoric and stage pathos to give a theatrical sublimity 
to the wretched end of the business, and to persuade foolish specta-
tors that the world was well lost by the twain.’ Shaw, Prefaces, 716–
17. As a contemporary reviewer wrote, however, this judgement is 
5877_Gray.indd   269 12/09/18   3:31 PM
270 ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic
‘worse than false’; it is ‘half true’, Cf. Bennett, review, Academy. 
Shaw’s ‘anti-romantic enthusiasms blind him to an example of real-
ism that was under his very nose’; that is to say, Shakespeare him-
self is more critical of the delusions he presents than Shaw himself 
recognises. Couchman, ‘Antony and Cleopatra and the Subjective 
Convention’. 
11. Eckermann, Conversations of Goethe, 167, 170–1.
12. Swinburne, Shakespeare, 76.
13. For a critique of efforts to align Shakespeare’s own sensibility with 
Romanticism, see Patrick Gray, ‘Seduced by Romanticism’.
14. Cantor, Shakespeare’s Roman Trilogy, 78.
15. Verg. Aen. 6.467–74.
16. Eliot, ‘What is a Classic?’ 64.
17. Ronan, ‘Antike Roman’, 31, 16, 29.
18. Phyllis Rackin, Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English Chronicles 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 94; cited in Ronan, 
‘Antike Roman’, 23.
19. A Christian tradition dating back to the Middle Ages holds that the 
Pax Romana which began with Augustus corresponds to the ‘univer-
sal peace’ (Is. 39:8 ff.) which Isaiah describes as a precursor to the 
birth of the Messiah. See Fichter, ‘Antony and Cleopatra: “The time 
of universal peace”’.
20. On these and other allusions to Christian Scripture in Antony and 
Cleopatra, see Cantor, Shakespeare’s Roman Trilogy, 69–70, 249 n. 
147, as well as Hamlin, Bible in Shakespeare, 214–30.
21. Plutarch’s Lives . . . in North’s Translation, ed. R. H. Carr (Oxford, 
1938), 221, 231–2; cited in Blissett, ‘Dramatic Irony’, 164 n. 36.
22. Shakespeare also brings in the story of the three Magi: Antony feasts 
‘three kings’ (2.2.81), and Charmian asks to be married to ‘three 
kings’ (1.2.28).
23. Hamlin, Bible in Shakespeare, 217–22, 225–30.
24. For more on such mementi mori, see Smith, ‘ “This great solemnity” ’, 
and Vance MacMullen, ‘Death imagery’. 
25. Hamlin, Bible in Literature, 217–19.
26. Strier, Unrepentant Renaissance, 114. 
27. See also Cox, Seeming Knowledge, 184. 
28. Hamlin, Bible in Shakespeare, 217 n. 95.
29. Strier, Unrepentant Renaissance, 114.
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In the fi nal turn to the idea of God as other that I have called ‘the 
last interpellation’, as well as my emphasis throughout on one-to-
one relationships between individuals, it may seem amiss that I do 
not invoke the ideas of Emmanuel Lévinas, including especially 
his concept of ‘the face-to-face’. Lévinas might also seem to pro-
vide the kind of Via Media between humanism and antihumanism 
that I fi nd instead in the work of Bakhtin. From my perspective, 
however, as well as that of other critics such as Buber and Ricœur, 
Lévinas’ underestimated antihumanism presents some cause for 
concern. In his analysis of the relationship between the self and 
the other, Lévinas too thoroughly and immediately subsumes what 
I have called ‘the horizontal’ into what I have called ‘the vertical’. I 
discuss something like Lévinas’ concept of the other in the conclu-
sion to my analysis of Antony and Cleopatra as what Katharine 
Maus calls ‘the hypostasized divine observer’. By and large, how-
ever, I want to preserve the idea that the other can also refer more 
simply to other people: fellow human beings. God is ‘an’ other, 
just like language is ‘an’ other. Neither the divine nor the symbolic 
order, however, is ‘the’ other, meaning, the only other with any 
effective agency, the bedrock or ground of being: ‘the Other’ with 
a capital O (L’Autre with a capital A), as per Lévinas’ usage, as 
well as Lacan’s. 
For Lévinas, the other is ‘infi nite’, ‘superior’. He cannot be 
said to be simply any other thing whatsoever, or even any other 
human being. Instead, for Lévinas, the other is a specifi c entity, 
albeit one which we can describe at best only apophatically: the 
ineffable, wholly transcendent God of Jewish Scripture. In other 
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words, Lévinas’ other is what Derrida would call ‘the transcenden-
tal signifi er’, except that, unlike Derrida, Lévinas believes that this 
other really does exist. The God of the Hebrew Bible is not wholly 
a myth, but out there, somewhere, in an objective sense. We meet 
him in person constantly, albeit not directly. Instead, we encounter 
him at one remove, through quotidian, ‘face-to-face’ exchanges 
with other people which for Lévinas are the most fundamental 
‘given’ of human experience.1 As regards Lévinas’ premises, it 
is fairly transparent that the God of traditional Judaism is to be 
understood as representing something radically distinct from any 
given human being. That God and the self are not secretly one and 
the same is the most fundamental distinction between the Abra-
hamic religious tradition as a whole, including Christianity and 
Islam, as well as Judaism, and the religious traditions of South 
Asia; most clearly, the Vedanta school of Hinduism found in the 
Upanishads, which holds as the highest form of enlightenment the 
recognition that Atman, the individual soul, is the same as Brah-
man, the world-soul. Lévinas departs from traditional Judaism, 
however, in his strenuous emphasis on God’s absolute transcen-
dence. Like Maimonides, he insists that discussion of Godhead 
must be radically apophatic; so much so, in fact, that the nature of 
the divine begins to lose any precise content. ‘The other remains 
infi nitely transcendent, infi nitely foreign.’2 God’s personhood 
blurs, dissipates; he becomes instead an inscrutable, impersonal 
force, holding the self ‘captive’ or ‘hostage’.3 
For Lévinas, our ‘face-to-face’ encounters with other people 
mediate and render apparent our relationship with this mysterious 
God: the ultimate ‘Other’. Human relatedness evokes ethical obli-
gations ultimately anchored in the overwhelming, commanding 
power of the divine. ‘The dimension of the divine opens forth in 
the human face,’ Lévinas writes. ‘It is here that the Transcendent, 
infi nitely other, solicits us and appeals to us. The proximity of the 
Other, the proximity of the neighbor, is in being an ineluctable 
moment of the revelation of an absolute presence.’ At times, Lévi-
nas even goes so far as to suggest that interpersonal exchanges are 
signifi cant only in light of this theological import. ‘To recognize 
the Other is to give. But it is to give to the master, the lord, to him 
whom one approaches as “You” [French, vous] in a dimension 
of height.’4 God in his ineffable superiority uses other people as 
instruments in order to make himself known to the individual self, 
presenting through them his own irresistible call.5 That is to say, 
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God interpellates the self, rendering it a subject, in much the same 
manner as one of Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses; other 
people are simply his means to that end. 
For much the same reasons as apply to Lévinas, Lacan’s use-
fulness in this case is also rather sharply limited. For Lacan, the 
self, conceived of as Cartesian cogito or as Freudian ‘ego’, is noth-
ing more than an effect of language: a misleading illusion, like a 
mirage. Language always antedates any given individual and deter-
mines everything about that supposed person: our sense of self is 
in fact nothing more than a delusion or dream patched together 
by ‘the discourse of the Other’. What Lacan means by ‘the Other’, 
moreover, is not what this phrase, ‘the Other’, tends to designate 
in most academic discourse, namely, another person, real or imag-
ined, or another culture. Instead, Lacan’s ‘Other with a capital 
O’ means ‘the place [‘locus’] where language exists’: ‘a place that 
is essential to the structure of the symbolic’.6 This ‘Other’ is for 
Lacan’s ‘language’ what the chōra (literally, ‘space’) in the Timaeus 
is for Plato’s unchanging ‘forms’ or ‘ideas’. 
Where does language come from, if not from us subjects, as 
an attempt to represent reality? Where does it reside, if not in our 
minds? Since Lacan undermines the very category itself of con-
sciousness, he is obliged to posit in its place a mysterious ‘locus’ 
that he calls ‘the Other’. ‘The Other is . . . the locus in which 
is constituted the I who speaks along with he who hears.’ ‘This 
Other (to be provided with a capital O) . . . is invoked by anyone 
when he addresses an other (with a lowercase o).’ The Other is ‘the 
locus of signifying convention’. ‘We must establish the Other with 
a capital O as being the locus of speech’s deployment.’ ‘In my view, 
the subject has to arise from the given state of the signifi ers that 
cover him [le recouvrent] in an Other which is their transcendental 
locus.’ ‘The Other [is] where discourse is situated.’7 
This peculiar defi nition of the other is very much original to 
Lacan and represents his application of the so-called ‘linguistic 
turn’ in contemporary French philosophy to a much older philo-
sophical debate about the relationship between the self and the 
other.8 More so than any of his contemporaries, many of whom, 
like Lacan, seized upon Saussure’s linguistics as a new ‘key to all 
mythologies’, Lacan saw language or something very similar to it, 
a structured, symbolic order that he sometimes calls ‘discourse’, 
as the fundamental, effi cacious and only true cause, not only of 
all human activity, but indeed of the very existence of anything 
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at all. ‘Concepts . . . engender things.’9 Individual consciousness, 
especially, is post hoc. This epiphenomenon, selfhood, devoid of 
any real agency, is as he sees it a by-product of a vast, impersonal 
and intangible symbolic order, ‘language’, which itself resides in 
‘the Other’ (‘with a capital O’), an immaterial ‘locus’. ‘Language’, 
understood in a broad sense as a network of semiotic patterns, 
functions, for Lacan, as a kind of Prime Mover. Signs ontologically 
precede and entirely generate the things that they signify, including 
especially the apparent self-awareness and agency of the individual 
self. ‘Language’ in this sense also determines the character of ‘the 
other’ (‘with a lowercase o’), meaning any other supposed inde-
pendent consciousness to whom the self might relate.
 ‘It is the world of words that creates the world of things.’ 
This core claim of Lacan’s is wildly implausible; so implausible, 
I would say, that it is literally unbelievable. Like Peter Holbrook, 
my reaction to such a view is to fi nd it, not merely dubious, but 
‘unreal’: ‘so remote from my own or, I suppose, anybody else’s 
experience that I have diffi culty comprehending how anyone could 
seriously hold it.’ ‘In other words,’ Holbrook explains, ‘I fi nd it 
diffi cult to imagine living as if this proposition were true. (One 
wants to know how many adherents of this theoretical orientation 
experience themselves in this way, as “effects” of “discourses”, 
etc.).’10 For instance, Freud invents the term ‘psychoanalysis’. Yet 
his having done so does not mean that the process that the term 
‘psychoanalysis’ denotes never existed theretofore, if perhaps only 
ex hypothesi, in his own mind. Freud invents it to describe some-
thing, an idea of his that until that point had been nameless. It is 
his desired variation on a practice that, up until his intervention, 
had been called something else: ‘confession’.11
It would be a digression, however, to dwell here on the possible 
truth-value of Lacan. The nature of reality itself is not in this case 
the subject of inquiry; the question, rather, is the nature of Shake-
speare’s perception of reality, even if incorrect. Even if the concept 
of the individual self were completely misleading, it would still 
be, nonetheless, an illusion he believes in and accepts, at least 
to some degree.12 In her study of Roman selfhood, Mirror of the 
Self, Shadi Bartsch declines to bring in Lacan ‘either as a piñata 
or a deus ex machina’. Otherwise, she explains, she would have 
had to ‘situate the Lacanian response to psychoanalysis in a world 
unfamiliar with this kind of analysis’. Like Bartsch, rather than 
aiming for a symptomatic reading, a critique from outside the 
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frame of the author’s own conceptual framework, I have chosen 
here ‘to apply interpretive tools that seem more or less familiar 
to the ancient cultures that generated them’.13 Lévinas’ conclu-
sions Shakespeare might have understood, if only by analogy to 
contemporary Calvinism.14 Lacan’s preposterous claims, however, 
are not even useful as a foil. Lacan is, as the saying is, ‘not even 
wrong’.
Having distinguished Shakespeare’s thought about selfhood 
from antihumanism such as that of Althusser, as well as Lacan, 
I hasten to add that I by no means wish to suggest that Shake-
speare believes in the idea that the self is wholly autonomous or 
transcendent, in the manner of what Ricœur calls the ‘Cartesian 
cogito’, as opposed to what he calls in contrast the ‘shattered 
cogito’ of antihumanism. Rather, like Ricœur, I wish to move 
beyond this false dichotomy altogether: ‘beyond the alternative 
of the cogito and the anticogito’. In his Gifford Lectures, later 
reprinted as Oneself as Another, Ricœur proposes that philo-
sophical anthropology ‘move beyond’ what he calls ‘the quar-
rel over the cogito, in which the “I” is by turns in a position of 
strength and of weakness’, ‘the great oscillation that causes the 
“I” of the “I think” to appear, by turns, to be elevated inordi-
nately to the heights of a fi rst truth and then cast down to the 
depths of a vast illusion.’15 
With Descartes, Ricœur argues, the self is ‘reduced’ to a ‘point-
like ahistorical identity’, ‘the simplest and barest act, the act of 
thinking’, ‘at the price of the loss of relation to the person who 
speak, to the I –you of interlocution, to the identity of a histori-
cal person, to the self of responsibility’. ‘What is there left to say 
about this free-fl oating “I”?’ Ricœur asks. ‘It is, in truth, no one.’ 
Nietzsche then destroys even this supposed ground of the self by 
‘extending the critique’ Descartes begins, the doubt introduced by 
the idea of the ‘evil deceiver’, ‘to so-called internal experience’. 
Nietzsche doubts ‘better’ than Descartes, that is, even more hyper-
bolically. Thinking itself might be no more than a ‘fi ction’. In the 
place of this oscillation between ‘exalted subject, humiliated sub-
ject’, Ricœur proposes a different ground of the self: its relation-
ship to other selves. As he explains, ‘there is no self alone at the 
start’.16 The self is born into a state of dialogue with other selves, 
the condition Hannah Arendt calls ‘plurality’. This web of rela-
tionships, not Descartes’ cogito, a variation on Aristotle’s ‘thought 
thinking itself’, is the proper ground of selfhood. 
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Habermas makes much the same point as Ricœur about the 
relationship between self and other, to wit, that interpersonal rela-
tionships are an essential ‘given’ of identity, rather than accidental, 
in an essay on what he calls ‘individuation through socialization’. 
Individuation for Habermas is not ‘the self-realization of an inde-
pendently acting subject carried out in isolation and freedom’. 
Instead, ‘individuality forms itself in relations of intersubjective 
acknowledgement and of intersubjectively mediated self-under-
standing’.17 This understanding of the fundamental nature of the 
self is more akin to Shakespeare’s own than that of Althusser, 
Lacan or any other antihumanist. For this reason, Lévinas’ most 
important source, the ethics and theology of Martin Buber, as 
mediated in this case through the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, pro-
vides a better analogue of Shakespeare’s thought about the other 
than Lévinas’ own paradigm.18 Another alternative is Ricœur him-
self, who like Shakespeare derives his understanding of the rela-
tionship between self and other in large measure from Aristotle’s 
theory of friendship. 
Buber’s positing of encounter as the ground of human exis-
tence is the source of Lévinas’ characteristic emphasis on what he 
calls ‘the face-to-face’.19 Whereas in Lévinas’ thought, however, 
the other is infi nitely more powerful, overwhelming, because the 
other is, in the fi nal analysis, God, in Shakespeare’s thought, like 
Buber’s on the ‘I–thou’ relationship, the other can mean instead, 
and mean truly, another human being. We meet this other as an 
equal in at least one important sense, albeit one that is meta-
physically refi ned. In so far as any human being can be seen as 
a ‘thou’, instead of an ‘it’, he shares something in common with 
any other human being: a capacity to impinge upon other people’s 
subjectivity and, to some degree, assimilate it to his own. This 
equality can be obscured or attenuated by worldly disparities of 
power. Nonetheless, it can never be dispelled altogether from any 
human relationship. The possibility of this kind of intersubjec-
tive interpellation stands as a salutary check, especially, upon 
that drive for absolute autocracy or imperium that St Augustine 
describes as libido dominandi. Neither nor the self nor the other 
can ever entirely overwhelm and obliterate each other’s subjec-
tivity. The ‘imperial self’ cannot expand forever; cannot become 
self-suffi cient and impassible. Instead, the best we can do is to 
make peace with the human condition as it is, ‘grotesque’, depen-
dent and vulnerable.20
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Notes
 1. For Derrida’s ‘religious turn’, see Caputo, Prayers and Tears. For 
Derrida on Lévinas, see Derrida, Adieu, as well as Derrida, ‘Violence 
and Metaphysics’. For Lévinas, see Lévinas, Totality and Infi nity, as 
well as Lévinas, Entre Nous. For a sense of Lévinas’ infl uence, see 
Cohen (ed.), Face to Face with Lévinas. 
 2. Lévinas, Totality and Infi nity, 194.
 3. Lévinas departs in this respect from traditional Judaism. Gillian Rose 
describes Lévinas’ vision as ‘Buddhist Judaism’ in Rose, Mourning 
Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37, and ‘Judaic Manicheism’, 
in Rose, Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), 43; cf. 213; cited in Hart, The Beauty of the Infi -
nite, 75 n. 56, q.v.: ‘The foremost representative of this [sc. Kantian] 
“school” of the sublime would surely be Emmanuel Lévinas, whose 
thought is often characterized as a kind of “Jewish” postmodern-
ism, thought it might be more accurately described as Manichaean, 
Orphic, or Gnostic.’ For an analogous medieval critique of Maimo-
nides, see, for example, Wolfson, ‘Crescas’.
 4. Lévinas, Totality and Infi nity, 78, 75.
 5. A trenchant summary and critique of Lévinas’ thought on the relation-
ship between the self and the other, as well as a discussion of Derrida’s 
attempt to moderate its dichotomies, can be found in Hart, Beauty 
of the Infi nite, 76–92. For Martin Buber’s criticisms of Lévinas, see 
the essays and primary sources in Atterton, Calarco and Friedman, 
eds, Lévinas and Buber. For Ricœur’s critique of Lévinas, see Ricœur, 
Oneself as Another, 335 ff.
 6. Lacan, Écrits, 379; for English, cf. Lacan, Écrits, trans. Fink, Fink and 
Grigg.
 7. Lacan, Écrits, 431, 439, 525, 628, 655–6, 678.
 8. On the rise and fall of the ‘linguistic turn’, see Pavel, The Feud of 
Language.
 9. Lacan, Écrits, 276.
10. Holbrook, Shakespeare’s Individualism, 58 –9. Cf. Galen Strawson 
on ‘consciousness deniers’ and what he calls ‘the Great Silliness’ in 
Strawson, Things that Bother Me.
11. Foucault presents ‘psychiatry’ as only one instance among others 
of a centuries-long ‘dissemination’ of ‘procedures of confession’. 
Foucault, History of Sexuality, 63. Another example of a histori-
cal antecedent to Freudian psychoanalysis, related to confession, but 
distinct, is the ancient monastic practice of ‘manifesting thoughts’. 
‘The practice of manifesting the thoughts of the heart was simple. A 
monk would go to a trustworthy, usually older, monk and say, for 
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example, “I am bothered by thoughts of envy towards someone. 
I wish I could see my parents. I think a lot about the happiness of 
the saints in heaven. I get distracted from my prayers. I wonder if 
I’ll ever be a real monk.” Sometimes the issue might be a particu-
lar sinful act, sometimes it might be something which wasn’t sinful 
at all, but which was preoccupying. For young monks this would 
have been a fairly regular practice, even daily or more frequent, as 
they began to learn about the topography and inhabitants of their 
hearts.’ Stewart, ‘The Desert Fathers’, 25–39, 143–56. For an inter-
esting example of this practice, see, for example, Apophthegm 509 
in Sentences des pères du désert, 184–6.
12. Cf. Mousley, Re-humanising Shakespeare, as well as Headlam Wells, 
Shakespeare’s Humanism. Useful background can be found in Halli-
well and Mousley, eds, Critical Humanisms. For a contrary reading of 
Shakespeare as an antihumanist, see Dollimore, Radical Tragedy.
13. Bartsch, Mirror of the Self, 13; cf. Nuttall, Shakespeare the Thinker.
14. See also William M. Hamlin’s concept of the god-surrogate in 
Hamlin, ‘Conscience and the God-Surrogate’, 243 ff., and Hamlin, 
Montaigne’s English Journey, 110–28.
15. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 16, 4 –5.
16. Ibid., 7–8, 6, 15, 38.
17. Habermas, ‘Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert 
Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity’, 152–3, in Habermas, Postmetaphys-
ical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. William Hohengarten 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 149–204; cited in Kuzner, 
Open Subjects, 47.
18. The standard overview of Buber’s life and thought remains Maurice 
Friedman’s Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, now in its fourth 
edition. From Buber’s own work, I am especially indebted to I and 
Thou and Between Man and Man.
19. Lévinas freely acknowledges this infl uence. ‘That valuation of the dia-
logical relation and its phenomenological irreducibility, its fi tness to 
constitute a meaningful order that is autonomous and as legitimate as 
the traditional and privileged subject–object correlation in the opera-
tion of knowledge – that will remain the unforgettable contribution of 
Martin Buber’s labors . . . Nothing could limit the homage due to him. 
Any refl ection on the alterity of the other in his or her irreducibility 
to the objectivity of objects and the being of beings must recognize 
the new perspective that Buber opened – and fi nd encouragement in 
it.’ Lévinas, Outside the Subject, Chap. 3 – ‘Apropos of Buber: Some 
Notes’, 41 ff.; cited in Friedman, Martin Buber, 338 n. 1.
20. Cf. tragedy as a failure of ‘acknowledgement’ in Cavell, Disowning 
Knowledge, as well as Markell, Bound by Recognition.
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